tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-64529415602158462722024-02-19T10:01:31.399-06:00Intestinal Fortitude.Miller's Rules: America, the World, and Modern National Security IssuesUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger112125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-34335718660723003732015-01-13T18:23:00.002-06:002015-01-13T18:35:46.984-06:00Revisiting COIN Strategies in Vietnam<div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;"><i>This post originally appeared in <a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/features/revisiting-coin-strategies-in-vietnam/" target="_blank">Cicero Magazine</a> 14 July 2014.</i></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;"><br />
</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">That “Generals are always fighting the last war” may be true, but this is often because they are fighting a different war from their opponent. According to Clausewitz, it is key to military strategy to find the “center of gravity” in any war. If one does not, or focuses on the wrong ‘center’, the battles and ultimately the war will be lost. In Vietnam, the United States did not come to recognize the people of Indochina as the center of gravity and focused on them too little and too late. Many post-mortems on the Vietnam War have recognized this fact. Yet in recent conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq—despite the battle cry of “hearts and minds”—America still believed it could win through “thunder runs”, “economy of force”, “dynamic maneuver warfare”, and remote or walled combat fortresses. Arguably, these tactics won battles, but they have not won the wars.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;"><br />
</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;"><strong style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Mao’s Teachings</strong></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">The goal and strategy of indigenous communist forces was related directly to winning over the people of Southeast Asia. They wanted to change society, not just change governments. They sought to communicate this goal to the people and mobilise them to support it, not just build a government and centrally-controlled army to fight pitched battles, though they did show ability to do so against <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=X8uMkhwysQQC&dq=the+first+time+that+a+non-European+colonial+independence+movement+had+evolved+through+all+the+stages+from+guerrilla+bands+to+a+conventionally+organized+and+equipped+army+able+to+defeat+a+modern+Western+occupier+in+pitched+battle%22&source=gbs_navlinks_s" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">the French</a> and, in later stages, against the United States.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">Communist forces devised effective tactics to further their strategy of revolutionary guerrilla warfare largely based upon the<a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Viet_Cong.html?id=amJwAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;"> teachings of</a> China’s Mao Zedong and Vietnam’s General Vo Nguyen Giap. They viewed the wars as a “struggle”—<i style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">dau tranh—</i>broken further into the “military struggle”—<i style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">dau tranh vu trang</i>—and the “political struggle”—<i style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">dau tranh chinh tri</i>. Included in the political struggle was “action among the enemy”—<i style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">dich van</i>. “Action among the enemy” referred to actions behind enemy lines taken by communist forces among the local population in areas controlled or contested by anti-communist forces. Almost all communist actions conducted in South Vietnam included detailed plans and directives for propagandizing and re-training “<a href="http://www.psywarrior.com/VNArmedPropTeams.html" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">liberated citizens</a>”.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">The primary and most effective vehicle through which communist forces undertook these actions was the “<a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Viet_Cong.html?id=amJwAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">Agit-Prop Team</a>”, also referred to as the “<a href="http://www.psywarrior.com/VNArmedPropTeams.html" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">Armed Propaganda Team</a>” (APT). These teams were first used by the Viet Minh to quickly disseminate news of the 1945 Japanese surrender and standing up of the communist government throughout the countryside—quickly pushed aside by<a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/30036312?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104487721193" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">British troops</a>. They continued to be employed by communist forces throughout the conflict. Travelling minstrels and drama troupes had been part of Southeast Asian culture for centuries. As retired Army Sergeant Major and veteran of psychological operations in Vietnam,<a href="http://www.psywarrior.com/VNArmedPropTeams.html" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">Herb Friedman</a> explains: “Because of the widespread familiarity of the peasant with culture-drama teams and the wide acceptance of this traditional culture form, the communists seized upon the concept and developed it as a PSYOP weapon.”</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">APTs were a non-violent, culturally-attuned and effective way of communicating the communist message and mobilizing rural South Vietnamese to their cause. As a 1968 article in <a href="http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/598/rec/9" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">Military Review</a> puts it: “If the United States had given a higher priority to finding out precisely what the Communists were doing psychologically in remote areas of South Vietnam between 1955 and 1959, and to urging the government of [South] Vietnam to develop and use a counter-psychological operation strategy, the Viet Cong would have been less able to exploit peasant resentments and to get them organized to support a guerrilla war the people did not want.”</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;"><br />
</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;"><strong style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Hearts & Minds in Saigon </strong></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">Perhaps the greatest testament to the success of the communist Armed Propaganda Teams is the fact that South Vietnamese and U.S. forces adopted the same tactics after coming to understand their effectiveness. These and similar missions were referred to as ‘psychological operations’—PSYOPS—by the U.S. military. Anti-communist APTs conducted operations similar to their communist counterparts and consisted of South Vietnamese cadre accompanied by <a href="http://www.psywarrior.com/VNArmedPropTeams.html" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">U.S. troops</a>.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">The first two Anti-communist APT companies were organised in 1964 and many of the cadre were former communists who could speak with credibility of the actions and conditions on both sides of the fight. The program grew to 75 companies by 1969. Anti-communist forces also employed entertainment through ‘Culture-Drama Teams’. Their tactics were similar to the communists. They would engage villagers in singing, including teaching the people the South Vietnamese national anthem, teaching them the positive goals of the Saigon government, and giving news of government successes, programs and improvements.</div><blockquote style="background-color: white; border-left-color: rgb(255, 109, 1); border-left-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 0px 3px; color: #515151; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; margin: 22px 0px; padding: 0px 0px 0px 1.692em; quotes: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><h2 style="border: 0px; clear: both; font-size: 1.385em; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px 0px 22px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="border: 0px; color: olive; font-family: inherit; font-size: 23px; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. does not seem to have fully taken these lessons from the Vietnam War on board.</span></h2></blockquote><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">American efforts to combat communism and win hearts and minds in Southeast Asia, and those of the French before them, were referred to generally as “<a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Z0VuAAAAMAAJ&q=andrade+ashes+to+ashes&dq=andrade+ashes+to+ashes&hl=en&sa=X&ei=MqjCU-2HEq3X7Abc74DYDQ&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">pacification</a>”. For most rural South Vietnamese in 1954, the newly independent government in Saigon was far away and not very relevant to their lives. Many government bureaucrats adopted <a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.1525/vs.2011.6.3.44?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104487721193" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">the hands-off</a> approach French colonial administrators had taken, remaining remote from citizens and more concerned with forms than people.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">However, with the 1954 Geneva Accords dividing of the nation along the 17th parallel, Ngo Dinh Diem’s government had to gain support from its citizens, not least of all because within two years there would—supposedly—be national elections encompassing both North and South Vietnam in which Vietnamese would decide between communism and democracy. Saigon would have two years to reach the people outside of the provincial capitals before the July 1956 elections and do it better than the communists.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">The Special Commissariat for Civic Action (CDV)—<a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.1525/vs.2011.6.3.44?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104487721193" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;"><i style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Cong Dan Vu</i></a>—was the brainchild of Kieu Cong Cung, a nationalist former soldier and police chief. He had also been Viet Minh in the fight against the French return in 1945, so knew the communist’s tactics first-hand. The idea was to get the government out of offices and into villages, showing it could improve lives. It “attempted to place the resources of the South Vietnamese state behind an effort to duplicate the tactics of the communists at the village level and beat them at their own game”.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">Mobile groups of CDV cadre, with support from local government, would connect with the people by living alongside them while working with them on civil projects to improve local living conditions. The first groups deployed in 1955 and began working in villages on information campaigns, attitude surveys and distributing medical aid. Their role expanded to holding classes on government services, ensuring each village had a school, a council, a village hall and a medical station, helping locals to build whichever they did not have. Once they achieved some success in an area, they moved on to another. Initial reports were optimistic.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">Unfortunately, the CDV program met with resistance from the beginning. The provincial governors resisted it as encroaching on their power and budgets. Provincial administrators felt the work below their status. Village chiefs did not like the intrusion of outsiders from Saigon. Language and dialects proved to be a barrier. Often when CDV teams left, things would return to their previous state without support to maintain improvements. CDV cadres were being targeted for assassination by communist insurgents. U.S. advisers thought the program too ambitious and costly for Diem’s budget.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">Despite its great promise, there simply was not enough support, time, money or cadres. In the end, the July 1956 elections which the CDV was envisioned to help Diem win never took place. It became clear the communists would win them by a wide margin. On the advice of the U.S., the South claimed it had not been party to the Geneva Accords and could therefore ignore them. The temporary split of Vietnam became permanent and set the stage for the Vietnam War.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">Early on anti-communist forces recognized the need to control the population to prevent communist communication and weed out communists. One of the tenets of revolutionary guerrilla warfare was <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Viet_Cong.html?id=amJwAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">Mao’s exhortation</a> that “the guerrilla must move among the people as a fish swims the sea.” Communist guerrillas depended upon the local population for information, shelter, money, food, and new recruits. Separating the guerrilla “fish” from their “sea” of people would do them harm.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">During the <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/malaya-the-myth-of-hearts-and-minds" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">Malayan Emergency</a>, British forces experienced some success with the “Briggs Plan”, which saw rural populations relocated to fortified, defensible “New Villages” with controlled entry and exit, separating the insurgents from the people and drawing them into the open to find support. As part of his effort to install democracy in Vietnam “from the bottom up”, Ngo Dinh Diem instituted the Agroville Programme in 1959—later Strategic Hamlet Program or New Life Hamlets—in an effort to isolate communists from the people.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">The fortified, controlled villages—guarded, moated, barbed-wired and bamboo-fenced—prevented communists from entering to exploit them for supplies and recruits. Residents gave up their ID card upon exiting the village to work the fields and their identity was checked upon return. The program was incentivized by providing electricity, schools and medical facilities. A network of roads linked the hamlets. Hamlet councils linked residents to the government for the first time and the government felt the villages safe enough to extend credit to farmers. Villagers were organised into a self-defense force and devoted one day a week to maintaining defenses. Communication between villages and news awareness improved with the installation of radios. By 1962, the <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_last_of_the_mandarins_Diem_of_Vietna.html?id=PftAAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">Diem government</a> claimed 39% of South Vietnamese lived in <a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2753142?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104487721193" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">such communities</a> .</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">The program created as many problems as it solved. Thousands were uprooted from their farms and made to build new homes—unpaid—within controlled villages, often far from their ancestral homes. For Vietnamese, veneration of ancestors is important and leaving behind graves caused great social disruption. In its zeal to complete <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Vietnam.html?id=YdG00yrWUFcC&redir_esc=y" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">the project</a>, initially the government uprooted 20,000 people to build a village for that could only hold 6,000, leaving 14,000 angry peasants. Many of those forced to move and into labor held smoldering resentment against the U.S. and the Diem government for uprooting them, something the communists exploited. Communist propaganda against the hamlets <a href="http://www.psywarrior.com/VNHamletPSYOP.html" style="-webkit-transition: color 0.1s linear; border-bottom-color: rgb(211, 211, 211); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #515151; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; transition: color 0.1s linear; vertical-align: baseline;">pictured them</a> as concentration camps or prisons and they made great efforts to infiltrate the hamlets to agitate against the South from inside.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">To America, the program was a way to isolate and starve communists. To the communists, it created further propaganda opportunities to show the repression suffered under the U.S. and Diem. To Ngo Dinh Diem, it was a way for his government to reach and control the people.</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;"><br />
</div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;"><strong style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Lessons For Counterinsurgents Today</strong></div><ul style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; list-style: circle outside; margin: 22px 0px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;"><li style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px; text-indent: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><i style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">For government to gain the support of the people, the government must reach the people positively. </i>The newly-independent democratic government was a wholly new beast to its people who had only lived under French colonial administration and had to convince them of its worth. Insurgent forces were more effective at reaching even the most rural of communities. U.S. and government efforts were too little, too late despite their potential to deliver tangible public benefits to rural populations insurgent forces could not have. American and local government efforts were less successful at reaching and convincing the people of their worth than insurgent forces.</li>
</ul><ul style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; list-style: circle outside; margin: 22px 0px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 1.5em; vertical-align: baseline;"><li style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px; text-indent: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><i style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Barriers keep bad things out, but they also keep them in.</i>While barriers separated insurgents from the population they depended upon for support, their use also reinforced the propaganda image of local government and U.S. oppression. It disrupted social cohesion and fostered resentment among the people. The government reached the people in a negative way. Walls can keep people out, but not ideas. People frustrated by the obstacles to normal life constructed by COIN forces presented fertile ground for the insurgent’s ideology—the center of gravity and the focus of their effort to win the war.<i style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"></i></li>
</ul><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #131313; font-family: Lato, 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Verdana, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 27.5119209289551px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. does not seem to have fully taken these lessons from the Vietnam War on board. America’s effort to establish governments that have positive reach outside of Baghdad and Kabul has returned mixed results at best despite billions of dollars and thousands of lives invested in building them. Local governments have been unable to prove their value to their people—or at least no better than their opponents have—despite the claimed importance of winning “hearts and minds” to the American effort. Perhaps it is indeed true that our Generals were still fighting the last war</div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-34687694108045622132014-08-29T10:02:00.000-05:002014-08-29T10:10:01.466-05:00The 'Hot' War in Cold War Southeast Asia<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjPgUbMGHkgxpwxTSY-KC6T1Q2pWAaKwFA6WIJF060dNx3aehrmsybJeusNeUwr_0OboDhH2KmoQB9dn_2cLOLmfxCVptDLhf5fr8dIZwQj6W1phIufzykW-5XpmKmNEWbo6uxSIbrhBGI/s1600/Vietnam.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjPgUbMGHkgxpwxTSY-KC6T1Q2pWAaKwFA6WIJF060dNx3aehrmsybJeusNeUwr_0OboDhH2KmoQB9dn_2cLOLmfxCVptDLhf5fr8dIZwQj6W1phIufzykW-5XpmKmNEWbo6uxSIbrhBGI/s1600/Vietnam.jpg" height="204" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444;"><i>This article originally appeared in <a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/essays/the-hot-war-in-cold-war-southeast-asia/" target="_blank">Cicero Magazine</a> on 3 July 2014.</i></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The popular understanding of wars past is an important determining factor how wars in the future will be received or perceived by the general public. Policymakers have come to understand this and turn it to their advantage. Equating an intervention with upholding democracy plays well when compared with WWI, when the world was “made safe for democracy”. Interventions involving the liberation of oppressed masses or a gathering existential threat are compared with WWII. Opponents of interventions latch on to these comparisons as well, equating them with quagmires in Vietnam and Iraq. As time goes on, the general memory and popular factual understanding of these wars weakens despite more historical and archival evidence presenting a truer picture being opened by governments or discovered by academics. Despite having ended only 25 years ago, the Cold War presents such a case.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The Cold War was not one war fought in one place, but several wars fought in different theatres in different ways. The most familiar narrative of the Cold War focuses on the struggle in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union. The American view of the Indochina Wars was that they were but another theatre in the war against international communism—the Global Cold War. For the French and Southeast Asians, it was a different battle. The French fought to preserve a dying colonial system; Southeast Asians, for national liberation and/or a new system based on communist principles.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; color: olive; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">The Cold War in Southeast Asia bore little resemblance to the Cold War in the West. The Southeast Asian Cold War was not “cold” at all…</span></h3>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The Cold War in Southeast Asia bore little resemblance to the Cold War in the West. The Southeast Asian Cold War was not ‘cold’ at all and, rather than a state-centric battle fought with nuclear threats, espionage and military-industrial production across clearly drawn map lines, the Indochina Wars were ‘hot’ wars featuring weak central governments with soft borders, the main driver of which was to capture the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people of Southeast Asia, who largely determined the course of the wars.</span></div>
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<b style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The Western Cold War</span></b></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The Cold War in the West was a battle between states in two clear blocs along clear national borders. The map-lines of Cold War Europe were drawn at the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. The “Iron Curtain” fell along the Oder-Neisse Line, running from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Czech border in the south, then traced southwards to the Mediterranean through Austria and Italy, divided in half between joint occupations. Control of defeated Germany and its capital, Berlin, was also split between the US, UK, France and the USSR. Following 1948 elections, Italy joined NATO as a full member of the West bloc. In 1955 Austria became a neutral state and occupation troops withdrew. Otherwise, national borders and lines between East and West in Cold War Europe remained largely unchanged for 45 years until German re-unification and the collapse of the Soviet Union.</span></div>
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<a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Big-3.jpg" rel="prettyPhoto[753]" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: #444444; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><img alt="Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta, 1945." class="size-medium wp-image-759" src="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Big-3-300x246.jpg" height="246" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; height: auto; margin: 0px; max-width: 100%; padding: 0px;" width="300" /></span></a><br />
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta, 1945.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The Cold War was an ‘<a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Imaginary_War.html?id=MsV8QgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">imaginary war</a>’ in which the two sides threatened each other with annihilation, but no direct military battles were fought. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons and collective security guarantees of NATO and the Warsaw Pact made the cost of war in Europe too high. The sides confronted one another along their border. Many such scenes played in Berlin, including the 1948 <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EdCssLSNO0EC&pg=PA127&lpg=PA127&dq=clash+at+checkpoint+charlie&source=bl&ots=zsNW7JBkYx&sig=q6ufFSyr8YdUCOnO_xPMhzBct9c&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NRJqU4znBsnHPbnAgaAO&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=clash%20at%20checkpoint%20charlie&f=false" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">Blockade and Airlift</a> and the 1961 confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie. The two sides also tried to out-produce one another, engaging in a statistical battle in which agricultural, industrial and military production <a href="http://universitypublishingonline.org/cambridge/histories/chapter.jsf?bid=CBO9781139056113&cid=CBO9781139056113A006" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">were weapons</a>. They engaged in an arms race to produce and field more and better nuclear weapons in different forms and faster than the other. The only fighting in any real sense was between <a href="https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/srv/article/viewFile/5610/2508" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">intelligence services</a> in a “shadow war of espionage, counter-espionage and covert actions. The armies were the security and intelligence agencies of West and East, the CIA and the KGB, and the multitude of other forces lined up on one or the other side. In the war that could never become a real war…”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The Western Cold War was a state-centric conflict prosecuted through nuclear posturing, national military-industrial production and covert intelligence operations fought across tightly-controlled national borders. It is telling that many of the most intense military confrontations of the European Cold War–and much espionage activity–hinged on the ‘German question’ and the fate of a single city, Berlin, issues not finally resolved until the fall of the Wall and the collapse of European communism.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The ideological battle to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Europeans was an important component, but the “center of gravity” in the European conflict–to use Karl von Clausewitz’s phrase–was the governments of the states involved. Governments and their security apparatuses could control the behavior of their citizens. Though the threat of nuclear war hung over their heads, the fighting was not real in its literal sense. Which side the average European fell on depended on where they lived, determined for them by the Big Three at conference tables in Yalta and Potsdam.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;"><b style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">The Cold W</b><strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">ar in Southeast Asia</strong></span></div>
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<strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Pandora’s Box</span></strong></div>
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<a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Ho-Chi-Minh-Van-Dong.jpg" rel="prettyPhoto[753]" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: #444444; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><img alt="Pham Van Dong & Ho Chi Minh, 1966." class="size-medium wp-image-761" src="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Ho-Chi-Minh-Van-Dong-237x300.jpg" height="300" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; height: auto; margin: 0px; max-width: 100%; padding: 0px;" width="237" /></span></a><br />
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Pham Van Dong & Ho Chi Minh, 1966.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">In contrast to the West, the Southeast Asian Cold War, rather than ushering in the beginning of a new struggle, was the continuation of a struggle which had begun for some, such as Ho Chi Minh, as early as <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=T5WSq5QeN_sC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">the 1920s</a>. The struggle for Indochina predated the Cold War. The Japanese invasion in 1941 and return of the French in 1945 “opened <a href="http://www.panmacmillan.com/book/michaelburleigh/smallwarsfarawayplaces" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">Pandora’s box</a>”, creating the opportunity to fight return of French rule to Indochina—something Southeast Asians may not have pursued nor achieved without the break in French control created by the war. The post-WWII period for Indochinese marked the resumption of two intertwined battles—that of <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GZeaAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA43&lpg=PA43&dq=indochina+struggle+for+liberation&source=bl&ots=LWzeU0IeTp&sig=NuTE96NopMAWl33x1v_fgvR2l8A&hl=en&sa=X&ei=oaNwU9_sA6WR7Ab5wYGoBw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=indochina%20struggle%20for%20liberation&f=false" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">liberation</a> from French <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ZJ0QJhjUmoUC&pg=PA267&lpg=PA267&dq=early+nationalism+in+indochina&source=bl&ots=-wnG0AtBGv&sig=HOTKVi-inHY-AtYSLh_N532Z-Pg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=uaVwU66xH4rYPL3ZgLAL&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=early%20nationalism%20in%20indochina&f=false" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">colonial rule</a> and between communist and anti-communist forces to determine which system would govern independent Indochina.</span></div>
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<strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Hot War</span></strong></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Arguably, the Cold War in Asia was not ‘cold’ at all. Unlike in Europe, where opposing forces stared each other down across borders but never fired a shot, the Southeast Asian <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=tzkoOL0oIv8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=isbn:9789004175372&hl=en&sa=X&ei=B7FwU721OYejO9LKgLgN&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">Cold War was ‘hot’</a>. Real armed battles were fought between colonial and nationalist and communist and anti-communist forces almost from the very beginning. During the First Indochina War, there would also be violent ethnic, religious and factional fighting among different<a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.1525/vs.2009.4.3.98?uid=2134&uid=2476025087&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=17498&uid=5910784&uid=1250872&uid=67&sid=21104244126577" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">Indochinese populations</a> alongside the battle for independence. Over two decades, troops would invade, occupy and fight in, to varying degrees, all of the Indochinese states in the First and Second Indochina War, resulting in hundreds of thousands of <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=qh5lffww-KsC&dq=statistics+french+casualties+indochina+war&source=gbs_navlinks_s" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">total casualties</a>—something unthinkable in Cold War Europe.</span></div>
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<strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Soft Borders</span></strong></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The battle in Southeast Asia was not between governments behind clearly drawn borders on either side of a clear line of demarcation between democracy and communism. Borders mattered little in the Southeast Asian Cold War. There was no Oder-Neisse Line in Indochina. The 1954 17<sup style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">th</sup> parallel border between North and South Vietnam came to matter very little due to communist infiltration and American bombing.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; color: olive; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">In Southeast Asia, Western governments were unwilling to commit fully to total war and unwilling or unable to take, occupy and hold territory they had won.</span></h3>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Under French rule, the states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos had all been one large colony–Indochina. There had always been interchange between these regions-cum-states, each with significant diaspora in the others. Many national leaders of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos would be born or spend significant time in <a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.1525/vs.2009.4.3.98?uid=2134&uid=2476025087&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=17498&uid=5910784&uid=1250872&uid=67&sid=21104244126577" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">neighboring states</a>. Close lingual, religious, cultural and ethnic relations facilitated ‘softer’ borders.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Much of the fighting during the Second Indochina War took place in South Vietnam and spilled over the border into Cambodia and Laos. Communist and anti-communist forces throughout Southeast Asia cooperated with kindred factions and used each other’s territories to transit through or as a sanctuary from their own fight across the border. The famous Ho Chi Minh and King Sihanouk <a href="http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/mounted/" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">Trails used</a> by communist forces to transit the borders of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are examples. Governments in distant Saigon, Phnom Penh or Vientiane could do little to control their frontiers. The porous nature of these borders has been blamed specifically for “<a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=zvg1lr79qcEC&q=190#v=snippet&q=190&f=false" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">enlarging</a>” the Second Indochina War beyond Vietnam.</span></div>
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<strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Weak Eastern Governments and Lack of Western Will</span></strong></div>
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<a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Dien-Bien-Phu.jpg" rel="prettyPhoto[753]" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: #444444; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><img alt="French propaganda poster following defeat at Dien Bien Phu, 1954." class="size-full wp-image-774" src="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Dien-Bien-Phu.jpg" height="240" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; height: auto; margin: 0px; max-width: 100%; padding: 0px;" width="176" /></span></a><br />
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">French propaganda poster following defeat at Dien Bien Phu, 1954.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Governments had far less power in Southeast Asia than their counterparts in Europe. Throughout most of the Cold War, Southeast Asian states had two or more governments which claimed rule. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia experienced periods in which territory in each was controlled by opposing governments, dividing the country, each claiming to hold legitimate power over the whole.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The sides hurled propaganda. South Vietnam was called a puppet of the United States, while North Vietnam was a creature of Beijing. The governments of <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/view/3023594" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">Cambodia and Laos</a> claimed neutrality, but received aid from all sides in a constant tug of war between North Vietnam, America, Russia and China. There was no grand post-WWII modernization and development plan like the Marshall Plan for Europe. Efforts to form effective Asian <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=tzkoOL0oIv8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=isbn:9789004175372&hl=en&sa=X&ei=B7FwU721OYejO9LKgLgN&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">collective security</a> regimes, such as SEATO, were stymied by the Geneva Accords requirement Indochinese states remain neutral.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Government heads did not stay in power long and there were constant overthrow attempts by both communist and anti-communist forces. There were multiple mutiny or coup attempts from 1960 against Ngo Dinh Diem in the lead up to his <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=cgo8s8qDIJQC&pg=PA25&lpg=PA25&dq=1960+coup+attempts+diem+south+vietnam&source=bl&ots=RnNGd315RQ&sig=vyPC5DZQ6oadmOXH6ZX47" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">1963 assassination</a>, a trend which continued with his successors until 1966. Loyalties also shifted. King Sihanouk of Cambodia was seemingly on<a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/How_Pol_Pot_Came_to_Power.html?id=KoaKt8a_7ngC&redir_esc=y" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">every side</a> of the struggle in Cambodia at one time or another—monarchist, republican, anti-communist and finally with the Khmer Rouge communists.</span></div>
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<a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Diem.jpg" rel="prettyPhoto[753]" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: #444444; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><img alt="" class="size-medium wp-image-766" src="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Diem-203x300.jpg" height="300" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; height: auto; margin: 0px; max-width: 100%; padding: 0px;" width="203" /></span></a><br />
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Ngo Dinh Diem, 1955</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">In previous modern wars such as WWI and WWII, large-scale troop deployments and naval, air, armor and artillery support were central features and the war was prosecuted largely by one army defeating the enemy militarily and advancing to occupy ever more territory until the state leadership was destroyed or it capitulated. Capitols, major population centers and industrial areas were particular targets of bombing campaigns. It was total war. Both world wars ended when belligerent governments surrendered. Their troops stopped fighting and normal life returned.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">In Southeast Asia, Western governments were unwilling to commit fully to total war and unwilling or unable to take, occupy and hold territory they had won. French commanders decided, rather than occupy Indochina with enough troops to guarantee security, they would pursue a “hedgehog” strategy of fighting the war through forays into enemy territory from a series of heavily <a href="http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/docrepository/frenchalgeria.pdf" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">fortified encampments</a>, leading to their encirclement and 1954 surrender at Dien Bien Phu. The US, having just fought an unpopular war in Korea, was unwilling to commit to another war in Asia. Eisenhower did not want America to be seen as supporting French imperialism in Indochina and would not act without <a href="http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Calkins/Lathers.pdf" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">diplomatic support</a> from Britain and Australia.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">There was no line of advance as there had been during WWII, behind which the war was over and civilians viewed themselves as ‘liberated’. Conversely, Southeast Asians saw the Westerners, especially the French, as ‘occupiers’. Communist forces, in territory and a culture much more home to them than their white counterparts, returned wherever they left. The moment Western troops left an area, they lost control of it. They <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Ashes_to_Ashes.html?id=Z0VuAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">controlled Vietnam</a> only “100 yards on either side of all major roads”. Though America used its fire support assets to great effect and multiplied the effectiveness of its troops, the enemy did not abate for it.</span></div>
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<a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Taylor-McNamara-Kennedy.jpg" rel="prettyPhoto[753]" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: #444444; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><img alt="Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Robert McNamara, John F. Kennedy, 1963." class="size-full wp-image-772" src="http://ciceromagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Taylor-McNamara-Kennedy.jpg" height="191" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; height: auto; margin: 0px; max-width: 100%; padding: 0px;" width="240" /></span></a><br />
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Robert McNamara, John F. Kennedy, 1963.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The U.S. government policy, championed by Robert McNamara, of relying on “body counts” and statistics as metrics to determine victory led America to<a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1991-02-09/news/mn-675_1_vietnam-war" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">lose focus</a> on other factors. Despite the focus on killing the enemy, America often refrained from bombing North Vietnamese government targets in the capital, Hanoi, as a tactic to keep them at the <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=J5RJtcGuNzkC&pg=PA511&lpg=PA511&dq=US+refrains+from+bombing+hanoi&source=bl&ots=rgNI22P4fw&sig=bLXNs7tOrxQmV31SQt4T3dcJAMI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=vPhxU622N4Tb7AafiIGYAg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=US%20refrains%20from%20bombing%20hanoi&f=false" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">negotiating table</a> while using B-52’s to carpet bomb entire swathes elsewhere in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This angered civilians and turned them into refugees, fleeing into the arms of communists—particularly benefiting the <a href="http://thewalrus.ca/2006-10-history/" style="margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;">Khmer Rouge</a>. The French and American governments sought to end their wars in Southeast Asia as soon as they began and both eventually pursued negotiated settlements. They did not win the wars.</span></div>
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<strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">Those Who Forget History…</span></strong></div>
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<span style="background-color: #444444; font-family: inherit;">The popular conception of past wars and what, where, how, who and why they were conducted is often incomplete and the accuracy of the picture fades over time despite the clearer image produced by years of academic study after the fact. The Cold War is a perfect example, with the story of the Western or European Cold War the dominant narrative over what was a “hot war” in Southeast Asia. Since the dominant narratives or popular conception of wars past determines how wars are perceived in the future, it becomes all the more important to look deeper into even recent history for an accurate picture of events. Why? As ever—those who forget history are doomed to repeat it.</span></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-46855994373909829702014-08-20T13:35:00.000-05:002014-08-20T13:35:17.492-05:00Warrior Culture: Ditch ‘Redskins’, but Keep Apache<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<i>This article originally appeared in <a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/opinion/warrior-culture/" target="_blank">Cicero Magazine</a> on 30 June 2014.</i><br />
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The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office have cancelled the trademark registration of the Washington Redskins football team, convinced the team’s logo and name is an offensive racial slur against Native Americans. It is an offensive name, more so than any other sports mascot with an ethnic connection. The decision followed a widespread public campaign and letters from 50 U.S. Senators urging a name change. Following the ruling, some, such as Simon Waxman, claim the effort needs to go further. He claims the U.S. military is guilty of the same racist conduct in using Native American tribal names and the names of Native leaders for equipment and operations. Is there a difference between the Washington Redskins and an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter?<br />
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Waxman claims that the use by the U.S. military of the tribal names such as Kiowa and Chinook, weapons such as the tomahawk, or names such as Grey Eagle and Geronimo are offensive. His evidence is the systematic U.S. campaign of “manifest destiny” which saw America expand its way across the whole of the continent, crushing Native tribes in the process.<br />
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It is true. The United States fought, tricked, cajoled, murdered and coerced Native tribes into moving off their own land and the U.S. military was the tool most often used to achieve it. By the turn of the 20th century, Native tribes had all but vanished from America. According to Waxman, the campaign was racist and it is therefore racially offensive for the military to use Native terms.<br />
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The U.S. military does honor Native American tribes for their warrior culture and fighting spirit because it is worthy of respect and honor and the American military requires and fosters a similar warrior culture.<br />
However, there is no such thing as a “Redskin” helicopter or a “Native Savage” cruise missile. The military does have Kiowa helicopters and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Kiowa were a real tribe and the tomahawk was a real weapon and Geronimo and Grey Eagle were real Native leaders. There is no racist connotation in the use of the names themselves. Waxman’s assertion is that since the U.S. military crushed Native tribes it is racist for the military to use terms associated with peoples it defeated. Waxman compares it, citing Noam Chomsky, with the hypothetical situation if the Nazi’s would have called their tanks or fighters “Jew” or “Gypsy”.<br />
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So why is it different? The U.S. military almost always uses themed names for different series’ of equipment. Aircraft carriers are named after U.S. Presidents or other leaders. Battleships were named after U.S. states. Submarines are often named after aquatic animals. Fighter jets are christened with birds of prey. Armored vehicles are named after Generals. The military does this to impart an association to that system of characteristics of its namesake and to honor them, not to disparage a vanquished foe. The association helps to build esprit de corps among those who are stationed on, maintain, use or operate the system.<br />
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How can it be that the U.S. military named its helicopters after Native tribes for racist motivations, but named its aircraft carriers after Presidents and Senators out of respect and to honor them? Was it racist against the British to commission the USS George Washington? How about the Sherman tank against white Southerners? If military equipment is named after vanquished foes, why don’t we have a “King George III” submarine, a “Nazi” landing craft, or “Hammer and Sickle” tanks. Waxman would surely argue that it is cynical to believe that the U.S. military, which spent decades hunting the Natives in the Southwest, would honor the same tribes today. That is because Waxman—who never served in the military—like many other people does not understand the concept of warrior culture.<br />
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Most Native American tribes had some form of warrior culture. They trained their young men not only to peacefully hunt animals and gather berries in the woods, as naïve and unbalanced narratives picture them, but to fight against neighboring bands, sometimes from the same tribe. They developed and conducted religious rituals in preparation and upon return from war. For many Native tribes, war was a way of life. They were not just the wide-eyed peaceful daisies waiting to be plucked as many postmodernist thinkers—like Noam Chomsky—portray them as. They were proud warriors, not just victims.<br />
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They believed there was no greater feat than to meet and defeat a foe in battle and no greater honor than to die in battle one’s self. When white settlers moved into their territory, they conducted raids upon them. It was on their land and therefore fair game. They knew violence would be met with violence. That was life. However, the tribes did not have the technological ability or the population to defeat a European foe which had systematic designs on making the entire continent their own. Despite the overwhelming odds against them, they resisted the white man for decades. The Comanche stopped the northern advance of Spain from Mexico, the westward advance of France out of Louisiana, and the advances of both Texas and the United States as well. Not a bad return for a people forced to live in the Llano Estacado, a desert corner of west Texas which even today is barren land. The warrior culture and fighting spirit of Native Americans is indeed worthy of respect.<br />
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<span style="color: #bf9000; font-size: large;">Ask an American soldier today if they consider Native Americans defeated enemies of the country or if they consider them warriors worthy of respect. They will answer with respect, hands down.</span></blockquote>
The United States military has a warrior culture of its own. American troops believe that, as George Orwell says, “People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.” Today less than 1% of America serves in the all-volunteer military and they come home to a country that does not understand them when they do. American veterans turn to one another for support. It reinforces a warrior culture. No one pays the costs of war more than the soldier. They understand that the world is a real and dangerous place where there are other people who want to see America fail and to harm and kill Americans. It is not something that just happens to someone else on TV. It is because of America’s warriors and their warrior culture that people such as Waxman and Chomsky never have to see or experience this first-hand. America’s warriors keep the wolf from the door.<br />
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So, yes, the U.S. military does honor Native American tribes for their warrior culture and fighting spirit because it is worthy of respect and honor and the American military requires and fosters a similar warrior culture. But those who do not understand warrior culture or violence and reject it in all of its forms would not understand such a feeling. They would have to believe that is just cynical, racist mocking to name a weapons system a Tomahawk, or a deadly attack helicopter an Apache, or a drone Grey Eagle. Ask an American soldier today if they consider Native Americans defeated enemies of the country or if they consider them warriors worthy of respect. They will answer with respect, hands down.<br />
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Washington Redskins owner Dan Snyder has attempted to justify the racist name of his team by using a similar argument. He argues that the Redskins moniker is a “badge of honor” and its use is meant to impart to his football team the fierce warrior fighting spirit associated with Native tribes. So what’s the difference?<br />
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It may come as a shock to some, but football is just a game. No one dies. Nothing tangible for the country rides upon victory or loss by one side or the other. While players are skilful and do risk injury, they also get paid ridiculous sums of money and receive excellent health care. Real soldiers are lucky to receive either. Many professional athletes act more like prima donnas than warriors. The tired old metaphors that equate sports with combat should be retired. They are offensive to those who really do fight. Many professional and amateur athletes themselves recognize that. There is no real warrior culture in football. It is just a game. Dan Snyder should not equate his team’s racist mascot with honor. Retire the “Redskins”.<br />
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On the other hand, Simon Waxman and likeminded individuals should suspend their disbelief that the U.S. military can in fact honor Native Americans and that it is not just cynical racism. It is clear to see why they have made the mistake and misunderstand the difference. It is an alien concept to them. The U.S government, the U.S. military and the American people of the time all took part in an act of genocide against Native Americans. That is a fact. That cannot be undone. However, no one alive today took part in those actions. The people who named these weapons systems after Native Americans did not have it in mind as a cynical ‘endzone dance’ against a defeated opponent when they did so.<br />
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The U.S. military chose to adopt Native American terms for these weapons and platforms in order to honor the warrior culture associated with them, to build esprit de corps among those servicemembers associated with them, and because the U.S. military has a proud warrior culture of its own. That is not racist. Get rid of the Washington “Redskins”, but keep the AH-64 Apache.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-60913020666381288982014-08-15T20:17:00.000-05:002014-08-16T05:31:41.034-05:00Will U.S. Military Advisors Face ‘Mission Creep’ in Iraq?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIU9e5Wo0U47c4nzKa6El9YaOxn5sq2pIzheD35nRclLXA7P_zwdVawUCUcF8KseClxVt3xHec52KE6NbELtxIuq-KZ2y8aNzBVqx-IS20GSMDnQEkNMAMsF4lFt6CBMymFQMMyd_qD7c/s1600/advisors.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIU9e5Wo0U47c4nzKa6El9YaOxn5sq2pIzheD35nRclLXA7P_zwdVawUCUcF8KseClxVt3xHec52KE6NbELtxIuq-KZ2y8aNzBVqx-IS20GSMDnQEkNMAMsF4lFt6CBMymFQMMyd_qD7c/s1600/advisors.jpg" height="212" width="320" /></a></div><i><br />
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</i> <i>This article originally appeared in <a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/opinion/will-u-s-military-advisors-face-mission-creep-in-iraq/" target="_blank">Cicero Magazine</a> on 23 June 2014.</i><br />
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President Obama announced as many as 300 U.S. military advisers may be deployed to Iraq to assist the government in fighting the Sunni extremist group ISIS, which has invaded areas of western Iraq. The White House is also considering airstrikes. In 2012 President Obama withdrew the last U.S. troops from Iraq, keeping a campaign pledge to end the American presence there. The President has promised that “American forces will not be returning to combat in Iraq” and that military advisers will only be there to assist Iraqi forces to repel the ISIS invaders. But some have called this misleading and pointed out that U.S. military advisors certainly have engaged in combat in the past and will again if sent back to Iraq. But would the deployment of U.S. military advisers mean U.S. troops will be engaged in combat in Iraq again?<br />
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I served as a U.S. military adviser while attached to a Military Transition Team (MiTT) in Iraq in 2005 and 2006. Our job was to provide for our assigned Iraqi infantry battalion what they did not have themselves–namely medical evacuation capability (MEDEVAC), air and artillery support, and certain forms of intelligence. We also facilitated training in administration, logistics, equipment and weapons maintenance, electronic communications, and operational and tactical strategy—all the skills of professional soldiers. We acted as liaison between our Iraqi battalion and its sister U.S. battalion responsible for the same sector. We also evaluated and reported on the readiness of the Iraqi unit to function autonomously. We were certainly engaged in combat, accompanying Iraqi units on patrols and cordon and search operations. Several U.S. members of our unit were killed and seriously injured in combat operations, along with scores of Iraqi soldiers.<br />
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Throughout WWII, U.S. military adviser General ‘Vinegar Joe’ Stilwell and his staff provided high-level military assistance to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and commanded Chinese and Western troops as Chiang’s Chief of Staff. Though their role was originally envisioned to be purely advisory in nature, the United States pushed for Stilwell to be placed in charge of all allied forces in the Chinese theatre, something Chiang resisted until the last. Stilwell and his staff had to fight their way out of Burma following Chinese defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1941, and Stilwell spent the rest of his time in China fighting with Chiang rather than the Japanese.<br />
<blockquote><span style="color: #7f6000; font-size: large;">The re-deployment of U.S. military advisors to Iraq will not automatically mean putting American troops back into combat. But it could.</span></blockquote>Perhaps the clearest example of U.S. military advisors becoming engaged in combat comes from Vietnam. Following the 1945 Japanese surrender, France attempted to regain control of its pre-war colony, Indochina. They returned to strong nationalist and communist resistance in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos which they lacked the understanding or will to fight. A small contingent of U.S. advisers were first dispatched to Indochina in 1950 to support the French military, still recovering from WWII and desperately trying to fight the communist insurgency with antiquated equipment. The U.S. mission was to train French forces on new military equipment the U.S. had supplied them to aid France in its fight against the communists.<br />
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After the final French defeat of the First Indochina War at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the U.S. began to directly advise the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem in its fight against communist North Vietnam and their indigenous Viet Cong allies. From 1955 to 1960, the U.S. mission grew to as many as 1,500 military advisors. As the Viet Cong insurgency grew in the South, the number of U.S. military advisors grew exponentially, with over 16,000 U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam by 1963. In an extreme example of ‘mission creep’, the soldiers of the Military Assistance Advisory Group-Vietnam (MAAG-V) and the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MAC-V) from 1950 to 1973 moved from a small advisory role to an allied Western military to an open combat role in a grinding Cold War counterinsurgency. They did much more than engage in ‘self-defence’, as once claimed by the Kennedy administration.<br />
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Not all U.S. military advisory missions have led to U.S. troops engaging in combat, however. Following WWII, U.S. military advisors assisted in the rebuilding of Germany, the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe, and reconstruction efforts in Japan, China and Korea. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. military advisers trained South American military forces to stabilise their governments against communist rebels during Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions. More recently, the United States has increased its military advisory presence in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. U.S. military advisers have trained troops and advised governments in Nigeria, South Sudan, Chad, Congo, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Yemen and the Philippines, among others, in recent years. Civilian civil servants with the U.S. Department of Defense also engage in military advisory missions through programs such as the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MoDA). The U.S. has frequently deployed civilian and military defence advisors during peacetime to assist allies through structures such as NATO in Europe and the defunct Cold War-era SEATO in Asia. The re-deployment of U.S. military advisors to Iraq will not automatically mean putting American troops back into combat.<br />
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But it could. U.S. Special Operations Forces, especially U.S. Army Green Berets, were originally conceived with the intent of training and organising indigenous troops to become a competent and coherent fighting force to engage in unconventional warfare or to train allied government troops in Foreign Internal Defence or counter-insurgency missions. Building an effective fighting force can hardly be done solely in a theoretical, classroom environment, and even field training under simulated fighting conditions is no substitute for real combat. Special Operations Forces often provide theoretical instruction, followed by field training, and progressing into leading, advising and evaluating performance in combat operations when necessary. If U.S. military advisers are deployed to Iraq, they will likely be Special Operations Forces who possess language and cultural skills and years of previous experience on the ground in Iraq. Anonymous U.S. officials have said the Pentagon would ask for U.S. Special Operations Forces to be on the ground in order to support advisory and intelligence operations there.<br />
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The U.S. has already invested billions of dollars, scores of American lives, and six years into training and equipping Iraqi government troops. That is more years of U.S. military training and experience than I had when I first deployed to Iraq myself in 2003. The Iraqi military has been engaged in a counterinsurgency battle on their home turf for years so are not novices to combat. They have already been trained by U.S. advisors. Difficulties in agreeing to an acceptable SOFA agreement with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki are the reason there has been no U.S. military advisory presence in Iraq since 2012. Now al-Maliki and the Iraqi government want U.S. forces to return.<br />
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There is a historical danger a renewed U.S. military advisory mission in Iraq could “creep” from helping Iraq to help itself into doing it for them. The U.S. may launch airstrikes against ISIS forces—something President Obama has announced he is considering—but they could not do so effectively without trained American controllers on the front lines, which would necessarily place them ‘in combat’—something the President has promised not to do. During the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, President Obama promised there would be no U.S. presence on the ground and that the U.S. would take a backseat to its European allies. Behind the scenes, paramilitary forces from U.S. intelligence were indeed on the ground in Libya and the U.S. military played a much larger role than was publicly acknowledged.<br />
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JCS Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, once in overall charge of the American effort to train police and military forces in Iraq, warned that the U.S. does not have the intelligence capability to effectively lead and target airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. The Iraqi army was not trained or equipped with communications equipment which would enable them to effectively guide U.S. airstrikes. The U.S. was rightly hesitant to train and equip a foreign military with that capability. Arguably only U.S. boots on the ground—filled by troops trained in combat air control—could make the difference.<br />
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In sum, U.S. military advisors have historically been deployed in both combat and non-combat roles. While there is a precedent, it does not necessarily follow that the re-deployment of U.S. military advisors to Iraq will lead to “mission creep” or putting American troops into combat there again. For the option of U.S. airstrikes being employed against ISIS in Iraq to be effective, however, U.S. controllers would most likely have to be on the ground at the front lines. So how does one definitively determine if U.S. troops are “in combat”? This is probably the question that is easiest answer. Forget what the President, Congress, the lawyers, the experts or the media say on the issue. To quote one of Murphy’s Laws: “If you are being shot at, you are in combat.”Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-36327433731252890962014-08-04T11:59:00.001-05:002014-08-04T11:59:35.813-05:00Two Views of Intelligence<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<i>This article originally appeared in <a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/features/two-views-of-intelligence/" target="_blank">Cicero Magazine</a> on 19 June 2014.</i><br />
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The purpose of intelligence is to speak truth to power. Intelligence agencies exist to provide decision-makers with absolute, unbiased facts or, failing to obtain absolute facts, to provide as clear, unbiased and true a picture of a situation as possible using what facts are available to enable decision-makers to reach informed conclusions as to what course of action to take. Rarely is it the case that Intelligence can present a picture of a situation that is purely fact-based. There are common intelligence requirements, such as determining the intent of another party, which can never be known for certain because their very nature prevents certain, permanent determination. ‘Gaps’ in fact while attempting to form as clear, accurate and true a picture of a situation as possible can only be filled with conjecture or informed ‘guesswork’ based upon past actions, history, logic and/or statistical probability. Informed ‘guesswork’ is what intelligence analysts do.<br />
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One of the central arguments in the field of intelligence analysis regards which angle estimative or predictive strategic intelligence analysis should be approached. Two schools of thought have emerged: Straussians, based around University of Chicago political scientist Leo Strauss, and Kentians, around Sherman Kent, founding father of CIA’s estimative process.<br />
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<b>Values or Truths?</b><br />
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The Straussian view of analysis is founded on the idea that the ‘regime’—specifically the form of government and society a state adopts—provides a window through which the political thought, intentions and actions of a state can be observed and predicted. It assumes there is a continual human search for which form of regime is ‘best’ and a qualitative analysis of the differences between these different forms is the route to determining which regime is ideal. For example, Strauss believed during the Cold War that the essential qualitative differences between American democracy and Soviet communism was the most important issue of the day.<br />
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At first read, there appears to be nothing controversial about that idea. However, the Straussian view requires that the judgment of the quality of a regime be based upon how well it provides public goods such as liberty, freedom, justice and so forth. This invites what can be called a ‘values’-based judgment into the process using determinants which are subjective in nature. This conflicts with the objective focus of mainstream notions of the social scientific approach which focusses on facts over values judgments and pictures measureable differences between regimes as a matter of different degrees of focus in pursuit of universal human pursuits.<br />
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The Kentian view of analysis is based firmly in the belief that intelligence analysis should be approached as an intellectual subject in the liberal social science tradition. Analysts were certainly not to make values judgments, but rather search for the underlying universal ‘truths’ common to man. Kent, a Yale historian, shied away from establishing or applying theoretical analysis based in international relations to intelligence, preferring instead more practical empirical frameworks and methods. He held that the intellectual and emotional detachment of his analysts allowed them to produce better estimates than military analysts or policymakers and their staffs because they focused on academic ‘truth’ as their goal without an attached or vested interest in their particular ‘regime’. Kent’s belief in the value of this objective analytical system was such that he held it to be more valuable than clandestine intelligence collection. No number of microphones or satellite photos could substitute for the value of being able to objectively divine the meaning of long-term trends in order to accurately estimate future actions.<br />
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<span style="color: #7f6000; font-size: large;">While Kentian objective analysis can lead analysts down blind alleys due to strategic deception, Straussian analysis can lead one to look at regimes such as the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in light of worst-case scenarios because of their (supposed) diametrical opposition to the U.S. regime.</span></blockquote>
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Kent created a system for intelligence analysis with the goal of creating ‘institutional memory’ so knowledge would become cumulative and not be lost between generations. While building CIA’s analysis structures Kent was very much committed to the professionalization of intelligence analysis. Besides its academic commitment to neutrality, the Kentian view was also shaped by organisational factors. The positioning of CIA’s early estimative body between the military and political leaders required it to maintain a reputation for objectivity so as not to become a target for either. Kent held up the CIA’s performance in more accurately estimating Soviet capabilities during the Bomber and Missile Gaps of the late 1950s compared with military intelligence estimates as an example of its detached view of analysis discouraging it from inflating estimates to support its own organisational goals. The Air Force was accused of inflating Soviet bomber and ICBM estimates in order to justify an ever greater share of the defence budget going to its SAC and U.S. ICBM programmes.<br />
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Leo Strauss never worked, studied or wrote about intelligence analysis. He was a political scientist. However, as Gary Schmitt and Abram Schulsky argue, Strauss’ work on political analysis can be related to intelligence analysis. Strauss argued that political and social sciences could never be true or ‘hard’ sciences because of ‘deception’. Atoms and particles do not attempt to hide, conceal or deceive their observers. Human beings can and do. Strategic deception should always be a consideration in intelligence analysis, especially when dealing with a foe aware of interest in their activity and have counterintelligence capability.<br />
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<b>Hall of Mirrors</b><br />
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When applying a detached, academic analysis to a problem, how can one account for strategic deception by the enemy? The annals of intelligence are filled with tales of strategic deception. Prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese diplomats continued to conduct negotiations, not allowing U.S. analysts to narrow the field of Japanese intentions. Operation Mincemeat saw the body of an RAF officer carrying fake plans released into Spanish waters by submarine and successfully duped German intelligence into believing the allies would invade Greece rather than Sicily. Operation Bodyguard supported the pre-conceived German view that D-Day would come at Calais, not Normandy.<br />
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Some deception debates still continue today. Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a GRU military intelligence officer, was the highest ranking source the West had in Moscow during the Cold War. The intelligence he provided on Soviet nuclear capabilities is claimed to have directly influenced President Kennedy’s actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, he was compromised, arrested, put on show trial and apparently executed. Questions remain. Penkovsky’s job did not give him access to the material he provided, so how did he get it? At what point was he compromised and how? Was he executed as a spy or was it a Soviet deception operation from the beginning?<br />
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Strangely, after his execution the CIA went to unprecedented lengths to get Penkovsky’s story out, granting full access to the authors of the generously-named The Spy Who Saved the World. Was it to exploit the psychological effect of such a high-ranking source against the USSR? Or was it to cover up the fact they had been comprehensively duped themselves? All this to say that strategic deception is a vital consideration in intelligence analysis and part of James Jesus Angleton’s ‘hall of mirrors’. Is this what they are doing? Or is it what they want me to think they are doing?<br />
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While Kentian objective analysis can lead analysts down blind alleys due to strategic deception, Straussian analysis has led in some equally undesirable directions. The values-based judgment Straussian analysis invites can lead one to look at regimes such as the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in light of worst-case scenarios because of their (supposed) almost diametrical opposition to the U.S. regime. Those who place primacy on a qualitative analysis of regimes and their ideology and view another regime as possessing an opposing ideology come to view that foe as a major threat where an objective analysis of the same regime considering its past actions, current posture and capability might see the same foe as posing only a minor threat.<br />
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<b>From Cuba to Iraq</b><br />
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In 1976, President Ford approved an exercise in competitive analysis, pitting a junior team of CIA analysts applying standard Kentian methods against an external team applying Straussian methods to an analysis of Soviet nuclear capabilities. The episode has come to be known as ‘Team B’. Team B accused CIA of ‘mirror imaging’—assuming the foe holds the same universal principles and goals as the analyst does. Its analysis focused on Soviet intentions, ideas, aspirations and motivations rather than capabilities. It drew conclusions as to intentions based upon an assumption that the Soviet regime not only wanted to defeat the U.S. militarily, but destroy its regime politically, socially and economically. Team B began its analysis from that anchor point and used data to reinforce the assumption as opposed to drawing conclusions from data.<br />
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After the fall of the Soviet Union, Team B’s analysis of Soviet capabilities was conclusively proven to be flawed. As an example of how far off path such methods can lead, Team B cited the lack of proof that the Soviet Union had developed an advanced submarine detection system as proof that it did in fact have it. They found it hard to believe the Soviets had not yet done so, so assumed that they had. The continued application of this kind of thinking is exhibited by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s 2002 statement on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction that ‘the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.’<br />
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However, Kentian analysis has also failed at times, most famously in failing in successive National Intelligence Estimates, utilising the entirety of America’s intelligence machinery, to predict the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba, leading to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1964, Sherman Kent authored his own well-written post-mortem of how it came to pass, since becoming a classic of intelligence literature. He writes that one of the hazards of the profession of intelligence analysis is filling in gaps in fact with informed guesswork. These gaps are filled with conjecture based upon past actions. That Khrushchev would place missiles on Cuba exhibited a different posture from any of his past actions. Khrushchev ‘zigged’ when they expected him to ‘zag’. Kent goes so far as to say CIA got the estimates wrong because Khrushchev had made such a poor decision that it caught them by surprise.<br />
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Returning to the Straussian argument about the Kentian susceptibility to strategic deception, Khrushchev clearly intended to surprise the United States with nuclear missile placements on Cuba and to use them as a bargaining chip against President Kennedy. By suddenly changing posture in a way out of character for Soviet leadership, the Soviet Union was able to fool CIA analysts. Applying Straussian thinking to the situation may have led analysts to assume the USSR would attempt to place missiles on Cuba at some point because of its strategic intent to destroy the United States and look for data to support the assumption. U.S. imagery intelligence did discover missile placements on Cuba, but only because DCI John McCone had suspicions about Khrushchev’s intentions and told them to keep watch over Cuba despite Sherman Kent’s estimates. If estimators began with the assumption Khrushchev would try, they may have been discovered earlier.<br />
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This argument about which method of analysis is best suited to producing strategic intelligence estimates has gone on since the beginning of the U.S. Intelligence Community. As episodes from WWII through the Cold War to the Iraq War show, there is no sign of it being decided any time soon. The purpose of intelligence is to speak the truth to power, but the job of analysts is to determine what the ‘truth’ will be before it happens. Whether thinking like Sherman Kent or Leo Strauss, attempting to peer into the future while surrounded by the hall of mirrors is a task anyone is bound to fail at from time to time.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-22787028682882381152014-07-28T04:53:00.000-05:002014-07-28T05:03:38.602-05:00The U.S.-Chinese War Over Africa<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiU50LB4cV9OLef_OCZ3HhBEM8qoOt2W46vToS6vVMRfbJX04aFHwIgldW8W0UTwhEB4Tjc7eoaNia8YhbtTygFJqhYhyphenhyphen5RkdRuGt8VLkFqWpNQ81FMj1CAMJtJ2tVke-4n1JDwF4Uar_c/s1600/China+in+Africa.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiU50LB4cV9OLef_OCZ3HhBEM8qoOt2W46vToS6vVMRfbJX04aFHwIgldW8W0UTwhEB4Tjc7eoaNia8YhbtTygFJqhYhyphenhyphen5RkdRuGt8VLkFqWpNQ81FMj1CAMJtJ2tVke-4n1JDwF4Uar_c/s320/China+in+Africa.jpg" /></a><br />
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<i>This article originally appeared in <a href="http://www.ciceromagazine.com/opinion/the-u-s-chinese-war-over-africa/">Cicero Magazine</a> on 9 June 2014.</i><br />
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American and Chinese efforts in Africa can be characterized by two contrasting outlooks. The United States focuses on security, the Chinese on economic investment. Contrary to Howard French’s claims in his new book, China’s Second Continent, that Chinese settlers constitute “the beginnings of a new empire,” Beijing’s relationship with the continent is more nuanced than that – China is a burgeoning world power in desperate need of resources and profits. Unlike its European predecessors, Beijing has no interest in re-imagining colonies in its own image. Yet, its attention toward the continent may foretell a larger strategic competition between the United States and China. Whereas the Chinese look at Africa and sees dollar signs, Americans look at the continent and see dangers – Islamic terrorists, pirates, and corrupt dictators chief among them. This may not be the first time China has made advances in Africa. But this time around, its economic might and no-strings-attached sales pitch may prove a winning combination.<br />
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<b>Pivot to Africa</b><br />
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The U.S. recognized the need to boost its presence in Africa because of its geographic and strategic importance. The establishment of U.S. Africa Command and its 2008 designation as a separate combatant command exhibit America’s renewed commitment to security on the continent. America has expanded airstrips to accommodate increasing personnel and logistical traffic and ramped up its training and liaison support of African militaries and intelligence agencies and institutions such as the African Union. U.S. Special Forces, intelligence officers and security contractors have been increasingly employed to target militants. Secretary of State John Kerry, on a recent trip to the region, linked U.S. assistance with a country’s democratic achievements.<br />
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Washington now has a military and intelligence presence in over a dozen countries there. For example, it employs private contractors to fly light civilian aircraft out of Burkina Faso over western Africa to track militants. Djibouti is its largest permanent base, home to 4,000 U.S. personnel and a hub for UAVs and manned reconnaissance aircraft. Washington also flies manned reconnaissance aircraft from Uganda, assisting in the hunt for Joseph Kony’s LRA. It has also established drone bases in Niger and Ethiopia, expanded facilities in Kenya for training African troops, and deployed forces to Mali to assist British and French efforts following the 2012 coup. The U.S. has also sent troops to Somalia, South Sudan, Chad, Congo and the Central African Republic in recent years. Most recently, it deployed a contingent to Nigeria to assist in the search for Boko Haram militants.<br />
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In contrast, China has focused on economic partnership and development. China’s rapid growth and demand for natural resources requires it to look outside its borders for stable and affordable resources. In this regard, Africa provides China with a bonanza: Over 85% of China’s imports from Africa consist of raw natural resources. Trade between Africa and China has swelled by 30% per annum over the last ten years, while trade volume has been more than double that with the United States. China has also invested in roads, railways and ports to help transport these resources, benefiting Africans as well. For example, China recently pledged to build a $3.8 billion railway in Kenya. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited the same African countries John Kerry had just a few weeks before.<br />
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Whereas the Chinese looks at Africa and sees dollar signs, the United States looks at the continent and sees dangers – Islamic terrorists, pirates, and corrupt dictators chief among them. <br />
Unlike the United States and other Western trade partners, China does not condition its relationships in Africa with political or ideological commitments. This advantage is appreciated by African strongmen subject to harangues from the West on democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Still, some fear China’s goals are purely mercenary and an attempt to “lock up” all of Africa’s resources and that China will abandon the continent once it has gotten what it wants.<br />
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<b>Reading Mao in Kinshasa</b><br />
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This is not for the first time Africa has become a chessboard of global competition between great powers, especially China. Though Washington and Moscow competed in Africa, the more interesting story is the competition between Beijing and Moscow for “hearts and minds” in Africa. As the Sino-Soviet Split deepened in the early 1960s, China began to challenge the Soviet Union for leadership of the socialist bloc. It saw an opportunity to build independent influence in states recently liberated from or still fighting for independence from European colonialism. Its influence was strongest in nearby North Korea and the former French colonies Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. However, as Jeremy Friedman writes, China presented a real challenge to the Soviets in Africa as well.<br />
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It attempted to create an Afro-Asian bloc and played up its own armed guerrilla insurgency and quest for independence and development as shared traits with Africans struggling for the same. It supported Algerian independence when Moscow did not and pictured Khrushchev’s ‘peaceful co-existence’ with the West and disarmament talks as evidence of lack of support for armed socialist revolutionaries in Africa and elsewhere. Chinese propaganda depicted the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis as Moscow backing down from the U.S. China greatly increased its African propaganda efforts by increasing local-language radio broadcasts and the distribution of books and pamphlets throughout the continent, far outpacing Soviet and even Western efforts. China seemed for a time to be winning the ideological battle with Moscow for leadership of socialism in the Third World.<br />
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But by 1963, it became apparent that though China was winning ideological and propaganda battles in Africa and elsewhere, it could not compete with the Soviet Union—or the West—in terms of material and financial support to socialist movements in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. Cold War China lacked the capacity to provide large amounts of troops, weaponry or money to allies in far off places such as Africa. It could not buy nor project power. The Soviet Union and the West could. China lost its first round in the competition for Africa.<br />
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China is in a quite different position today. It is an economic powerhouse with the clear ability to contribute large amounts of wealth to the economies of African countries with the natural resources they seek. Today it is able to build the roads, railways and ports it could not afford during the Cold War and which the Soviets and the West could. While its first efforts in Africa were driven and focused purely on communist ideology and the shared revolutionary struggle, its African efforts today are marked by a clear lack of any connection to ideology. It buys resources and builds necessary infrastructure seemingly with no strings attached. Additionally, its relationship with the U.S. itself is one characterized by mutual dependence, rather than clear opposition as the competition during the Cold War was. African countries do not have to choose definitively between East and West.<br />
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While Chinese policy is to remain militarily disentangled from events that do not directly affect its interests, it has shown a greater willingness to contribute to African security. Beijing, for example, was instrumental in the passage of Security Council 1769 in 2007, authorizing a joint UN-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur. It has provided over 1500 troops to UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa, more than any other member of the UN Security Council. Its navy is part of the joint multinational effort to combat piracy off the African coast. Even Chinese aid and arms transfers to Africa have been misrepresented, as they give more military arm and aid to democratic regimes than the United States, according to a 2012 study.<br />
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In the mainstream narrative of the Cold War, the focus was placed on the conflict between the United States versus a monolithic Soviet Union, which supported socialist movements from Cape Horn to the Cape of Good Hope. But this was never the case. Moscow was not the puppet-master it was believed to be. China and the Soviet Union fell out badly beginning in the late 1950s, and the relationship remained rather sour until the 1980s. This has perpetuated a view that China has always been isolationist and lacking in ambitions overseas, as well as concerns over the “rise” of China being over-inflated. China, in fact, attempted to project power outside of its own borders before—in Africa specifically. Previously it tried and failed because it lacked the resources to become a global power. But that has all changed.<br />
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Beijing is once again putting up stiff competition for Africa, this time for Washington instead of Moscow. Its “no strings attached” partnerships are attractive to many African governments. America’s financial and military aid, by contrast, often comes with strings attached, such as criteria for good governance and human rights. China’s efforts focus on obtaining the natural resources it requires and pays African states well in return in terms of both sales and infrastructure development to obtain them with no added conditions. With $2 trillion in trade, China may well win its second round in the scramble for Africa.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-31245341624837261562014-07-16T01:52:00.000-05:002014-07-16T01:52:54.367-05:00Russia's NATO Expansion Myth<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZFXMghVW5yANc2EYwfp1p-JDqsQs5ukZ0abxb4MrEMjeEHMKK2DrIQjrhnjcvAzO6S4BDEXCA7eGACoKsBlqPK64ikDGynStPUUGCmbuLuUDNG6k_PdoAXoRVyyWojk12srAbxNlLPCQ/s1600/NATO.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZFXMghVW5yANc2EYwfp1p-JDqsQs5ukZ0abxb4MrEMjeEHMKK2DrIQjrhnjcvAzO6S4BDEXCA7eGACoKsBlqPK64ikDGynStPUUGCmbuLuUDNG6k_PdoAXoRVyyWojk12srAbxNlLPCQ/s320/NATO.jpg" /></a><br />
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<i>This article originally appeared in <a href="http://www.ciceromagazine.com/opinion/russias-nato-expansion-myth/">Cicero Magazine</a> on 28 May 2014.</i><br />
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It has recently been argued by some that Russia’s invasion and intrigue in the Ukraine was foreseeable and a natural consequence of NATO’s broken promise to Mikhail Gorbachev and the collapsing USSR not to expand eastwards into its former domains. Russian President Vladimir Putin is, so the theory goes, reacting to a 24-year program of US/NATO eastward expansion stemming from that broken promise. This is a grievance Russia has put forward in arguments against Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic States joining NATO and again in 2008 when possible NATO membership for Georgia and the Ukraine was discussed. The ‘broken promise’ thesis was also offered to explain Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. The claim is that this course of events, or a similar one, was reasonably foreseeable, that some predicted it, and that it is a natural consequence. You reap what you sow. The problem is that NATO did not sow these seeds.<br />
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The myth that such a promise was made has been allowed to grow by assertion, speculation and incomplete information. More and more primary sources and memoirs of the participants in the negotiations between Washington, Bonn and Moscow have become available over time. There is a rich background of study of this particular controversy by academics such as Fred Oldenberg, Mark Kramer, Mary Elise Sarotte, and Kristina Spohr, among others. From the available interviews, memoirs, written documents, agreements, transcripts and notes on the multiple bilateral negotiations—from Soviet and East German sources as well as Western—it is clear the subject of the eastward expansion of NATO into former East bloc states was never discussed as a stand-alone issue and no such agreement or promise was given by Washington to Moscow. At a recent Council on Foreign Relations event, for example, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said U.S. negotiators never agreed to such a thing at the time.<br />
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The closest the participants ever came to directly tackling the issue was at the very beginning of the negotiations quickly following the collapse of Eastern European governments and the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. West Germany’s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher—more concerned with German issues than the larger Cold War—was concerned Moscow would take a hard line and wanted to make a pre-emptive offer to smooth their feathers—before the issue had ever been formally discussed between East and West—that a unified Germany would not be a member of NATO, but rather either neutral or a member of another strictly European organisation, the OSCE. Interestingly, Genscher became Chairman of the OSCE in 1991.<br />
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If NATO expansion was as vital an issue to Russia then as is claimed today, Moscow would and could have insisted on a clear statement of it in writing.<br />
However, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl did not endorse even this view. It would essentially mean West Germany leaving NATO. The U.S. and UK also disagreed. NATO without West Germany would have significantly weakened the organisation, making it an almost solely an Anglo-American affair after France all but exited in 1966. The official West German, U.S. and UK positions in negotiations with Moscow never included Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s idea. NATO’s eastward expansion was only discussed in clear text in the context of German reunification—namely whether NATO troops would be allowed on former-East German soil. NATO took the position that they had to be, as it would make no sense to have unified Germany as a full member with security guarantees for only half the country. Moscow agreed in the 1990 Treaty on Final Settlement with Respect to Germany that, yes, reunited Germany would remain in NATO, but no NATO troops should be moved into former East Germany until after all Soviet troops had departed. NATO was held to and kept this promise. Arguably, as NATO’s security blanket now also covered eastern Germany, it already represented an eastward expansion of NATO—by way of agreement with Moscow.<br />
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If NATO expansion was as vital an issue to Russia then as is claimed today, Moscow would and could have insisted on a clear statement of it in writing. It certainly would and should have wanted more than verbal assurances given during ongoing and evolving diplomatic negotiations. Of course some argue this away by claiming Moscow was outsmarted or outmanoeuvred by George HW Bush and Helmut Kohl and that the Soviets were under pressure to move quickly because of the impending collapse of Eastern European governments. Such a vital point must surely have been apparent to the Soviets. That former East bloc states may want to join the alliance one day was not so far outside the realm of possibilities. The idea had occurred to the U.S. State Department and Hungary and Poland were already discussing NATO membership in February 1990.<br />
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One important question should be asked: Why would NATO agree not to expand NATO eastwards? In 1990 the world held its breath at the prospect of the end of 45 years of Cold War. The United States and its trans-Atlantic partners had come out on top. Many in the Bush administration saw the job now as to help Gorbachev hold the situation together so that it did not descend into violent chaos. However, it would be extremely naïve to believe that the U.S. and its allies would agree to leave everything east of the Oder-Neisse Line alone, especially when they had finally won the Cold War. To do such a thing would fly in the face of 45 years of fighting a battle for democracy, capitalism and freedom against a communist vision of collectivism, oppression and stagnation. Why would NATO agree to forgo the fruits of victory? There is no written provision addressing NATO expansion contained in any of the agreements or communiques stemming from any of the negotiations. Those, such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Americans such as former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara and former US Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock, who assert such a promise was made have no concrete evidence to point to. They rely on retellings of flawed memories or the myths built from an assertion over time, all refuted by primary-source evidence. No such promise was ever made.<br />
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Regardless of the truth, the Russian government asserts, and many Russians undoubtedly believe, that such a promise was made and has been broken by NATO and the US specifically. Many others outside of Russia also believe it as an article of faith. Many want to believe it because it conforms to their Weltanschauung—worldview. With such cases, the truth is—sadly—unhelpful. Regardless of what was not promised, no less a personage than George Kennan asserted in 1998 that NATO expansion was unnecessary, that with the USSR gone there was no longer any threat and US support for continued expansion placed Russia up against a wall. Russia had to struggle to rebuild itself in a new post-Soviet image with a new role in Europe. Unable to join NATO or the EU, it watched as its former foe swallowed up more and more of its former satellites and crept into its ‘near abroad’. A reaction was to be expected. If this view is true, Vladimir Putin maintains a lingering Cold War imperialist mindset. Putin must see the 1990 negotiations, not as the final testament and rites of a dying empire, but as a sort of Neo-Potsdam Conference in which the Oder-Neisse Line was still being maintained, just with open borders, friendlier relations and looser control over satellites. Perhaps he considers it a bit like a much wider and more severe Polish or Prague Spring. He believes Russia was promised something by the US—that it would leave its near-abroad alone. He must also still believe Russia has a right to and should maintain dominance over its bordering states, as in the time of the Czar and Stalin after him. He does not believe these nations have a right to independent self-determination.<br />
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Putin must refuse to believe that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Georgia and now the Ukraine determined themselves they wanted to join NATO and/or the EU. For Russia, it can only be that America—and its partners Britain and France—conned or cajoled these states into coming over to their side of the ‘Iron Curtain’. For Putin, there is only Russia and the US and every other state is just a piece on the game board. If this is all true, it is understandable why Vladimir Putin wants to believe the US promised to leave Eastern Europe to him and Russia in 1990. This thinking also portrays some wishful thinking on America’s part, hoping against hope for the ‘end of history’ and the ‘peace dividend’. It is true that NATO was conceived to collectively confront the Soviet threat, now gone. However, to believe that the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact meant that NATO was no longer necessary because the last great evil had been defeated portrays naïve thinking and perhaps the doomed repetition of history.<br />
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The West still has not learned some lessons. We believed WWI was the ‘war to end all wars’. It was not. We believed the same at the end of WWII in 1945 and again at the end of the Cold War in 1990. While threats from Islamic terror and atomic rogue states have been exaggerated over the last 15 years, the history of the 20th century shows that America and Europe still need NATO. The world is still a dangerous place in which collective security remains necessary. In fact, looking at individual European military forces and defence budgets, collective security under NATO is all they have. None maintains a fighting force capable of mounting any sizeable operation without US support. History always returns. As with the dominant narrative of the Cold War, this thinking also leaves out the agency and will of other states besides the US and Russia. If the Cold War is truly over, then the Baltic and Eastern European states such as the Ukraine are not anymore just pawns or peons or customers to be convinced or coerced into choosing one side or the other. Even if such a promise had been made between NATO and Moscow 24 years ago—and it was not—they do not have the power to make decisions for these other countries today. They are sovereign, independent nations.<br />
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These states, their governments and their people control their own relations and chose to be members of NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and etcetera. After all, this freedom is what the US claimed to be fighting the Cold War for. It is within the Western rhetoric of freedom, independence and democracy. It was not the US or Europe who overthrew the Russian puppet government in the Ukraine in some Cold War-esque covert action—it was the Ukrainian people taking to the streets to demand change as they have several times over the last decade. To say that the US and its allies should have predicted and it was foreseeable that expanding NATO and considering Ukrainian EU membership would lead to a backlash from Russia is to ignore the individual will of Ukrainians, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians and reduce what they want to a secondary consideration. Anyone who claims this future was predictable based upon a false version of the past should be seriously questioned. Vladimir Putin believes Russia is entitled to control its neighbouring states as in the days of the USSR and the Russian Empire. It is not entitled to, no matter what it falsely believes it was promised 24 years ago.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-34188111855775900462014-07-10T14:21:00.000-05:002014-07-16T11:41:04.092-05:00When Vets Kill<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTaDyRiFf1vRRiV0rfCb_D8m7uokDVY8B-m3TgdOd51ajkSa1A_bzo6xU0P8Yme4AkOi95Hof9idREX1spyvUenzM4YEZs1VU6yZEkrheCQF0ZTwVBKtRsES2taQqnTnF_s15pWTr_M-M/s1600/Army+Funeral.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTaDyRiFf1vRRiV0rfCb_D8m7uokDVY8B-m3TgdOd51ajkSa1A_bzo6xU0P8Yme4AkOi95Hof9idREX1spyvUenzM4YEZs1VU6yZEkrheCQF0ZTwVBKtRsES2taQqnTnF_s15pWTr_M-M/s320/Army+Funeral.jpg" /></a><br />
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This post originally appeared in <a href="http://ciceromagazine.com/opinion/when-vets-kill/">Cicero Magazine</a> on 9 May 2014.<br />
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Are American vets saints or sinners? When incidents such as the 2009 and 2014 Fort Hood shootings, the 2012 Wisconsin Sikh Temple attack and the 2013 Washington Naval Yard shootings—all involving former military personnel—are combined in the media with reports of the epidemic of veteran suicide, veteran homelessness, military sexual trauma, and domestic violence among soldiers, it paints a grim picture. Yet the portrayal sends a mixed message when paired with the ‘celebrity Generals’ and corporate and political hero worship of serving troops and veterans. Such media depictions only serve to erect the metaphorical wall even higher between those who serve and those who do not, yet creating a kind of collective guilt among the latter that recoils in horror after such shootings, even as they cannot pass someone in uniform without reaffirming their patriotism with a token nod of support. More perplexing is when such shootings get hijacked by media discussions over PTSD, which distracts everyone from the real issue at stake: the presence of handguns on military bases, which are supposed to be citadels of security.So which is it: saints or sinners? <br />
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The answer is complicated, and one that is informed by this country’s collective urge to celebrate all things that support the troops, who Boston University’s Andrew Bacevich describes as the real “One Percent”, but without asking Americans to make a shred of sacrifice. God forbid that taxes were raised to pay for two wars or that anybody in Congress mention talk of a draft. In truth, a cynic might say that the troops are unfurled before the public whenever they help move product — whether to sell newspapers, to sell beer, to sell candidates, and so forth. The military and veterans are together one of the few institutions in America that continues to enjoy near-Universal, non-partisan respect. However this ‘respect’ often translates into little more than a pat on the back, a handshake and a ‘thanks for your service’. The struggles of America’s veterans are real. However, they are neither unblemished heroes nor violent mental psychopaths. What is missing from the veterans’ narrative depicted in the media is the veterans themselves.<br />
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Vets are portrayed as national saints or victims and perpetrators. Despite having such obvious symbolic power in America, veterans have little real power. Corporate boardrooms do not welcome them. There are virtually no veteran CEOs who do not work for military-related companies or in a project they did not start themselves. The US Congress has the lowest number of veteran members since the end of WWII. Military pay and benefits—long sacrosanct—are now being targeted as entitlements in fiscal battles in Washington. The VA benefits backlog is still a problem after decades of empty political promises. Many of those vets who do make it into powerful circles are often granted access because of who they come to know, not out of some belief that they merit success for their sacrifices. Most veterans organisations, new and old, have chosen or been forced to pick a partisan political side, despite the fact that neither side can claim to have clean hands when it comes to handling military and veterans affairs.<br />
Madison Avenue has also gotten on the troops-are-heroes gravy train. One can hardly pick up a name-brand product at a grocery store in America without it carrying a notice that some of the corporate proceeds go to helping ‘our heroes’ through a tax-deductible veteran’s charity. The opening or halftime ceremony of every major sporting event features tributes to the troops. <br />
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While it is encouraging that veterans and charities are receiving this kind of attention, it is clearly not for altruistic motives. Images of US troops are being used to sell products. Almost every major corporate brand in America has a military page on its website where it professes to make special efforts to hire vets—leaving out mention of the tax incentives it receives to do so. For-profit colleges with questionable reputations for quality mercilessly target veterans for their GI Bill funds. Politicians and political action groups are the worst offenders in abusing service-members for their own personal gain, from sources as diverse as gay pride rallies to Ron Paul’s presidential campaign. Despite regulations against it, men and women in uniform are a favorite backdrop for elected officials who hope to gain from the legitimacy and public support the troops enjoy.<br />
One can hardly pick up a name-brand product at a grocery store in America without it carrying a notice that some of the corporate proceeds go to helping ‘our heroes’ through a tax-deductible veteran’s charity.<br />
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This year’s Super Bowl featured a Budweiser ad showing a ‘Hero’s Welcome’ for a Lieutenant returning from Afghanistan. Budweiser at one point even claimed to have ‘Army support’ for the ad. Opinion among veterans was split as to whether the commercial stepped over the fine line between recognizing the troops and using them to sell products. It is against military regulations to appear in uniform to sell products or to participate in political activities. The US Army initially considered pursuing a cease-and-desist order to prevent the spot from airing and never adequately explained why it decided to allow Budweiser to go-ahead.<br />
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By way of contrast, immediately following the recent shootings at Fort Hood, Texas by Army Specialist Ivan Lopez, media reports were quick to point out that it happened on a military post, the shooter was a soldier, a veteran of the Iraq War, and apparently had Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Parallels were immediately drawn between this incident, the 2009 Fort Hood shootings by Major Nadal Hassan and the 2013 Washington Naval Yard shootings by Navy Reservist Aaron Alexis. Even the killing of three people at a Jewish community center in Kansas by a Klansman was linked to the gunman’s status as a Vietnam vet. With 24-hour television news and most major newspapers providing extensive coverage in the days and weeks following the Lopez shootings, one would be excused for believing there must be an epidemic of violence among American troops and veterans. Inside each of us, the media appears to insinuate, is a Timothy McVeigh itching to be heard.<br />
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But the depiction is false. A law enforcement analysis of 29 active shooter incidents between 1999 and 2012 found that most were workplace-related incidents committed by lone young men, the majority of which used semiautomatic pistols and died in the incident, either by their own hand or through the response of law enforcement personnel. Almost all of them had long-term issues with work or family. The most interesting fact is that of these 29 incidents, only 4 were current or former military personnel. One of them, Major Nadal Hassan, cited Islamic terror as his motive. Another, the Wisconsin Sikh Temple shootings, was motivated by racial hatred. The other two exhibited histories and grievances consistent with the other 25 non-veteran shooters. Based on this data, arguably there is no link between military service, PTSD and shooting rampages.<br />
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Specialist Ivan Lopez has the same profile as non-veteran active shooters. He was a young, lone male with a semiautomatic pistol who eventually turned his weapon on himself when confronted by law enforcement. The picture that has emerged of Lopez is of someone struggling to adjust to a new home, a new career and difficulties with his superiors—a situation that is not military-specific whatsoever. He just happened to be a soldier. Contrary to common views, Lopez did not just snap; he was likely harboring a long-simmering resentment toward his workplace and what he saw as unfairness in his life. The fact he already had his weapon in his car on the day of the shooting incident suggests a degree of premeditation or that he was already considering the possibility of taking action.<br />
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But the media immediately latched onto the fact he was a soldier, had deployed to Iraq and was being evaluated for PTSD. Much has since been made of the fact that he deployed to Iraq for only four months as proof he could not have PTSD. In fairness, one incident on one day is enough to be traumatized if severe enough. Different people are affected in different ways and, contrary to the media narrative, development and severity of PTSD does not depend upon the number of months or tours served in combat. One of the issues of treating PTSD and Traumatic Brain Injury is that they are mental wounds which can only be diagnosed by their symptoms as reported by or observed in the patient.<br />
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Perhaps Lopez did have PTSD, perhaps not. There is no way to know now. It actually matters very little. Despite the connection the media immediately draws in such circumstances, there is only a very weak connection between PTSD and violence. However it is clear that Specialist Lopez was struggling to deal with his life in a way that many non-military, non-veteran Americans do every day, a struggle which can lead to violence. However this has not kept the media from playing up the military-PTSD aspect.<br />
When it comes to US troops and veterans, the American media has developed a clearly detectable ‘Madonna/Whore Complex’, in which those who serve are invariably portrayed as either perfections of virtue beyond reproach (see the fawning coverage of David Petraeus prior to 2012) or as victims of the government or society or as perpetrators with festering mental health issues which may lead to suicide, violence or even murder. <br />
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Consider the following headline: “Veterans with PTSD Linked to Everything That Could Kill Your Children.” Fortunately, it is from the military satire site The Duffel Blog. Adding to this state of affairs is the (ab)use of service-members and veterans in media campaigns by politicians, political action committees and corporations for their own gain. Troops have become the new talking babies or cute kittens playing with yarn – mere props to move product and check Americans’ box to pay tribute for their service, and maybe even profit off their presence. Whenever events like the Fort Hood shooting presents us with a more nuanced and untidy picture of our veterans’ well-beings, we tend to veer into the other extreme, painting them with a broad brush as PTSD-addled killers. That is not to simply grasp the cliché that the truth is somewhere in between, but rather that most of our veterans are not unlike any other segment of the American population.<br />
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Take Specialist Ivan Lopez. On another day, in different circumstances, a former police officer, Iraq War vet and Army reservist who decided to switch to driving trucks on active duty to feed his family would have been a hero. He would have been in a Budweiser commercial or spoke at the local VFW. Instead, the media pictures him as a frustrated loser with PTSD who was ten years older than other troops his rank who could not handle his troubles anymore. The veteran is a war hero one day, an armed killer the next. Within hours of the shootings and his suicide, the story was already creating media churn and being put to political use by politicians and advocacy organisations. It has become the latest chapter in the debate about guns in America. One side argues that active shootings like those in Aurora, Sandy Hook, and Fort Hood could have been prevented if the public, school officials, and off-duty soldiers were allowed to be armed in public. The message has to focus on Lopez’s undiagnosed PTSD and mental health issues. It was not easy access to firearms that caused this shooting; it was Lopez’s mental health issues. Guns don’t kill people; people kill people.<br />
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Contrary to popular belief, living on a military post means less access and exposure to privately-owned firearms than living off post. The weapons used by Major Nadal Hassan and Specialist Ivan Lopez were obtained off post at private establishments and kept against military regulations. Though every company-sized military element on a base counts hundreds of firearms among its equipment, access to this weaponry is very tightly controlled by commanders and armorers. Troops cannot simply draw out their assigned rifle at will. It can only be for a purpose authorized by the unit commander. Though military posts such as Fort Hood may contain tens of thousands of small arms weapons, they are kept secure in padlocked racks or cages behind bank vault doors armed with alarms that notify military police directly any time an arms room is accessed. Most military facilities with arms rooms are also manned by soldiers 24 hours a day. Any time a weapon leaves a vault, a paper trail is created as to who signed for it, when, and what armorer allowed it out. Access to weaponry is taken seriously by the US military.<br />
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Contrast this with the various disjointed, inconsistent and ill-enforced laws regulating the purchase, use, transport, carrying and storage of civilian firearms outside of bases across the United States. No matter your interpretation of the 2nd Amendment, even transporting a firearm from one town or county to another can lead to an unknowing violation of the law. Each city, county and state seems to have its own rules and regulations and the federal government seems to change its application or interpretation of firearms regulations depending upon who is in Congress or the White House. America’s gun laws, no matter your view of them, are a tragi-comical absolute mess.<br />
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Many troops own personal firearms as well. Military policy requires these weapons be registered with their unit and must be stored in the same arms room as military weaponry and are subject to the same controls. As with military-issue weaponry, access to personal weapons is only by arrangement with the armorer with the permission of the unit commander.<br />
Yet some on the right would like to see more guns on military posts. More guns would not stop or deter an active shooter like Ivan Lopez. These are people who have determined they will commit a violent act and will continue to shoot people until they are shot by police or shoot themselves. The Hasan and Lopez shootings took place during the duty day and military police were on the scene within fifteen minutes. Both incidents were over quickly. Introducing an off duty soldier who happened by chance to be in the area and carrying his personal weapon into the situation could serve only to cause confusion among law enforcement as to who the perpetrator is. This would be made worse if word spreads across a post and draws armed soldiers who want to help, creating a tangle of armed troopers without command and control. Soldiers do not behave that way in combat and it makes equally less sense to do so on post. Law Enforcement, with special training, radios and coordination should handle such incidents.<br />
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It is rather ironic that the media focused on the military and PTSD aspect of the Lopez shooting rather than use it as an opportunity to discuss responsible gun laws. Instead, they’re portraying soldiers as victim-perpetrators to sell newspapers. In the case of Ivan Lopez, it was not PTSD or a soldier’s fondness for guns or access to military weaponry that allowed this latest Fort Hood shooting to occur. Lopez’s grievances with the world were not military-specific. They were the same issues many civilians have. Military weapons were not involved.<br />
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It was the easy access to weaponry off post that allowed Ivan Lopez to obtain a firearm in Killeen, Texas (ironically, from the same gun shop where Major Nadal Hasan bought one of his guns) and bring it onto post to kill his fellow soldiers. This incident had nothing to do with Lopez being a soldier or if he had PTSD or any failure in military policy as the media and some politicians and advocacy groups have claimed. It was the America outside of Fort Hood that allowed this incident to occur. If America outside the walls of military posts had as sensible gun control laws and took weapons as seriously as the America inside them, active shootings like this could be stopped.<br />
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Which returns us to the general public’s schizophrenic relationship with its armed forces. So long as there is this metaphorical wall between us and them, there will be this mixed message after tragedies whereby we praise our heroes with our right hand, while condemning their PTSD with our other hand, even as we refuse to do anything to fix our own gun-obsessed culture. Carry on America “supporting the troops,” with tributes, fundraisers, and shout-outs during seventh innings.<br />
Keep patting backs, wearing t-shirts and slapping on bumper stickers. But if you really want to pay tribute to their sacrifice, fix this country. Make it into one that is worth fighting for and that the troops are welcome and safe to return to.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-44176063400441144462014-06-24T10:00:00.001-05:002014-06-25T08:32:36.339-05:00Book Review: Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjuhpkK615PvOKXfSx2SMwCuMyaqc3nYW1i7twFq9TvHq1zZS0vH-V_h6nF1YTRxcXVeCWRa9gLozilpa7W9w1OsQwDYkbuCed2KEhG4zKB8ZgeCqUZYtIylNrSrudQWxsS4xmie2X1zLw/s1600/Huntington.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjuhpkK615PvOKXfSx2SMwCuMyaqc3nYW1i7twFq9TvHq1zZS0vH-V_h6nF1YTRxcXVeCWRa9gLozilpa7W9w1OsQwDYkbuCed2KEhG4zKB8ZgeCqUZYtIylNrSrudQWxsS4xmie2X1zLw/s320/Huntington.jpg" /></a><br />
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May, 2014<br />
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<b>Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.<br />
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In <i>The Clash of Civilisations</i>, Samuel Huntington offers a theory that seems accurate on the surface, but underneath leaves much to be desired. This review will outline some basic criticisms of Huntington’s theory.<br />
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Huntington’s central argument is that the world is a collection of competing and conflicting ‘civilisations’, a state of affairs which continues today and can be useful in predicting world trends in future. He poses that there are Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American and (possibly) African (45-48) civilisations. He defines civilisation (42-45) as ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species’ (43). The trouble, which Huntington himself avoids by referencing earlier works to establish them, is trying in any detailed way to define the tenets or boundaries of individual civilisations, which would be vital if it is to offer any value in understanding their motivations or predicting their future actions. He identifies self-identification (43) with a civilisation as a factor and religion as another (42, 47). However, the former is chosen by an individual and the latter can be misleading as to where that individual falls on any issue based upon how strong their faith is. He acknowledges that civilisations change, ‘evolve’, ‘rise and fall’, ‘merge and divide’, and even ‘disappear’ (44). Though it may help explain the world as it is, the evolving nature of civilisations saps his theory of much of its predictive value.<br />
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Huntington’s most convincing point in defining civilisations is that civilisations are cultural groupings which outlive or transcend the politics, governments and states which govern them (43-44). Though the British Empire has fallen, there is still British civilisation. The Ottoman Empire is gone, but the civilisation still exists in Turkey. China and Germany have seen multiple forms of state over the last 200 years, but still maintain distinct civilisations very similar in character to those which predate these changes. Civilisations are cultural communities which outlive political, economic and scientific upheavals.<br />
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A weakness in the theory, which Huntington alludes to, is that civilisations ‘do not, as such, maintain order, establish justice, collect taxes, fight wars, negotiate treaties, or do any of the other things which governments do’ (44). Civilisations simply exist and their underlying cultures, as discussed above, evolve, merge, divide or disappear. No one controls them. Mao Zedong attempted to alter China’s ‘civilisation’ during the Cultural Revolution, as did Western powers in their colonies, and Hitler and Stalin in their own attempts. Arguably, none of them succeeded in permanently altering cultures or civilisations, despite killing millions. Huntington devotes Chapter 3 (56-78) to the concept of ‘universal civilisation’, dominated by Western ideas which Modernists attempt to portray as the ideal civilisation the world should adopt in order to progress. Huntington actually agrees with his critics, such as Edward Said, that the attempt to impose or promote this Modernist, Western-dominated version of a universal civilisation is a major reason for the ‘clash’ between cultures which reject its imposition upon them. Huntington believes ‘Western universalism is dangerous to the world because it could lead to a major inter-civilizational war’ (311).<br />
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However, the specific activities which can be seen as evidence of the’ imposition’ of this idea are conducted by certain identifiable states, not Western civilisation, because no one controls Western civilisation or any civilisation--accepting Huntington’s definition of them. Civilisations exist independent of any control. States within the West, and within other civilisations, often go in opposite directions. The United States and others may claim or be seen as speaking for the West as what Huntington calls a ‘Core State’ (35), but the US cannot control the will of Western civilisation. The division between Western powers over the War on Terror and the Iraq War in particular are examples. GW Bush’s attempt to rally the West with a ‘with-us-or-against-us’ line failed miserably among allies.<br />
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When Huntington points out armed conflicts as ‘clashes of civilisations’ they are also still clashes between states. As Huntington himself points out above, civilisations ‘do not, as such, ...fight wars’ (44). ‘Civilisations’ themselves cannot conduct any of the actions which Huntington must cite as evidence of ‘clash’. States can act. Civilisations cannot. Even non-state actors such as terrorist groups and international institutions have only a weak claim to represent civilisation. Different civilisations or cultures may present cultural differences which can lead to conflict, but civilisations themselves have no vehicle for armed conflict, or peace, or governing. Civilisations do not clash; states or non-state actors clash and claim their fight is for the good of their version of ‘civilisation’. Civilisation cannot be controlled by any state, but state behaviour can be controlled.<br />
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<blockquote>
<span style="background-color: #444444; color: #ffd966; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-large;">Civilizations do not clash; states or non-state actors clash and claim their fight is for the good of their version of 'civilization'.</span></blockquote>
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If Huntington is right and civilisations are indeed the vehicle through which clashes are increasingly occurring and civilisations are entities which no state or other institution directly controls, then the ‘clash of civilisations’ would seem to be inevitable and uncontrollable. The only path to peace is for civilisations to retreat into themselves and recognise the spheres of other civilisations. This is exactly the situation Huntington describes and what he prescribes for the West (312). In a section called ‘The Renewal of the West?’ (301-308) he deplores the erosion of moral values, specifically calls for a rejection of multiculturalism, revival of Christianity and a renewed commitment to ‘liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property’ (305), concepts claimed as central to Western civilisation. This can be seen as a return to basic principles akin to fundamentalism. As discussed in a section called ‘The Islamic Resurgence’ (109-119), Huntington holds that Islamic Fundamentalism is the Islamic world doing just that, in line with his advice for the West. His answer to Islamic Fundamentalism is Western Fundamentalism. Arguably, this sort of ‘fight-fire-with-fire’ response could just as well serve to widen any divide and perhaps hasten the very clash Huntington wants to avoid.<br />
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Huntington outlines early on (31-35) why other prevailing international relations theories leave room for his argument and makes his weakest argument against Realism (33). He believes Realism explains much about how states exercise power in pursuit of interests, but it doesn’t account for differences in how different states determine what their interests are or determine priorities among interests. He believes civilizational contrasts accounts for these differences. This may or may not be true, but he simply asserts that ‘states increasingly define their interests in civilizational terms’ (34) without much more explanation. He then goes on to argue that international institutions have eroded state authority, that there is a trend toward secessionism and devolution of power to local governments and that globalisation and the internet have reduced states’ ability to control ‘the flows of ideas, technology, goods, and people.’ (35)<br />
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Huntington gives international institutions more authority than they actually have. The UN does carry much weight in the world today, but despite this, states continue to do what they consider in their interest and the UN, lacking autonomous enforcement mechanisms, must rely on states to enforce its collective will. Much like civilisations, international institutions only work when states play along. Institutions such as NATO and the World Bank, though international, fall under the sway of their dominant member states, such as the United States. Most devolved governments are still dependent upon national governments for revenue, law and order and security. These institutions don’t have a will of their own; rather they represent the will of their dominant state member(s). Many secessionist movements are in fact proxy conflicts between states. States such as China and North Korea show states are still able to control the flow of goods and ideas within their borders if they decide it is in their interest to do so. Most states have decided open minds and borders are in their interest and haven’t simply lost the ability to control their borders as Huntington argues. State behaviour can be changed and controlled, whereas the character of civilisations cannot be. A ‘clash of civilisations’ is not inevitable.<br />
<br />
A major criticism of Huntington’s theory is that it is all about ‘clash’ and says very little about the positive aspects of what happens when civilisations meet. Huntington only explores the negative security dimensions of his theory. The success of Huntington’s Clash may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with those in government who take up the theory seeing only clashes . If the West were to follow Huntington’s prescription, it would retreat into its core, focus on intra-civilisational interaction and pursue isolationist foreign policy. The world has benefitted greatly from the open exchange of people, ideas, culture and technology between civilisations. For example, Huntington goes on in sections entitled ‘Islam and the West’ (207-217) and ‘Incidence: Islam’s Bloody Borders’ (254-258) to discuss at length conflicts between Islam and other civilisations it comes into contact with, but wholly ignores the historically positive benefits of trade, scientific exchange and political cross-pollination between them, for example, between the Ottoman Empire and Western or Orthodox states on the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Huntington’s theory would be much more acceptable if it balanced the ‘clash of civilisations’ with ‘cooperation of civilisations’. There is an argument to be made that even if civilisations clash at times, the benefits of cooperation and interaction outweigh the drawbacks.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, Huntington’s theory seems at the surface to explain the perceived intractable differences between the West and the Islamic world and between other civilisations, but, in depth, the picture drawn is an inaccurate representation of how these ‘clashes’ occur. Huntington’s prescriptions for the ‘clash’ are also questionable. He additionally fails to explore any positive aspects of the meeting of civilisations which could bring balance to his theory. However, the theory is not wholly without merit and deserves more in depth articulation and exploration.<br />
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<br />
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NOTES<br />
1. Booth, K. (1997) “Huntington’s Homespun Grandeur.” The Political Quarterly 68 (4): pp. 425–428.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-23303732051117537002014-06-15T10:56:00.001-05:002014-06-25T08:35:52.085-05:00De-Stalinisation: A Fatal Blow for International Socialism?<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBtn33wc6UO17UIk0rpT1G_Xk4JvcRqPe6cwL6fcEfFMUovB1C1tVsy_vVAya0FpSdYvuWU3vv-ZNc7dEFGt0HzwNqGc4skHVOAIQ8IwdtI_LTM2wJpmHYq0-QKTJB0fHsQkF5YprWkt8/s1600/Khrushchev.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBtn33wc6UO17UIk0rpT1G_Xk4JvcRqPe6cwL6fcEfFMUovB1C1tVsy_vVAya0FpSdYvuWU3vv-ZNc7dEFGt0HzwNqGc4skHVOAIQ8IwdtI_LTM2wJpmHYq0-QKTJB0fHsQkF5YprWkt8/s320/Khrushchev.jpg" /></a><br />
<br />
May 2014<br />
<br />
<b>Introduction</b><br />
Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’ of 25 February 1956 to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) served as the first clear, unequivocal and public notice that overdue reform had indeed come to Soviet policy. As Khrushchev made clear, for the Soviet Union it marked the full commencement of ‘de-Stalinsation’ in which Stalin’s ‘Cult of the Individual’ would be denounced; subjective history would be corrected; his paranoia and purges would be condemned; gulags would be emptied and party members rehabilitated, and; rule of law would be reinstated. It also provided a way for current CPSU leaders to win public support while shifting the blame for excesses onto the late Stalin and his executed security chief, Lavrentiy Beria. The Secret Speech and De-Stalinisation had major political effects for international communism. <br />
<br />
De-Stalinisation had different effects in different places. To provide some (but surely not all) particular examples, the 1956 revolt and government changes in Poland were clearly results of Khrushchev’s speech and new policy. In China, Mao Zedong opposed de-Stalinisation and contributed to the Sino-Soviet split. In North Korea, Kim Il Sung viewed de-Stalinisation as a personal threat which led to an attempt to unseat him. This essay will rely predominantly on primary sources, beginning with the Secret Speech and continuing with correspondence with national leaders involved, to show that de-Stalinsation, while not dealing a fatal blow, certainly created cracks and fissures within the foundation of international communism.<br />
<br />
<b>De-Stalinisation and the Secret Speech</b><br />
In order to understand why de-Stalinisation created such problems for international communism, it is necessary to analyse what de-Stalinisation meant. As Jones (2006:2) points out, there is more than one definition of ‘de-Stalinisation’. It can refer to the wider context of not only the program of government policy reform and programs of the Khrushchev era from 1956 to 1964, but also to social, cultural and artistic changes over the same period, a larger concept used often by post-USSR and Western journalists and academics to study all of these changes over the period. However, here de-Stalinisation will refer to the narrower concept contemporary to the era itself which focused on ‘de-mythologization of the leader cult’ (ibid.). Khrushchev’s Secret Speech (1956) reads like an instruction manual laying out what Khrushchev and the Presidium intended to achieve with the new policy and provides an explanation of what was controversial about de-Stalinisation so as to cause rifts in international communism.<br />
<br />
<b>Background: Soviet Succession and de-Stalinisation, 1953-1956</b><br />
According to Filtzer (1993:12), ‘even before Stalin’s death the need for economic and even some political reforms had been mooted’ and ‘immediately after Stalin’s death there were cautious movements toward de-Stalinisation.’ In the period preceding Stalin’s death in March 1953 up to 1956, cautiously floating ideas for judicial, economic and political reform became part of the power struggle to succeed Stalin involving Khrushchev, Levrentiy Beria, Georgy Malenkov, and Vyacheslav Molotov (Morgan et al, 2000:103). <br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="color: #ffd966; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: large;">'In order to understand why de-Stalinisation created such problems for international communism, it is necessary to analyse what de-Stalinisation meant.'</span></blockquote>
<br />
Beria, seen as the most ready proponent of reform, was quickly out of the picture, denounced in 1953 for a supposed coup plot and eventually executed. The following month, a plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU became a forum for the first joint criticisms of Stalin by Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov in private, but the public plenum report ‘fantastically’ blamed Beria for the nation’s troubles (Filtzer, 1993:13-5). No member of the CC, each struggling for power against the others, could rule alone as Stalin had and consequently had to win support for their policies. Whoever emerged as leader would have to rule the Soviet Union by persuasion rather than fear. However, each of them had come to their position in collusion with Stalin and it would be difficult to criticise him without inviting criticism of their own actions. They also worried signalling radical change too quickly could invite more political unrest as had been triggered by Stalin’s death, such as the uprising in East Berlin in June 1953. Laying the blame on Beria solved the problem for the time being (ibid.).<br />
<br />
The power struggle continued, with Malenkov, Prime Minister and head of the government, facing off against Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU and head of the party, rising to the top. Malenkov, favouring more conciliatory policy toward the West, was discredited following what was perceived as more confrontational US and NATO policy, allowing Khrushchev to become leader of the Soviet Union by 1954 (Morgan et al, 2000:104). In 1955 the CC CPSU established a committee to investigate Stalin’s crimes, but limited it to investigating his ‘abuses of power’. It distinguished between Stalin’s ‘legitimate’ or ‘necessary’ actions against supporters of other competing Bolsheviks such as Leon Trotsky and Nikolai Bukharin in the 1920’s and 1930’s as opponents of ‘Lenin’s Party’ and Stalin’s illegitimate denunciations of innocent party members, artists and intellectuals who could now be released from gulags and rehabilitated into society. Again fearing the report would trigger unrest and questions regarding the involvement of CC members, Malenkov, Molotov and others opposed it. However, a strengthened Khrushchev argued it would be better to discuss the matter now at a time of their choosing. The goal would be to place blame on Stalin and Beria to support the need for the coming policy changes. The report formed much of the basis for Khrushchev’s February 1956 ‘Secret Speech’ (Filtzer, 1993:14-6). An analysis of its contents is necessary to understand why it caused such a stir in the communist world.<br />
<br />
<b>The Secret Speech</b><br />
Khrushchev announced the topic and set the tone of his Secret Speech (1956) with reference to the ‘founding fathers’ of the Soviet Union. He quotes Karl Marx:‘Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual…Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my merits and which annoyed me…Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute...’(ibid.:para 2).<br />
<br />
He moved on to Vladimir Lenin, stating ‘Lenin at the same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the individual’ and continuing (ibid.:para 5):‘During Lenin's life the central committee of the party was a real expression of collective leadership of the party and of the Nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers. He tried to convince; he patiently explained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently observed that the norms of party life were realized, that the party statute was enforced, that the party congresses and the plenary sessions of the central committee took place at the proper intervals (ibid.:para 7).<br />
<br />
Khrushchev made clear that the founders were firmly against the Cult of Personality; were believers in collective leadership of the party and state; discussed views rather than imposing them, and; allowed the party apparatus to function as it was organised to. Stalin had not been for these things. <br />
<br />
Khrushchev opened direct criticism of Stalin by quoting Lenin:‘Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, that lies capriciously, and abuses his power...Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man, who above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness, and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper…’(ibid.:paras 8-9).<br />
<br />
Khrushchev used the words of Lenin himself to begin criticism of Stalin and there is a suggestion that Khrushchev could fulfill Lenin’s wish that Stalin be replaced as head of the party by a more worthy man. <br />
<br />
He went on to describe in detail Stalin’s transgressions as ‘grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party’ (ibid.:para 11), that ‘many prominent party leaders and rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism...’ (ibid.:para 12) in a system that ‘rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven’ which ‘actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this or that issue’ and where ‘confessions were acquired through physical pressures against the accused...’ (ibid.:para 13). He carefully explained why current CC leaders could do nothing: ‘The majority of the Political Bureau members did not, at that time, know all of the circumstances in these matters, and could not therefore intervene...’(ibid.:para 55).<br />
<br />
He built toward his conclusion, announcing ‘Comrades, we must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological, theoretical and practical work’ (ibid.:para 76). He then laid out what de-Stalinsation would entail: ‘First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another…’ (ibid.:para 78). Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the party's central committee during the last years…characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, characterized by the observation of the norms of party life described in the statutes of our party, and,finally, characterized by the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism’ (ibid.:para 81).‘Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet Socialist democracy expressed in the constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight willfulness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary Socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected…’ (ibid.:para 82). He drew the speech and the 20th Party Conference to a close to resounding applause throughout the hall.<br />
<br />
The Secret Speech made clear the Soviet view that the Cult of Personality was inimical to Marxism-Leninism and was to be eradicated; that collective leadership of the state by a functioning party apparatus was to be restored, and; that abuse of power was to end and rule of law was to be restored.<br />
<br />
<b>International Communism and the Problems of de-Stalinsation</b><br />
A look around the communist world in Europe and Asia as it existed in 1956 reveals that it was actually home to many ‘little Stalins’ who had built their own Cults of Personality, who did not want collective leadership or a functioning party apparatus, and who were happy to continue dictatorial rule. Poland’s Boleslaw Bierut, China’s Mao Zedong and North Korea’s Kim Il Sung were men who had very much consolidated power and ruled their countries as Stalin had had ruled the Soviet Union. Criticism of Stalin meant criticism of them by implication. The people they ruled now had legitimate grounds--straight from Moscow--to grumble and criticise their own leaders. De-Stalinisation caused real problems in the relationship between Moscow and its international communist brethren.<br />
<br />
<b>De-Stalinisation and the Polish October</b><br />
In Poland, events following the Secret Speech seemed to align in a way guaranteed to lead to turmoil. Only a week after the 20th Party Conference, Poland’s ‘little Stalin’--Boleslaw Bierut--died mysteriously in Moscow. With the goal of winning popular support and to head off any unrest following Bierut’s death as had followed Stalin’s, the Polish government distributed Khrushchev’s speech more widely than any other socialist government to show readiness to break with Stalin and for national reform. Between late March and early April 1956, over 10,000 Polish socialists had participated in meetings discussing the Secret Speech (Machcewicz, 2006: 144). These new ideas contributed to a violent uprising, beginning in the city of Poznan, and eventually led the government to invite the popular Vladislaw Gomulka, a socialist formerly imprisoned for resisting Stalin and viewed as a reformer, to become Prime Minister. He immediately began to pursue a more balanced, independent relationship with Moscow, including advocating removal of all Soviet troops from Poland. This alarmed Khrushchev and the CC who in October 1956 ordered troops poised at the Polish border to intervene. Khrushchev and most of the CC flew unannounced to Poland. In an all-night conference at the Belweder Palace in Warsaw, Gomulka was finally able to convince a furious Khrushchev that Poland was not leaving the socialist orbit and was only pursuing a looser relationship with Moscow, averting a full-scale Soviet invasion (ibid.: 149-51).<br />
<br />
<b>Gomulka’s Notes on the Belweder Conference</b><br />
Vladislaw Gomulka’s (1956) shorthand notes reveal the great Soviet concern about the more independent Polish course. The Poles had not informed or discussed with Moscow these party and policy changes, had then ignored Moscow’s request for a conference, and left the Kremlin concerned about American media reports of a split between Moscow and Warsaw (ibid.:para 2). The Soviets made clear that ‘From Poland they need nothing’, but they were ready to invest 2.2 million roubles into a Polish iron ore facility and pointed out that Soviet officers had turned the Polish military into a ‘high calibre force’ (ibid.:paras 3-5). The Soviets urged war should be avoided and unity of socialist camp maintained (ibid.:paras 6-8) and a ‘wedge’ should not be forced between them (ibid.:para 9). They feared the Poles did not understand the danger of the situation—though it is unclear if the ‘danger’ they meant was of a Soviet invasion or that posed to the Polish government by the workers revolts (ibid.). The Soviets were very concerned with anti-Soviet sentiment in the Polish press and comparing it to criticisms in Yugoslavia, a socialist state which had left the Soviet orbit. They were also concerned with the effects if Poland were to leave the Warsaw Pact. They also were disgruntled with the continued personnel changes in the Polish communist party—a reference to Gomulka himself (ibid.:paras 9-15).<br />
<br />
From Gomulka’s notes it is clear that the Polish events of 1956, set in motion by de-Stalinisation and the death of Bierut, caused a rift between Warsaw and Moscow which brought them to the brink of war to repair. Moscow acquiesced to Warsaw’s will for a looser relationship. Over the coming weeks, those hoping for change in Hungary as a result of de-Stalinisation would not fare as well as those in Poland.<br />
<br />
<b>De-Stalinsation and the Sino-Soviet Split</b><br />
The effect of de-Stalinisation following the Secret Speech was equally if not more pronounced in Sino-Soviet relations. In 1959, the Soviet Foreign Ministry instructed Mikhael Zimyanin to author a report on the Moscow-Beijing relationship to assist efforts to alleviate ‘a growing rift between Moscow and Beijing—a rift that had not yet flared up in public’ (Kramer, 1995:170). Among the report’s conclusions was that the official commencement of de-Stalinisation following the 20th Party Conference had a detrimental effect upon Sino-Soviet relations (ibid.:171).<br />
<br />
According to the report, in months following the conference ‘the CPC CC, while not speaking about this directly, took a position different from ours when evaluating the activity of J. V. Stalin’ (Zimyanin, 1959:para 4), namely one that was critical of Soviet policy toward China as a whole. The difference was exhibited during the ‘hundred flowers’ campaign in the activity of those: ‘Who denounced the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing to uphold principles of equality and mutuality, and they alleged that Soviet assistance was self-interested and of inferior quality. They also asserted that the Soviet Union had not provided compensation for equipment taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that the Soviet Union was extracting money from China in return for weapons supplied to Korea, which were already paid for with the blood of Chinese volunteers. In addition, they lodged a number of territorial demands against the USSR’… It is also worth noting that the Chinese friends, despite crushing the rightist elements, did not offer any open condemnation of statements expressed by them about so-called “territorial claims on the USSR”’(ibid.:para 5).<br />
<br />
<b>Mao Zedong’s View of De-Stalinsation</b> <br />
Mao Zedong makes it even clearer that de-Stalinisation contributed to the Sino-Soviet split and therefore problems for international communism as a whole. In a 1962 meeting with Albanian officials, he offered: 'At the beginning we did not foresee the effects that would flow from the spirit of the 20th Congress. Later the 21st and the 22nd Congresses were held. From them we saw that N. Khrushchev was not calm; he once again showed that he is very worried about Stalin. That is why he once again attacked Stalin at the 22nd Congress until he achieved his goal of removing Stalin’s body from the mausoleum and burning it. But we know well that N. Khrushchev is not so much afraid of dead people; he is afraid of the living, he is afraid of those that support Stalin’ (Zedong, 1962:para 14).<br />
<br />
Mao most clearly stated his opposition to Moscow’s de-Stalinisation--lumping it together with fighting against the Japanese and Americans--in a 1969 conversation with North Korea’s Choe Yong-Geon: ‘During the years of resistance against Japan, the Korean comrades fought against the enemy together with us for a long time. During the war against the Americans, we also fought side by side with the Korean comrades…In opposing Khrushchev's revisionism, we stood together on the same side!....We have been old friends. We both opposed de-Stalinization, and we reached a consensus on this issue a long time ago’ (Zedong, 1969).<br />
<br />
It is clear from the views of both the Kremlin and Mao Zedong himself that de-Stalinisation following the 20th Party Congress contributed greatly to the Sino-Soviet split and to problems for international communism as a whole which would only worsen in following years.<br />
<br />
<b>De-Stalinisation and Kim Il Sung’s Cult of Personality</b><br />
The opening of de-Stalinisation following the 20th Party Congress led to a break between the USSR and North Korea in fall 1956. Khrushchev’s speech against the Cult of Personality was of direct concern to Kim, who had very much adopted Stalin’s leadership style since coming to power. Lankov (1999:46) states ‘The North Korean political and social system had been modelled on the Stalinist system, and the personality cult of Kim Il Sung—the cult of "the little leader"—had been patterned after the cult of "the big leader" Stalin; any diminution of Stalin's prestige spelled danger for Kim's own authority. Kim had good reason to fear that his rivals would employ the "little leader, big leader" analogy to accuse him of establishing his own personality cult.’ Kim had already taken steps to repress the Soviet faction of the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) as early as 1955 (ibid.). However, at the 30 August 1956 plenum of KWP CC, only 6 months after the CPSU’s 20th Party Congress, the leaders of the so-called Yanan and Soviet factions attempted to move against Kim, denouncing him in speeches as ‘an adherent of outdated Stalinist methods and personally responsible for numerous “distortions of the socialist legality’’ and a headlong rush toward heavy industrialization’, much in the line of the general criticisms of Stalinists following the Secret Speech. In the end, Kim was able to see off the challengers, promptly expelling them from the party and arresting them, besides the few able to escape to China (Lankov, 2002:90). Following these events, Kim moved further from Moscow and closer to Beijing, consolidating his power and maintaining his Cult of Personality, which continues unabated today.<br />
<br />
<b>Ambassdor Ivanov’s Notes from a Discussion with Kim Il Sung</b><br />
The day after the turbulent KWP CC plenum, Kim met with Soviet Ambassador Ivanov and described the events to him: ‘At the Plenum…[Minister of Trade] Yun Gong-heum arose. In his speech he brought accusations that the Workers’ Party had rejected the decisions of the Twentieth Congress and does not follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism; he described matters such that the very serious consequences of the cult of personality are being retained inside the KWP and had repudiated the general line of the party’ (Ivanov(a), 1956:para 5).<br />
<br />
Kim was able to see off their challenge with other members of the CC who had conspired with Yun had been expelled from the KWP and some had fled to the Chinese border (ibid.:paras 6-9). It is clear that Kim considered de-Stalinisation stemming from the 20th Party Congress as the main driver of this attempted putsch.<br />
<br />
<b>Ambassador Ivanov’s Notes from a Discussion with PRC Ambassador Qiao</b><br />
A few days later Ambassador Ivanov met with the Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK, Xiaoguang Qiao who confirmed that the KWP plenum refugees were indeed in China. Qing relayed that, according to his information, Yun’s speech had: ‘Contained malicious and libellous attacks on the leadership of the KWP. He accused the leadership of the KWP of poorly putting into practice the decree of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU about the personality cult. As a result the leadership of the KWP had supposedly committed serious mistakes, conveying in the absence of democracy within the party incorrect distribution of cadres, and displaying incompetence in handling the difficult welfare situation of the Korean people’ (Ivanov(b), 1956:para 7).<br />
<br />
Oddly, despite the clear references to de-Stalinisation and the 20th Party Congress, both ambassadors somehow agreed later in the meeting, seeking to dodge blame, that the Korean events ‘were not stimulated by any outside factors, Soviet or Chinese, but were a domestic process taking place within the KWP’ (ibid.:para 12). However, it is clear from these documents and events that de-Stalinisation stimulated the August 1956 KWP CC uprising against Kim and created the rift between Pyongyang and Moscow.<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion</b><br />
The official onset of de-Stalinisation following Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’ to the 20th Party Congress on 25 February 1956 set in motion events throughout the world that caused great turmoil within international communism. These events were not fatal; the Soviet Union, China and its socialist partner states remained, as a bloc, a world force for at least another 35 years. Despite their differences, their ships still sailed in generally the same direction when it came to opposing the West and capitalism. Nonetheless, the 1956 revolt and party leadership changes in Poland were clearly results of de-Stalinisation; in China, Mao Zedong’s opposition to de-Stalinisation contributed to the Sino-Soviet split, and; in North Korea, Kim Il Sung viewed de-Stalinisation as a personal threat which had led to an attempt to unseat him. Though not fatal, de-Stalinisation clearly created cracks and fissures within the foundations of international communism.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b><br />
<br />
Filtzer, D. (1993) The Khrushchev Era: De-Stalinisation and the Limits of Reform in the USSR, 1953-1964. London: Macmillan.<br />
<br />
Gomulka, V. (1956) “Gomulka’s Notes from the 19-20 October Polish-Soviet Talks”. The Wilson Center. The Wilson Center Digital Archive. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116002<br />
<br />
Ivanov(a), V. (1956) “Diary of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V.I. Ivanov for the Period from 29 August to 14 September 1956”. The Wilson Center. The Wilson Center Digital Archive. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114136<br />
<br />
Ivanov(b), V. (1956) “Memorandum of Conversation with the Ambassador of the Peoples Republic of China to the DPRK Qiao Xiaoguang”. The Wilson Center. The Wilson Center Digital Archive. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113373<br />
<br />
Jones, P. (2006) “Introduction.” In The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization, edited by Jones, P., pp. 1–18. New York: Routledge.<br />
<br />
Khrushchev, N. (1956) “Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech,’ Delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,”. The Wilson Center. The Wilson Center Digital Archive. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115995<br />
<br />
Kramer, M. (1995) “The USSR Foreign Ministry’s Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, September 1959.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6/7, no. 6/7: pp. 170–185.<br />
<br />
Lankov, A. 1999. “Kim Il Sung’s Campaign Against the Soviet Faction in Late 1955 and the Birth of Chuch’e.” Korean Studies 23: pp. 43–67.<br />
<br />
———. (2002) “Kim Takes Control: The ‘Great Purge’ in North Korea, 1956-1960.” Korean Studies 26 (1): pp. 87–119.<br />
<br />
Machcewicz, P. (2006) “The Polish 1956.” In 1956 European and Global Perspectives, edited by Fink, C., Hadler, F., and Schramm, T. Leipzig: K&M.<br />
<br />
Morgan, P., Nelson, K., and Arbatov, G. (2000) Re-Viewing the Cold War: Domestic Factors and Foreign Policy in the East-West Confrontation. New York: Greenwood. <br />
<br />
Zedong, M. (1962) “Memorandum of Conversation, Albanian Labor Party Delegation with Mao Zedong”. The Wilson Center. The Wilson Center Digital Archive. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117679<br />
<br />
———. (1969) “Mao Zedong’s Conversation with North Korean Official Choe Yong-Geon (Excerpt)”. The Wilson Center. The Wilson Center Digital Archive. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111509<br />
<br />
Zimyanin, M. (1959) “Mikihail Zimyanin’s Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt)”. The Wilson Center. The Wilson Center Digital Archive. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117030Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-42561175868347109862014-05-28T14:06:00.000-05:002014-06-24T08:21:13.271-05:00'The Middle East is not so particular': Fred Halliday and his Critique of Orientalism<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGH5xkDm6Jb-dQY4jIQUzxLNm2cAqMl8pfZaS6FBbdJWVKa9pWtIB4QW1lzpcmcEZ9hFOuwatxL1Yzu50VhyEL0MwuBmgOejGq1hir9QDkJ7l0CCyvYmaFPiMAt010M0LL7q4UYDcF6Yo/s1600/Orientalism.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGH5xkDm6Jb-dQY4jIQUzxLNm2cAqMl8pfZaS6FBbdJWVKa9pWtIB4QW1lzpcmcEZ9hFOuwatxL1Yzu50VhyEL0MwuBmgOejGq1hir9QDkJ7l0CCyvYmaFPiMAt010M0LL7q4UYDcF6Yo/s320/Orientalism.jpg" /></a><br />
<br />
<i>May, 2014</i><br />
<br />
<b>Introduction</b><br />
The study of the Middle East, the Arab world and Islam owe much to a group of historians who call themselves ‘Orientalists’ and no study of these subjects would be complete without considering the critique of these historians by another group of Postmodernist thinkers who follow the writings of Edward Said, especially his 1978 book Orientalism. Together their views have formed two academic camps within the study of the Islam, the Middle East and its peoples. In his 2003 book Islam & the Myth of Confrontation, Fred Halliday criticises both camps for their lack of useful analysis and building a ‘particularist’ view of the Middle East in which the region is treated as peculiar from the rest of the world, with conditions there only being explicable through a unique regional prism or by a particular Western program of domination of the region. This essay will explore Halliday’s critique of Orientalism in support of his view that ‘the Middle East is not so particular’ as the Orientalists or Postmodernists would have it.<br />
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<br />
‘If [Bernard] Lewis is arguing that for Muslims history is about the production and maintenance of a legitimizing set of historical myths, then Muslims are hardly unique. The same could surely be said of the Irish, the Serbs, the Hindus, the Boers, the Americans, the Japanese, and indeed almost anyone. What appears as a specific, defining characteristic turns out to be something shared with many others. The Middle East is not so particular’ (Halliday, 2003:205) [emphasis added].<br />
<br />
Here Fred Halliday criticizes an assertion by Bernard Lewis, intellectual and personal arch-enemy of Edward Said, in the New York Review of Books which begins ‘For Muslims, history is important’ (Lewis, 1991). Halliday cites Lewis’ views in the article as an example of Edward Said’s concept of ‘Orientalism’ and explains what Lewis actually means is ‘history in the sense of an accurate assessment of the past does not actually matter for them [Muslims]’ (Halliday, 2003:205). Halliday argues that the ‘production and maintenance of a legitimizing set of historical myths’ (ibid.) is not unique or particular to the Middle East as Lewis would have it and cites other non-Muslim peoples who maintain their own self-regarding historical myths. <br />
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Abizadeh (2004:292), writing on nationalism particularly in the context of Western liberal democracies, holds that ‘the national memory must be a wilfully selective memory. This mythical element in its shared memories is what enables the nation’s common history to provide it with a motivating power, so much so that the academic study of history poses a threat to the capacity of the nation to hold together’. The common memory of this manufactured history unites people and ties them together and the unsentimental, objective study of history threatens that narrative. Negative reaction to histories, such as many Americans’ reaction to Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States (1980), which seek to counter such sanitised, nationalised histories by telling the bad along with the good are labelled as revisionist (Greenberg, 2013) by those who do not wish to hear them. Russians, Chinese and Britons for example—all non-Middle Eastern societies—each have just as strong national or origin myths, often historically inaccurate, about their nations and ethnic origins as people of the Middle East. ‘American exceptionalism’ provides a particularly strong example of a non-Middle Eastern society with a selective attitude toward its own history. As Tyrrell (1991:1031) puts it, ‘nowhere has a nation-centred historical tradition been more resilient than in the United States. There, modern historicism, with its emphasis on the uniqueness of all national traditions, was grafted onto an existing tradition of exceptionalism. The pre-historicist idea of the United States as a special case "outside" the normal patterns and laws of history runs deep in American experience.’ Halliday is correct that a selective, oft-inaccurate view of origin and history is not particular to the Middle East as asserted by Bernard Lewis and other Orientalists; it is common throughout humanity.<br />
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It is these and similar assertions of the particularity or uniqueness of the Middle East and its people and culture that Halliday’s criticisms are aimed at. He believes ‘In approaching the analysis of the Middle East the element of particularism, uniqueness or impenetrability has been greatly overrated’ and argues that ‘particularism’ by both Orientalists such as Bernard Lewis and Postmodernists such as Edward Said has prevented better academic analysis of Middle Eastern society (Halliday, 2003:215). He holds Orientalists have ‘asserted that the only way to understand the behaviour of Middle Eastern societies is through analysis of “Islam”: that class politics, or revolutions, or even social consciousness do not arise there, or that democracy, in either its literal or socialist sense, is not possible in such countries’ (ibid.:13). Nonetheless, he also points out that Islamists, Arab Nationalists and Arab intellectuals are just as guilty of ‘vaunting the uniqueness and specificity of the “Arabs”, and arguing that forms of oppression found elsewhere—based on class, gender or ethnicity—do not operate in the Arab world’ (ibid.). Al-Azm, among others, calls this approach of extolling the superiority or the contrasting of these specific ‘oriental’, Islamic or Arab values in contrast to Western values, in its most distilled form, ‘Occidentalism’ (Al-Azm, 2011:6). Halliday argues that Postmodernist Saidists are guilty of claiming a ‘special European animosity towards Arabs, let alone towards Palestinians or Muslims, [which] does not bear historical comparison’ (ibid.:210). Though the Islamic world certainly has legitimate grievances against the West, it is not historically accurate to declare, as Said does, the Middle East occupies a special place as a Western target.<br />
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Halliday (ibid.:215) explains that there are many issues in the Middle East which can be analysed or explained in either a ‘particularist’ context through concepts such as the prism of the ‘Middle East’, the ‘Arab mind’ or ‘Islam’, but offers that they can also be equally or better analysed or explained using the social sciences in the same way as studying phenomena common and present in other regions and societies elsewhere throughout the world. The issues and problems of the Middle East are also issues and problems in the rest world. They are not particular to the Middle East. <br />
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The issue of the structure of Middle Eastern states provides an excellent opportunity to explore Halliday’s criticism of particularism in studying the Middle East. One of the main issues in Middle Eastern society today is that the majority of its constituent states are run by despots who repress political opposition, free expression and political participation, many of which have been or are supported by Western governments, some of which installed these very governments during their rule or as or after the colonial era drew to a close. <br />
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The United States, United Kingdom and France, as well as the Soviet Union/Russia and China, have been influential in Middle East politics throughout the Cold War era and after. For example, between 1946 and 2011, the United States provided over $118 billion in aid to the Egyptian government, the majority of which was directed toward military spending, Egypt receiving fully a quarter of all US foreign military aid (Sowa, 2013). The tanks this money bought are on display in Cairo at places like Tahrir Square today. The Soviet Union and then Russia also poured comparable amounts of money into the coffers of Middle Eastern dictators, such as Syria’s al-Assad regime (Hopwood, 1988:72-77), also a continuing relationship. Some Middle Eastern dictators, such as Egypt’s Nasser, were as wily as to receive money from both the US and USSR at times during the Cold War (Goldschmidt, 2008:167). Beyond solely economic or military support, there are also personal relationships between Western and Middle Eastern elites. The special, decades-long business and political relationship between the Bush family and the royal family of Saudi Arabia (Unger, 2007) is an example. That the West ‘props up’ repressive Middle Eastern governments is a valid criticism.<br />
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However this state of affairs is not unique to the Middle East. Western states, especially throughout the Cold War era, ‘propped up’ many unsavoury, repressive, non-democratic dictatorships throughout the world. At alternating times, the United States and the Soviet Union provided economic, political and/or military support to oppressive regimes throughout the world. In Southeast Asia, they supported opposing sides: Ngo Dinh Diem or Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam (Immerman, 2011:120-143), Sukarno and then Suharto in Indonesia (Brands, 1989:785-808; Evans, 1989:25-48), and King Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (Kiernan, 1985). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the two superpowers funded competing regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Uganda, among others (Friedman, 2011:247-272; Westad, 1996:21-32). In the Americas, the USSR devoted great attention to the Castro regime in Cuba (Fursenko & Naftali, 1997) while the United States continues to work with friendly dictatorships throughout Latin America (Livingstone, 2014). Moscow devoted its greatest efforts to building and supporting oppressive regimes in Eastern Europe, in places like East Germany (Harrison, 2000:53-74), Hungary and Poland (Kramer, 1998:358-384). No matter which side the people of these particular nations were on, they were abused, oppressed and threatened by their own governments. The Middle East has not been a particular victim in the political power games of Western or European states as Edward Said claimed.<br />
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Additionally, if one looks at the grievances that Middle Easterners aired during the recent ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings, it is easy to see that for many their complaints are the same as other peoples throughout the world. As Zubaida (2011:1) explains, ‘the "revolutions" in Tunisia and then Egypt seemed to eschew religion and nationalism in favour of classic political demands of liberty, democracy and economic justice.’ The signs protestors carried and their complaints to media of the corruption and lack of justice and representation in their governments in places like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria were mirrored by those voiced by the ‘Occupy’ movement in Western cities such as New York, Washington, London and Berlin. This solidarity and recognition of common goals between East and West was understood and embraced by the protestors themselves (Shanker & Gabbatt, 2011).<br />
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Many Orientalists generally argue, with some variation, that the prevalence of despotic regimes in the Middle East today exists because there is a basic historical and/or social incompatibility or conflict between Islamic society and modern notions of liberal democratic government that has created or aided in creating this state of affairs. For example, William Montgomery Watt (1988:3-8) argues that Muslims see the world and society as ‘unchanging’ and therefore people can live today just as they did in the time of the Prophet and Islam is the ‘final’ religion, living any other way being against God’s will . New, modern concepts such as equality, democracy, and tolerance for different lifestyles do not enter easily into their thinking. Bernard Lewis explains that the history of Islam is different from Christianity or Judaism (and by inference, Buddhism and Confucianism as well), where the central figures of Jesus and Moses were spiritual leaders whose people finally triumphed, but who were never actual heads of a state. Lewis writes that ‘from the days of the Prophet, the Islamic society had a dual character. On the one hand, it was a polity—a chieftaincy that successively became a state and an empire. At the same time, on the other hand, it was a religious community, founded by a Prophet’ (Lewis, 2003:9). He also points out that as the head of a state, Muhammad was also a military leader (ibid.:23). He goes on to explain that Islam conferred the authority on the Prophet and his successors and for Muslims Islam is the only real source of legitimacy, with all forms of secular government incurring ‘reserve, even mistrust’ (ibid.:10). Not all Orientalists see the Islamic world in this way, of course. <br />
<br />
Edward Said would argue that these Orientalist views are the result and part and parcel of the process of Orientalism: ‘the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ (Said, 1995:3). Said continues: ‘To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise’ and ‘since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did’ (ibid.: 4). <br />
<br />
Nonetheless, oppressive, despotic states restricting civil liberties and avenues of political input from the population they rule are just as common in Africa, Asia and South America and are not particular to the Middle East. North Korea, the Central African Republic, Venezuela or China and Russia can be seen as equally as despotic, repressive and non-representative as any Middle Eastern state. According to the Freedom House report Freedom in the World 2014 (2014), the Middle East and North Africa have the worst civil liberties protections in the world, but there are more people in the world living without freedom outside of the Middle East than in it. While the report shows five of the ten least free countries in the world are Muslim-majority societies, the other half are not. 25% of the world’s states are classified as ‘not free’. The report shows declines in political freedom, stability and civil rights in every region of the world outside of Europe (ibid.). <br />
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However, the Postmodernists would reject Freedom House’s criticisms of the Middle East and North Africa as imposing a Western measuring stick onto a non-Western region, with Saidists pointing to Freedom House, a Western-based ‘think tank’, as an example of Foucauldian ‘knowledge as power’ and part of the Western, Orientalist government-corporation-academia nexus which Said discusses at length in Covering Islam (2007:135-161). That the Freedom House report shows declines in freedom throughout the world except Europe could arguably show that the measuring stick is rather Eurocentric. <br />
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Orientalists are surely wrong in asserting that the prevalence of despotic regimes is an issue caused by the particular society, history or conditions of the Middle East. Clearly comparable regimes exist in similar circumstances throughout the rest of the world and generally the academics who study these other regions refrain from making sweeping statements about regional incompatibility of freedom, civil rights or democracy there. However, Postmodernist Saidists are also wrong in asserting that Western criticisms of Middle Eastern despotism are particularly aimed against them when, especially in the case of organisations such as Freedom House, they are applied equally or universally to the rest of the world. Postmodernists harm their own case by criticising Western support for oppressive Middle Eastern regimes but then also rejecting Western criticisms and sources which support that argument. Ibn Warraq points out this dilemma between having to utterly reject Orientalist knowledge or selectively accept it as evidence when necessary as a problem in Said’s Orientalism (Warraq, 2007:22-3), where Said alternately rejects Orientalist assertions, but accepts some of them as authentic at other times. As Halliday (2003:211) puts it, ‘Said implies that because ideas are produced in a context of domination, or directly in the service of domination, they are therefore invalid.’ Anything the West asserts about the Middle East is invalid because of its dominant position over it. In that light, anything regarding the Middle East that emanates from the West is unacceptable to Postmodernists.<br />
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Postmodernists, if they are true to Said’s thought, cannot even accept Eastern-generated knowledge. For Edward Said, there is really no such thing as the objective ‘truth’, there are simply ‘representations’ which cannot be separated from the interests of the ‘representer’ (Said, 1995:272). By that logic, if Western criticisms of the East are representations of Western interest, then Eastern rejections of these criticisms are also representations of Eastern interest. This creates a circular logic in which nothing anyone says can be considered ‘true’. There is only discourse without truth or talk without substance.<br />
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This is another of Fred Halliday’s criticisms. He professes to believe in the ‘now supposedly outmoded and pre-modernist view that there is such a thing as reality, and that it is the task of concepts and theories to analyse it, and that their efficacy and values are above all to be judged in terms of how much they explain it’ (Halliday, 2003:196). Said’s Orientalism and its Postmodernist adherents criticise the theories and discourse of those it calls Orientalists as agents of a cultural process of Western--especially British, French and American--domination of the East (Said, 1995:3). They seek to counteract the Orientalist narrative by questioning the truth and motives behind its representations. Yet Postmodernists do not offer an alternative version of the facts. They pose questions, but give no answers. Edward Said seems to deny that the ‘Orient’ exists at all other than as a concept the West has created (Warraq, 2007:22). This begs the question: If the Middle East is not that way, then how is it? <br />
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Said has no answer. In fact, he admits ‘no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam really are’ (Said, 1995:331). Yet, though admittedly lacking the ‘interest’ or ‘capacity’ to say what the Orient and Islam are, he has no trouble saying they are not as the Orientalists would have them. According to Fred Halliday, the value of concepts and theories should be judged on how well they explain the region (Halliday, 2003:196). Edward Said and his Postmodernist adherents fail woefully in this category because they do not—and in fact refuse—to explain the Middle East or Islam at all. One would be ill served in turning to Edward Said or Postmodernists when trying to understand the Middle East.<br />
<br />
Halliday also points out that the Middle East is not alone in struggling to deal with or overcome a Western-dominated imperial or colonial past. Regions as diverse as Ireland, Scotland and the Basque region to the former colonial states of Indochina to virtually the whole of Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:71-89) and South America have a history of imperialist and colonial domination by Western states. This treatment was not solely reserved for the Arab world. Though European Christians launched multiple ‘crusader’ armies into the Middle East supposedly to liberate the holy land over a period of centuries (Davies, 1997:358), it also launched similar centuries of ‘crusades’ afterwards into South America and Africa to convert the native populations to Christianity and exploit their labour and resources, wiping out entire nations of indigenous peoples and sending countless thousands back as slaves. Between 1490 and 1890, the native population of North and South America declined 96% as a result of contact with the West (Taylor, 2002:40). Ward Churchill compares Christopher Columbus--formerly considered one of the great European explorers--to Hitler’s executioner Heinrich Himmler due to the deaths of millions of indigenous South and North Americans following his ‘voyages of discovery’ (Churchill, 1993:12). <br />
<br />
This does not place the West in a better light, but it does show that the exercise of the West’s expansionist, colonial, imperial drive was not particular to the Middle East alone. Native North and South Americans and Africans by this measure have a stronger claim to being the victims of a particular European animus. Their attempts at resistance were quickly overcome and those peoples who survived the onslaught were unable to regain control of their own lands or cultures until decolonisation in the 20th century. The major indigenous peoples of the Americas and Africa were either enslaved or driven to virtual extinction within a few centuries. Tens of thousands of Africans were transplanted into the Americas, losing all connection with their ancestral land and culture. Their stories are utterly lost to history.<br />
<br />
In fact, because of the strength of Middle Eastern kingdoms during the period of the Crusades they were able to resist and finally force out the Christian European invaders, eventually themselves returning the favour by invading and occupying European Christian lands as far north as Tours, France (Lewis, 2003: 47). Peoples of the Middle East were able to preserve their own kingdoms, religion and culture and were able to invade, colonise and dominate Western lands for centuries before being turned back themselves. The Middle East still retains its broad geographic, ethnic, religious and political identity today. Other peoples who were the target of Western expansion are gone. There is no one to speak for them. The Sioux, Comanche and Zulu do not have their own Edward Said.<br />
<br />
Both Saidian Postmodernists who attempt to explain the prevalence of despotic government and lack of freedom in politics and society in the Middle East as occurring as the result of particular Orientalist imperial crimes and the Orientalists they criticise for creating the false idea that modern, free, democratic governments are incompatible with Islamic society are leaving out a large part of the story of the rest of the world.<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion</b> <br />
In conclusion, Fred Halliday is correct that the Middle East is not so particular. The Orientalist assertion that Middle Easterners are more susceptible to nationalised, religious or ethnic foundation myths as opposed to objective historical truth is clearly false--the rest of the world suffers from this problem as well. The fact most Middle Eastern states are despotic dictatorships in which its people are not represented is not a particular feature of the Middle East either. The Orientalist assertion that this occurs because there is a basic incompatibility between Islamic society and modern democracy ignores the fact that the West has built and supported these regimes in support of their own interests. They are not indigenous. However, the Middle East is not the only region where Western states have and do support oppressive regimes. The Islamic World was not singled out. <br />
<br />
The Postmodernist view of Orientalism criticises and rejects these Western views of the Middle East as part of this domination of the East by the West, but refuses to offer any alternative explanation of the ‘truth’ because, to Postmodernist Saidists, there is no such thing, only subjective representations of it. Halliday believes there is a ‘truth’ and concepts and theories are judged on how well they explain that truth. Said’s Orientalism offers a one-sided critique of the West, but no analysis of the Middle East. It does not explain it at all. The peoples of the Middle East are not the particular victims of Western, imperialist, colonial crimes or hatred and historically fared better in many ways than other peoples who were targets of European expansion. Fred Halliday is correct in his critique that ‘both [Orientalists and Postmodernists] fail us in what I have defined as the central intellectual task, namely the analysis of the societies in question’ (Halliday, 2003:201) [original emphasis]. The Middle East is not so particular.<br />
<br />
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<br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-3799948458277750932014-04-10T12:45:00.000-05:002014-06-24T08:23:27.735-05:00‘Nobody intends to put up a wall’: Walter Ulbricht, Khrushchev and Building the Berlin Wall, 1961<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6nw0KQwQLS9vwFtNsxRn393qGL7-IDbBaBRdU8QSl4i10_jBmmd5CPNnkDS_9xb-rPz3zQeZtwUbSHbLNEGmJEg-7FYFEqw_mnKw5bWmjiBrctWHntr4aNzx0qN6y5XMmUXGWdfsf5Zg/s1600/Berlin+Wall.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6nw0KQwQLS9vwFtNsxRn393qGL7-IDbBaBRdU8QSl4i10_jBmmd5CPNnkDS_9xb-rPz3zQeZtwUbSHbLNEGmJEg-7FYFEqw_mnKw5bWmjiBrctWHntr4aNzx0qN6y5XMmUXGWdfsf5Zg/s320/Berlin+Wall.jpg" /></a><br />
<br />
<i>March 2014</i><br />
<br />
Drawing predominantly on the work of Harrison, Maddrell, Slusser and Zubok, this essay will argue that the Berlin Wall was not conceived of nor built by Nikita Khrushchev alone, that building the Berlin Wall served the immediate needs of East Germany’s Walter Ulbricht more than Khrushchev’s international goals, and that Khrushchev was heavily influenced by Ulbricht’s campaign to pressure him into finally allowing the DDR to erect the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961.<br />
<br />
<b>Khrushchev’s International Goals v Ulbricht’s Immediate Needs: Maximum & Minimum Objectives</b><br />
Much of the early Western-based literature on the Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961, and indeed throughout the Cold War, pictured Nikita Khrushchev as a puppet-master, pulling the strings of satellite states. It portrays Khrushchev as the sole architect and decision-maker on Soviet and socialist bloc policy in Berlin. However, this is a misrepresentation (Slusser,1973:ix). Archives and recollections of Cold War actors show Khrushchev did not decide alone to build the Berlin Wall. Khrushchev’s decisions were especially influenced by East German head-of-state Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the German Social Unity Party (SED) of the German Democratic Republic (DDR). Harrison (2000:53-74) discusses at length the lack of study of ‘super allies’ in the Cold War that led to the focus solely on ‘super-powers’. As Leffler (1996:120-135) argues, the picture developed from Cold War archives is more complex.<br />
<br />
Slusser (1973:2) holds many Western scholars have reduced Ulbricht’s role because it was official Western policy that the DDR did not exist, that Ulbricht and the DDR had no recognised rights in Berlin, and there were no official ties between the DDR and Western governments in 1961 (Slusser, 1973:2). Bonwetsch and Filitow (2000:155-56) point out responsibility for die Mauer and Ulbricht’s role was and continues to be deflected onto Khrushchev by many former-DDR officials attempting to avoid public and criminal liability since the Wall fell in 1989. Khrushchev and the USSR are no longer there to defend themselves.<br />
<br />
Harrison (1993:7-8) lists comprehensively motives ascribed in the literature to Khrushchev in the 1961 crisis: ‘to prevent West Germany from having access to nuclear weapons, to get Western recognition of the East German regime and thus stabilize that regime, to show Khrushchev's domestic opponents how strong and successful he was, to show Khrushchev's Chinese critics that he was not "soft on the imperialists," to divide the Western alliance, to force the West to accept the Soviet Union as its political and military equal, to test the rules of the new nuclear game to see if nuclear weapons could be used for coercive purposes, and to force the West to a summit conference to discuss German and disarmament issues.’ Khrushchev’s concerns in 1961 Berlin had more to do with global issues and the position of the USSR and socialism than with the future of Berlin itself.<br />
<br />
Walter Ulbricht had much more immediate concerns. For the DDR, West Berlin in 1961 presented three threats to its very existence (Harrison, 2002:99). First, Berlin, with free movement throughout all sectors of the city guaranteed by the post-WWII four-partite agreement, was a ‘loophole’ that could not be closed by the DDR. The borders throughout the rest of East Germany had been secured since 1952 (ibid.; Schaefer, 2011:509) However its citizens could still freely cross into West Berlin and fly out of Tempelhof Airport, leaving the DDR permanently behind. Western powers did not recognise the DDR had any control in Berlin which would allow them to close the border. 1,000 people per day were fleeing the DDR into West Berlin (Schake, 2001:29). In June 1961, The Economist reported that since 1949 2.5 million citizens had fled the DDR (Slusser, 1973: 67). The annual number rose from 120,230 in 1959 to 182,278 in 1960 (Harrison, 2002:108) and continued to rise in 1961 (ibid.; CIA, 1961:2). Pictures and press testimonials of Germans leaving the DDR was bad publicity for the DDR, USSR and socialism as a whole. Additionally, many of those leaving were skilled professionals. According to CIA: <br />
<br />
‘The high proportion of professionals, engineers, and intellectuals has been of particular concern to the (DDR) regime. From 1954 through 1960, the refugees included 4,334 doctors and dentists, 15,330 engineers and technicians, 738 professors, 15,885 other teachers, and more than 11,700 other college graduates. In addition, industrial managers have been leaving East Germany in significant numbers, many of them Socialist Unity Party (SED) members of long standing’ <br />
(CIA, 1961:2). <br />
<br />
The flood of migrants not only reflected bad light on socialism, but also represented a ‘brain drain’ of skilled workers from East to West Germany. <br />
<br />
A second threat was the economic impact of Grenzgaengern (Harrison, 2002:99): the estimated 50,000 East Germans who worked in West Berlin, were paid in West Marks and who returned home daily to East Berlin to enjoy the advantageous exchange rate against the East Mark. The term also included West Berliners who crossed into East Berlin to shop, also enjoying the exchange rate and contributing to scarcity of goods in the East, thus increasing prices for less-wealthy East Berliners (ibid.). The number of East Germans working in West Berlin rose from 50,000 to 65,000 in 1961 alone (ibid.:108).<br />
<br />
The third threat was to DDR security. Western intelligence agencies used Berlin as a transit point for intelligence material and agents. Maddrell (2006:829-847) argues that while the DDR refugee crisis and the economic situation were the main impetus for building the Berlin Wall, DDR security concerns regarding Western espionage were a more important factor than often cited. Western intelligence agencies used Berlin as a major base of operations, obtaining information from refugees and using the free movement of Grenzgaengern to conduct espionage, ferry information and meet agents. To be fair, the East bloc used it in the same manner against the West. The DDR State Ministry for Security—the Stasi—was concerned that Western intelligence would use the fragile state of the DDR in 1961 to incite an uprising in East Berlin similar to that of 1953, which Ulbricht had blamed on subversion coming from West Berlin (US State Department, 1954), ending in a massive uprising against Ulbricht’s government that was only eventually put down by Soviet tanks. Maddrell (2006:833) points out, ‘in the whole history of states, it is hard to think of a state which has suffered an espionage and subversion crisis as grave as that which gripped the DDR in the years up to 1961.’ For Ulbricht, choking off this attack point was vital to DDR survival.<br />
<br />
Slusser (1973:9) argues that for Khrushchev, Berlin was a ‘lever’ to be used in the larger struggle with the West, while for Ulbricht Berlin was not a means to an end, but the end itself. For Ulbricht, Berlin was the prize to be won (Harrison, 1993:11). Ulbricht sought elimination of the embarrassing refugee problem, the ‘brain drain’, Grenzgaengern, security worries and the vanishing prestige of the DDR itself. Building a wall could do that. Khrushchev’s international concerns were secondary to him. Harrison (2002:103) agrees Khrushchev’s goals in Berlin were larger, global concerns, whereas Ulbricht’s were DDR-specific and could be immediately addressed by building the Berlin Wall. During 1961, it was Ulbricht who was impatient, confrontational and aggressive, while Khrushchev was patient and more restrained (ibid.). As Ahonen (2011:40-56) points out, for Ulbricht controlling the borders was about the legitimacy of the DDR.<br />
<br />
Slusser (1973:93) adroitly describes this tension between Khrushchev’s larger international goals and Ulbricht’s immediate needs as a choice between ‘maximum’ and ‘minimum’ objectives. He describes Khrushchev’s maximum objective as, ‘inflicting a major diplomatic defeat on the Western powers by forcing them to accept the fait accompli of a Soviet-East German peace treaty, bringing with it the end of Western occupation rights in West Berlin.’ Ulbricht’s minimum objective was, ‘shoring up the East German regime by shutting off the escape route via West Berlin.’ In the end, Khrushchev set aside his maximum objective and in favour of Ulbricht’s minimum objective.<br />
<br />
<b>Ulbricht Probes Khrushchev and the West on the Border</b><br />
Why would Khrushchev, premiere of the Soviet Union, be influenced by Walter Ulbricht, the leader of a divided country dependent upon aid from Moscow and not even recognised by Western powers? Zubok (1993:11-12) argues Khrushchev was tied politically and sentimentally to Ulbricht because of their history. During the 1953 East Berlin uprising, Khrushchev sided with Ulbricht over other Soviet leaders and accused them of abandoning socialism in the DDR, thus tying himself politically to Ulbricht’s success. While Khrushchev faced uprisings in Poland and Hungary in 1956, Ulbricht swiftly quelled protests and had no quarrel with Soviet troops on East German soil and in fact welcomed them, a story explored further by Granville (2006:422). Ulbricht’s commitment to building socialism in East Germany won him Khrushchev’s praise (CWIHP, 1993:60), though it was these very ‘collectivisation’ policies that caused the economic hardship in the DDR that precipitated the refugee crisis. Zubok (1993:11-12) says Khrushchev did not want to lose the DDR, a place millions of Russians died to win in WWII, a place where a higher standard of living was enjoyed than anywhere else in the socialist bloc (CWIHP, 1993:61), and the place Westerners could most easily come into contact with socialism to be ‘won over’ by it. Khrushchev developed a similar affinity for the embattled socialist island of Cuba (Zubok, 1993:12). In 1961, Ulbricht ‘masterfully exploited’ Khrushchev’s fears of losing the DDR to force a confrontation with the West over Berlin (CWIHP, 1993:58).<br />
<br />
Talk of a Berlin Wall neither began in 1961 nor just between Khrushchev and Ulbricht. There is evidence that Wilhelm Zaisser, the first head of the DDR’s Stasi, put forward a plan to build a wall to separate the two halves of Berlin in the early 1950s (Maddrell, 2006:833). Though DDR security officials such as Erich Honecker, charged with erecting the Wall, claimed the operation was a surprise to and great success against Western intelligence (Harrison, 2002:113), that the border may one day be sealed was no surprise at all to them. In fact, Western intelligence had been planning and instructing its agents regarding the possibility since 1953 (Maddrell, 2006:833). The Soviets had been turning down DDR requests to seal the border in Berlin for at least that long (Harrison, 2002:96). Erecting a barrier between East and West Berlin was not a new concept in 1961.<br />
<br />
The rest of the DDR border outside Berlin was sealed since 1952 (Schaefer, 2011:509). The East Berlin border was temporarily sealed during the 1953 uprising, but soon reopened. The DDR announced in 1957 that it was now illegal for East Germans to leave the country without official permission (Maddrell, 2006:833). Until 1960, attempts by Ulbricht to secure the Berlin border were limited to controlling transit of East Germans into the West. However, from 1960 Ulbricht began to probe Western responses—and Khrushchev’s—to increased security measures affecting West Berliners and the Western allies. He acted without consulting Khrushchev and often even against Soviet cautions.<br />
<br />
On 21 September 1960, Ulbricht, frustrated with Khrushchev’s slow approach on a permanent solution regarding the status of the DDR and Berlin, decided to press the issue by requiring Western diplomats obtain DDR Foreign Ministry permission to enter East Berlin. He had not notified Moscow and under the post-war four-partite agreement on Berlin (to which the DDR was not a party) he had no recognised authority to do so. The Soviet response was negative as they wanted no reciprocal restrictions made against them (Harrison, 2002:105). <br />
<br />
On 17 October 1960, the Soviet embassy cabled Moscow that, ‘Our friends [East Germany] are studying the possibility of taking measures directed towards forbidding and making it more difficult for DDR citizens to work in West Berlin, and also towards stopping the exodus of the population of the DDR through West Berlin. One of such measures by our friends could be the cessation of free movement through the sectoral border and the introduction of such a process for visiting West Berlin by DDR citizens as exists for visiting the BRD [West Germany].’ (Harrison, 2002:107; Zubok, 1993:18). The next day, 18 October, Ulbricht wrote to Khrushchev directly defending the restrictions, arguing they should stand firm against the Western powers which did not recognise the DDR’s right to control its own borders, a fundamental right of any state. In a 30 November meeting, Khrushchev instructed Ulbricht to refrain from measures on the border (Harrison, 2002:107). Ulbricht tried again. On 19 May 1961 Soviet Ambassador Pervukhin reported that an impatient Ulbricht was not following Soviet guidance and wanted to immediately close the border to address the growing economic and refugee problems (ibid.:110-11). <br />
<br />
On 15 June, Ulbricht held an infamous press conference. He offered, ‘there are people in West Germany who would like us to mobilise the building workers of the DDR capital to put up a wall. I am not aware of any such intention…Nobody intends to put up a wall.’ This only two months before the Wall would go up. It has since become a phrase many Germans repeat when someone is not being completely honest. Ulbricht went on to mention Soviet/DDR control of Berlin would mean closing Tempelhof Airport, the main escape route for refugees, and that Berlin would become a neutral city, ‘free’ from ‘disturbance’ by Western forces (Slusser, 1973:8-10). Slusser argues that rather than just a blatant lie or an attempt to calm tensions, Ulbricht’s intent—and the effect—was to increase the panicked atmosphere in Berlin to force Khrushchev to bring a swifter conclusion to the crisis.<br />
<br />
Ulbricht’s probing continued. On 28 June, Ulbricht ordered all foreign air traffic to notify DDR controllers upon entering and exiting DDR airspace, a move quickly brushed aside by the Western allies (ibid.:43). On 8 July, the East Berlin police chief refused entry of West German delegates to an All-Germany Protestant church conference. That day, 2,600 refugees crossed into West Berlin. Throughout July, DDR ministers continued to publicly push the issue of DDR recognition and control of Berlin. On 16 July, the Ministry of Justice publicly released a detailed plan for the administration of West Berlin under DDR control (ibid.:63). Western figures show that over 100,000 refugees left the DDR in the first six months of 1961 alone (ibid.:66).<br />
<br />
Rather presciently, on 30 July US Senator and Kennedy-ally William Fulbright remarked to the press that he did not understand why the DDR does not build a wall in East Berlin, as he considered it their right to do so (ibid.:94; Zubok, 1993:29). It appears Khrushchev made the decision to finally agree Ulbricht’s request at just this time. <br />
<br />
There is no ‘smoking gun’ record of when exactly Khrushchev decided to agree to Ulbricht’s continuous request to seal East Berlin. Harrison puts the period between 15 and 25 July 1961 and argues that it came about broadly as a result of Khrushchev’s disappointment with the Vienna talks with Kennedy in June (2002:110). Slusser (1973:93-4) believes the decision fell on 27 July and came about after Khrushchev read Kennedy’s 25 July television speech in which he announced a large increase in US defence spending, which Khrushchev interpreted as an escalating US response to his own recent decision to increase Soviet defence spending. Zubok (1993:26-7) also places the decision on or around 27 July, citing Khrushchev’s own recollections. <br />
<br />
Khrushchev also claims credit for the idea of building a concrete wall, not just a barbed wire barrier. Literally interpreted, Khrushchev may be said to be responsible for a Berlin ‘Wall’, not just a Berlin fence. Khrushchev recalls Ulbricht, upon being informed of the decision said, ‘This is the solution! This will help. I am for this’ (ibid.). Ulbricht sent Khrushchev a copy of the speech he would deliver at the coming 3-5 August Warsaw Pact conference on Berlin, stating that in regard to sealing the borders, ‘we have prepared all the necessary measures’ (Harrison, 2002:111). The Berlin Wall would be erected as planned on 13 August 1961.<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion</b><br />
Contrary to much of the early Western-based literature on the Berlin Wall, more recent literature based on archival research shows Khrushchev did not make the decision to build it alone. Building the Wall served Ulbricht’s immediate needs to stabilise the DDR more than they did Khrushchev’s larger international goals in the Cold War. Ulbricht had been seeking to seal the DDR’s Berlin border for several years and his probing campaign, beginning in late 1960, played a key role in pressuring Khrushchev to finally allow DDR forces to build the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
<br />
Ahonen, P. (2011) “The Berlin Wall and the Battle for Legitimacy in Divided Germany.” German Politics and Society 29 (99): pp. 40–56.<br />
<br />
Bonwetsch, B., and Filitow, A. (2011) “Chrutschtschow Und Der Mauerbau. Die Gipfelkonferenz Der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten Vom 3.-5. August 1961.” Vierteljahreshefte Fuer Zeitgeschichte 48 (1): pp. 155–98.<br />
<br />
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (1961) “The East German Refugees”. Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/16/1961-08-10a.pdf.<br />
<br />
Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) (1993) “Document Two: Khrushchev’s Secret Speech on the Berlin Crisis, August 1961.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin (3): pp. 58–61. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.<br />
<br />
Garthoff, R. (1991) “Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected.” Foreign Policy 84: pp. 142–156.<br />
<br />
Granville, J. (2006) “East Germany in 1956: Walter Ulbricht’s Tenacity in the Face of Opposition.” Australian Journal of Politics and History, 52 (3): pp. 417–438.<br />
<br />
Harrison, H. (1993) “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-61”, pp. 1-140. Working Paper No. 5. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.<br />
<br />
——— (2000) “Driving the Soviets up the Wall: A Super-Ally, a Superpower, and the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1958-61.” Cold War History 1 (1): pp. 53–74.<br />
<br />
——— (2002) “The German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall Crisis.” In The Berlin Wall Crisis, edited by Gearson, J. and Schake, K., pp. 96-124. Cold War History Series. NewYork: Palgrave MacMillan.<br />
<br />
——— (2011) “The Berlin Wall after 50 Years.” German Politics and Society 99 (2): pp. 1–7.<br />
<br />
Leffler, M. (1996) “Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened.” Foreign Affairs 75 (4): pp. 120–135.<br />
<br />
Maddrell, P. (2006) “The Western Secret Services, the East German Ministry of State Security and the Building of the Berlin Wall.” Intelligence and National Security 21 (5): pp. 829–847.<br />
<br />
National Archives & Records Administration (2011) “A City Torn Apart: Building the Berlin Wall”. Washington, DC: National Archives & Records Administration. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/building-of-the-berlin-wall/index.html.<br />
<br />
Schaefer, S. (2011) “Hidden Behind the Wall: West German State Building and the Emergence of the Iron Curtain.” Central European History 44: pp. 506–535.<br />
<br />
Schake, K. (2002) “US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises.” In The Berlin Wall Crisis, edited by Gearson, J. and Schake, K., pp. 22-42. Cold War History Series. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.<br />
<br />
Slusser, R. (1973) The Berlin Crisis of 1961. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.<br />
<br />
US Department of State (1954) “Fourth Party Congress of the SED: Topic C-The Treatment of the Problem of Defense and Internal Security by the Party Congress”. Washington, DC: US Department of State. Vol. VII(2) Germany and Austria Doc. 772. Foreign Relation of the Unites States, 1952-1954. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v07p2/d772.<br />
<br />
Wiegrafe, K. (2009) “The Khrushchev Connection: Who Ordered the Construction of the Berlin Wall?” Der Spiegel Online, May 30, Vol. 23, sec. Aus dem Spiegel. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-khrushchev-connection-who-ordered-the-construction-of-the-berlin-wall-a-628052.html.<br />
<br />
Zubok, V. (1993) “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)”, pp. 1-33. Working Paper No. 6. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.<br />
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-17798682759732795262014-03-29T07:44:00.000-05:002014-06-24T08:34:18.828-05:00Is a Nuclear Weapons-Free World Possible?<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQd9n5X_wlFUpOYRQ1mpqIEeGf0JbCcCkVMnP_SSUzVpbpMyYpmRHrbnfmo2gN3qfmoT7BTm7VoxnbYzSpyyxZohTnC9oyXH3NXd_Mm68BrW90XdxUNsPMr7KThRmpwkfjWOat7iAcJF8/s1600/Nuclear.png" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQd9n5X_wlFUpOYRQ1mpqIEeGf0JbCcCkVMnP_SSUzVpbpMyYpmRHrbnfmo2gN3qfmoT7BTm7VoxnbYzSpyyxZohTnC9oyXH3NXd_Mm68BrW90XdxUNsPMr7KThRmpwkfjWOat7iAcJF8/s320/Nuclear.png" /></a><br />
<br />
<i>November 2013</i><br />
<br />
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013) recognises only five ‘nuclear states’—the U.S., UK, France, Russia and China. Since 1967, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel have also developed nuclear weapons, almost doubling the size of the group. South Africa stands alone as the only country to develop atomic weapons and give them up (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2013). There has been a slow, steady reduction of the number of nuclear warheads in the world to between 10,000 (Kristensen & Norris, 2013) and 25,000 (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 82), with, according to some, 90% of nuclear warheads produced since 1945 now out of service (Kristensen & Norris, 2013). However, there are still more than enough warheads to destroy civilisation as we know it.<br />
<br />
We live in a world today with an increasing number of nuclear states, not decreasing. Nonetheless, the picture is not as bleak as it may seem. President John F. Kennedy predicted that by 1964 the world would see as many as 10-20 nuclear powers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, quoting Kennedy, 2003). There are not even that many today, 50 years later. Since 2007 world leaders have shown renewed interest in nuclear disarmament. With a practical view of nuclear disarmament, an agreement with proper control, verification and enforcement mechanisms, and the necessary political will, it is possible to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world.<br />
<br />
<b>‘Abolition’ v. ‘Disarmament’</b><br />
O’Hanlon (2010) correctly points out an important difference in vocabulary in what one means by ‘a world without nuclear weapons’. ‘Abolishing’ nuclear weapons means not only dismantling all existing weapons, but outlawing their testing, use, reconstruction, development, proliferation and make them wholly illegal in all circumstances. This differs from dismantling or demilitarising all currently existing nuclear arsenals in the world and agreeing an international framework to monitor progress and fissile materials, verify disarmament and mediate disputes, but not totally outlawing them forever in all circumstances. It would also eliminate all current atomic weapons. Both would constitute a ‘nuclear weapons-free world’, but disarmament is more realistic and achievable.<br />
<br />
The NPT attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation and elicits an agreement in Article VI (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013) from nuclear states to cease the nuclear arms race, dismantle their nuclear weapons and agree a treaty leading to ‘general and complete disarmament’ under international control, something they have yet to do. Article I (ibid.) stops ‘nuclear states’ from transferring nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear states while Article II (ibid.) prevents signatories which did not already possess nuclear weapons from obtaining them. States which have developed atomic weapons after the NPT have done so as non-members of the treaty. The NPT does not seek to ‘abolish’ nuclear technology in the world. It recognises, at Article I (ibid.), the right of ‘nuclear states’—America, Britain, France, China and Russia—to possess them. NPT Article IV (ibid.) in fact recognises and encourages the development and sharing of the ‘inalienable right’ to peaceful nuclear technology among nuclear and non-nuclear states. NPT Article X (ibid.) gives members the right to leave the treaty in circumstances where they believe it is contrary to their national interest.<br />
<br />
Individuals and groups who call for the ‘abolition’ or banishment of nuclear weapons stand on firm moral ground. However, groups such as Greenpeace (2013) and iCan (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 2013) focus on campaigning to motivate individuals at ‘grassroots’ level to apply pressure on officials to abolish atomic weapons, which, while also an important part of the effort, does not address the perennial underlying political and security issues which cause states to cling to or seek to acquire nuclear weapons. These groups have been critical of the 1970 NPT (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013) as legitimising a system of nuclear ‘haves and have-nots’ by giving special recognition to the 5 original nuclear states, charge it has been ineffective in applying pressure to disarm (Brehm et al., 2013: 12-16), and point to a complete ban on nuclear weapons along the same path as treaties for landmines and biological weapons as a better goal. Nonetheless, even some critical of the NPT and piece-meal bilateral agreements acknowledge that forever ‘dis-inventing’ nuclear weapons is not possible and that if one state reconstitutes a nuclear programme, there may be no alternative but for others to do so to confront that threat (Blechmann & Bollfrass, 2010; 583).<br />
<br />
The distinction between disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons is not clearly articulated, even by those familiar with nuclear issues. Abolition involves what some have called ‘putting the genie back in the bottle’—(Gusterson, 2008) requiring all states to simultaneously disclaim and disown nuclear weapons for good, an idea that becomes difficult to achieve if even one state refuses to agree or comply, thus causing all others to consider doing so as well. It is unrealistic because it does not take into account the underlying (in)security conditions, discussed by countless security scholars over the last several decades (e.g., Sagan & Waltz, 2013), which lead states to acquire atomic weapons to begin with. If these are not addressed, even incremental steps toward disarmament become difficult and a comprehensive agreement becomes impossible. This differs from nuclear disarmament built on the back of the trust, agreements and institutions of the existing NPT, specifically the Article VI (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013) agreement to pursue a treaty leading to ‘general and complete disarmament’. NPT Article VII (ibid.) also allows states to conclude bi- or multi-lateral agreements relating to nuclear disarmament, something the U.S., Russia/USSR and other members have used to positive effect to agree nuclear reduction treaties, such as SALT, START, SORT, and New START. Nuclear disarmament under the NPT means states continuing (finally) to seriously pursue something they have already agreed to do, making nuclear disarmament more possible than nuclear abolition. Though progress has been slow under the NPT, it still has made progress.<br />
<br />
<b>Control, Verification and ‘Virtual Deterrence’</b><br />
In considering whether a nuclear weapons-free world is possible it must also be considered how any nuclear disarmament agreement, once reached, would be verified, how fissile materials would be controlled and how noncompliance would be confronted. An agreement without such ‘teeth’ would be doomed from the start.<br />
<br />
Tracking and controlling nuclear material is the only way to ensure new atomic weapons cannot be developed (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 87). However, environmental, market and economic pressures have brought about the need for energy from a clean, reliable source such as nuclear power. The IAEA itself has called for 1,400 new nuclear reactors to be built worldwide by 2050 to meet world energy demand (ibid.: 88). NPT Article IV upholds the ‘inalienable right’ of states to pursue peaceful nuclear technology (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013). Even if a comprehensive international nuclear disarmament agreement is reached, fissile material will still be available and remain a growing issue. To simultaneously meet the growing international demand for energy and confront the issue of controlling fissile materials, multi-national nuclear power facilities could be built. No single nation would ‘own’ the plant or materials and the facility and nuclear fuel could be easily inspected by an organisation such as the IAEA (Drell & Goodby, 2008: 26-7). A similar solution has been put forward to settle the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme (Forden & Thompson, 2009: 11).<br />
<br />
Counterintuitively, none of the nine states known to possess nuclear weapons is currently subject to IAEA inspections. The five NPT ‘nuclear states’ are exempt and the four non-NPT states—India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea—are not subject to them (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 88). This means the overwhelming bulk of nuclear weapons and material in the world is only tracked by these governments. We have to take their word for it. Any comprehensive treaty would have to include control, verification and inspection measures by an organisation, such as the IAEA, which apply to all countries equally. The IAEA, “should be given the authority to inspect any facility, at any time, and anywhere on the territory of every signature state” (Blechmann & Bollfrass, 2010: 571).<br />
<br />
Even if all nuclear weapons are demilitarised, fissile material closely controlled and an inspection regime instituted, there will always be the chance that one or more states will reconstitute nuclear weapons at some point in the future. The first steps could be similar to those taken today against states such as North Korea and Iran—sanctions, negotiations and possible military action. However, such a process may take too long to stop the reconstitution of nuclear weapons and allowing it to be subject to a UN Security Council veto could further complicate matters (ibid.: 573). The fear a foe would secretly maintain nuclear weapons or rebuild them is an obstacle to convincing current nuclear-armed states to agree to give them up. <br />
<br />
The concept of ‘virtual deterrence’ has been put forward both to calm the security fears of current nuclear states regarding disarmament and as an enforcement and deterrence mechanism against rogue states that would start or reconstitute a nuclear weapons programme after achieving nuclear disarmament (Paloczi-Horvath, 1998). Briefly, the idea is that current nuclear states, such as the P5, could maintain the threshold ability to reconstitute their nuclear programmes in a matter of months in such circumstances in order to confront the threat (ibid.: 3). Nuclear ‘abolitionists’ would object, however nuclear weapons technology cannot be ‘dis-invented’ and the threat will always exist. Nuclear disarmament is possible; abolition of nuclear weapons forever is not.<br />
<br />
<b>Political Will</b><br />
One of the most important factors, if not the most important, in arriving at a world without nuclear weapons is political will. In 2007, U.S. senior policy leaders Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz breathed new life into the movement toward ‘Global Zero’ beginning with a series of opinion pieces in major American newspapers (Kissinger et al., 2007; 2008; 2010; 2011) as part of the Nuclear Security Project. They succeeded in making nuclear disarmament an issue in the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, supported by both then-Senator Barack Obama and Senator John McCain (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 81; Ferguson, 2010: 88). <br />
<br />
As President, Barack Obama named nuclear disarmament one of the priorities of his administration and promised in his 2009 Prague Speech that America would take ‘concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons’ (White House Press Office, 2009). In October 2009, President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons (Nobel Prize, 2009). In April 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense released a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in which it reiterated America’s commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, committed to ‘reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy’ and to ‘maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels’ as key priorities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010: iii). In April 2010, President Obama also signed New START with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, reducing and limiting both nuclear arsenals to 1,550 warheads and between 700-800 delivery platforms (U.S. Department of State, 2010). In May 2010 the 5-yearly NPT review conference was held in New York. The final document included recommitment of members to the NPT, specific action-plans regarding nuclear disarmament and proposed steps for creating a ‘WMD-free’ zone in the Middle East (Choubey, 2010). The U.S. National Security Strategy, released in May 2010, also reiterated U.S. commitment to ‘pursue the goal of a world without nuclear weapons’ and strengthening the NPT (White House, 2010: 23). <br />
<br />
Senior UK policymakers also got behind the renewed push. In June 2007 Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett spoke in support of the effort by Kissinger, Nunn, Perry and Schultz (Beckett, 2007), as did Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson in 2008, calling for support of New START, a strengthening of the NPT and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Hurd et al., 2008). Prime Minister Gordon Brown (Brown, 2008) and Defence Minister Des Browne shifted UK policy from that under Tony Blair where non-proliferation was the sole focus as opposed to now pursuing both non-proliferation and disarmament (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2008). The United States and United Kingdom have both continued to engage with North Korea and Iran on their nuclear programmes, strengthening sanctions and leading talks alongside allies, culminating in the recent multilateral agreement between the ‘P5 + 1’ nations and Iran to slow development of their nuclear programme (Borgher & Dehghan, 2013).<br />
<br />
These events of the past seven years have shown a renewed commitment on behalf of most of the major nuclear states to nuclear disarmament, but it hasn’t all been easy or good news. The U.S. and Russia did sign New START in 2010, though it was only just barely ratified by Congress in 2011 over objections by hawkish Republican Senators (Oliphant, 2010), such as Sen. John McCain, who had had claimed to support nuclear disarmament in his 2008 presidential campaign (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 81; Ferguson, 2010: 88). After agreeing a 2008 deal with the P5+1 to end its nuclear programme, North Korea destroyed the cooling tower of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon. However the IAEA claims it has restarted work at the facility in recent days (Reuters, 2013). <br />
<br />
However, the renewed push for nuclear disarmament since 2007 has been overtaken by other domestic and international events in key states. The 2008 economic downturn, economic crises in EU states, government ‘austerity’ policies in the UK and political fights over tax and fiscal policies and domestic political issues such as ‘Obamacare’ and the ‘debt ceiling’ in the United States continue to absorb much of the world’s political energy and capital. Since 2008 there have been changes in national leadership in the U.S., UK, France, Russia, China, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel—every nuclear state. The 2012 conference called for in the 2010 NPT review to devise a ‘WMD-free zone’ in the Middle East was cancelled as it was unclear whether Israel, having just begun a military incursion into Gaza (Gladstone & Kershner, 2012), or Iran would fully participate and Arab states were angered by further delays in a discussion which began 15 years before at the 1995 NPT review (Malin & Miller, 2013: 1-2). The 2010 Arab Spring uprisings have caused political and national security concerns for the P5 states and others. The U.S., UK and France have clashed with Russia and China in their response to the Syria conflict. The use of chemical weapons in Damascus on 21 August, most-probably by the Assad regime (Gladstone & Chivers, 2013), has focused the world’s attention on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and a different ‘weapon of mass destruction’.<br />
<br />
The reinvigorated campaign for nuclear disarmament shows that the political will to push forward the agenda for a nuclear-free world exists, however it is also constantly being stretched to the limit and attention is divided by other world events. O’Hanlon (2010) points out that timing is also crucial on this issue and real progress may not be possible until some of the world’s other major problems which often cause security concerns which complicate the nuclear disarmament issue—Taiwan, Kashmir, Russia and its neighbours, Israel-Palestine—are resolved first. As President Obama acknowledged in his 2009 Prague Speech, “This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us the world cannot change” (White House, 2009). The political will is there, but the attention and timing must also be right and they all must coincide in order for there to be any realistic chance of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.<br />
<br />
<b>Do We Really Want a World Free of Nuclear Weapons?</b><br />
Though the accepted dilemma seems to be how to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and whether it is possible, there is not much in-depth discussion as to whether a nuclear weapons-free world would provide security and peace as asserted. Arguably the most famous analysis of this question is the debate in book form between Scott Sagan and the late Ken Waltz (2013).<br />
<br />
Briefly, as a Realist, Waltz believes that the world consists of states in global anarchy which must find ways to create security for themselves through the two separate ideas of ‘defence’, the ability to repel an attack, and ‘deterrence’, the ability to inflict enough punishment on an opponent to create a disincentive for them to attack (ibid.: 5). Simply put, possession of nuclear weapons greatly bolsters a state’s ability to defend and deter and when two nuclear states stand opposed to one another, these weapons have an equalising effect which causes them to proceed in a much more considered manner because of what they risk in a nuclear exchange and the knowledge that the other side, rationally, must be proceeding in the same manner creates a more secure condition (ibid.: 5-8). He asserts nuclear weapons allow states to meet the need to provide their own security and secure states do not fight wars (ibid.: 37). When confronted with the question if ‘global zero’ would be better Waltz answers that, “Abolishing the weapons that have caused sixty-seven years of peace would certainly have effects. Such an action would, among other things, make the world safe for the fighting of World War III” (ibid.: 221).<br />
<br />
Also briefly, Sagan responds by arguing that nuclear weapons make the world less secure because they are military objects and, institutionally, military organisations are concerned with achieving ‘military victory’ by defeating opponents in war and because nuclear weapons provide unmatched potential to do that, military organisations will always seek to obtain advantage by building more nuclear weapons and will, as all institutions do, seek ever more resources to do so. Many states do not have sufficient civilian control over their military apparatus to counter these tendencies. More states will seek nuclear weapons and states that already possess them will build more, the end state being that they will not provide security for anyone, just more nuclear weapons. He also shows empirically that political and military leaders cannot always be counted on to act rationally in the severe emotional circumstances high-level conflict creates (ibid.: 41-3). On the question of global zero, Sagan answers that the need for nuclear deterrence ended with the Cold War and the threat of loose nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations is greater because they do not fear nuclear retaliation, making the need to reach zero a pressing issue (ibid.: 215-19).<br />
<br />
As the title of the book suggests, this is An Enduring Debate. The world was a violent place before nuclear weapons and will still be one if ever we are without them, as Sagan recognises (ibid.: 219), and still be fraught with conflict and the state quest for security, as Waltz asserts (ibid.: 5-7). Unless and until the world arrives at that point, there can be no answer.<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion</b><br />
It is possible to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. It must be recognised that nuclear weapons cannot be ‘dis-invented’ and the knowledge and technology will always exist even if global zero is achieved. Nuclear disarmament is achievable; nuclear ‘abolition’ is not. The political will to pursue disarmament must be there and there is good evidence it has been renewed since 2007. However, political will must coincide with the right time, when international attention and political capital is not being focused elsewhere on other problems. To succeed, any comprehensive international nuclear disarmament agreement would have to address issues of verification, control of fissile material and mechanisms to confront states in noncompliance. If all of these concerns are addressed, it is indeed possible to reach a nuclear weapons-free world. The question if that world will actually be the one we have envisioned is one that will have to be answered when we get there.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
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Borger, J., and Dehghan, K. (2013) “Secret Talks Helped Forge Iran Nuclear Deal.” The Guardian, November 25, sec. World News. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/secret-usa-iran-talks-nuclear-deal [Accessed 3 December 2013].<br />
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Choubey, D. (2010) “Understanding the 2010 NPT Review Conference.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 3. http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/06/03/understanding-2010-npt-review-conference/594#2 [Accessed 2 December 2013].<br />
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Daalder, I., and Lodal, J. (2008) “The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons.” Foreign Affairs 87 (6): pp. 80–95.<br />
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Ferguson, C. (2010) “The Long Road to Zero.” Foreign Affairs 89 (1): pp.86–94.<br />
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Forden, G., and Thomson, J. (2009) Iran as a Pioneer Case for Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements. 4th ed. Massachusetts Institute of Technology: The Science, Technology, and Global Security Working Group. http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/IPCPublicationMay2009.pdf [Accessed 26 November 2013].<br />
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Gladstone, R., and Chivers, C. (2013) “Forensic Details in UN Report Point to Assad’s Use of Gas.” New York Times, September 16, sec. Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/world/europe/syria-united-nations.html [Accessed 2 December 2013].<br />
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Gladstone, R., and Kershner, I. (2012) “Israel and Hamas Step Up Air Attack in Gaza Clash.” New York Times, November 15, sec. Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-assault.html?_r=0 [Accessed 3 December 2013].<br />
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Greenpeace (2013) “Abolish Nuclear Weapons.” Greenpeace. http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/peace/abolish-nuclear-weapons/ [Accessed 2 December 2013].<br />
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Gusterson, H. (2008) “The New Nuclear Abolitionists.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Online). http://www.thebulletin.org/new-nuclear-abolitionists [Accessed 3 December 2013].<br />
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Hurd, D., Rifkind, M., Owen, D., and Robertson, G. (2008) “Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb.” The Times (London), June 30, sec. Features.<br />
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International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (2013) “The Case for a Ban Treaty.” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. http://www.icanw.org/why-a-ban/the-case-for-a-ban-treaty/ [Accessed 2 December 2013].<br />
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Kissinger, H., Nunn, S., Perry, W., and Shultz, G. (2007) “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” Wall Street Journal, January 4. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NSP_op-eds_final_.pdf?_=1360883065 [Accessed 26 November 2013].<br />
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———. (2008) “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.” Wall Street Journal, January 15. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NSP_op-eds_final_.pdf?_=1360883065 [Accessed 26 November 2013].<br />
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———. (2010) “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent.” Wall Street Journal, January 20. <br />
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———. (2011) “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation.” Wall Street Journal, March 7. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NSP_op-eds_final_.pdf?_=1360883065 [Accessed 26 November 2013].<br />
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Kristensen, H., and Norris, R. (2013) “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2013.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Online). http://www.thebulletin.org/2013/september/global-nuclear-weapons-inventories-1945-2013 [Accessed 2 December 2013]. <br />
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Malin, M., and Miller, S. (2013) “A WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East: Regional Perspectives.” Edited by Foradori, P. and Malin, M., pp. 1–5. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/dp_2013-09.pdf [Accessed 3 December 2013].<br />
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Oliphant, J. (2010) “Republicans Stiffen Opposition to Nuclear Treaty with Russia.” Los Angeles Times, December 20, sec. News. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/20/nation/la-na-start-20101220 [Accessed 4 December 2013].<br />
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Sagan, S., and Waltz, K. (2013) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate. 3rd ed. New York: Norton & Co.<br />
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Weiss, L. (2010) “India and the NPT.” Strategic Analysis 34 (2): pp. 255–271.<br />
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White House Press Office (2009) “Remarks by President Barack Obama: Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic.” White House Press Office. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered [Accessed 2 December 2013].<br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-26473769309232614952014-03-18T08:31:00.000-05:002014-06-24T08:37:18.118-05:00The Inevitability of Intelligence Failure: Sources, Locations and Causes<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyb5Kic8M69E-d0JopOyF4lDUFWnL9VmT2PX0dPxRV7B_eEl8xX7qZ-MsCkylWFlcqneBp9YFWEHe62OBmHuvVTENZeeZoICZ7XusIlgEoJ_FovQroLbNFCrlYuzVOJJp_GgYk2ph1vK8/s1600/Intelligence+Failure.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyb5Kic8M69E-d0JopOyF4lDUFWnL9VmT2PX0dPxRV7B_eEl8xX7qZ-MsCkylWFlcqneBp9YFWEHe62OBmHuvVTENZeeZoICZ7XusIlgEoJ_FovQroLbNFCrlYuzVOJJp_GgYk2ph1vK8/s400/Intelligence+Failure.jpg" /></a><br />
<br />
<i>November 2013</i><br />
<br />
Intelligence failure can be defined as ‘a misunderstanding of the situation that leads a government (or its military forces) to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests’ (Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 62). Explorations of what could or should have been done differently form the basis for millions of pages of government investigations, newspaper articles, books, journals and entire academic careers.<br />
<br />
A uniting factor which leads an event to be considered an intelligence failure is that it was or came close to a national disaster, whereas ‘the record of success is less striking because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen’ (Betts, 1978: 62). If one takes this definition of intelligence failure and turns it around, an ‘intelligence success’ occurs when a situation is understood properly and leads a government (or its military forces) to take actions appropriate and productive to its own interests. Concern with intelligence failures always far outstrips that of any intelligence successes, which may not become known until long after the event, if ever.<br />
<br />
Intelligence failures are inevitable because there are limits to what intelligence can accomplish. Its proponents are often guilty of overselling its capabilities and its ‘consumers’ and observers are guilty of misunderstanding them (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104-5). This essay will use a framework based upon the work of Betts, Schmitt and Shulsky, and Gill and Phythian, among others, to outline the different ‘sources’ or ‘locations’ of intelligence failure, where they occur in the ‘intelligence cycle’, their ‘causes’ and other factors, followed by the use of the 2003 Iraq WMD controversy as a case study to briefly illustrate real-world examples to show why intelligence failures are inevitable. <br />
<br />
<b>Sources & Causes</b><br />
There are three general locations which can be identified as sources of intelligence failure: ‘Collection’, ‘Analysis’ and ‘Decision-Makers’ (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 103-4, citing Betts, 1978). These categories broadly separate persons involved in the ‘Intelligence Cycle’ by their positions or functional roles within it. CIA defines the Intelligence Cycle as the ‘process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers’ (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).<br />
Collection<br />
<br />
The first step in the Intelligence Cycle is to develop directions as to what information is necessary, known as ‘requirements’, and how it will be collected based upon the needs of the eventual consumers of the intelligence, usually senior policymakers (ibid.). Based upon this guidance, intelligence agencies then begin Collection, also known as ‘espionage’, which can be defined as, ‘the practice of using spies to collect information about what another government or company is doing or plans to do’ (Williams, 2011: 1165). Put simply, Collection involves obtaining the information or ‘raw intelligence’ which is required to meet Requirements developed at the first step in the Intelligence Cycle. Collection is performed by all means available to intelligence agencies, including human intelligence, signals intercepts, imagery and scientific and technical measurement, among others, and relates to one or more ‘types’ of intelligence, including military, political, economic or cultural intelligence (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 51).<br />
<br />
<b>Collection Failure</b><br />
Collection Failure can be seen as the ‘unavailability of information when and where needed’ (Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151, citing Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 64-7;) or part of Betts’ ‘Pathologies of Communication’–the lack of timely collection of information (Betts, 1978: 62-3). Essentially, Collection Failure occurs because the information necessary to respond successfully to the situation was not collected or not when needed.<br />
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<b>Inevitability?</b><br />
Planning and directing intelligence requirements and Collection must still deal with the fact that, in the famous words of U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, ‘There are no "knowns." There are thing we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know’ (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2002), a sentiment similar to one expressed earlier by CIA’s Sherman Kent when he stated there are ‘Things which are knowable but happen to be unknown to us, and…things which are not known to anyone at all’ (Kent, 1964). Simply put, Collection Failure can occur when necessary information, known to exist and known to be needed, is not available due to some limitation. Or it can occur because it was not even considered, dismissed or there were no indicators it was necessary to gather such information. Nonetheless, as Betts (1978: 61) states, ‘In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information’.<br />
<br />
<b>Analysis</b><br />
Station three in the Intelligence Cycle is the ‘processing’ of the collected information, followed by the fourth step of Analysis and creation of intelligence ‘products’, such as reports, findings and estimates. This is followed by the fifth step, Dissemination—distributing the intelligence product to decision-makers in a proper format in a timely manner (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).<br />
<br />
The analysis stage begins with an evaluation of the truth of the collected material and the validity of the process which acquired it (Butler Panel, 2008: 527-8). For some forms, such as imagery and signals intelligence, this will be easy; for others, especially human intelligence (usually obtained second-hand from an informant by a case officer) it is more onerous to establish. There may be the wish of the collecting officer to have his source believed, giving rise to the need for an independent appraisal of the information (ibid.). Accuracy in reporting or quoting the information from the source to the analyst must be ensured. It must be checked that the source has actual access to the information or an acceptable explanation of how it was obtained. It must be considered if the source has some ulterior motive for providing the information or if they are involved in a counter-intelligence operation. Their previous track record must also be considered (ibid.). If the veracity of the information is not thoroughly tested and established, anything that follows may be derived from false information and will be fruit from a poison tree. <br />
<br />
Actual Analysis of the information, after its validity has been established, involves appraising the value of the information in its own right, deciding how much weight should be assigned to it and compiling it into ‘meaningful strands’ based upon what it relates to. These ‘strands’, compiled from all available sources of related information, are then further used to develop ‘estimates’ (‘assessments’ in the UK) of a particular international situation or set of circumstances (ibid.: 528). They can be rapid, low-level appraisals or they can be the premier product composed of the collective wisdom of the entire intelligence community, as with America’s National Intelligence Estimates (Johnson, 2008: 344). The product is then disseminated and/or briefed to decision-makers in an appropriate format.<br />
<br />
Collecting information is difficult enough; deciding what should be done in light of it and how it should be presented creates even more problems. Sherman Kent, ‘father figure of CIA analysis’, felt that estimates consist of, ‘knowledge, reasoning and guesswork’ (Johnson, 2008: 344). The pitfalls of analysing information to attempt to piece together accurate appraisals, predictions and/or advice based upon information of varying types and of contestable accuracy or value, often in a short amount of time, in order to develop an intelligence product are apparent. Estimates are used to develop national policy regarding situations vital to national security. If information, analysis or estimates are wrong or wrongly presented, the policy response will be wrong as well, with serious consequences (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 106-112).<br />
<br />
<b>Analysis Failure</b><br />
Analysis Failure is a broader category. It includes ‘Tendency to concentrate on ‘usual suspects’ for ideological or practical purposes’ (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104), ‘Opinion governed by “conventional wisdom” without supporting evidence’, ‘”mirror imaging”, in which unfamiliar situations are judged upon the basis of the familiar’ (Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151, citing Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002, 64-67) and the ‘Paradox of Perception’—failure to properly balance pre-conceived notions based upon previous and historical experience against an unbiased look at information and failure to balance sensitivity of warnings between insufficiency and alarmism (Betts, 1978: 62-3). It also includes failure in ‘effectively communicating with Decision-Makers’, Betts’ other entry under ‘Pathologies of Communication’ (ibid.).<br />
<br />
In sum, Analysis Failure can be located in the Processing, Analysis and Production, or Dissemination stages of the Intelligence Cycle. Essentially, Analysis Failure occurs because information is not properly validated or it is improperly dismissed; the wrong degree of emphasis is placed on collected information; opinion developed through collected information is skewed by practical, ideological, or some other cognitive bias, or; where intelligence products do not effectively communicate the necessary information collected to Decision-Makers, either through an ineffective portrayal of the information collected or untimely dissemination to them.<br />
<br />
Inevitability?<br />
Writing in defence of the wrongly-concluded 1962 NIE on the likelihood of Soviet nuclear missiles being stationed on Cuba, Sherman Kent (1964) explained the process of estimates thus:<br />
<br />
“If NIEs could be confined to statements of indisputable fact the task would be safe and easy. Of course the result could not then be called an estimate. By definition, estimating is an excursion out beyond established fact into the unknown--a venture in which the estimator gets such aid and comfort as he can from analogy, extrapolation, logic, and judgment. In the nature of things he will upon occasion end up with a conclusion which time will prove to be wrong. To recognize this as inevitable does not mean that we estimators are reconciled to our inadequacy; it only means we fully realize that we are engaged in a hazardous occupation.”<br />
<br />
If the circumstances for which Decision-Makers require intelligence were unambiguous, then intelligence services could hand them Kent’s ‘indisputable facts’ and leave them to it. However, there are few circumstances in international politics today which possess such clarity that Decision-Makers, often elected officials with little or no security experience, can decide on their own with ‘raw intelligence’. Today the problem may be too much information, as opposed to not enough, when one considers the mass amounts of imagery and signals information collected, processed and analysed (Irwin, 2012). Intelligence analysis remains a necessity. <br />
<br />
Schmitt and Schulsky (2002: 72) argue, ’The heart of the problem of intelligence failure, [is] the thought processes of the individual analyst.’ Attempts to counteract the human element in analysis through systemic or procedural reforms, rather than fixing these flaws, may actually serve to build overconfidence in them afterwards through a belief that the problem has been solved and won’t recur (Betts, 1978: 61). However, history shows that the same mistakes continue to be made. At bottom, intelligence analysis is still a flawed human process and will always be as flawed as the human beings conducting the analysis. So long as there are ambiguous situations requiring, as Kent (1964) puts it, ‘guesswork’, there will inevitably be Analysis Failures.<br />
Decision-Makers<br />
<br />
In the final step of the Intelligence Cycle, the product, having been disseminated, has been received by its ‘consumers’ and they have informed themselves of the intelligence. They may have further questions or desire more information. This leads to the development of new Requirements, leading back to the first stage of the Intelligence Cycle, which begins anew (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).<br />
<br />
Decision-Makers, a mix of high-level elected officials, executive appointees and military officials, then actually use the intelligence produced to inform their decisions. Making decisions that are vital to protecting a nation’s security are inherently difficult, with or without accurate intelligence. Historically, intelligence failures are most frequently located with Decision-Makers (Betts, 1978: 62-3). Policymakers often make one of Johnson’s ‘seven sins of strategic intelligence’—ignoring intelligence that which does not conform to their view of a situation (Johnson, 1982: 182-4). If intelligence is misunderstood or ignored, the policy decision-makers pursue may lead to an intelligence failure.<br />
<br />
<b>Decision-Maker Failure</b><br />
‘Decision-Maker Failure’ is the ‘subordination of Intelligence to policy’ (Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 64-67; Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151) and may influence the initial Planning and Direction stage of the Intelligence Cycle or be exhibited in how or if Decision-Makers use intelligence to make policy. It also occurs when pressure from Decision-Makers is brought to bear on those involved in analysis at the Processing, Analysis and Production or Dissemination stages. According to Betts (1978: 61), ‘In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision-makers who consume the products of intelligence services.’<br />
<br />
Decision-Maker Failure often occurs as a result of ‘Politicisation’, one of the central problems of intelligence. In the words of Robert M Gates as Director of Central Intelligence (Gates, 1992):<br />
<br />
“Politicization can manifest itself in many ways, but in each case it boils down to the same essential elements: almost all agree that it involves deliberately distorting analysis or judgments to favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence. Most consider `classic' politicization to be only that which occurs if products are forced to conform to policymakers' views. A number believe politicization also results from management pressures to define and drive certain lines of analysis and substantive viewpoints. Still others believe that changes in tone or emphasis made during the normal review or coordination process and limited means for expressing alternative viewpoints, also constitute forms of politicization."<br />
<br />
Essentially, Decision-Maker Failure most often occurs because of some form of ‘politicisation’ by Decision-Makers where intelligence is deliberately distorted, ignored or selectively applied.<br />
<br />
<b>Inevitability?</b><br />
According to Johnson (1983: 182), ‘No shortcoming of strategic intelligence is more often cited than the self-delusion of policymakers who brush aside-or bend-facts that fail to conform with their Weltanschauung.’ In Western democracies, Decision-Makers are either elected officials or senior civil servants influenced by elected officials. Politics is their job and it affects all aspects of it, including making security decisions based upon intelligence. Politics affects every form of government, from totalitarian dictatorships to communist collectives. As von Clausewitz is often quoted, ‘War is the continuation of politics by other means.’ Attempting to totally remove politics from war and national security is an impossible task. As stated above, Decision-Maker Failure through politicisation is the most common reason for intelligence failure. So long as politics are involved in security decisions, there will inevitably be intelligence failures.<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Other Factors</b><br />
<br />
<b>Systemic Factors</b><br />
Systemic Factors which may lead to intelligence failure include internal bureaucratic obstacles and failure to share information or cooperate with other agencies (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104). Garciano and Posner (2005: 159) describe this as, ‘lack of prompt and full sharing of intelligence information within intelligence agencies, between different agencies, and between federal, state and local government levels.’ These Systemic Factors may occur at any phase of the Intelligence cycle and lie within Collection, Analysis or with Decision-Makers. If Collection resources or collected information is not shared it cannot be properly analysed and will not make its way to Decision-Makers, leading to intelligence failure.<br />
<br />
<b>External Factors</b><br />
‘External Factors’ are always present. They include the, ‘Intrinsic difficulty in identifying targets’ and the fact that states or organisations which are or may be the target of intelligence agencies cannot be expected to remain passive to intelligence operations against them (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104-5). Simply put, sometimes it is difficult or impossible to collect some forms of information, or, as Kent (1964) puts it, ‘Something literally unknowable by any man alive.’ Knowing the intent of an adversary before even he has formed it is an example of this impossibility. An intelligence failure for one state is often the result of an intelligence success by another. External Factors most often affect Collection, but they may also affect Analysis and Decision-Makers at any stage of the Intelligence Cycle, especially if the particular intelligence failure is the active effort of a foreign intelligence service, such as infiltration, double-agents, strategic deception or a counter-intelligence operation.<br />
<br />
<b>Case Study: Iraq WMD</b><br />
The false belief and assertion by the U.S. and UK governments that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq possessed WMD capabilities in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War is an instructive case which illustrates examples of each of the different causes of intelligence failure. Some of these are explored here, though there are more which could be cited.<br />
<br />
<b>Collection Failure</b><br />
According to Morrison (2011: 520), one of the reasons for the intelligence failure relating to the existence of Iraq’s WMD capabilities was a failure to set a Requirement for Collection of political intelligence to place in context technical information on Saddam’s WMD programs. Collection was instead focused on gathering information about the existence of the programs themselves. This led to failure to consider the question in light of Saddam’s ‘political system, fears, and intentions’ (Jervis, 2006: 41). Collecting such information could have offered an explanation as to why Hussein would refuse to disavow WMD programs and cooperate with UN inspections despite not having active WMD programs. Setting this Requirement may have served to balance the dominant presumption that Iraq had WMD, the justification for the war which turned out to be false.<br />
<br />
<b>Analysis Failure</b><br />
UK and U.S. analysis of Iraq’s WMD relied heavily upon unreliable human intelligence sources which were not properly vetted and, in some cases, have since proven to be fabrications. Information was also being quickly disseminated to policymakers without being properly validated or analysed first (Morrison, 2011: 520). In his study of the major U.S. and UK post-mortems on Iraq, Jervis (2006) cites many examples of Analysis Failure: ‘ICs’ judgments were stated with excessive certainty’ (ibid.: 14), ‘no general alternative explanations for Saddam’s behavior were offered’ (ibid.: 15), ‘lack of imagination’ to develop these alternative views (ibid.: 17), ‘failure to challenge assumptions’ regarding existence of WMD programs and a situation ‘whereby assessments were based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties’ (ibid.: 22), among others. These examples illustrate just some of the places where analysis went wrong.<br />
<br />
<b>Decision-Maker Failure</b><br />
The case of Iraq’s WMD provides a clear example of politicisation of intelligence. The Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP) was specifically established by the Bush administration to develop assessments based upon the assumption that Iraq had WMD and its products were used in preference to other Intelligence Community assessments that contradicted that hypothesis (Ryan, 2006: 304-5). A ‘Red Team’ analysis conducted by CIA’s WINPAC, designed only as an initial ‘devil’s advocate’ view in the face of evidence Iraq did not have WMD, was also selectively used by the administration despite strong evidence from the rest of the Intelligence Community its conclusion was wrong. Assessments by agencies such as U.S. Department of Energy and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence Research provided strong, clear arguments against the central argument made in assessments preferred by the Bush administration, but they were pushed aside by Decision-Makers (Conway, 2012: 490-1).<br />
<br />
<b>Systemic Factors</b><br />
Garciano and Posner (2005: 149) point out the WMD Commission’s finding that there was not enough cooperation or information sharing between agencies, specifically in regard to reports that called into question the credibility of the information by the source ‘Curveball’, whose assertion that he had been involved in active WMD programs in Iraq became a central piece of evidence in the Bush administration’s push for war. Curveball (Rashid al-Janabi) himself has since admitted his evidence was a fabrication (NBC News, 2011). If more than one agency had access to these reports, there may have been more questions asked. However, bureaucratic obstacles and security standards stood in the way. There is a lack of information sharing between U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, seen to have separate functions, which may have led to vital information not being shared and considered (Cilluffo et al, 2002: 70-1).<br />
<br />
<b>External Factors</b><br />
Saddam Hussein and his regime were not inactive players in their fate. There was a systematic denial and deception campaign by the regime and their failure to cooperate with and eventual ejection of UN inspectors supported the belief that Iraq had something to hide regarding its WMD programs. Wherever evidence was not available to prove or disprove hypotheses, Saddam and his regime could be blamed for blocking attempts to collect the necessary intelligence (Jervis, 2006: 27-8). In his debriefing by the FBI, Saddam admitted that he wanted to maintain the façade of possessing WMD to counter enemies, especially Iran (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008). Of course, had Saddam been open regarding WMD and cooperated with UN inspections, the likelihood of war would have been greatly reduced. Intelligence is, ‘a game between hiders and finders, and the former usually have the easier job’ (Jervis, 2006: 11).<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion</b><br />
As Gill and Phythian (2004: 105) point out, ‘the limits of intelligence dictate that intelligence failure is inevitable. Partly, this is a consequence of the impossibility of perfect predictive success; partly it is a consequence of decision-makers’ (politicians with regard to states) natural tendency to err on the side of caution by subscribing to worst-case scenarios, or to simply ignore intelligence that does not fit their own preferences.’ As discussed, there are other locations within the Intelligence Cycle where things can go wrong and there are other possible causes and factors leading to intelligence failure. The debacle of Iraq’s WMD provides many real-world illustrations. <br />
<br />
Jervis (2006: 11) makes clear that, ‘Any specific instance of intelligence failure will, by definition, seem unusual, but the fact of the failure itself is quite ordinary’. If the result of the failure is a great national disaster, it will seem to be a great failure. However, factual examinations of how failures occur inevitably show common, ordinary failures by people and organisations that often occur in situations outside of the intelligence context. Jervis usefully compares the Iraq WMD investigations to enquiries into the 1986 Challenger shuttle disaster and abuse allegations in the Catholic Church (ibid.: 4-5). It is only the consequences of intelligence failure that make them appear much larger than they are—the stakes are simply much higher (Betts, 1978: 62). Despite all of the post-mortems conducted on intelligence failures, there is little evidence their conclusions or the reforms enacted afterwards as a result have translated into an elimination or even significant reduction of failures (ibid.). <br />
These human failures are impossible to ever eliminate for good, especially those of a political or cognitive nature. Intelligence failures are inevitable because they seek to make clear ambiguous, complex situations using information that may be difficult to obtain, validate and understand, either through the resistance of the target or the nature of the information itself, and then present information in a digestible manner to Decision-Makers, who may do as they wish with the intelligence produced. Even minor errors at any point in the Intelligence Cycle may throw off the entire enterprise. The fallible and flawed nature of human beings attempting to put together some unknown puzzle with an incomplete picture means mistakes will inevitably occur at some point in the process. There is an old military maxim: ‘what can go wrong, will go wrong.’ Betts (1978) and Gill and Phythian (2006: 105) believe we must accept that intelligence failures are inevitable. Indeed, given the nature of the work of intelligence and all that can go wrong, it would be more extraordinary if intelligence failures did not occur.<br />
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<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
Barrett, D. (2010) “Why Intelligence Failures Are (Still) Inevitable.” Diplomatic History 34 (1): pp. 207–213.<br />
<br />
Betts, R. (1978) “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable.” World Politics 31 (1): pp. 61–89.<br />
<br />
———. (2002) “Fixing Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs 81 (1): pp.43–59.<br />
<br />
———. (2007) “Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD.” Political Science Quarterly 122 (4): pp. 585–606.<br />
<br />
Butler Panel of Inquiry (2008) “The British Experience with Intelligence Failure.” In Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies, edited by Johnson, L. and Wirtz, J., 2nd ed., pp. 526–536. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />
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Cilluffo, F., Marks, R., and Salmoiraghi, G. (2002) “The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence.” Washington Quarterly 25 (1): pp. 61–74.<br />
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Conway, P. (2012) “Red Team: How the Neoconservatives Helped Cause the Iraq Intelligence Failure.” Intelligence and National Security 27 (4): pp. 488–512.<br />
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (2008) “Interviewing Saddam: FBI Agent Gets to the Truth.” Federal Bureau of Investigation – Stories. http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/piro012808 [Accessed 4 January 2014].<br />
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Garciano, L., and Posner, R. (2005) “Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (4). http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134960 [Accessed 4 January 2014].<br />
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Gates, R. (1992) “Guarding Against Politicization.” Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/volume-36-number-1/html/v36i1a01p_0001.htm [Accessed 5 January 2014].<br />
<br />
Gill, P., and Phythian, M. (2006) “Why Does Intelligence Fail?” In Intelligence in an Insecure World, 1st ed., pp. 103–124. Cambridge: Polity.<br />
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Hatlebrekke, K., and Smith, M. (2010) “Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure.” Intelligence and National Security, 25 (2): pp. 147–182.<br />
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Irwin, S. (2012) “Too Much Information, Not Enough Intelligence.” National Defense Magazine. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/May/Pages/TooMuchInformation,NotEnoughIntelligence.aspx [Accessed 6 January 2014].<br />
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Jackson, P., and Scott, L. (2004) “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice.” Intelligence and National Security 19 (2): pp. 139–169.<br />
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Jervis, R. (2006) “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq.” Journal of Strategic Studies 29 (1): pp. 3–52.<br />
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Johnson, L. (1983) “Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence.” World Affairs 146 (2): pp. 176–204.<br />
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———. (2008) “Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President’s Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate.” Intelligence and National Security 23 (3): pp. 333–370.<br />
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Johnson, L., and Wirtz, J. (2008) “Part II: Collection.” In Intelligence and National Security, 2nd ed., pp. 49–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />
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Kent, S. (1964) “A Crucial Estimate Relived.” Studies in Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency). https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol8no2/html/v08i2a01p.htm [Accessed 4 January 2014].<br />
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Morrison, J. (2011) “British Intelligence Failures in Iraq.” Intelligence and National Security 26 (4). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.580604 [Accessed 6 January 2014].<br />
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NBC News (2011) “‘Curveball’: I Lied about WMD to Hasten Iraq War.” NBC News. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41609536/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/curveball-i-lied-about-wmd-hasten-iraq-war/#.Us12Fp5_u8A [Accessed 5 January 2014].<br />
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Renshon, J. (2009) “Assessing Capabilities in International Politics: Biased Overestimation and the Case of the Imaginary ‘Missile Gap.’” Journal of Strategic Studies 32 (1). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390802407475 [Accessed 5 January 2014].<br />
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Roman, P. (1995) “Strategic Bombers over the Missile Horizon.” Journal of Strategic Studies 18 (1): pp. 198–236.<br />
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Ryan, M. (2006) “Filling in the ‘Unknowns’: Hypothesis-Based Intelligence and the Rumsfeld Commission.” Intelligence and National Security 21 (2): pp. 286–315.<br />
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Schmitt, G., and Shulsky, A. (2002) Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s.<br />
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Williams, R. (2011) “(Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action.” George Washington Law Review 79 (4): pp. 1162–1200.<br />
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-75023286073686434562014-02-27T05:10:00.001-06:002014-06-24T08:39:51.255-05:00The Nuclear Revolution: Deterrence, Flexible Response, Massive Retaliation, Medium Nuclear States and the Impossibility of Victory<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFIjOE2TDXQ210ncCV9KGwNMmWcNL_Z0-KA3AuaZkGiiCV5ockdNOBReVIkdCjUgCPT2oOW8-IJ9g0pIJ0GBCu3ObBPYPQHgNHeTft3-S2tbZTlj8DDippfh4RYIrzku8MQYx3AiIpCEE/s1600/Nuke+Explosion.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFIjOE2TDXQ210ncCV9KGwNMmWcNL_Z0-KA3AuaZkGiiCV5ockdNOBReVIkdCjUgCPT2oOW8-IJ9g0pIJ0GBCu3ObBPYPQHgNHeTft3-S2tbZTlj8DDippfh4RYIrzku8MQYx3AiIpCEE/s320/Nuke+Explosion.jpg" /></a><br />
<br />
<i>November, 2013</i><br />
<br />
In August 1945 the United States military dropped nuclear devices on the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, directly or indirectly bringing about the end of WWII. These attacks were the first and—so far—last time atomic weapons have been used in war. I argue these attacks represented a ‘nuclear revolution’, the dawning of a new era in which the character of warfare was dramatically altered. Anyone who then or since has witnessed the consequences of their use understands that the awesome destructive power of atomic weapons is greater than anything the world has seen before. However there is more to this fundamental change. Below I will explore three additional dimensions of this shift in the nature of military conflict: the impossibility of victory in nuclear war, how the revolutionary character of atomic weapons bolstered smaller states as much as large, and how the concept of deterrence turned warfare on its head to explain why the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of this ‘nuclear revolution’, signalling a fundamental change in the character of warfare.<br />
<br />
<b>Nuclear War Cannot Be Won</b><br />
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represented a revolution in that they marked the beginning of a new era of warfare in which neither side could, no matter the outcome, claim military victory. Both parties would stand to lose so much that even if one side were left standing, they would preside only over a ruined world. A mass nuclear first strike and ‘mass retaliation’ would leave the world decimated. This state of affairs is ‘mutually-assured destruction’ (Jervis, 1989:4).<br />
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U.S. President Eisenhower (1956, cited ibid.: 5) held that nuclear war means destruction of the enemy and likely ‘suicide’ for the victor. In all previous iterations of warfare, from archaic and ancient to modern up to 1945, there was still some way to determine that one side had come out ahead of the other, whether the measure was military, economic or political. In a full-scale nuclear war, the destruction by both sides following a mass first-strike and mass retaliation would be so total that any national government which scurried out of their bunker after the exchange would have nothing left to rule over. It can hardly be imagined that any political, military or economic goal would be worth risking such an outcome to any rational actor. Ambrose quotes Eisenhower (1954, cited ibid.: 4) as questioning his Joint Chiefs of Staff what could be done with such a victory with society in North America, Europe and Asia destroyed, devoid of communications and virtually devoid of life. That cannot be seen as a victory in any sense. French President Charles de Gaulle held, “[After nuclear war, the] two sides would have neither powers, nor laws, nor cities, nor cultures, nor cradles, nor tombs” (ibid.: 1).<br />
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The ‘Flexible Response’ doctrine attempted to address Ike’s bleak picture of mutually-assured destruction through first-strike and mass retaliation. Advocates of the policy such as Colin Gray (1981: 47-9) argued that U.S. nuclear strategy should not be based upon a large-scale unleashing of the full nuclear arsenal upon Soviet cities and industrial areas likely to be met with an equal reaction from Moscow, but rather based upon a more restrained, step-laddered approach where tit-for-tat nuclear strikes, though heavily damaging, would still leave open the possibility for diplomatic negotiations and a political climb-down before the conflict reaches nuclear Armageddon. Such a nuclear exchange would leave open the possibility of one side or the other ‘winning’ without destroying society as we know it (ibid.).<br />
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However critics of Flexible Response such as David Dessler (1982: 55-7) argue the idea was wrongheaded. Such a policy could lead to ‘deterrence failure’ if the Soviets did not believe the U.S. would respond massively in kind to a nuclear attack, thus inviting them to try their luck. It also ignored Moscow’s ‘strategic culture’, namely that the USSR utterly rejected a graduated response in favour of massive retaliation. In this view, attempts to lessen the costs of a nuclear war could in fact increase the likelihood of nuclear war occurring (ibid.). According to Schelling (1963: 6), pursuing a ‘lesser evil’ policy of limiting war below massive retaliation detracts from deterrence because the reduced threat this implies may not create enough disincentive for a would-be attacker. Thus if the Soviet Union mounted a mass nuclear attack, the U.S. would be faced with the option of hoping to absorb it and respond with a step-laddered approach or respond immediately in kind. The USSR had stated its policy, thus eliminating any real options in a U.S. response. Thibaut and Kelley (1959, cited in Jervis, 1989: 3) call this the difference between ‘fate-control’ and ‘behaviour-control’—namely that the U.S. and USSR controlled one another’s fates in a nuclear exchange, but U.S. Flexible Response policy could not control Soviet behaviour, only hope to influence it. If the Soviets struck, their policy stated it would be en masse. The only hope was that a limited U.S. action would reciprocate a limited reaction from Moscow—a rather risky idea. <br />
<br />
Further, Ball’s (1981) analysis of American and Soviet nuclear command and control systems calls into question the ability of either side in a nuclear exchange to control their response in a coordinated way once a nuclear engagement has begun as communications and firing control systems would likely be destroyed or break down and/or political and military leadership may be eliminated. If true, the advantage will lay with the party conducting the first strike and seriously degrade or even eliminate the possibility of a retaliatory strike if not conducted immediately or simultaneously. This reinforces the idea that nuclear strikes must be an ‘all or nothing’, massive force affair; otherwise the loss of command and control may render any non-immediate response ineffective or impossible (ibid.).<br />
<br />
Fortunately the impossibility of victory or the rectitude of mass retaliation or Flexible Response have never been, and hopefully never will be, tested in practice. In any case, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a revolution in that they signalled the beginning of a phase when both sides had to take into account that a nuclear war meant neither side could ever really claim victory, a wholly revolutionary state of affairs in the history of conflict.<br />
<br />
<b>A Revolution for ‘Medium’ Nuclear States</b><br />
Possession of nuclear weapons was also a revolution for powers smaller than the U.S. and USSR. It meant states with relatively small militaries, small population and/or smaller industrial and financial resources—though large enough to develop and maintain nuclear weapons—could keep up with states with vastly more such resources. <br />
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This aspect was especially important for Western second-tier nuclear powers such as Britain and France who were able to maintain a degree of influence over collective security in the new bipolar world, unlike satellites of the Soviet Union such as Hungary, East Germany and Bulgaria (Mastny, 2005: 30-1). Because of the military and political influence nuclear weapons granted them, Britain and France arguably maintained more influence in the U.S.-dominated Western bloc than did their Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact opposite numbers. The USSR wholly rejected the idea of arming its satellite states with an independent capability, refusing to help them build their own programs or even to jointly develop Warsaw Pact nuclear strategy (ibid.). In this regard, nuclear weapons were a revolutionary tool for less powerful states to stay in the game militarily and politically.<br />
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According to Clark and Wheeler (1989: 43), the 1947 British decision to pursue the bomb was, “So self-evident as to require no compelling strategic assessment in support of it.” Though individual policymakers had their own reasons, there was never any doubt Britain would pursue atomic weapons (ibid.). In 1945, the Soviet military had consisted of 6 million service personnel (Dear and Foot, 2005: 966) and the United States had over 8 million spread across North America, Europe and Asia (ibid.: 931). Britain had only 4.6 million in uniform (ibid.: 884) to cover home and all of its international empire. Britain’s domestic economy was greatly strained under the heavy burden of war-related debt and the costs of conventional forces had to be reduced (Clark and Wheeler, 1989: 25-30). The argument would frequently be put forward, predominantly in the early 1950s, that investment in nuclear arms would translate into cost savings by reducing Britain’s need for conventional forces (ibid.: 27). Though pursuing atomic weapons was not cheap for Britain, they were certainly more obtainable than attempting to build as many conventional bombers, tanks and artillery pieces to stay relevant in the contest between the U.S. and USSR and simultaneously attempting to maintain the standard of living at home. Both the United States and Britain came to see nuclear weapons as a set-off to reducing spending on conventional forces (Pierre, 1972: 87-8). It is arguable that while Britain lost political and economic influence and shed its colonial empire following WWII, developing nuclear arms kept London at the table with Washington and Moscow while it cut spending on conventional forces and rebuilt the economy at home.<br />
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According to Stoddart (2007), this lesson was not lost on Charles de Gaulle, who, in a similar situation economically, was already pursuing an independent path for France after splitting with the U.S. and Britain over NATO policy. De Gaulle hoped to convince Britain to help France obtain its own nuclear capability quicker and cheaper and there is good evidence Britain traded atomic know-how, telling French atomic scientists what not to do, for UK accession to the European Economic Community in 1972 (ibid.). Though France was late to enter the Cold War nuclear club, the capability made sure France was still a player in the politics of the era.<br />
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The nuclear era, ushered in by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represented a revolution for Britain, France and later smaller powers in that developing their own independent nuclear capabilities allowed them to influence the actions powers such as the United States and USSR, relieved some of their budget pressures, and allowed them to have a significant say in their independent and collective security.<br />
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<b>Deterrence Turns War on its Head</b><br />
One of the major facets of the revolution in the character or warfare that followed the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was that nuclear weapons turned the focus of military power on its head. As Brodie states, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them” (1946, cited in Jervis, 1989: 7). Schelling (1963: 9) called deterrence, “A theory of the skilful nonuse of military forces” (original emphasis).<br />
<br />
There were differences in how these states viewed the use of their nuclear weapons and how credible the threat of their use was (Pierre, 1972: 87). Britain and France could not afford to build a nuclear arsenal capable of credibly threatening the Soviet Union with the same level of mutually-assured destruction America could. However atomic weapons meant they possessed their own independent nuclear capabilities which could still inflict a degree of ‘punishment’ on Soviet cities in a nuclear exchange that would be high enough to deter Moscow from attacking (ibid.). <br />
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According to Pierre (ibid.), Britain’s 1952 ‘Global Strategy Paper’ called nuclear weapons a revolution in the character of warfare. It was also the first policy paper to call for a strategy based upon the concept of deterrence, picked up in the United States by President Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ policy (ibid.). The idea was for the West to openly state that Soviet military advances would be met with an atomic response, not just local, conventional action. Deterrence would make clear to Moscow that any aggression would be met not solely at distant points of friction between East and West, but would strike at the centre of the USSR itself (ibid.). Moscow would not be allowed to whittle away at the margins by taking calculated risks. The idea was to promise to punish the Soviets severely for any attack on Western interests.<br />
<br />
Jervis (1989:6-9) points out that the speed and scale of destruction wrought by atomic weapons is such that their use is almost unthinkable despite the clear offensive advantage they represent. Conventional weapons such as artillery and strategic bombers and methods such as sieges and blockades could rationally deliver as much ‘punishment’ through destruction, but could do so only very slowly, very intensively and very expensively. Such conventional methods are calculated to bring an opponent down before their destruction was total and certainly before the act became destructive to the aggressor as well and still left time for diplomacy and second thoughts (ibid.). Nuclear weapons are of such awesome power and so fast and absolute in their destruction that there can be no real rational basis for their use. When both sides possess nuclear weapons, the destruction is mutual and virtually simultaneous. Cities are destroyed within hours and no time is left for negotiation. Rationally, their character becomes therefore more responsive than active or offensive. Facing such destruction, an opponent will be demur from attacking in the face of this scale of ‘deterrence by punishment’ (ibid.).<br />
<br />
Another aspect of nuclear capability is that it defeats ‘deterrence by denial’. In conventional war, the credible ability of a state to repel or defend itself against attack by an opponent is ‘denial capability’ (Snyder, 1961: 3-5). Defence is the actual capability to repel an attack. A state that is credibly seen to be capable of defending itself by inflicting damage on any aggressor will deter an aggressor from attacking—deterrence by denial. However, nuclear weapons make defence impossible and thus eliminate deterrence by denial (ibid.). <br />
<br />
The creation of a weapon that can hardly be defended against is a revolution, further exhibited in the unique response to the prospect of developing capability to defend against them. The development of every other weapon in history has logically led to the development of a defence, leading, of course, to further improvements to the weapon or new weapons to overcome that defence. Swords and arrows were countered by shields and armour. Bullets and artillery were countered by flak jackets and Kevlar helmets. As yet, there is no credible defence against a nuclear attack. The position of nuclear weapons in this regard was revolutionary because both the U.S. and USSR agreed not to fully develop a defence against them. U.S thinkers argued stability could be gained through this concept of ‘mutual vulnerability’, though both sides continued to attempt to develop nuclear defences to varying degrees (Yost, 2007: 555). Barnaby (1969: 26-35) writes comprehensively on the arguments for and against developing anti-ballistic missile systems and exhibits the difficulty in coming to any conclusion as to whether developing such a defensive capability actually provides increased security or if it decreases security. In the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the U.S. and USSR agreed to limit their capability to destroy each other’s incoming nuclear missiles to one battery of interceptors each. Later, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or ‘Star Wars’, missile defence programme threatened to derail nuclear arms reduction talks. Though the feasibility of such a program was questioned, it presented enough of a threat to the balance of nuclear power to Moscow that Premier Mikhail Gorbechev was induced to sign the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement, a bilateral treaty to eliminate IRBMs and SRBMs, in exchange U.S. promises regarding the SDI (Boyd and Scouras, 2013; Norman, 1986). Never before had a weapon of war been considered so essential or given so much credence as to induce two powers to agree not to develop a defence against it in order to maintain peace.<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion</b><br />
Besides the great destructive power nuclear weapons represent as shown through the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were a revolution that changed the character of warfare. Conflicts in which both opponents possess nuclear weapons made victory in war for either side impossible, despite risky attempts to control the destruction through Flexible Response. Atomic weapons gave smaller states such as Britain and France more leverage, independence, and economic relief than they would have otherwise had, shown more clearly in contrast with their Warsaw Pact counterparts who were denied the capability. The deterrent effect nuclear weapons created and virtual impossibility of defending against them meant that military strategy was now more concerned with avoiding war than with winning it. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki truly marked a ‘nuclear revolution’ that brought about a fundamental shift in the character of warfare.<br />
<br />
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<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
<br />
Ambrose, S. (1984) Eisenhower the President. Vol. 2/2, p. 246. London: Allen & Unwin.<br />
<br />
Ball, D. (1986) ‘Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?’ Adelphi Papers, 21: 169, pp. 1-51.<br />
<br />
Barnaby, C. (1969) ‘Arguments For and Against the Deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems’. In Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, edited by Barnaby, C. and Boserup, A., pp.26- 38. London: Souvenir Press.<br />
<br />
Boyd, D. and Scouras, J. (2013) ‘Escape from Nuclear Deterrence; Lessons for Global Zero from the Strategic Defense Initiative’. The Nonproliferation Review, 20:2. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10736700.2013.799822 [Accessed 6 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Brodie, B. (1946) The Absolute Weapon. New York: Harcourt, Brace.<br />
<br />
Clark, I. and Wheeler, N. (1989) The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945-1955, pp. 25-30, 43. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
<br />
Dear, I. and Foot, M. (2005) The Oxford Companion to World War II, pp. 884, 931, 966. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
<br />
Dessler, D. (1982) ‘’Just in Case’ - the Danger of Flexible Response’. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 38. Available from: http://books.google.co.uk/booksid=dQoAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA55&dq=Dessler,+David+Bulletin+of+the+Atomic+Scientists&hl=en&sa=X&ei=vj96Ur-dAqOS0AWx_ICwCA&ved=0CD0Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=Dessler%2C%20David%20Bulletin%20of%20the%20Atomic%20Scientists&f=false [Accessed 6 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Eisenhower, D. (1956) ‘Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary, box 8’. Abilene, KS: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.<br />
<br />
Gray, C. (1981) ‘Issues and Non-Issues in the Nuclear Policy Debate’. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 37, pp. 47-9. Available from: http://books.google.co.uk/booksid=RQsAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA47&dq=Colin+Gray+Issues+and+nonissues+in+the+nuclear+policy+debate+december+1981&hl=en&sa=X&ei=EUN6Up63KYXG0QWNpoGICA&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Colin%20Gray%20Issues%20and%20nonissues%20in%20the%20nuclear%20policy%20debate%20december%201981&f=false [Accessed 6 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Jervis, R. (1989) The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, pp. 1-8. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.<br />
<br />
Kelley, H. and Thibaut, J. (1959) The Social Psychology of Groups, pp. 101-11. New York: Wiley.<br />
<br />
Mastny, V. (2005) ‘The Warsaw Pact as History’. In A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, edited by Byrne, M. and Mastny, V., pp. 30-1. Budapest: Central European University Press.<br />
<br />
Norman, C. (1986) ‘Star Wars and the Summit’. Science, 234:4776, pp. 533–34.<br />
<br />
Pierre, A. (1972) Nuclear Politics, pp. 87-8. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
<br />
Schelling, T. (1963) The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 6-9. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.<br />
<br />
Snyder, G. (1961) Deterrence and Defense, pp. 3-5. Princeton: Princeton University Press.<br />
<br />
Stoddart, K. (2007) ‘Nuclear Weapons in Britain’s Policy Toward France 1960-1974’. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 18: 4, pp. 719–44.<br />
<br />
Yost, D. (2007) ‘Analysing International Nuclear Order’. International Affairs, 83:3, pp. 549-574. Available from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4541759 [Accessed 13 November 2013].<br />
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-18816254056367539762014-01-31T14:16:00.000-06:002014-06-24T08:45:32.266-05:00Bush's Freedom Agenda: Claiming Victory Without Victory<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhAQo5UtPr66VmJwctZOaTUUq7DnHh2Z21OL6Cz0g7m1eLlp-C7YEozdtQXNvAdK0IrDAOXema-cDe4Mhc8LHGewf5f5-4ghNTg44cDBg_rw19lVz8fUmwA3se5QefhedaRIJ_CVv7lN-s/s1600/Bush+Freedom+Agenda.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhAQo5UtPr66VmJwctZOaTUUq7DnHh2Z21OL6Cz0g7m1eLlp-C7YEozdtQXNvAdK0IrDAOXema-cDe4Mhc8LHGewf5f5-4ghNTg44cDBg_rw19lVz8fUmwA3se5QefhedaRIJ_CVv7lN-s/s400/Bush+Freedom+Agenda.jpg" /></a><br />
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<i>November, 2013.</i><br />
<br />
The claim put forward by some (Raz, 2011; Daily Beast, 2011) that U.S. President George W. Bush’s ‘Freedom Agenda’ contributed to the ‘democratic wave’ that engulfed the Middle East and North Africa in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is one that is prima facie hard to prove. A deeper examination of this tall claim shows there is, in fact, little basis to support it at all. In this essay I describe what the Freedom Agenda is, who is putting forward this claim and why it should be viewed with scepticism. <br />
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President Bush followed a policy course that ignored or contradicted the tenets of his own Freedom Agenda as much as it promoted it, making any claim that it had the designed or desired effect questionable. Additionally, it is also questionable that there has been a democratic wave resulting from the Arab Spring judging by the results thus far. It is far too early to begin to make assertions about the causes or outcomes of the Arab Spring at all, let alone that U.S. policy contributed to it. The contributing factors and causes of the Arab Spring will be debated for many years into the future, but the Freedom Agenda should not seriously be considered a major factor among them.<br />
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<b>The Freedom Agenda</b><br />
According to President G.W. Bush’s White House, the Freedom Agenda promotes freedom and democracy in the world as alternatives to ‘repression and radicalism’ (White House Press Office, 2007). It asserts that besides the moral imperative to promote freedom, international democracy provides increased security for America and its allies at home. As evidence of President Bush’s support for the agenda, the White House exhibited a long list of political activists and dissidents from oppressive states Bush met with between 2003 and 2007; touts the creation of a $1 million U.S. government legal fund to support the defence of captive dissidents; a presidential ‘Freedom Defender’ award for activists or NGOs who strongly commit to ‘defending liberty and courage in the face of adversity’; and another ‘Diplomacy for Freedom’ award for the U.S. ambassador who does most to promote the Freedom Agenda (ibid.). It mentions the doubling of funding for ‘Democracy, Governance and Human Rights’ and for the National Endowment for Democracy. It includes the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the struggle against anti-democratic forces, as well as diplomatic efforts to support movement toward freedom and democracy in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (ibid.). <br />
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Bush’s 2007 Prague Speech (White House, 2007) is the President at his rhetorical best when speaking about his Freedom Agenda. Before an audience including the national leaders of several former Soviet satellite states and political dissidents from many different nations, Bush spoke about the courage of Eastern Europe facing the Nazis and enduring the ‘long darkness’ of the Soviet Union. He calls their democratisation a ‘triumph of freedom in the battle of ideas’. He claims the post-9/11 struggles of America and its allies against Islamic extremism in the War on Terror are an equal struggle in the battle of ideas and that freedom and democracy are not only a moral imperative, but also the greatest weapon in this struggle. He goes on to hold that America is pressing for democratic reform in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, among others. Bush acknowledges that democratic change may lead to violence, but that it is necessary and preferable to pursuing stability and asserts that fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq are caused by extremists attacking democratic reform and freedom. He puts forward America’s wars in the Middle East as proof that the Freedom Agenda is eliciting a response from these extremist opponents who fear freedom and democracy.<br />
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Perhaps the greatest proponent and Bush-era official who has publicly cited the Freedom Agenda the most as a factor in the Arab uprisings is Elliot Abrams, a Deputy National Security Advisor to G.W. Bush. As early as February 2011, with the Arab Spring only in its third month, Abrams was making media rounds promoting the Freedom Agenda as a factor in the revolts and called for the Obama administration to push for freedom and democracy in the region (Raz, 2011). Abrams criticises President Obama as a state-centred Realist for rejecting the Freedom Agenda by continuing to focus on and attempting to negotiate with Middle Eastern dictators in preference to supporting a dialogue with their peoples striving for freedom and cited ‘slow and unenthusiastic’ Obama administration policy in support of protestors in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria as examples (Abrams, 2011). Abrams and his allies believe that President Obama should have supported the uprisings by seeing them as the will of the people and engaging with them, even if that means regime change, as opposed to solely diplomatically engaging with their embattled dictators (LaFranchi, 2011). <br />
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As Muammar Qaddafi’s regime was falling in Libya in October 2011 under the pressure of a NATO air campaign, President Bush’s National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice held that the Bush administration, “pursued the Freedom Agenda not only because it was right but also because it was necessary. There is both a moral case and a practical one for the proposition that no man, woman or child should live in tyranny . . . In the long run, it is authoritarianism that is unstable and unrealistic.” Rice predicted a positive ending to the revolts and cites the Freedom Agenda as a contributing factor to the uprisings (Daily Beast, 2011).<br />
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In summary, the Freedom Agenda developed by President G.W. Bush and his national security team holds that pursuing international democracy, reform and freedom are a moral and security imperative for the United States and its allies in a battle of ideas against oppression and extremism and should be pursued in preference to a policy of maintaining stability by engaging with dictators and heads of state, though accepting that this course may lead to increased tensions and violence. U.S. diplomacy, accompanied by military force where necessary, is the tool to be used to pursue the agenda. From the outset of the Arab Spring, the policy’s architects have asserted that the Freedom Agenda was a factor in triggering the uprisings.<br />
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<b>Contradicting the Agenda</b><br />
The most significant evidence to undermine the claim that Bush’s Freedom Agenda contributed to the Arab Spring uprisings is that it was not adhered to as claimed. Though the Freedom Agenda can be seen as Bush’s legacy and signal foreign policy agenda (Miniter, 2007), Bush and his national security team created policy that contradicted the Freedom Agenda as much as followed it. It does not follow that the agenda was a cause of the Arab Spring if it was not followed in practice.<br />
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The administration holds out discussions on democratic reform and increasing freedoms with the leaders of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, among others, as proof of pursuing the agenda (White House Press Office, 2007). Pervez Musharraf seized power in Pakistan in a 1999 military coup and subsequently banned his opponents from participating in elections, initially appointed all members of National Assembly, and threatened politicians with criminal investigations if they were critical (Bennett Jones, 2002: 274). Despite continuing moves to consolidate his power and to amend the constitution, this undemocratic behaviour was met only with assurances that ‘private messages’ were being sent to Musharraf by the administration (Carothers, 2003: 85). Pakistan was given $600 million in U.S. aid by the Bush administration in 2002 (ibid.). Musharraf’s decision to support President Bush’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq garnered a further $3 billion from the United States in 2003 (Bennet Jones, 2002: 3), with many more millions to follow until he stepped down in 2008. By way of comparison, according to a 2007 White House ‘Fact Sheet’ on the Freedom Agenda (White House Press Office, 2007), in 2008 President Bush, at the height of his Freedom Agenda legacy-building, budgeted $1.5 billion for all Democracy, Governance and Human Rights projects and $80 million for the Endowment for Democracy. If money translates into support, the administration’s support for Pervez Musharraf was almost twice as strong as its touted commitment to democracy and freedom.<br />
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Saudi Arabia provides an even clearer example of the Bush administration contradicting its Freedom Agenda. Unger’s House of Bush, House of Saud (2007) documents the long, close relationship between the Bush’s and the Saudi royal family. Despite these strong ties and influence, Bush has little to exhibit as far as real freedom and democratic reform is concerned. Much as with Pakistan, the Bush administration exerted little pressure other than to privately discuss democratic change with the al-Sauds (Carothers, 2003: 87). Initially following the 9/11 attacks and terror attacks in Saudi Arabia itself in 2004 and 2005, it was argued by advisors inside and outside the Kingdom that democratic reform may be needed to quell unrest within the Kingdom (Fattah, 2007). This liberalisation fit in well the Bush’s agenda. However, only very small changes occurred: laws oppressive to women were eased a bit; half the seats in local councils were opened up for democratic elections; and restrictions on public protest were relaxed (ibid.). By 2007, the moment of reform had passed. Petitions for establishing constitutional monarchy continue to be rejected. Though royal family members often mention reform in speeches, little is actually being done (ibid.). Restrictions have in fact tightened again since the Arab Spring, especially in areas such as media and free speech (AFP, 2011). What democratic reforms have been made in the Kingdom during Bush’s era and since have been small, cosmetic and, in some cases, been fully reversed (Fattah, 2007). In fact, Saudi Arabia lands on Freedom House’s Worst of the Worst list as among the world’s most oppressive societies in every year of President Bush’s term and since, frequently receiving the lowest rankings possible in ‘Freedom’, ‘Civil Liberties’, and ‘Political Rights’ (Freedom House, 2001-2013 inclusive).<br />
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Bush has a bit more to show for Egypt, but not much. In 2002 the administration decided against increasing the massive military aid Egypt receives from the United States because of Hosni Mubarak’s persecution of Egyptian activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Carothers, 2003: 92). Nonetheless, Mubarak still received nearly $2 billion in U.S. military aid that year, though the Bush administration did reduce annual military aid to Egypt by several hundred million dollars every year until he left office (Sowa, 2013). Egypt is yet another state that, if, as with Pakistan, money translates into support, the Bush administration supported nearly twice as much as it supported freedom and democracy. According to Pressman (2009: 162), the Egyptian regime, as in Saudi Arabia, just ‘tinkered at the margins’. The 2005 presidential election in Egypt was a democratic farce, featuring widespread vote-tampering, state media remaining a Mubarak propaganda tool, and the arrest of his main opponent, Ayman Nour (ibid.). When the Muslim Brotherhood did much better than expected in parliamentary elections, the regime responded with arrests and crackdowns on Islamist and secular parties and vote-tampering in later rounds (ibid.). Though the Bush administration did take some small actions against Mubarak’s anti-democratic excesses, in the round the United States remained his largest foreign donor and supporter.<br />
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Besides saying one thing and doing another in Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the reputation of American democracy promotion in the region as a whole suffered during the Bush administration. While America ignored the oppressive and anti-democratic policies of allied dictators and monarchs such as Musharraf, the al-Saud’s and Mubarak, it pushed democracy in states it attacked and invaded. Though Bush claimed to be for democracy in Afghanistan following the toppling of the Taliban, the U.S. campaign depended upon tribal warlords and the Northern Alliance, reinforcing Afghan tribalism to further military goals and sent the message that the U.S. would support warlords over democracy promotion (Hassan and Hammond, 2011: 537). The democratic Karzai government it built after the fall of the Taliban has little authority outside of Kabul and the diversion of resources to the Iraq effort further weakened its power and legitimacy (Carothers, 2003: 88). <br />
<br />
Bridoux (2011: 558) points out that in Iraq, the Bush administration did not begin to focus on democracy promotion until it became apparent that the main justification for the war, Saddam’s alleged WMD, did not exist and this is exhibited by the fact that U.S. civilian and military pre-war planning and the initial interim administration in Iraq and the U.S. military command were focussed solely on immediate security and humanitarian needs, not long-term ‘nation-building’ or democracy promotion. Democracy promotion became a reserve justification when the actual security justification fell through. It also calls into question Bush’s assertion of the ‘moral imperative’ (White House Press Office, 2007) to pursue democracy when it is used for politically expedient purposes. Bush’s claim (White House Press Office, 2007) that Taliban and insurgent attacks on coalition troops in Afghanistan and Iraq are attacks on freedom and democracy brought on by the enemy’s fear of them is also questionable. After all, the U.S. and its allies showed up in their neighbourhood and began to impose it upon them, not the other way around.<br />
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The U.S. seemed, to many, to be targeting its enemies in the Middle East with the ‘threat’ of democracy, but not its friends. The different treatment shown to friends and foes in the Middle East and North Africa generated the criticism that U.S. freedom and democracy promotion was really a tool for punishing or destabilising opponents rather than being truly concerned with granting them to local populations (Pressman, 2009: 160). Bush administration policy, in the words of Carothers (2003: 94), “wrapp[ed] security goals in the language of democracy promotion and then confus[ed] democracy promotion with the search for particular political outcomes that enhance those security goals.” The Bush administration supported the 2006 elections in the Palestinian Territories as an early show of support for democracy promotion, yet also was clear what they wanted the result to be. However, Hamas won a landslide victory, leaving Bush to attempt to put a positive spin on it (Kessler, 2006). Elections in Lebanon since the 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’ led to more seats for Hezbollah in the national assembly (Dakroub, 2005). Democratic elections in Egypt following the Arab Spring allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to initially gain control of Egypt. The same protestors who toppled the dictator Mubarak in 2011 toppled the democratically-elected Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Democracy promotion and elections have not always achieved U.S. goals, created lasting stability nor made the U.S. safer as the Freedom Agenda claimed it would. It has, at times, had arguably the opposite effect.<br />
<br />
In summary, the Bush administration pursued a policy course that was just as contradictory to its own Freedom Agenda as it was supportive of it. The relationships with some of the very states—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—that it cites itself (White House, 2007; White House Press Office, 2007) as proof of following the agenda also offer proof it did not. The unequal application of the Freedom Agenda between friends and foes also called the commitment into question and damaged the reputation of U.S. democracy promotion. A policy that was not truly followed cannot be cited as successful in achieving its goals or if it did so, it did so incidentally. Where the U.S. and its allies have established democratic governments—Afghanistan and Iraq—they also did much to weaken them and were only able to do so following military action. These governments did not come to be through indigenous agitation for freedom and democracy brought on by the Freedom Agenda. In the case of Iraq especially, the Bush administration turned to democracy promotion as a major goal only after its initial justification for the war turned out not to exist. The bases offered for promoting the Freedom Agenda—moral imperative, long-term stability, and increased security for the U.S.—have also been shown to be questionable as, when it was followed at all, it has arguably not dependably provided those things or not more so than the alternative policies it criticised and was supposed to offer improvements over.<br />
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<b>Too Early to Predict Anything, Let Alone a ‘Democratic Wave’</b><br />
It is too early to predict or draw any serious conclusions as to the causes, effects and consequences of the Arab Spring. Arguably, it is still going on. Battles in Syria are still raging. The revolution in Egypt continues with the deposition of Mohammed Morsi by the military following demonstrations as large as those against Mubarak (Maqbool, 2013). Protests may flare up again in any number of countries in the region. Any real academic analysis of the Arab Spring cannot take place until all of the facts are known or until it appears to reach some sort of conclusion. Anyone who attempts to do so prematurely risks getting it wrong and being overcome by events, as those who have been asserting since 2011 that the Freedom Agenda contributed to the Arab Spring have been. It is hard to know what next month will bring in the region, let alone claim the events have been a triumph for any policy or any party involved.<br />
<br />
It is also too early to say that there has been a ‘democratic wave’ at all in the Arab Spring. Freedom House has called Tunisia the ‘Arab Spring’s pivotal democratic example’ (Walker and Tucker, 2011) and is arguably where the revolt began and where there have been signs of real democratic reform. However, in neighbouring Libya, it took NATO military intervention to topple Muammar Qaddafi. Some armed militias still, two years on, refuse to give up territory. Fighting still grips all of Syria where the regime and rebels are locked into an effective stalemate as foreign Jihadists join in and America and its allies wrangle with Russia, Iran and China over intervention there. Despite protests and minor concessions, there has been no real democratic change in places such as Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. Egyptian protestors overthrew the dictator Mubarak in 2011, but then also overthrew his democratically-elected successor Morsi in 2013. The transition there begins anew with Morsi in the court dock along with Mubarak. In some Arab and North African states, there has been no change at all. <br />
<br />
Though many protestors and activists clearly have and will continue to call for increased freedom and democracy and many who have never been politically involved before have taken to the streets to take up the cause, there has not yet been a ‘democratic wave’ if one judges that by the state-by-state results of the Arab Spring thus far. The Middle East and North Africa region is still overwhelmingly not free and democratic (Freedom House, 2013). This being the case, it is hard to argue that the Freedom Agenda contributed to a ‘democratic wave’ resulting from the Arab Spring if there really hasn’t been such a wave as yet. Nonetheless, as above, it is still far too early days to judge what caused or will become of the Arab Spring.<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion</b><br />
The Bush Freedom Agenda has not contributed to a ‘democratic wave’ resulting from the Arab Spring. The Bush administration deviated from the agenda as much as it adhered to it. Some of the same evidence it puts forward to show its support for the agenda shows equally it did not support it. The administration’s goals in applying the agenda were arguably not met in practice. It is questionable if there has been a ‘democratic wave’ at all thus far following the Arab Spring, though it is still too early to form real conclusions yet as to the causes and consequences of the uprisings. The Arab Spring continues today in many places. However it should be clear that a policy agenda that was only partially or haphazardly followed and has arguably not brought about the goals it sought to achieve in an event that is not yet over cannot be credited with achieving anything.<br />
<br />
<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
Abrams, E. (2011) “Obama’s Empty Speech.” National Review, May 19. Available from: http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/267700/obama-s-empty-speech-elliott-abrams [Accessed 13 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Agence France Presse (2011) “Saudi King Tightens Media Restrictions.” Agence France Presse, April 30. Available from: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ibYIKWVqfMnfLpdTfx34MADvd6nQ [Accessed 14 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Bennett Jones, O. (2002) Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. New Haven: Yale University Press.<br />
<br />
Carothers, T. (2003) “Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror.” Foreign Affairs 82(1): pp. 84–97.<br />
<br />
Daily Beast (2011) “Condi Rice: The Bush ‘Freedom Agenda’ Won.” The Daily Beast, October 23. Available from: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/10/23/condoleezza-rice-on-gaddafi-death-bush-freedom-agenda-won.html [Accessed 13 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Dakroub, H. (2005) “Hezbollah Wins Easy Victory in Election in Southern Lebanon.” Washington Post, June 6, sec. World. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/05/AR2005060501144.html [Accessed 15 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Fattah, H. (2007) “Momentum for Democratic Reform Wanes in Saudi Arabia.” New York Times, April 25, sec. Africa. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/world/africa/25iht-saudi.4.5438141.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [Accessed 14 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Freedom House (2013) “Freedom in the World”. Freedom House. Available from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/saudi-arabia [Accessed 14 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Hammond, A and Hassan, O. (2011) “The Rise and Fall of America’s Freedom Agenda in Afghanistan: Counter-Terrorism, Nation-Building, and Democracy.” The International Journal of Human Rights 15(4): 532–551.<br />
<br />
Kessler, G. (2006) “Bush Is Conciliatory in Accepting Victory of Hamas.” Washington Post, January 27. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012601009.html [Accessed 15 November 2013].<br />
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LaFranchi, H. (2011) “Democracy Uprising in Egypt: Vindication for Bush ‘Freedom Agenda.’” Christian Science Monitor, February 1. Available from: http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/r14/USA/Foreign-Policy/2011/0201/Democracy-uprising-in-Egypt-Vindication-for-Bush-freedom-agenda/(page)/2 [Accessed 14 November 2013].<br />
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Maqbool, A. (2013) “Egypt Crisis: Mass Protests Over Morsi Grip Cities.” BBC News, July 1. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23115821 [Accessed 15 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Miniter, P. (2007) “Why George Bush’s ‘Freedom Agenda’ Is Here to Stay.” Foreign Policy, August 21. Available from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/08/20/why_george_bushs_ldquofreedom_agendardquo_is_here_to_stay_0 [Accessed 14 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Pressman, J. (2009) “Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East.” International Security 33(4): pp. 149–179.<br />
<br />
Raz, G. (2011) “Conservative Credits Bush Agenda for Revolutions.” Conservative Credits Bush Agenda for Revolutions. National Public Radio (NPR), 26 February.<br />
<br />
Sowa, A. (2013) “Aid to Egypt by the Numbers.” Center for Global Development, July 19. Available from: http://www.cgdev.org/blog/aid-egypt-numbers [Accessed 14 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Tucker, V. and Walker, C. (2011) “Tunisia: The Arab Spring’s Pivotal Democratic Example.” Freedom House Policy Brief (August 8). Available from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Tunisia%20-%20The%20Arab%20Spring%E2%80%99s%20Pivotal%20Democratic%20Example.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2013].<br />
<br />
Unger, C. (2007) House of Bush, House of Saud. London: Gibson Square.<br />
<br />
White House (2007) “President Bush Visits Prague, Czech Republic, Discusses Freedom.” The White House, President George W. Bush, June 5. Available from: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070605-8.html [Accessed 14 November 2013].<br />
<br />
White House Press Office (2007) “Fact Sheet: Advancing Freedom and Democracy around the World.” The White House, President George W. Bush, June 5. Available from: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070605-6.html [Accessed 14 November 2013].<br />
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-59492812420721710022014-01-20T20:00:00.000-06:002014-06-24T08:48:27.612-05:00Why NATO Intervened in Libya but not Syria<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIuP4w4Jq2tMwMJQA5MWT6lCg46qW9f_F7fe7V1sYAAjeysb4TuT_kQolvwuBKffJANzLFr0xyZwvy896Qhp1hojvHMErdZmfRjqo0DWxizyfOAPCyBop4JrZmIWwRxlhyphenhyphenFFTSnAzVz64/s1600/Syria+RPG.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIuP4w4Jq2tMwMJQA5MWT6lCg46qW9f_F7fe7V1sYAAjeysb4TuT_kQolvwuBKffJANzLFr0xyZwvy896Qhp1hojvHMErdZmfRjqo0DWxizyfOAPCyBop4JrZmIWwRxlhyphenhyphenFFTSnAzVz64/s320/Syria+RPG.jpg" /></a><br />
<br />
<i>Authored 31 October, 2013.</i><br />
<br />
Despite calls to intervene militarily in Syria, NATO has remained hesitant to do so despite surface parallels with conditions in 2011 Libya which precipitated a NATO intervention that toppled the regime of Muammar Qaddafi. In Syria today, as in 2011 Libya, much of the population is in armed revolt as part of the Arab Spring and being met by a bloody regime campaign to put down the rebellion. Despite similarities, NATO has held back despite the conflict entering its third year and the August 21st nerve agent attack on civilians in Damascus, attributed by the U.S., UK and France to the Assad government (Reuters, 2013), an event identified as a ‘red line’ that would trigger military action (Reuters, 2012).<br />
<br />
There are many factors contributing to NATO’s decision against intervening in Syria. Despite using the same Liberal values-based rhetoric and human rights justifications, the situation in Syria has elicited a different response. Domestic politics in individual NATO states runs against it. The Syrian military is better trained and equipped and more committed to Assad than the Libyan military to Qaddafi. The influx into Syria of foreign Islamic extremist fighters on the rebel side has generated second thoughts for NATO and other actors considering the removal of Assad (Martini et al, 2012: 5-7).<br />
<br />
The largest contributing factor—and the one I will focus on—is that the resistance to a NATO campaign in Syria would be more significant than with Libya due to the greater strength of international, regional and internal allies of the Assad regime. In the following sections I will compare and contrast the Libyan and Syrian regimes in turn in reference to their relationships with international, regional and internal allies and then show why their respective effects on NATO’s ‘Realist’ calculation has led to the choice not to act in Syria.<br />
<br />
<b>Libya under Qaddafi</b><br />
<br />
In an Arab League conference tirade, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi called himself, ‘an international leader, the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of Muslims’ before going on to insult fellow Arab leaders (Otterman and Mackey, quoting Qaddafi, 2009). From the beginning of his rule following a military coup in 1969, Qaddafi rubbed the world the wrong way. As an Arab Nationalist, he never fit into either camp during the Cold War, but also never managed to use this seeming neutrality to Libya’s advantage in attempting to take up Nasser’s mantle (St. John, 1987: 21). The lack of ability to make and maintain powerful friends to shore up his power or to properly balance allies against foes would eventually lead to his downfall.<br />
<br />
Early in Qaddafi’s rule, the U.S. hoped to cultivate him as an anti-communist ally and wanted to maintain strategic airbases in Libya, but hopes were dashed when U.S. troops were expelled in 1970 (Zoubir, 2006: 48-9). The nationalisation of Libyan oil in 1971 and his anti-colonial agitation soured relations with Britain (St. John, 1987: 115). The Pan Am 103 bombing and other terrorist acts in the 1980s and the continued use of Libya as a terror haven into the 1990s (Church, 1992) made him a major NATO enemy in the Middle East and led to harsh UN and U.S. sanctions with severe economic consequences.<br />
<br />
His relations were also rocky with the USSR as he ‘grouped the United States and the Soviet Union together as imperialist countries intent on expanding spheres of influence in the Middle East’ and, believing Islam was central to Arab identity, condemned the atheism of the USSR. He was not as skilled as Nasser or Assad at walking the line between Moscow and Washington and neither considered him a reliable partner (St. John, 1987: 29).<br />
<br />
Libya was also isolated in the Middle East, with regional leaders, especially monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, viewing negatively Qaddafi’s Arab Nationalist views and misuse of Islam to meet political and policy goals (ibid.: 149). Varying relations with regional powers over OPEC and oil issues (ibid.: 107-24) and support for Iran during its war with Iraq (Associated Press, 1985) further deepened its regional problems.<br />
<br />
In order to survive an antagonistic position toward the rest of the world, Qaddafi had to build strength at home. He purposely weakened the Libyan military to prevent any challenge while arming loyal militias and the security services (Hendawi, 2011). Though weakening the military prevented challenges, it also eventually left him virtually defenceless against more capable NATO forces. According to Mokhefi (2011), Qaddafi also consolidated internal control by manipulating the tribal system using a ‘carrot and stick’ policy of granting wealth and government positions to tribes that supported him and legally and violently repressing those that did not. <br />
<br />
For the first 30 years of his rule, Qaddafi’s rejection of both camps of the Cold War, support for terrorism, espousal of Arab Nationalism, politicisation of Islam and continuing squabbles with neighbours turned Libya into an isolated state with no Great Power patron or strong regional friends. It was not until years after the fall of the Soviet Union that Qaddafi attempted rapprochement with the West. After years of public and behind-the-scenes diplomacy in which Britain played a large role, a deal surrounding handing over the Lockerbie bombers for trial and paying compensation to the victims’ families led to European states re-establishing relations and UN sanctions against Libya being lifted in 2003. Normalisation and lifting of unilateral U.S. sanctions did not occur until 2004 when, against the backdrop of the Afghan and Iraq wars, Qaddafi further agreed not to seek weapons of mass destruction and to cooperate in the War on Terror (Zoubir, 2006). <br />
<br />
Libya was in a weakened state of transition from a pariah state to a full member of the international community when the Arab Spring struck in March 2011. Qaddafi responded to protests with violent crackdowns in which hundreds of Libyans were killed by the security forces, leading his newly-found Western friends to denounce him again. Qaddafi underestimated the national and international response to the violence (Buckley, 2012: 84), which undid years of public and secret diplomacy to rehabilitate his image. The Arab League, usually hesitant to endorse outside interference in Arab affairs, gave approval to military intervention (BBC News, 2011). He was denounced by the UN Security Council, which approved a no-fly zone over Libya. Before the vote and further after implementation began, the Arab League and Russia, China, India, Germany and South Africa expressed consternation with NATO’s interpretation of the UN resolution, (Buckley, 2012: 85). These objections in the UNSC and Arab League were too little, too late to save Qaddafi.<br />
<br />
Internally, despite years of patronage, Libyan tribal leaders from the influential Warfalla and Zawiya tribes who controlled militias and the security services condemned Qaddafi for his violent crackdowns on protests in Tripoli and elsewhere (Mokhefi, 2011). With a UN resolution and the Arab League against him and support crumbling at home, they sensed the inevitability of his fall. The Libyan military was kept too weak to save him.<br />
<br />
Qaddafi’s forces were quickly overcome by the NATO-led campaign, leading to his death in October 2011. In the end, no one but family and his own tribe stood in support of Muammar Qaddafi. He was not the ‘the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of Muslims.’<br />
<br />
<b>Syria under the Assads</b><br />
<br />
Hafez al-Assad seized power in Syria after a 1970 coup—shortly after Qaddafi’s in Libya. As a Ba’athist and military officer, Hafez was largely influenced by the same Arab Nationalist and Nasserist sentiments and even agreed a short-lived 1971 proposal for a federation between Egypt, Libya and Syria (Hopwood, 1988: 55). Hafez al-Assad was a shrewd leader with great ability to maintain strong alliances at home and abroad, a trait passed on to his son, Bashar. Hafez was able to build an equal partnership with the USSR without becoming a satellite (ibid.: 76). The ability to balance alliances and power has kept the Assad regime in power for over forty years and is why it is still holding on despite the Arab Spring and strong international pressure.<br />
<br />
The Assad’s are members of the minority Alawite sect of Shi’ia Islam and Hafez was the first Syrian president not from the Sunni majority. Though military officers, fellow Alawites and Ba’athists formed Hafez’s base, in power he legitimised and consolidated his rule by including elements of other ethnic and religious minority communities (including Christian Druze and Kurds) in shaping his government and improved the lot of the middle and lower classes. He co-opted and cooperated with other communist and left-leaning political parties. He pursued policy that consolidated all state power in his own hands, but went further than previous governments by legitimising his rule through inclusion of minorities (Ma’oz, 1986: 28-9). <br />
<br />
While forming a strong base at home, Hafez al-Assad also forged international and regional alliances. According to Hopwood (1988: 72-7), Syria refused to become a satellite of the U.S. or USSR after throwing off colonial rule. However, the Soviets would sell arms to Syria with no strings attached, unlike NATO. As the USSR sought parity with the West, it curried favour in Syria before Assad took power by offering large public works projects and siding with Syria in the 1967 war as Syrian pilots were shot down flying Russian aircraft. <br />
<br />
The relationship grew closer under Assad, with Moscow agreeing multi-million-dollar arms deals and sending thousands of military advisers. The two countries signed multiple diplomatic and trade agreements and Assad dealt with Moscow as an equal, not a subordinate. Syria fielded Soviet military tanks, missiles and other equipment, which were again replaced by Moscow after the disastrous 1973 war. By 1986, Syria had become Moscow’s largest Third World arms purchaser. Regardless of Hafez’s own opinion, America considered Syria a client of the Soviet Union (ibid.: 76). <br />
<br />
In 1980, Syria—Arab, pluralist, Ba’athist-led, with a Sunni-majority—formed a counterintuitive alliance with Iran—a newly-formed Persian Islamic republic with a Shi’ite majority—in their war with Iraq. According to Hirschfeld (1986: 115-21), this was an act of shrewd political Realism by Assad. Despite being counter to its economic interest, Syria shut its border and blocked Iraq’s oil pipeline to the sea, costing Syria millions in oil transit fees. Hafez also turned down $2 billion from Saudi Arabia to reopen it (ibid.: 115). However, giving much-needed assistance to Iran in its early days greatly increased Syria’s influence with Khomeini and its control over Lebanon, where Iran was induced into influencing Shi’ites much more persuasively than Syria could alone. In the early years of the alliance, Syria was the dominant partner. Attacks by Iran-controlled Shi’ite terrorists in 1983-4 led to the withdrawal of Western troops from Lebanon, leaving Syria and Iran squarely in control until 2005. It also increased Syria’s independence and influence in the Middle East as a whole, as it was Syria that set its own course and became a fulcrum point deciding where the balance of regional power would lie. With one decision, Hafez had increased Syria’s influence and made it indispensable in the region (ibid.: 115-121).<br />
<br />
This was the situation Bashar al-Assad inherited when his father died in 2000. The Soviet Union had collapsed, but Syria’s alliance carried on with Russia. Moscow, along with Tehran, continues to arm and assist Assad to this day. Nonetheless, there was early hope in 2011 that Bashar would ameliorate relations with the West. With the War on Terror following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Bush administration seemed ready to roll up Middle Eastern dictators. In 2005, America approached Bashar with a ‘Libya-style’ deal similar to that offered in 2004 to Qaddafi: stop interfering in Lebanon, supporting terrorism and supporting the Iraq insurgency and receive normalised relations in return (Beeston and Blanford, 2005). They saw Bashar as vulnerable following a damning UN report blaming members of the Assad family for murdering popular former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Despite the blow to its influence when Syrian troops pulled out of Lebanon and a Western-backed government coming to power there, Bashar al-Assad remained in power in Syria.<br />
<br />
Internationally, Russia has stood firmly by Assad. Moscow has defended the regime before the UN and threatened to veto military action. Russia acted as Assad’s proxy in negotiations to avert a U.S. strike following the August 21st nerve agent attacks in Damascus and has offered counter-arguments to NATO assertions supporting intervention. It continues to supply Syria with arms and has even displayed a show of force by dispatching additional warships to its Syrian port at Tartus (Investor’s Business Daily, 2012). Stymying NATO efforts in Syria has reminded many of the bipolar era when Moscow was on par with Washington and has increased Russian influence and power in Syria and elsewhere.<br />
<br />
Regionally, Iran also remains committed to Syria in the same manner Syria stood by Iran in 1980 (discussed above). There is evidence the elite Iranian Quds Force is assisting Assad in Syria (Reynolds, 2012). Lebanon-based Hezbollah, dependent upon Syria as its conduit of support from Iran (Martini et al, 2012: 3), is fighting alongside Assad’s forces. Tehran is committed to opposing NATO interests anywhere it can in the Middle East and has done so since its 1979 revolution, most recently by proxy in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO troops or a Western-aligned government in Syria, paired with NATO’s presence elsewhere in the region, would leave Iran surrounded and isolated.<br />
<br />
Internally, support from minority factions Hafez al-Assad cobbled together to legitimise his rule—military officers, Ba’athists, Alawites—have remained largely loyal to Bashar. There is fear by many that the tolerance cultivated by the Assad regime would disappear and the country would return to Sunni-dominated rule. There is already evidence of repression of minorities in rebel-held areas of the country (Martini et al, 2012: 5). The Syrian military, despite many defections to the rebels, remains largely loyal to Bashar. Many military officers have benefitted materially from supporting Assad over the years and they stand to lose everything and likely be branded as criminals if he falls. Other minority groups split between supporting the regime or the rebels are not enough of a factor to tip the balance to either side (ibid.: 3-5).<br />
<br />
Unlike Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, the military and factions within Syria have not abandoned Assad, nor have allies Russia and Iran. These strong alliances have, thus far, kept Assad in power and their existence has checked NATO from taking military action.<br />
<br />
<b>NATO Liberalism and Realism in Libya</b><br />
<br />
When considering military action against Qaddafi in Libya, NATO faced almost no opposition to intervention and was encouraged to act by initial Arab League support for a no-fly zone and Qaddafi’s loss of domestic support. The dearth of opposition and Qaddafi’s utter lack of allies meant that virtually nothing stood in the way of a NATO campaign there. Action in Libya was significantly easier to achieve.<br />
<br />
There was no opposition to refute the case for a UN resolution. Russia, China, India, Brazil and Germany abstained from voting and they and other states expressed reservations only after military action had begun, holding they had been duped by NATO as to the meaning and interpretation of the UN resolution, a criticism echoed in the Arab League (Buckley, 2012: 85-7). There was little opposition and little to lose in getting rid of a nuisance dictator murdering his own people, though arguably the feeling they had been tricked increased some states’ opposition to authorising UN action in Syria.<br />
<br />
Conducting a Realist calculation, Libya presented no real threat to NATO interests or security since normalising relations in 2004, but some argued toppling Qaddafi would get rid of a troublesome dictator with a dirty past and grant access to high-quality Libyan crude oil, decidedly in NATO interests (Jenkins, 2011). However, NATO states predominantly used Liberal, values-based rhetoric regarding democracy, freedom and human rights to legitimise intervention. Both Realist and Liberal justifications were given to support the case for Libyan action. <br />
<br />
<b>NATO Liberalism and Realism in Syria</b><br />
<br />
Syria presents a different case for NATO. The same Liberal arguments used in Libya are being used to justify acting in Syria. For Liberals, supporting democracy, freedom and human rights—values NATO states claim to support—for people facing violence to obtain them is right regardless of the power-political circumstances. <br />
<br />
However, according to Coetzee (2012: 312), from a structural Realist perspective, supporting Liberal democracy and freedom during the Arab Spring has already been harmful to security interests—specifically NATO’s—as it has led to gains for militant Islamism in the region. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islamist violence against U.S. targets in Libya, and Islamic militants with ties to al Qaeda operating in Syria are examples. It is the Realist calculation of balancing potential gains against potential losses that has held NATO back. <br />
<br />
There are some gains to be made. Ending Assad rule would deprive Russia and Iran of an ally and a source of mutual support, reducing their regional influence. Iran would be isolated with the loss of its last large regional ally. Russia would lose a major trade partner, be booted out of the Middle East and may lose Tartus, its only port on the Mediterranean. These outcomes are in NATO’s interest. <br />
<br />
Nonetheless, these gains are not worth the potential hazards. According to Martini et al (2012: 3), NATO and its allies have less at stake and Assad remaining in power does not greatly harm NATO interests. In deciding to intervene, it will face strong opposition and vetoes from Russia and likely China in the UNSC. Taking military action without a UN mandate will undermine the legitimacy of any NATO action. Iran already has fighters on the ground in Syria. Russia continues to arm Assad and has shown military support by dispatching more ‘gunboats’ to Tartus (discussed above). It is unclear how far Russia or Iran may go in defending Assad and their interests. Military action may increase violence in Syria and/or lead, at worst, to a larger, longer regional or international war. NATO does not want that and the gains are not worth risking it.<br />
<br />
Assad has promised to confront foreign intervention with full military force. Though it recently signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and agreed to decommission its chemical weapons, Syria still has a sizeable stockpile and Assad has threatened to use them against any outside military intervention. If NATO were to intervene, it would still have to deal with post-war stability and reconstruction efforts and could face an Iraq-style insurgency, not to mention undertaking the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons itself.<br />
<br />
Though it is a Machiavellian calculation, all that is at hazard for NATO is that the status quo will be maintained in Syria, though thousands of Syrians will continue to die and become refugees. NATO states may be seen as hypocrites for supporting Liberal ideas like democracy and human rights with military intervention in Libya but not in Syria. Russia, Iran and Assad may receive a boost in power and influence for having seen off the NATO challenge. However, none of these outcomes presents a dire, direct threat to NATO security or interests, while possibly enabling Islamists to increase their influence in a new Syria in the absence of Assad may (Martini et al, 2012: 5-7).<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion</b><br />
<br />
From a Realist perspective, for NATO the possible risks of intervention in Syria outweigh possible rewards. A comparison of the strengths of the allies—or lack thereof—of the regimes in Libya and Syria and what they stand to gain or lose in either case explains why NATO has chosen not to intervene in Syria as it did in Libya. The status quo will be maintained in Syria for now, while the jury is still out on Libya’s future.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
<br />
Associated Press (1985) Iraq Breaks Ties With Libya Over Support for Iran [online]. Available from: http://articles.latimes.com/1985-06-27/news/mn-10776_1_iran-iraq-war [Accessed 15 October 2013]<br />
<br />
BBC News (2011) Arab League Backs Libya No-fly Zone BBC News [online]. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12723554 [Accessed 15 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Beeston, R., and Blanford, N. (2005) ‘America Offers “Gaddafi Deal” to Bring Syria in from the Cold’ The Times (London), October 15, 2005, Overseas News, p. 45.<br />
<br />
Buckley, C. (2012) ‘Learning From Libya, Acting in Syria’. Journal of Strategic Security 5:2, pp. 81-104.<br />
<br />
Church, G. (1992) Wanted: A New Hideout [online]. Available from: http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=81cb6491-87cc-404a-9977-405832b485b7%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=123&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=bth&AN=9204061092 [Accessed 10 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Coetzee, E. (2013) ‘Democracy, the Arab Spring and the Future (Great Powers) of International Politics: A Structural Realist Perspective’. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 40:2, pp. 299-318 [online]. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpsa20 [Accessed 23 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Hendawi, H. (2011) Gaddafi Survival Means Weak Army, Co-opted Tribes [online]. Available from: http://www.todayszaman.com//news-236612-gaddafi-survival-means-weak-army-co-opted-tribes.html [accessed 15 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Hirschfeld, Y.(1986) ‘The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran’. In Syria Under Asad, edited by Moshe Ma’oz and Avner Yaniv. London: Croom Helm.<br />
<br />
Hopwood, D. (1988) Syria 1945-1986 : Politics and Society. London. Unwin Hyman.<br />
<br />
Investor’s Business Daily (2012) Russia’s Syrian Gunboat Diplomacy [online]. Available from: http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=6d9c0ac7-498c-4ab9-9773-7d9d327052b5%40sessionmgr114&vid=1&hid=119&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=bth&AN=77055357 [Accessed 10 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Jenkins, Simon (2011) The End of Gaddafi Is Welcome. But It Does Not Justify the Means [online]. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/23/gaddafi-downfall-britain-intervention [Accessed 27 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Martini, J., York, E. and Young, W. (2013) ‘Syria as an Arena of Strategic Competition’. RAND Corporation, pp. 1-11 [online]. Available from: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR213/RAND_RR213.pdf [Accessed 10 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Ma’oz, M. (1986) ‘The Emergence of Modern Syria’. In Syria Under Asad, edited by Moshe Ma’oz and Avner Yaniv. London: Croom Helm.<br />
<br />
Mokhefi, M. (2011) ‘Gaddafi’s Regime in Relation to the Libyan Tribes’. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, pp. 1-4. [online]. Available from: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&ved=0CD4QFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aljazeera.net%2Fmritems%2Fstreams%2F2011%2F3%2F20%2F1_1049205_1_51.pdf&ei=eitdUoqWPKWm0QX3w4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNFBCU4VOS9yDF1DjnfHwVcFWMp9cQ&bvm=bv.53899372,d.d2k [Accessed 15 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Otterman, S., and Mackey, R. (2009) Qaddafi Erupts, on Schedule [online]. Available from: http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/there-was-no-shortage-of-drama/?_r=0 [Accessed 10 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Reuters (2012 Obama to Assad: U.S. Would Act If Chemical Weapons Used [online]. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/20/syria-crisis-idUSL6E8JKBKY20120820 [Accessed 10 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Reuters (2013) U.N. Confirms Sarin Used in Syria Attack; U.S., UK, France Blame Assad [online]. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE98F0ED20130916 [Accessed 10 October 2013]<br />
<br />
Reynolds, J. (2012) Iran and Syria: Alliance of Shared Enemies and Goals [online]. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18369380 [Accessed 23 October 2013]<br />
<br />
St. John, R. (1987) Qaddafi’s World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy 1969-1987. London. Saqi.<br />
<br />
Zoubir, Y. (2006) ‘The United States and Libya: From Confrontation to Normalization’. Middle East Policy, 13:2, pp. 48-70.<br />
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-14839915901079183812013-11-11T07:40:00.002-06:002013-11-11T07:42:15.485-06:00"Highway to Hell" - Journal of Military Experience, Vol. 3<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPoxKI8PnHIYPmXDCjmiNBum-SJxMtHWEZw7cWw6IK8_Lt7uh7VWb-auhP-95ONiZU9GR1v4jeXDpS3esD9A94j7u1aXrJyWAeW3YxxrIxB2EF8pU6OJT_fKmg2nm7GpUQB9iHr5NxEOA/s1600/Tea+&+PTSD.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPoxKI8PnHIYPmXDCjmiNBum-SJxMtHWEZw7cWw6IK8_Lt7uh7VWb-auhP-95ONiZU9GR1v4jeXDpS3esD9A94j7u1aXrJyWAeW3YxxrIxB2EF8pU6OJT_fKmg2nm7GpUQB9iHr5NxEOA/s320/Tea+&+PTSD.jpg" /></a><br />
<br />
<i>This story originally appeared in the <a href="http://militaryexperience.org/the-journal-of-military-experience-vol-3/">Journal of Military Experience</a> on 11 November 2013.</i><br />
<br />
So we were sitting outside the TOC, on call to take officers from the Puzzle Palace to wherever they needed to go in the mean streets of Baghdad to help us win hearts and minds. We were in high spirits because we were short: a week and a wake up or so until we were on the long road back down to Kuwait. A year is a long time. Me and Burt, my gunner, were smoking nasty local Royales and D, my driver, was trying to piss me off by playing Backstreet Boys out loud on his<br />
MP3 player.<br />
<br />
That’s when the Sergeant Major’s gunner came out of the head shed, looking both sad and pissed off. “Y’all ain’t heard?” he asked.<br />
“Heard what?”<br />
“Man,” he said. “I ain’t gonna be the one to say.”<br />
Our Captain came out of the frat boys’ lounge and saw the looks on our faces and came over. “Suppose you guys’ve heard the news by now.”<br />
“No, sir.”<br />
“They’re saying we’re being extended. It’s on CNN. But I don’t think so. I still give us 50-50. Think they’d have given us orders first. What do you guys think?”<br />
“CNN? I think we are fucked, sir.”<br />
And we were, stuck in Iraq for three more months. It was almostas if the gods of war were trying to see how hard they could push us,how far we could go, how many obstacles they could throw up in our path before we would crack. I had shied away from the Iraqi bathtub gin that could be had because my crew and I were on 24-hour call, but I decided I really needed a drink. I hadn’t had a drop since my R&R back to Germany in February, some five months before. The cooks were shooting dice for cash and drinking cherry MRE Kool-Aid with Iraqi moonshine and listening to a mixture of Jimi Hendrix and Young Jeezy. I sat in on the session for quite a while until well after midnight, whereupon I discreetly vomited behind the building and then watched the omnipresent red tracers shoot across the night sky while I smoked Marlboros. <br />
I had been asleep on my cot in my roofless broom closet for an hour when Burt came and shook me awake. We had to take the K9 team back to Brigade because their mission got scrubbed. It was 0200. We were loaded up and parked in front of the Puzzle Palace in less than ten minutes. I was still feeling the drink. We lined up in the middle of our four-Hummer convoy, called up the report, and rolled out. At night, the city of Baghdad can be a strangely quiet and beautiful place. Old men in white dishdashas habitually finger their prayer beads and patiently lead donkey carts along the street. Women in black Abayas shuffle quietly down alleyways with their groceries. The fishermen sleep in the cool open air along the banks of the Tigris in the hot summer. Kids prod sheep down the city streets. Other times it turns into some sort of loud and hellish cartoon episode, with fingerless, toothless beggars affected by a tropical disease from a medieval triptych and reaching out to you like lunatics. Gunfire comes from out of nowhere, sending red or green tracers ricocheting off into the night sky. The loud whoosh of an RPG becomes familiar and explosions erupt spontaneously and aimlessly.<br />
A ride to Brigade promised to be short and sweet along the outskirts of the Green Zone and through Al Kindi to the checkpoint. We did it almost every day. At 2 a.m. the traffic was sparse and we<br />
drove as fast as our built-by-the-lowest-bidder war-wagons could carry us. I stuck my head out the window like a dog to get the fresh air and sober up. <br />
Burt put on “Don’t Fear the Reaper” by Blue Öyster Cult, and we roared down the empty highway, this small section now blocked off by huge concrete barriers─the U.S. military’s own personal highway. We turned onto the streets of Al Kindi, neon lights from the hookah bars and late chai cafés and kebab restaurants blurring along. We shouted and waved at passing Iraqis on the sidewalks with laughs and smiles on our faces and they waved and smiled gladly, more used to us tearing-ass around in the daylight wearing sunglasses and ugly expressions. Everyone was in a good mood.<br />
When we got to Brigade, they had another job for us. We had to get up to the Baghdad International Airport─BIAP─and bring back a truck of new arrivals and a couple guys coming off R&R. The party atmosphere vanished. This was a more serious proposition. The road to BIAP from downtown Baghdad was the most dangerous in the world at the time. It was bad in the daylight, but just plain spooky at night. There were lots of high windows and rooftops along the way. There were stretches where the streets were well lit, which made it easier for the bad guys to see us and harder for us to see them. Other stretches would be pitch dark except for our headlights, which meant the Jihadis would have plenty of notice we were coming along in our loud diesels. We all put on our game faces and geared up again. There was no music this time.<br />
About halfway there the lead vehicle called back about an obstacle, which turned out to be a half-built wall of old tires. We increased our speed and swerved around it. You never know if the bad guys want you to go to one side or the other or straight through the middle so they can blow you up. You also can’t stop to figure it out because they might ambush you, especially at night. There’s a way to die no matter what you do. Our tactic was to blow through the area as fast as we could. We got to Division HQ at BIAP and rounded up all the guys who were coming with us. A couple were coming back off emergency leave and had been hoping they wouldn’t have to return, but the game had now gone into OT for us all. Another ten or so of the guys were new in country, mostly Privates, who had also been hoping for a reprieve. Luck didn’t go their way. Mac, our convoy leader, decided he was going to have some fun with these guys. The rest of us listened and smoked cigarettes on the other side of the truck and exchanged smiles.<br />
“Welcome to the suck,” he said. “If you fuck around out here, you get your face shot off. You do what you’re told and don’t ask any questions until we get to the FOB. We’re going to be driving at a very high rate of speed so keep your asses glued to the floor of the truck with your rifles pointing out so you don’t accidently shoot each other. Don’t stand up for nothing. Don’t shoot at nothing unless you got<br />
something to shoot at. Don’t do nothing, don’t touch nothing. You just keep your head down and we’ll get through this and about fifty percent of you might make it back to the FOB alive.”<br />
We had to stifle our laughter at the last part. The faces of the newbies showed no amusement. They got onto the back of the five-ton with their rucks and duffels piled along the edges of the bed. The truck pulled into the middle of the convoy and we left. It was about 0300 now.<br />
The roads had been relatively empty on the way up, but they were dead empty now and that was not a good sign. The convoy leader urged us to pull our heads out of our fourth point of contact, which we had done already. The big five-ton truck, the back open to the sky above, was rolling in front of us as fast as it could go, which is to say not fast at all. It was more like a fat beetle on wheels. In the beam of our headlights I could see the round helmets of the new guys bouncing up and down comically as the truck barreled over huge potholes in the beat-up pavement. And far up the road in front of us, right along our route of travel, a huge shining light came into view. As we got closer it became apparent what it was: a wall of burning tires in the middle of the highway. <br />
The lead-vehicle commander called for us all to punch through like we had on the way in, but the wall was across the entire roadway now and it was on fire. There was no way around as there were thick metal guards along both sides of the road. It takes a lot to get tires to burn, but once they do they really go, and the smoke was forming into an ominous black thunderhead. The first and second Humvees managed to make a good sized hole through the wall, but whoever built the thing knew what they were doing because much of it was still standing. <br />
As we entered the edge of the dark cloud, the five-ton barreled through the wall and cast flaming tires and chunks of rubber and ashes out in all directions. I told Burt to get all the way down out of the gunner’s hatch as D mashed the gas pedal and we ploughed through ourselves, having to lean inward and away from the tongues of bright gold flame licking in through the windows. A wave of smoke and fire washed over the truck. I checked on everybody and watched in the rear-view mirror as the last truck broke through in a shower of burning rubber. Flaming tires rolled into the darkness across the median and down into the drainage culvert along the road. <br />
The adrenaline rush ebbed and we all three began to laugh and yell out the windows. There had been no IED and no ambush. We were sure that the new guys in the back of the five-ton in front of us were shitting themselves. Maybe the wall builders thought we would stop, in which case they were sitting in the dark sorely disappointed, or maybe it was just a prank by some bored Iraqi teenagers. Either way, we cursed them up and down for it now like a high-speed caravan of foul-mouthed stable boys on parade.<br />
As we rolled on through the darkness of the quiet city, somebody started yelling, “Viet-fucking-nam!”<br />
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-30288582424921583652013-09-07T06:33:00.000-05:002014-06-24T08:53:19.675-05:00Destroying Syrian Chemical Stockpiles Won't be Easy<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjwuDTlGNRXRLt3pKrKmp4t1jeCNoBS0H1qdKjC2PI4XH0hAJCi7p-nNeQCJ1b4nl2ZSRVqjpSwGsgE_fvAuP8Tkqjuwio4ovo4e33_tFk9XbenOQS5acv59CmkBCZNqaP7CRTiAe2wMWw/s1600/Syria+gasmask.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjwuDTlGNRXRLt3pKrKmp4t1jeCNoBS0H1qdKjC2PI4XH0hAJCi7p-nNeQCJ1b4nl2ZSRVqjpSwGsgE_fvAuP8Tkqjuwio4ovo4e33_tFk9XbenOQS5acv59CmkBCZNqaP7CRTiAe2wMWw/s320/Syria+gasmask.jpg" /></a><br />
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<i>This article originally appeared in <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/06/destroying-syrian-chemical-stockpiles-won-t-be-easy-may-kill-civilians.html">The Daily Beast</a> on 6 September 2013.</i><br />
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It is now clear that the Syrian government used sarin nerve gas to attack suspected rebel forces in Damascus on August 21. There is no doubt that the “red line” was breached. With the American public delivering a clear consensus against committing ground forces, the Obama administration will almost certainly limit any intervention to remote attacks. In the best circumstances, destroying chemical weapons is a dangerous and intensive task, but trying to destroy them from the air without spreading their deadly agents makes it even more difficult.<br />
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Drawing from my experience serving 9 years in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND) for the U.S. Army, here is a rundown of the options available for destroying chemical weapons with a look at the feasibility of different methods and the complications that each entails.<br />
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An air campaign could focus on eliminating chemical munitions, military chemical units, chemical weapons production facilities, any or all of the above. The first step is to identify the targets and fix their locations. Since the first mentions of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime in July 2012, U.S. intelligence has been tracking the movements of Syria’s chemical assets. There is a ready supply of human intelligence from rebel forces and refugees, a steady stream of signals intercepts from Syrian government forces, and near constant visual surveillance using aerial imagery platforms. Social media and news reports from inside Syria also provide open-source intelligence.<br />
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Syria is reported to have one of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons in the world. Locating all of these munitions, even with the best intelligence available, will not be easy. Syria is also known to store chemical agents in“binary” form, where two components of the chemical agent are stored separately and only mixed before being loaded into munitions. This makes transport safer and simpler but can vastly expand the number of targets that need to be located and destroyed and makes them easier to conceal.<br />
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Syria’s chemical weapons-production facilities are reported to be located near major cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs, while munitions are stored at as many as 50 different sites. As the U.S. prepares for an attack, the regime is likely spreading munitions across cities throughout the country, making detection more difficult, necessitating more strikes, and increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.<br />
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Some intelligence reports indicate that the Assad regime lacks the ability to produce certain necessary precursor ingredients, but Syria stockpiled chemicals from European suppliers before export controls became effective. It also doesn’t take much to create many of the chemical agents used; they can be produced by anyone with an advanced chemistry degree given a moderately equipped refinement facility. Targeting Syria’s production facilities is possible, but will be difficult. Tracking movements of Syrian military chemical units and weapons platforms capable of firing chemical munitions would be an easier task.<br />
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The hardest part comes after the munitions are located. Once the targets are acquired they must be destroyed without releasing the deadly chemical agents— it’s possible but a bit like bombing a paint factory at long range and expecting not to have any splatter.<br />
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Syrian chemical units and their launchers can be targeted using airstrikes, drones, or cruise missiles launched from naval vessels. However, given the likelihood that the Syrians have intentionally moved these weapons systems into populated areas, even precise strikes on them could lead to civilian casualties. On a larger scale, there is also the danger that an attack on launchers loaded with chemical munitions could spread toxic substances as far as Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan or into the Mediterranean Sea.<br />
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America must face the possibility that in carrying out attacks to prevent the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons it risks unleashing those deadly agents on a civilian population.<br />
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Other than weapon systems and facilities, Syrian soldiers working in chemical units are another likely target for attack. The troops in these units are usually outfitted in identifiable protective gear for their own safety, a clear indicator of the presence of chemical agents and their impending use. But attacking these soldiers presents a similar set of problems—their likely proximity to chemical weapons means that targeting them risks hitting the munitions they are guarding or operating and releasing them into nearby populations.<br />
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The care America takes in eliminating its own chemical weapons reflects how dangerous the process is, even when it’s done in a safe and controlled environment. Since 1986, the protocol has been to incinerate the agent at temperatures above 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit or to neutralize it using hot water and a caustic compound. After the destructive phase, the next step involves extensive monitoring and testing of air, water, and soil to ensure no residual release.<br />
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Simply dropping a conventional bomb on an ammo dump is not a solution. Besides the initial deadly effect of dispersing chemical agents, their release into air, soil, and water can have severe health effects for years down the road.<br />
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A chemical rocket or artillery round does not explode like conventional munitions. They contain a propellant to get the munitions on target and only enough explosive to rupture the round and release their agent, either bursting in the air above a target or upon hitting the ground. This is why there were several rockets found semi-intact after the August 21 attack on Ghutah which were subsequently sampled by U.N. investigators.<br />
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The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency has conducted extensive research into anti-chemical strike options. One weapon they have studied is the non-explosive CBU-107 “PAW” which releases 3,700 extremely dense metal rods into a high-altitude free fall that acts like thousands of daggers, penetrating and shredding a target without the use of explosives. This weapon is less likely to cause an explosion at production facilities but it will rupture munitions, releasing their chemical agents and making casualties of anyone in the vicinity.<br />
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Thermobaric explosive weapons, like the BLU-119/B “CrashPad” are another option. Thermobaric explosives, essentially the most powerful non-nuclear devices in the U.S. arsenal, work by sucking in all the oxygen in the blast radius and using it to fuel an intense, high-velocity explosion reaching over 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit. In theory, such devices have the potential to suck in and incinerate chemical agents, however, no conclusive testing of such devices on live chemical agents has yet been conducted.<br />
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While they may have a better chance of destroying chemical munitions without releasing their agents, the blast and heat generated by thermobaric weapons are intensely deadly. Structures near the blast will be destroyed and persons not killed by the initial explosion or flying debris will suffer lethal damage to internal organs caused by the pressure wave it creates. The effect of their use in a populated urban area would cause casualties comparable to a small nuclear explosion or a chemical attack. Using a nonexplosive penetrator or a thermobaric device in a city such as Damascus could cause more civilian casualties than the regime’s attack on Ghutah, which is just the reason Assad’s forces are likely relocating their chemical assets closer to urban centers.<br />
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The ability to safely destroy large stocks of chemical agents with airstrikes is still unconfirmed, though it is theoretically possible. Testing that method now requires accepting that even relative success may mean killing thousands of the very Syrian civilians we would be acting to protect. As the American people and Congress consider the proposals for action made by the president and his cabinet they should be aware of the chances for success, the risks, and the potential cost in lives.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-39999441801483825742013-09-05T09:44:00.000-05:002014-06-24T08:56:36.431-05:00Why Chemical Weapons are a 'Red Line' the World Must Enforce<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsAkUlYwAyxdYQqVziqdXBqp1Ogyy-SUuHuU7-xr-3-eHOHI80mLXjEIkSOdrY7PXjfa8sE2k6KC81xGwt9NuuVrQzaiC0ql6iGYLlTQXbLYhW5H4CGZglHM0HYnX8OnGsR5zh7WuaAwc/s1600/Chemical+Stockpile.jpg" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsAkUlYwAyxdYQqVziqdXBqp1Ogyy-SUuHuU7-xr-3-eHOHI80mLXjEIkSOdrY7PXjfa8sE2k6KC81xGwt9NuuVrQzaiC0ql6iGYLlTQXbLYhW5H4CGZglHM0HYnX8OnGsR5zh7WuaAwc/s320/Chemical+Stockpile.jpg" /></a><br />
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<i>This article originally appeared in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/04/chemical-weapons-red-line-world">The Guardian</a> on 4 September 2013.</i><br />
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Echoing President Barack Obama's remarks of a year ago, US Secretary of State John Kerry has called the use of chemical weapons a "red line for the world", asserting that evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the Assad regime used Sarin nerve gas against its own people. Failing to act now would push that red line back and send a message that the use of chemical weapons will be frowned upon, but that nothing will result other than stern international admonitions.<br />
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This would reverse the tide that has been rolling back the use of chemical warfare for the last 25 years. Chemical weapons are a world red line, and action is necessary to protect hard-won international progress against chemical weapons proliferation.<br />
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<b>The long war against chemical weapons use</b><br />
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The first world war was the first occasion on which chemical weapons were used on a large scale in war. The results of these attacks, mostly on British and German soldiers, were so horrendous that a prohibition of their use was included in the 1925 Geneva Protocol – subsequently ratified by 138 nations. This was the first formal recognition that the use of chemical weapons is a red line for the world community.<br />
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The US and USSR took another step against chemical weapons by agreeing to cease production and set up an inspection regime in the1989 Wyoming Agreement. Then, in 1993, the world again pushed forward the red line to halt the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).<br />
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The rest of the world has kept these agreements, and the reduction of chemical weapons has progressed steadily ever since. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the enforcement agency of the CWC, has reported that 72% of the world's declared stockpiles have been eliminated, as of 2011. The rest are scheduled to decommissioned within the next few years. These are mostly located in Libya and Iraq, but crucially, they are secured and will be eliminated with co-operation from other CWC signatory states. The US has eliminated 90% of its chemical weapons and Russia over 60%.<br />
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There are reports of chemical weapons use by Russia, Vietnam, and Cambodia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Saddam Hussein notoriously used chemical weapons against Kurds around Halabja, and during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. However, there have now been no proven lethal chemical attacks in 25 years. Worldwide, the use of chemical weapons in war has virtually ceased since the 1993 adoption of the CWC.<br />
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Only Syria has continually chosen to ignore the world's red line on chemical weapons; it is one of only seven nations in the world that refuses to ratify the CWC. (It is joined only by Angola, North Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan; Israel and Burma/Myanmar have signed the CWC, but not ratified it.) At a time when the rest of the world was eliminating chemical weapons, Syria was actively stockpiling precursor chemicals and building what has become one of the largest chemical weapons arsenals in the world.<br />
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In July 2012, an official Assad regime spokesman, Jihad Makdissi, declared it was Syrian government policy that chemical weapons would not be used against Syrians, but reserved the right to use them against any external forces. So, Assad could not even keep his own declared red line on chemical weapons use. Unleashing nerve gas on noncombatants in Damascus was a big step over the line.<br />
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<b>What about other conflict-zone 'red lines'?</b><br />
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Throughout the last century, the world has borne witness to violence throughout the world, including violent political crackdowns, ethnic cleansing, religious conflict, assassinations and border wars. In virtually every one, international law, norms and values – "red lines", if you will – have been stretched or broken. Victims and refugees caught in these conflicts have repeatedly called for intervention by outside powers. Most of these calls have been made on the United States and other western powers.<br />
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Sometimes, we have answered; most often, we have not. So what makes this "red line" different and why should we act this time?<br />
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The world order has been in turmoil since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 upended the geopolitical bipolarity of the previous 50 years. Former Soviet satellites in eastern Europe and the Caucasus continue to struggle for their own identity and to remain independent. The Arab Spring uprisings are tearing apart the old political order in the Middle East, while the rise of China is making its Asian neighbours nervous and attracting American attention. South American nations continue their journey out of poverty and away from repressive regimes.<br />
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Meanwhile, the US is coming to the end of over a decade at war, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, we have already witnessed over 100,000 deaths in Syria.<br />
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Not all of the benefits the world was promised when the US and its allies prevailed in the cold war anti-Communist struggle have materialised. In some parts of the world, things seem to be regressing, rather than improving. That is why it is important to preserve and jealously guard what progress has been made in working toward a more peaceful world – even if that means turning to military action against rogue states in order to do so. The steady worldwide reduction of chemical weapons is a prime example of that progress – one that we cannot allow to be eroded so easily.<br />
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A failure to act after the Assad regime has crossed that red line would be akin to the world retreating and setting a new, weaker standard without a fight. No state other than Syria has dared to cross the line of chemical weapons use in a quarter-century. If we do not act today, we have set a new world precedent that says the use of chemical weapons is frowned upon, but there will be no serious consequences. We should not retreat so easily without serious consideration of what we would be sacrificing for the future.<br />
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Until this moment, the world was on the cusp of eliminating one of the unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction. Quietly, steadily, we had been approaching the point where we would one day be able to say we had eliminated chemical weapons.<br />
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This is progress toward a safer world we can only hope to achieve with nuclear or biological weapons. Worldwide, proliferation of nuclear weapons has increased. Since the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel have developed new nuclear weapons. Other states, such as Iran, may be trying to join the nuclear club. Meanwhile, the nature of biological weapons makes tracking or controlling them difficult and there is no major international agreement specifically to enforce their prohibition. Though it receives less attention, the Chemical Weapons Convention is a real success story in comparison.<br />
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Syria is the last country in the world with a large stockpile of chemical weapons that refuses to eliminate them. Now, the Assad regime has used them on its own people. And Syria has threatened to use them against any outside forces which threaten the Assad regime. No other country in the world has dared do that since 1988.<br />
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President Assad is the last major roadblock to achieving a world free from the horror of chemical weapons. That is why the world, led by the United States, must take action in Syria.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-72206443288146928032013-09-01T10:27:00.001-05:002014-06-24T09:33:50.050-05:00The Military Teaches Soldiers Strength; the VA Teaches Veterans to Beg<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEioAvKyPRI3TOX_dI6lquRRxfDhA1QPatTXvwkQt4QfKUE41HF4gG0V_j4F7tce-OUoXbB1RF_j-e-obRcC2uzLnfQ_bE7saOVOm_pcGj90LjRpZ7ErhV1FbLmk9azP8OqCLJ_EhR9zXvo/s1600/VA+HQ.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEioAvKyPRI3TOX_dI6lquRRxfDhA1QPatTXvwkQt4QfKUE41HF4gG0V_j4F7tce-OUoXbB1RF_j-e-obRcC2uzLnfQ_bE7saOVOm_pcGj90LjRpZ7ErhV1FbLmk9azP8OqCLJ_EhR9zXvo/s320/VA+HQ.jpg" /></a></div><br />
<i>This article originally appeared on <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/30/the-military-teaches-soldiers-strength-the-va-teaches-veterans-to-beg.html">The Daily Beast</a> on 30 August 2013.</i><br />
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I come from a family of combat vets. We have all been fortunate enough to make it home, from WWII, Vietnam, and for me, Iraq. Military service is a family tradition, as is bitching about the VA. Dinner conversations include horror stories about wait times, neglect, and endless red tape. Often lost in the cycle of stories about VA screw-ups and VA reforms (inevitably followed by more stories of VA screw-ups) is the demoralizing affect that the process has on individuals by taking the very values the military teaches—integrity, hard work, accountability—and undermining them by making veterans act like beggars.<br />
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The term “red tape” in America actually derives from Civil War veterans’ records being bound together in the stuff. The story of veterans getting stiffed by the government is an American tradition going back at least 150 years. In the present day, while bill payments can be done online and any song ever recorded is instantly accessible, we are still using a paper-based VA system that has the upshot of being noncompatible with the Department of Defense system used for tracking active-duty soldiers.<br />
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Veterans are proud characters, used to standing on their own feet. And while self-sufficiency is a central part of the military ethos, reintegrating into civilian life can be difficult and require some assistance, particularly for those with injuries and mental traumas incurred during their service.<br />
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Only 0.5 percent of Americans have served in the post-9/11 era, compared with 9 percent during the height of WWII. The burden of fighting for the country continues to fall on the shoulders of the few. When veterans have to fight for the benefits they are owed, it alienates them even further from the rest of the country that did not serve.<br />
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Following multiple tours, veterans can come home and feel isolated in their own communities. It’s difficult enough discussing their time overseas with friends and neighbors; most are in no rush to introduce a new uncomfortable topic: problems with the VA over disability ratings and payment. The outcome is that they become further estranged and often bitter both toward the government that fails to honor its commitments and the civilian population that has not fought harder to force the issue.<br />
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How can insurance companies and banks—also large organizations processing thousands of compensation claims daily—succeed in processing within reasonable time frames but the VA cannot? The answer, simply, is a lack of political will and accountability.<br />
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The VA once had to close a facility because the huge number of files piled up made the building structurally unsound and unsafe to work in. Recent congressional testimony revealed that the Baltimore VA office was late on 81 percent of its claims, though speed may not be the answer, given the additional revelation that errors were made in 26 percent of claims processed by that office.<br />
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Asking for help is hard enough; making vets act like supplicants with their hands out is an insult.<br />
As soldiers, veterans were used to counting on the government. Paychecks came on time and family health care was readily available. Everything they needed to do their job was made available—if not immediately and in perfect order, at least predictably and with a system of accountability for when things went wrong. Imagine the position of a veteran who leaves that sort of environment, finds that the benefits promised as job payment are suddenly unavailable, that the government reneged on its word and the only option for recourse involves automated systems and faceless bureaucrats.<br />
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It often goes like this: You visit a VA facility, file a claim, and wait months for an acknowledgment by mail. You submit relevant medical evidence, service records, and statements supporting your claim and wait months for another acknowledgment. Repeat this process several more times as you’re asked for additional evidence.<br />
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Your claim file may be shuffled between different VA facilities in different cities or it may be lost completely—keep in mind that none of this is digitized. The VA and the post office: the last two true paper pushers left in America.<br />
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Meanwhile, your life goes on. Your service-related injuries may become worse. The VA can’t cope with changes in contact details or conditions, so God forbid you move or have a new development not documented in the papers you submitted months ago. After dealing with all of this, often the VA will reject the claim outright and the process begins again with an appeal. Even if it is approved there may be an unexplained delay or error in receiving payment.<br />
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You are not entitled to be kept informed about the progress of your claim; calling their office won’t help. You may write to the VA, but you will either receive no reply or an automated response. You may try to use the VA’s eBenefits online system to check your status and submit evidence, but it is never updated. You will find, if you were told something in a previous communication with the VA, that it may be wholly untrue but there is no special effort made by the VA to correct mistakes.<br />
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The VA, despite repeated claims of its reform, remains mysterious to those who depend on it and the process can makes veterans feel small and powerless. For many the idea of asking for help is hard enough, but making them feel as if they are supplicants, with their hands out for a favor, is an insult. Add to this the thinly veiled accusations by some that the system is filled with false claims and veterans are “freeloaders” and the insult becomes unbearable.<br />
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Now, in the wake of Congress’s self-imposed sequestration, some think-tankers, career civil servants, and congressional staffers on both sides of the political spectrum are pushing for trimming veterans’ and military benefits. Veterans’ benefits have been spared from sequestration directly but are being eyed indirectly by bean counters who seem unbothered by asking vets to sacrifice even more for their country.<br />
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Veterans’ benefits are not over-generous entitlements. Entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are open to every citizen who pays into them, and even some who do not, and troops pay these taxes like everyone else. Veterans’ benefits such as VA health care are earned through years of service and designed to care and compensate for injuries and losses incurred while serving. These benefits are not a luxury or the thanks of a grateful nation; they are part of a service contract.<br />
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Being a veteran in America has never been an easy road. We win the wars but come home to see our own battles lost every time. From the red tape of the Civil War, the WWI veterans’ bonus march, Agent Orange in Vietnam, and the newest generation’s continuing fight against post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury, unemployment, homelessness, and suicide, justice for American veterans is slow to come. It’s an American tradition overdue for change.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-274304042833956072013-08-17T07:48:00.001-05:002014-06-24T09:38:44.561-05:00Egypt Unrest Blame Game: August Edition<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgERtL_sSDMSaZ7Fdk7G2yMvOADtBeu_H901lWy9UYqHoJHqAu7H2VhHhwc-R2OpE2bS2kUrMFNdvLCz-4GFjIFRHWluNH_U0HyM_p00An-EDnE4iRGmKxMTUiUot3sxG_zVEKGtEQDSSY/s1600/Egypt.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgERtL_sSDMSaZ7Fdk7G2yMvOADtBeu_H901lWy9UYqHoJHqAu7H2VhHhwc-R2OpE2bS2kUrMFNdvLCz-4GFjIFRHWluNH_U0HyM_p00An-EDnE4iRGmKxMTUiUot3sxG_zVEKGtEQDSSY/s320/Egypt.jpeg" /></a></div><br />
<i>This article originally appeared on <a href="http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/the-egypt-unrest-blame-game-august-edition/">The Truman Doctrine</a> on 16 August 2013.</i><br />
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Who is to blame for the unrest in Egypt? If you listen to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, Israel and its Zionist ally America are to blame. Iran has also adopted this line. There are some in the United States and Europe who also believe America is to blame as we have given billions of dollars in aid every year to Egypt under Mubarak and are likely to continue to do so under any new government in order to maintain influence. Others, mostly on the political right, have blamed the violence solely on President Obama. The real answer is that Egyptians are to blame for the violent unrest in Egypt. It is an unfortunate human reality that national systems do not experience major changes at rapid pace through peaceful evolution, but rather through violent revolution. Egypt is in the throes of a violent process in which there are no easy or clear answers.<br />
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The moment reports the military’s raid against Muslim Brotherhood protesters had turned violent became public the presses were already hot with the next round of the blame game. Who is pulling the secret strings behind the scenes? America is always the first culprit. Even Americans love to blame America. That the US has given an average of a billion dollars annually to the Egyptian military is cited as evidence that America has out-sized influence on Egypt’s military, especially its popular commander, General Abdel el-Sissi. Supporters of the ‘blame America’ school hold we should have used our influence to prevent this latest outbreak of violence and should withdraw our aid and support. America has been blamed for both supporting and opposing Egypt’s coup at the same time.<br />
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But hold the phone. US government policy communications regarding Egypt from the beginning of the Arab Spring up until today are filled with calls for the Egyptian military to use restraint. Every major US officeholder and appointee from President Obama on down has called for a peaceful transition from Mubarak and, now, a peaceful transition to democracy following the military coup. And we’re swinging our only big stick. It has been communicated that if restraint is not shown or violent crackdowns continue, the US may withdraw its $1.3 billion aid package. Essentially, America has done what all of its critics are saying it should have done. Yet, here we are.<br />
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The problem is that many critics of America share something in common with those diametrically opposed to them who believe emphatically in American greatness—namely, a false belief that America has much more power to shape and influence events in other states than it actually has. America has called for restraint in Egypt. America has threatened to withdraw its billions of aid dollars. It may not have any effect. Here’s why.<br />
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America is not the only country in the world writing checks to other governments in exchange for influence. Taking 2010 as an example, the US contributed 19% of all development aid to Egypt. Germany, France, Japan, Kuwait and other Arab states contributed between 10-15% each. If economic aid is supposed to equal a requisite amount of influence, than each of these other states are in the same boat with America. Why aren’t they being blamed equally for failing to act to stop the violence?<br />
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Recently Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have agreed to give around $12 billion in financial aid to Egypt, dwarfing the US package of $1.3 billion in comparison. These states, especially those with monarchies still standing, have no wish to see an Islamist government in Egypt and they’re willing to pay lots of money to prevent it—and they care little about the possibly violent consequences. Yet the blame still falls on America’s shoulders.<br />
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The US should also tread carefully as it has had to with Pakistan when it comes to the threat to withdraw aid. Continuing to give aid may look like collusion or acquiescence to the actions of the military and interim government, but withdrawing aid may mean the US no longer has any leverage or audience with the powers that be. It is a double-edged sword. If aid continues, the Egyptian military rulers may still continue to do as they please. Withdraw aid and they may do the same thing.<br />
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The US and its aid dollars are not to blame for violence in Egypt, nor are the aid dollars of any other outside state. Money did not compel people into the streets again and money could not prevent this recent violence. The Egyptian people overthrew Mubarak by taking to Tahrir Square. The Egyptian military stood down and allowed it to happen. The Egyptian people voted Mohammed Morsi into office as their new president. The Egyptian people took to the streets again to depose him and the Egyptian military allowed it, again. Though the violence is regrettable, many Egyptians are cheering the crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood and General el-Sissi remains the most popular figure in the country.<br />
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Though the violent images and hundreds of casualties among Muslim Brotherhood members are absolutely terrible, no one else was there pulling the strings. It was, once again, the Egyptian people and the Egyptian military that set this chain of events in motion. It is only hubris to believe that the US or any other state has enough influence to have stopped these events or to cause them to happen.<br />
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Terrible as they are, they are part of a process of rapid political and social revolution. The Russian, French, American, and British revolutions were bloody as well. The difference is that there was not Twitter, 24-hour news or the internet to send the pictures across the world in real time. As much as the violence is regrettable, Egypt is deciding for itself the form its future will take.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-50896480527478527172013-07-08T07:22:00.000-05:002014-06-24T09:36:44.257-05:00Egypt Coup Was Necessary to Preserve Democracy<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjqrt7Q2ZW371F3W913mVH3n-QqXluyHhhkuPQKsooix6oBMwJkJWuon2ZvQlp1Rg0V4ZAoZ-84xM82h9GvWM3b7ANMwNb3mkb0jqFiAgmZO4AUBoMx4rniLDfRzpTxG62JIqmt10GGnUc/s1600/Morsi+Coup.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjqrt7Q2ZW371F3W913mVH3n-QqXluyHhhkuPQKsooix6oBMwJkJWuon2ZvQlp1Rg0V4ZAoZ-84xM82h9GvWM3b7ANMwNb3mkb0jqFiAgmZO4AUBoMx4rniLDfRzpTxG62JIqmt10GGnUc/s320/Morsi+Coup.jpg" /></a></div><br />
<i>This article originally appeared on <a href="http://www.policymic.com/articles/53275/egypt-coup-was-necessary-to-preserve-democracy">PolicyMic</a> on 8 July 2013.</i><br />
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Mohamed Morsi has been removed as the elected President of Egypt following a military coup d'etat widely supported by the Egyptian public. Violent clashes continue between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, as Egyptians — and not America or the West — are control their own fate. Independence and stability must come before democracy can take root.<br />
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The military takeover has given rise to cries from some among the media intelligentsia. For example, The Independent's Robert Fisk blames President Barack Obama for not denouncing the coup, and claims it shows Egypt is not on the path to democracy (as claimed). Whether called a coup or not, history shows that the road to democracy begins with such violent events, and the military may be the only stable national institution to turn to in times of crisis.<br />
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The history of every major democracy in the world starts with a violent war or revolution or even several of them. From Britain's Magna Carta to the American and French revolutions, it has become a rule of history that those asked to give up absolute power won't give it up without a fight. It is wrong to think things are any different in the 21st century. This is a lesson of America and Britain's misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan —democracy doesn't grow on trees.<br />
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Though the West claims to believe in democracy above all else, the truth is that democracy doesn't work overnight or on its own. The proper groundwork must be laid. This includes, among others, the trust and confidence of the people, rule of law, freedom of speech and press, a stable economic system and a system safeguarding the physical security and order of the citizenry.<br />
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Egypt under President Morsi had none of these things. His refusal to negotiate, failure to commit to improving the economy and assertion that his policy was supreme law brought the people into the streets, eventually leading the military to depose him. In Morsi's defense, he was only in office for a year. But we should expect the people of Egypt, hungry for change after Mubarak, to keep coming back to the streets until someone gets it right. It will be violent and bloody.<br />
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The French Revolution would have sent Morsi and his Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to the guillotine — fortunately the Egyptian military has only arrested them, giving several days advanced warning. It may take years of struggles before Egypt stabilizes. America struggled with violent uprisings throughout the first years of its independence. The struggle for sustainable democracy will take longer. Britain's oft-violent struggle for democracy took place over centuries and the UK still has no written constitution. Just because we have 24-hour television and Twitter coverage of the events today doesn't mean that things are any different.<br />
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It is a mistake to categorically reject this Egyptian coup as an assertion of military rule and a rejection of democracy. It is a misunderstanding of how revolutions often work. There are many recent historical precedents, particularly in Southwest Asia, which show that the military can act as a national safeguard, providing stability until civilian institutions can get it right in the eyes of the people.<br />
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Throughout the modern history of Turkey, the military has acted as a national safeguard. In 1960, 1971 and again in 1980, the Turkish military deposed the civil government. In each case the country had been gripped with economic, social and political turmoil and in each case the military quickly returned the country to civilian rule. Ethnic and political strife has made Pakistan hard for anyone to rule, leading it to be called a "compromise state." The Pakistani military has been the only institution with the strength to rule, supporting coups in 1958, 1977 and 1999, though it has not always been as quick to return to civil rule. The military has also played a vital role in the stability of Thailand, stepping in when the government was deadlocked, most recently in 2006 over the allegedly corrupt rule of millionaire Thaksin Shinawatra.<br />
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One only need look at the conduct of the Egyptian military itself during the initial stages of the uprising against the Mubarak government. While the military was brutally suppressing protests in other regional states such as Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen, Egyptian troops generally remained calm observers. Though there were complaints following the fall of Mubarak, rule was quickly returned to civil hands. Now, again following the deposition of President Morsi, the country is nominally in the hands of a civilian interim government, headed by Supreme Court judge Adly Mansour and international diplomat Mohamed ElBaradei.<br />
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To denounce this coup as an attack on democracy in Egypt paints a false picture, as does depicting it as a return to military dictatorship. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Egyptians support the action should not be brushed aside. States in turmoil often turn to stable institutions such as the military to safeguard the national interest in times of crisis. The Egyptian military is already taking steps to turn the country back over to civil, democratic rule. Those who are sending up cries of foul had better return to their history books and look at events on the ground. Independence and stability first—then comes democracy.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-83995797469347970372013-07-03T04:18:00.000-05:002014-06-24T09:40:56.007-05:00Contracting Out U.S. National Security<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjNgDbfcjkGc66LXc4tHygMOAk0XCXKCZE7FJkU85zB5A9QNtQvsTyCsBIa3Jsgx0SZVKgNz5XSNTp5F6ATa3nF_4R2B0RF9U3pNAsprEF4I7TdHAZAx7PVkmLHAwpPgW_1XBrhjlK0oqY/s460/CIA+HQ.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjNgDbfcjkGc66LXc4tHygMOAk0XCXKCZE7FJkU85zB5A9QNtQvsTyCsBIa3Jsgx0SZVKgNz5XSNTp5F6ATa3nF_4R2B0RF9U3pNAsprEF4I7TdHAZAx7PVkmLHAwpPgW_1XBrhjlK0oqY/s460/CIA+HQ.jpg" /></a></div><br />
<i>This article originally appeared in <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jul/02/contracting-out-us-national-security">The Guardian</a> on 2 July 2013.</i><br />
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Despite the cheers and jeers at leakers such as Julian Assange, Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden over the last few years, it would seem access to such information is less protected than ever. Serving intelligence officers are allowed to sell their skills to corporations. High-level intelligence work, once closely guarded, is farmed out to contractors, who leak information like a sieve.<br />
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The Obama White House has conducted more leak investigations than any previous administration, now including the leak of a cyber-warfare campaign against Iran by a top US army general, James Cartwright. We are selling our national security in an effort to save a buck – and we will continue to pay for it in other ways.<br />
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In 2010, Eamon Javers reported on CIA's controversial "moonlighting" policy, which allowed active intelligence officers to seek permission to work in the private sector on the side if they made full disclosure and it did not conflict with their duties. Generally, the same standard applies to all federal employees who are not political appointees.<br />
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But not all federal employees are CIA officers. No statistics of how many took advantage of the policy were forthcoming, but the policy itself was disturbing enough to lead to questions before Congress.<br />
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Why is this allowed? Defenders hold it is important to stop the "brain drain", where the best and brightest depart the agency for better pay. Supporters argue the level of compensation at CIA doesn't stack up against other federal or private-sector employment. This "discrepancy" leads talented employees to look elsewhere – for roles in which their skills fetch better prices. The CIA thus finds itself in competition with the private sector to keep personnel on whom it has expended a great deal of money and effort in training.<br />
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Demand for intelligence work has ballooned since 9/11, though government belt-tightening in recent years has had an effect. Washington has decided, rather than expanding intelligence services in a permanent sense, to farm out the increased workload to private contractors. This has advantages, as for any business seeking to outsource operations. When the need for the work reduces, it is easier to allow a contract to expire than it is to lay off excess federal employees or to keep them on, under-employed.<br />
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But there are drawbacks as well. Rather than paying solely for the service, the price also reflects the contractor's own costs – their HR, finance, management and marketing departments' wages, office costs, even redundancies. It is questionable if contracting saves anything at all. One doesn't have to look hard to find stories of wasted costs, foul-ups or even corruption in security contracting.<br />
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Just last week, USIS, the contractor responsible for performing background checks for security clearances – including Edward Snowden's – was accused of misleading the government as to the thoroughness of their investigations. Lawmakers have been told that thousands of background checks may have been improperly conducted. (The firm has made no comment, but issued a statement saying it was co-operating with an investigation.)<br />
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Private intelligence contractors look to hire employees who already have active clearances and intelligence experience – requirements not easily obtained elsewhere than an intelligence agency. The problem becomes circular. Farming out intelligence work to contractors creates its own demand. Agency employees leave for jobs with higher pay because the government itself has created a market for them, creating the very "brain drain" it seeks to stem. This is because bean-counters are worried about the effect on the budget – namely, of salary, benefits and pension obligations to employees. In the CIA's defence, these decisions are made in Washington, DC, not Langley, Virginia.<br />
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A second argument is that no harm is being done and these individuals have dedicated years to the country and are entitled to "feather their nests". However, the US military shares the same commitment to the country – yet service personnel get paid even less, and veterans are coming home to high unemployment rates.<br />
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While the job has its risks, most CIA employees still have desk jobs. The more academic nature of the job does not automatically entitle analysts to higher pay. There are also brainy folks at the Department of Interior or Forest Service who are overworked and underpaid. Many other less fortunate Americans would be happy to have such pay and benefits as CIA officers enjoy.<br />
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That our national security apparatus feels it must compete with the private sector to attract the best talent now means attracting the wrong kind of talent. Those who work in such a vital role should not do so for the salary, even if that is a great recruitment tool. One recruit who signs up for the right reasons is worth five who sign up for others. This should be familiar to US intelligence officers from the CIA's chief architect, Allen Dulles, who believed the most dependable sources are those not in it for pay.<br />
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The net effect on security is that it has become impossible for America to keep secrets. Security information is being handled by private companies poaching the intelligence community's talent and selling it back to the government, who paid to develop it in the first place. Government budget cuts and a failure to invest in intelligence infrastructure have created this problem.<br />
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National security challenges do not simply go away because we are having budget fights. If we are not willing to pay for this now, we'll pay for it later – in another, more sinister sense. Some things are worth paying for; our national security is one of them.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6452941560215846272.post-13664727128600274772013-06-21T04:29:00.002-05:002014-06-24T16:49:58.723-05:00High Time for a US-EU Trade Agreement<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghuvuOgQejAm5MzpQUv6cZrGrd95PaSZP0TmL5FBkS9hHp1MlTJNqeoeXRJgYMK206OKJKnkbcvm-La4mOw-bah6GR0EDiIUx1G_kVZE71rvQ2P1xQkWCLJdVChyphenhyphenDPkdv7M6y6gqz4S7c/s1600/EU+&+US.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghuvuOgQejAm5MzpQUv6cZrGrd95PaSZP0TmL5FBkS9hHp1MlTJNqeoeXRJgYMK206OKJKnkbcvm-La4mOw-bah6GR0EDiIUx1G_kVZE71rvQ2P1xQkWCLJdVChyphenhyphenDPkdv7M6y6gqz4S7c/s400/EU+&+US.jpg" /></a></div><br />
<i>This article originally appeared on <a href="http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/high-time-for-a-us-eu-trade-agreement/">The Truman Doctrine</a> on 20 June 2013.</i><br />
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Despite our differences, many of which have come to a head in recent years over the War on Terror, the United States and its allies in the European Union share overwhelming common interests. Beyond shared values, culture, and military and political systems, these interests are also the result of diplomatic design and modern history. The U.S.-EU free trade negotiations recently announced at the G8 summit in Enniskillen are a natural progression of this relationship and are an important step for both blocs in responding not only to today’s problems, but tomorrow’s problems as well.<br />
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WWII left the European continent devastated for the second time in only 30 years. The labour force was decimated, production had ground to a halt and national treasuries were empty, with crushing inflation and debt. Determined that European states should never go to war with each other again over resources or ‘balance of power’ politics, European leaders formed the European Coal and Steel Community, which evolved into the European Union of today. The EU is the world’s largest common market for goods and services. Though often misunderstood and even demonized, the EU is in great measure responsible for the continental peace that has followed its creation. Economic integration has created overriding mutual interests among EU states. Those who trade together, stay together.<br />
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The Marshall Plan helped to rebuild Western Europe’s economy. Continuing cooperation between intelligence agencies has been vital to both sides of the Atlantic. The joint military structure of NATO ensured that the U.S. and Europe remained engaged in each other’s national security. NATO is still a vital tool through which America and Europe engage with the world in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era. The U.S. and its western European allies recognized the need for intelligence and military cooperation to confront the Soviet Union and the spread of communism during the Cold War and again in the fight against terrorism.<br />
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But an over-arching agreement on transatlantic trade has been missing for many decades due to national protectionist instincts that often kick in on both sides. Many Americans blame ‘globalization’ and trade agreements such as NAFTA for the loss of jobs. Many Euro-sceptics wrongly blame the EU for the same. Britain often finds itself at odds with the EU, most memorably in relation to weights and measurements when Imperial units became a nationalist rally point. France has been guilty of setting emissions standards that strangely only Peugeots and Citroens could pass. Even in this most recent agreement announced at Enniskillen an exception, pushed for in France and Poland, was made for the European film industry, which fears it would be driven to extinction by Hollywood blockbusters.<br />
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A bilateral U.S.-EU trade agreement would give American and European businesses access to millions of new customers for goods and services. The increased competition and elimination of tariffs should lead to better prices for consumers on both sides. The opening of new markets will create new jobs, something sorely needed in both Europe and America. It will also help cut through a lot of the red tape for importers and exporters already in the transatlantic trade.<br />
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But there are also bigger strategic reasons to hail such an agreement. Both sides of the Atlantic have suffered attacks and face the continuing threat of international terrorism. The 2008 economic downturn was fuelled by questionable lending policies by major banks in both America and Europe and are where the effects have been most acutely felt. U.S. and EU governments have faced similar struggles regarding foreclosures, government austerity, ‘bailouts’, bonuses and tax evasion. Both the U.S. and Europe continue to require fossil fuel energy. Despite better efforts than America to increase use of renewables, Europe must often depend upon Russia for oil and gas, giving Moscow a larger share of leverage than they may ordinarily be due. War and instability in the Middle East and Africa have shown the folly of America’s continued dependence on foreign oil, an issue the Obama administration has set out to tackle to the opposition of many in Congress. The world’s insatiable appetite for energy is growing at an even faster rate. The rise of China and India and other smaller tigers mean that the dominance the U.S. has enjoyed since the end of WWII may be challenged. This increase in global competition for energy resources may lead to conflict sometime in the near future.<br />
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This is no time for the EU or the U.S. to call ‘every man for himself’ and turn to their own tasks. The two blocs face the same challenges and the success or failure of one side is of great consequence for the other. China and India did not grow themselves in a vacuum. American and European consumers, investors and business out-sourcing have fuelled their growth. The same capital employed there could have flowed back and forth between American and European states, but the want of cheap labour and materials, less or non-existent regulation and reduced government red tape caused it to flow eastward instead. The U.S. and EU have been fuelling the growth of their own competitors at a time when both are in dire need of economic growth.<br />
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Hopefully that will change or slow with a successful U.S.-EU trade agreement. It is high time for one.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0