Thursday, November 22, 2012

U.S. Military owes more to combat Joes than a four-star General

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 14 November 2012.

The pressure on those in positions of great responsibility is tremendous. Although constantly surrounded, they are, in fact, alone. Men like General David Petraeus and General John Allen could never live up to the myths that surround them, pedestals they never asked to be placed upon as fame-seekers do – though, certainly in Petraeus' case, they haven't shied from it. To expect them to live up to the standards of perfection others have set for them is an impossible task no one could succeed at. They're not saints. They're soldiers. Marines.

Yet, at some point, "celebrity generals" pass out of the realm of being troopers and into being politicians. Similar uproar occurred when President Obama required General Stanley McChrystal, another admirable commander, to resign after he and his staff publicly criticised the commander-in-chief, a well-known "don't" in the military. That was a case of over-confidently taking shots in the press. The Petraeus affair is worse, in that it may have presented a real threat to national security as an opportunity for a foreign intelligence service to exploit.

I'm a two-tour army veteran of the Iraq war. I've spent the majority of my adult life as a soldier. We're no angels. Guys and girls like me come in any colour, from inner-city or rural America, places like the south side of Chicago or Lovelady, Texas. We're regular middle- or lower-class kids (average age: 19). Some joined for college money; some to get away from home; others out of a sense of duty. We like to fight, we like to swear, get tattoos, and we enjoy a good drink. We remain pretty much anonymous. We don't have biographers or make it onto the social circuit.

We're the absolute backbone of the country – Uncle Sam's misguided children. We're the men and women without any of the advantages in life. We're not supposed to succeed, but we do. In fact, it's the very flaws in each of our individual characters that make it all the more extraordinary what the US military has achieved in its 236 years. As we're reminded every Veteran's Day, victory was never certain and the sacrifices by our troops are great. These were the men and women fighting in Afghanistan while this melodrama was going on back home.

One can see how allowances can be made for the personal indiscretions of such people. Yet, I somehow can't help but feel let down by the expanding circle of this controversy, which has brought down General Petraeus and threatens to do the same to General Allen. I expected more of them, and the behaviour thus far revealed seems petty and melodramatic – a military soap opera complete with affairs, threatening notes, twins and fancy parties.

There are some who believe that this affair is nothing compared to the work General Petraeus has done for the country. Despite the great respect I have for the general, I find myself less willing to grant such allowances.

It is a military principle that a leader cannot impose a standard on others he doesn't impose on himself. This situation started out innocently enough, but seems to have gotten out of control. As director of an intelligence agency, the general would certainly have seen the danger this scenario presented if he had been looking at it from the outside. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recognised that – and required Petraeus' resignation.

General Petraeus is widely respected by the military and veterans. But he is utterly exalted in both liberal and conservative Washington circles, which see him as a sort of noble warrior-philosopher, with credentials from West Point, Princeton and Georgetown. I was taught in the military that none of us is indispensable. We're all cogs in the wheel, and two minutes after we walk out the door, there will be an adequate replacement. The machine keeps going. The success or failure of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and of the United States as a whole, do not depend upon the fate of one or two men, no matter how exemplary their service. This country is stronger than that.

In fact, as study of our recent military campaigns has gone on, we have arguably been successful in many respects, despite the failures and inadequacies of some of our top military commanders and elected leadership. The credit for our limited successes should go to the great mass of regular, everyday troops who have been called upon to be not just soldiers, but police officers, doctors, aid workers, public works directors and social scientists.

The tough kids with high school diplomas got it done, not the administration in Washington, Ivy League professors, the brass in the Pentagon or generals at garden parties. These average Americans have done more than was asked of them and theirs should be all the credit.

The combat Joes are the ones who have been let down by this scandal. General Petraeus shouldn't have been placed on an exalted pedestal, even if he welcomed it. That very isolation may have clouded his judgment and created the risk of a security breach. In the end, though, he is a man just like other men: he is a cog in the wheel and the United States will go on without General Petraeus.

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

Now the Real Work Starts

This article originally appeared in The Truman Doctrine on 12 November 2012.

Everyone breathes a sigh of relief once Election Day is over in hopes
life can finally move on. Though the President has won re-election and
the Democrats retain control of the Senate, don’t expect this to
loosen up the gridlock in Washington. In fact, the political calculus
remains generally the same with the President facing a divided, often
obstructionist Congress. This is the reason we should all breathe a
sigh of relief that Barack Obama was re-elected. In the coming budget
fights, we’ll need a President willing to compromise and work across
the aisle.

Despite the claims of Mitt Romney and Republicans, the U.S. economy
continues to tick slowly upwards with 29 consecutive months of job
growth and the trend looks set to continue. But the next big political
fight will come over massive automatic federal spending
cuts—‘sequestration’—that will occur if Congress and the President do
not agree to a budget deal. The cuts will essentially lock up over $1
trillion and prevent it from being spent, half coming from defense
spending, the other from domestic programs.

Sequestration provided the incentive for the failed budget
‘supercommittee’ to reach agreement. When former Vice-Presidential
contender Paul Ryan accused President Obama of wanting to cut
defense spending, sequestration was what he was referring to—a bit
dishonest considering it was part of a bipartisan deal between
Democrats and Republicans, including Ryan himself as Chairman of the
House Budget Committee.

Efforts to stave off sequestration by passing an agreement acceptable
to both parties have essentially been put on hold pending the results
of the election. Both parties needed to see who would end up in the
White House and Senate before deciding how hard they could push and
what mandate would be impliedly returned from the American people.
They have their answer. The President and Democrats have successfully
made the argument that reducing the federal deficit can only be done
through a reasonable combination of raising revenue and cutting
spending. The revenue would, and should, come from those who can
afford it, namely those making incomes over $250,000 a year. This
would be paired with cuts to spending at a ratio approaching $2.50 in
cuts for every $1 in revenue raised. In returning the President to
office and Democrats to the Senate, the American people have spoken.

To this point, Republicans have argued there should be no increases in
taxes and that the only way to increase revenue is to cut taxes to
promote private-sector growth, in turn returning more revenue. This,
paired with large cuts to domestic programs important to the middle
class, was their solution to the deficit problem. Then again, it’s
always their solution to every problem, whether in good times or bad.
The election result shows Americans have rejected it. Anyone who looks
at their own household finances knows there is only so far you can cut
your spending. Hoping your boss will make a large enough profit to
give you a pay raise won’t feed your family. When you’re short on money, the
better option is to cut what you can and find some way to bring more
money in to pay the bills. The same idea applies to the government
deficit and asking those who can most afford it to pay their fair
share is the right way to do it instead of increasing the burden on
the struggling unemployed and middle class.

But don’t look to Republicans to offer leadership on a compromise even
now. Many are locked into ‘no taxes’ pledges made popular by
conservative commentator Grover Norquist. The belief that taxes should
be cut and never raised is a Republican article of faith. The GOP have
hamstrung themselves from being able to talk about increasing revenue
in any sort of reasonable manner, even when it is essential to
reducing the federal deficit (another Republican whipping boy) and
staving off the effects of sequestration. America’s fragile recovery
requires that a deal be reached. Many have signed away their ability to
compromise even when staring sequestration in the face.

In contrast, President Obama has shown himself to be ready to reach
compromises and reach across the aisle to do so. With congressional
Republicans locked into ridiculous tax pledges, it’s going to take a
President willing to make a deal to get the job done and save the
federal budget from falling off the fiscal cliff that sequestration
represents. Now that the election is over, the real work of governing
can start. It’s a good thing we have a President who can get it done.

Friday, November 9, 2012

American Military Decline? Not When Force is Used Properly

This post originally appeared in Small Wars Journal on 7 November 2012.

In recent years many have cited America’s military struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan as signs of decline. Political wrangling over the size, use, and budget of the U.S. military, withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, the fault and effects of impending sequestration, and the Arab Spring and its follow-on effects have, among other issues, put wind in the sails of this theory. Others hold using military force for ‘wars of choice’ is no longer a viable option for America. However, to think that America can’t or shouldn’t project its power globally when necessary is a mistake. America’s military struggles in the post-9/11 era have stemmed from improper application of military force. Put simply, our recent counterinsurgency efforts haven’t been using it right. When used as it should be, using military force is still an effective choice.

A soldier’s job is to fight and win in combat and to prepare to do so. Nowhere in the job description is being an international aid worker mentioned. It is a testament to the commitment and adaptability of the U.S. military that they have been as successful as they have been at it in Iraq and Afghanistan. Providing public works, policing, community political relations, and social services is something that should be done by educated and experienced professionals in that area. The U.S. military is a hammer, not a scalpel. However, our troops have been asked to fill these sensitive roles on a steep learning curve over the last decade because of our own domestic politics have required it.

Our highest elected leaders are responsible for this. Americans don’t like to spend money on ‘foreign aid.’ Politicians, especially of the conservative variety, characterize this spending as wasteful and beat the drum against it as fiscally irresponsible. Foreign development assistance actually comprises less than one percent of the federal budget, but the returns received are much more cost effective, though hard to quantify. It costs much more to send one soldier to Afghanistan for a year than it does to build a school or new market building that will stand to be used for decades in places the sorely need them.

These were the programs Gen. Petraeus, Gen. McChrystal, and other military leaders asked for to help win hearts and minds. But conservative resistance to spending on any programs considered foreign aid means the professionals at places like the U.S. State Department and USAID or even the UN and non-governmental organizations weren’t going to get the job. Our troopers had to add it to their already long to-do list. Funneling it through the military was the only way it would get done at all. That’s not doing it right.

Following NATO’s decision to severely curtail joint patrols with Afghan security forces, the wisdom and effectiveness of training and equipping indigenous forces to eventually replace U.S. troops has also been questioned. This is a tactic the U.S. has been used often in places like Korea, Vietnam, South America, and the Philippines, among others, and again in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of these efforts were moderately successful, but not successful enough that the U.S. has ever been able to fully disengage in these places. We still have troops in Korea, Vietnam was overrun, and we’re still engaged in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. These efforts can be successful as an auxiliary to a military campaign, but not as its main effort.

Often these efforts revolve around cooperating with a marginalized minority, such as the Montagnards in Vietnam, Kurds in Iraq, and Hazara in Afghanistan. When the U.S. eventually departs, these people can become even more marginalized as a result. These forces also lack the air, logistical, financial, and political support needed to be self-sustaining afterwards and can at times feel abandoned by America when finally do leave, as with Osama bin Laden and the Mujahedeen in 1980’s Afghanistan. Building security capacity essentially from scratch after effecting a regime change, especially in states with vast cultural differences from our own, is a very tall order to fill.

However, there is benefit to the U.S. in building military-to-military relations outside of conflict. There is a great difference between a modern, professional military and a ragtag militia when they’re called to respond to internal conflicts. Despite controversy over America’s military support of Egypt during Mubarak’s rule, the Egyptian military’s show of relative restraint was not just a sign of support for the people, but of an institution that believes it has a responsibility to the nation. A less professional force may have answered the calls by some to crush demonstrations or so reacted of their own volition. The Egyptian military has had a great deal of exchange with the U.S. military and the British military before it. The role of a professional military as a neutral arbiter in national conflicts can also be seen in Turkey, Thailand, and Pakistan. However, such relationships should be built in peacetime, not after a conflict has occurred.

Another example of the misuse of American military power has come in the weak, middling size of troop numbers sent into major combat—numbers fixed by the administration. America’s elected leadership opted for smaller, faster, lighter, more-economical force packages that, while winning all the battles, have arguably not won the wars. The small number of U.S. troops on the ground and reliance on indigenous forces early on in Afghanistan allowed al Qaeda and the Taliban to slip away into Pakistan, where they continue to operate today by straddling the border. The lack of sufficient troop numbers in Iraq meant America couldn’t provide adequate security when it decided to stay put and later necessitated the ‘surge’ to stave off sectarian civil war and allow the return of commerce, also emulated later in Afghanistan. Though these were certainly major troop commitments, they weren’t enough to get the job done from the outset.

The problems that insufficient troop numbers created have proven wrong those critical of the Powell Doctrine, such as Paul Wolfowitz, and vindicated its supporters, such as Gen. Eric Shinseki. It is arguable that a stronger commitment of troops from the very beginning in both Afghanistan and Iraq would have turned up better results. The mission in Afghanistan suffered in particular from the loss of attention and resources caused by the Iraq War. The administration was keen to commit to the wars, but having decided to take the course, was unwilling to commit to it as much as necessary to guarantee victory from the beginning. Bring back the Powell Doctrine.

However that does not mean that every American intervention should become D-Day. There still is scope for America to intervene militarily in world events on moral or humanitarian grounds. When or what those grounds are is another discussion. The past twenty years have shown that U.S. interventions can be successful when they have clear, concise objectives that are consistent throughout the action and on a short timeline in which to achieve them. Limiting campaigns to air strikes with intelligence, material, medical, and humanitarian support for local allies on the ground and keeping our own conventional ground troops out has been successful. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya are examples. Iraq and Afghanistan are examples where intervening has gone wrong because they did not stick to these principles. Even in small, limited interventions, the commitment of force must be sufficient to meet a clear objective from the outset. The 1992 adventure in Somalia is an example where this failed.

It can be said that when it comes to using U.S. military power, it should be an all or nothing affair. If a major commitment of ground troops is required, it should follow the Powell Doctrine. If a small-scale intervention is decided upon, it should attract as full a commitment of force and support proportionate to meet the objective without ground troops. The past decade has shown that opting for a middling, unclear, inconsistent approach does not work.

Fighting grinding counterinsurgency campaigns has apparently become acceptable to America. CIA Director Gen. David Petraeus wrote his doctoral thesis and the military manual on it. It’s the topic of thousands of professional journal articles, newspaper columns, and PowerPoint slideshows. However, we do not have to accept the idea of confronting an insurgency as an inevitability or necessity of modern warfare. In fact, America would do well to avoid having to apply COIN tactics at all by avoiding insurgencies altogether.

Insurgencies are a case of catching the tiger by his tail. Once America invades a country on the ground and decides to accept the responsibility of rebuilding it or, rather, making it into something it never was, it will meet resistance. Not only local resistance, but regional as planting our flag also becomes a beacon for like-minded opponents to come and fight us. The argument that holds we have to stay, occupy, and rebuild a nation is that if we do not, we’ll be facing the same threat again down the road, not to mention moral obligations to fix what we’ve broken.

After WWII we decided not to repeat the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty following WWI and invested in rebuilding our foes under the Marshall Plan. But Afghanistan and Iraq are not Germany and Japan. Current history shows the results of following this logic are just as unpalatable as not following it. After ten years, Afghanistan and Iraq are much the same countries for average citizens as they were when we started. Only the cast of characters at the top has changed.

We have applied a strategy that worked well fifty years ago in two industrialized nations with previously-existing strong central governments to two underdeveloped Middle Eastern states with significant cultural differences, one of which has never had a strong central government in its entire history. That was a mistake. Leaving aside discussion about justifications for either war, the fact is that the U.S. should not have stayed in Afghanistan or Iraq, let alone both simultaneously. It is an aggravating factor that we also did not plan for the immediate aftermath or a long occupation afterward, yet went ahead with them anyway.

What should we have done? Leaving aside discussion of justification for going to war, we should have set very clear, concise, and consistent objectives and, having achieved them, left. In both cases, one objective was clearly unconditional surrender. In Afghanistan, the goal should have been to capture Osama bin Laden and his identified lieutenants, along with the whole of the Taliban leadership. Iraq is a more controversial case. It is clear now that the weapons of mass destruction did not exist. Another goal there should have been to capture Saddam Hussein and his identified lieutenants.

We should have followed the Powell Doctrine. The invasion should have been preceded by a build-up of troop levels sufficient to secure the whole of the country and should have proceeded at a pace expeditiously enough to block all escape routes and eliminate all resistance on a steady march toward the center. We should have blocked the escape across the Tora Bora Mountains or, failing that, pursued al Qaeda and the Taliban into Pakistan if necessary. We should have destroyed all Baathist or Fedayeen Saddam units we encountered, rather than bypassing some of them in a race to Baghdad.

We should have seen necessarily to humanitarian needs with programs administered through the State Department, USAID, the UN, and NGOs, secured by the U.S. military. At most, we should have facilitated and secured a gathering of national leaders, but not interfered in its decisions. Our troop drawdown should have begun within six months. We should have continued to provide humanitarian aid and assistance during and after withdrawal. All assistance beyond that should only have been given upon request from the self-determined leadership of Afghanistan or Iraq.

If years later a threat to America or its allies or vital interests is presented by the same nation, then America uses military force to eliminate it once again following the same template. The best way to defeat an insurgency is not to give it time or be present for it to develop. This strategy can be repeated ad infinium. America should always expect to face an insurgency, but never accept that it must. Nowhere in the rulebook does it say the U.S. must remain in or occupy a country it has invaded. Recently, we have chosen to. Once the threat has been removed, we have accomplished the objective. Anything beyond that is territory where the wisdom of continued use of military force becomes questionable, the rules of engagement become shaky, the objectives become unclear and inconsistent, and an insurgency is likely to develop.

The campaign in Libya was a success because it had a clear, concise, and consistent goal—namely to end the rule of Muammar Qaddafi. After some initial hesitation, America decided to intervene. The successful result shows that when a correct assessment of the amount of force needed to achieve the objective is applied proportionately, we will succeed. Had we limited our involvement to non-military support, the mission likely would have failed as the resistance was defeated by Qaddafi’s superior military forces. Sending troops in was never an option. If we had sent U.S. troops into Libya, following the model of Afghanistan and Iraq, they would likely still be there and perhaps face an insurgency. Despite toppling the oppressive Qaddafi regime there, the recent anti-American violence in Benghazi shows not everyone would have accepted our presence. The program of directed airstrikes and tactical support was strong enough to tip the balance. American involvement there was over in less than ninety days and with zero U.S. casualties.

It would be a mistake to believe America’s military power is in decline. America, even with proposed cuts, still spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. No other nation can match the United States’ ability to project power anywhere in the world on just a few days or hours’ notice. Though multiple combat deployments have taken their toll, America’s military is the most experienced in the world. It has been fighting two grinding wars on multiple fronts tens of thousands of miles from home in some of the most inhospitable terrain imaginable. Most of our opponents are still stuck at home, parading their troops and aging equipment down the streets of their own capitols. Despite sometimes bad policy decisions by its elected civilian leadership regarding the use of force, the United States military has risen to meet its challenges and succeeded despite them. That’s no sign of decline.

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

The (Camouflage) Things They Carried

This article originally appeared in Small Wars Journal on 23 October 2012.

Those who never served in the military would find it hard to believe the degree to which a soldier’s appearance is regulated. Army Regulation 670-1 governs the wear and appearance of the Army uniform and is constantly revised. But it goes far beyond just uniforms. It covers shaving, haircuts, and hairstyles, fingernail polish, length, and cleanliness, tattoos, piercings, dental work, and even extends to appearance off duty. AR 670-1 is the reason you won’t find soldiers with their hands in their pockets. Admittedly, this degree of micromanagement is one of many reasons I decided not to make the Army my career and left after nine years. I followed regulations like a professional soldier, but after I came back from combat each time I found it increasingly difficult to care about trivia like what color gym bag I could or couldn’t carry or enforce it on others. These regulations naturally extend to the camouflage fatigues soldiers wear into battle.

After years of testing and developing new colors and patterns, the Army decided in 2005 to adopt a new all-purpose field uniform, the Army Combat Uniform (ACU), of pixelated grey hues. The decision was met with a great deal of skepticism among troops and veterans. The first day I wore the pixels an old Army retiree told me, “You look like a truck hit you with a mud puddle.” Many leaders in the field complained that the new pattern didn’t blend in with vegetation at all. Delays in fielding and replacing equipment and uniforms in Woodland or Desert camouflage led to units deploying with a confusing mixture of uniforms, wearing a grey pixel uniform with a Desert ballistic vest and Woodland ammunition pouches. My Sergeant Major remarked at the time, “We look like a ragtag circus.”

The blend of pixelated colors is officially dubbed ‘urban grey ’, ‘desert sand’, and ‘foliage green’ arranged in a digital pattern. The grey pixels were selected in an effort to find an all-purpose uniform fit for any terrain. Though predominantly grey in appearance, when viewed in a woodline at a distance the colors appear green when combined with the shadows in vegetation and differing intensities of sunlight. The grey and khaki colors also compare with shades of grey and brown in urban terrain. In testing, the pattern was referred to as ‘urban track.’ The khaki color also melds with brown rock or sand. The shades also compare with the skyline when silhouetted against the horizon. It has been claimed that this relates to the historically-informed military tactic that attacks often take place in the grey of early dawn. These are the arguments made in its favor.

The new uniform came with changes other than the camouflage pattern. They allow units to automatically reorder replacement uniforms for deployed soldiers after a field-life of six months – a great logistical improvement. In early 2003, many Army units, including my own, deployed to Iraq with only two sets of so-called desert camouflage uniforms, or DCUs, because they couldn’t be produced and fielded fast enough to meet the demand. They were also quickly and poorly sewn and didn’t stand up well to the effects of daily combat. Our uniforms would be ringed in white salt stains from sweating profusely in the heat. We had to constantly wash them in buckets by hand like old washerwomen and hang them out to dry like a back-alley laundry. Some of the desert uniforms were threadbare and almost white in color, not to mention all the oil, dirt, and bloodstains picked up from daily combat, when we returned from Iraq in 2004. We were all issued new DCUs to fly home from Kuwait in. On the plane, we all felt like we were being prettied up for the public. Things improved once the procurement and supply system caught up, but not fast enough for troops in Iraq with ripped pants or cut-up tops. But, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked when pressed on Army equipment shortages at the time, to much consternation, “You go to war with the Army you have, not with the one you want.”

In the end, after $5 billion worth of testing and fielding the uniform to every American soldier and eight years of discussion and complaints from leaders in the field, the Army has decided to nix the grey all-purpose pixels in the coming years. The Natick Army Soldier Center in Massachusetts, the organization charged with developing Army camouflage, says they have a replacement for the pixels, what some have come to call an expensive mistake. Officials at Natick have claimed that the original decision to go with the pattern was rushed and influenced by politics among top Army leaders, not based on a complete, full assessment by field and scientific testing. But one question lingers: Is all this costly concern about camouflage as relevant as it once was to future combat for the Army?

The Science of Camouflage Uniforms

The dead man knows that camouflage is all in the mind./ He has seen in the human need for shape the undoing of shape./ He has witnessed the displacement of up-and-down, across and slantwise./ He has curled the straight lines and unbent the curves, he has split the wishbone and painted outside the lines./ The dead man has undone the map by which to get there./ It is not what the dead man looks like, but what he no longer resembles.

-Marvin Bell, from More About the Dead Man in Camouflage

As science has progressed, so has the study and use of camouflage. In layman’s terms, the job of a camouflage pattern is to break up the familiar outline of the head, shoulders, torso, and legs of the human body while standing or crouching. Uniforms of various colors help soldiers blend in with terrain colors. Desert and wooded patterns mimic the shapes of features of the terrain and shadows in addition to their colors. Pixels, rather than focusing on color or shape, rely on the confusion they create in human eyesight. From further distances, the pixels become just blotchy patches of color.

So why grey? American armies do have some traditional connections with grey. Cadets at West Point, members of ‘The Long Grey Line’, have worn grey since its founding. The army of the Republic of Texas wore grey uniforms, as did the Confederacy. German armies wore ‘field gray’ from the turn of the century up until the early Cold War period. Though green is the first color that comes to mind when one thinks of the Army, grey also has a place. Politics and economics, as always, had their effect on the decision as well.

Indeed, the decision to go grey didn’t come from Natick. In fact, testing consistently rated the current grey as the worst among four competitors, one of which was MultiCam. The call to go with a pattern that did not contain strong shades of green or black was questioned from the beginning. This has led many to ask who and why the decision was made and what considerations it was based on. No answers seem to be forthcoming. In another possible change, Natick has also developed four different terrain-specific patterns for desert, snow, and urban environments to possibly be issued in the future as well. The Army will now repeat the cost and time of fielding a new uniform again by around 2014.

The new all-purpose uniforms have greatly improved utility from previous uniforms, the basic design of which hadn’t changed much since WWII. The material is a lighter mix of cotton and nylon. The old uniform tops had four pockets on the torso, all of which were covered over while wearing a ballistic vest. The new uniform tops eliminate the waist pockets and move them to the shoulders where they aren’t covered under the vest. The tops are shorter to allow better ventilation. New tops made specifically to be worn under the ballistic vest feature torsos made of moisture wicking material. The pants have two new pockets below the knees in addition to the usual cargo pockets. Buttons were eliminated in favor of Velcro, zippers, and drawstrings. Rank and insignia are velcroed or pinned to the uniform rather than sewn on.

To the cheers or jeers of many, the ACU doesn’t require ironing and the ‘rough side out’ leather boots don’t require polishing. This provided for quite a wave in Army culture. When I joined the U.S. Army in 1999, I wore the standard Woodland camouflage fatigues. As an eager young soldier I starched and pressed my uniform every day with creases so sharp you could cut bread with them. I polished my boots to a shine so high you could see your soul in it. Some soldiers used to soak their uniforms in buckets of starch and iron them until they could stand up on their own. Others used hair dryers to melt and re-melt their boot polish. A few used floor wax. Many would turn their uniforms in to the cleaners every week to be pressed. Some even bought their own industry-grade machines. Every Monday morning at 9:00 am there was a showdown to see which platoon had the sharpest looking troopers.

The elimination of the old traditions of pressed and starched uniforms and spit-shined boots has generated much discussion. After I came home from Iraq the first time in 2004, a pressed uniform and shined boots just weren’t that important to me anymore. Other things seemed more important, such as teaching soldiers who hadn’t been to Iraq yet skills that would help them fight there. I found it increasingly hard to care about trivia such as what color gym bag I could carry while in uniform, much less enforce it on others. Many were sad to see the press-and-shine Army go. They felt it built esprit de corps and showed discipline and commitment. Some were not sad, however. Soldiers had easily spent around a thousand dollars annually on uniform maintenance. Some leaders were too easily impressed by a ‘squared away’ uniform over a soldier’s actual ability to do their job at war. Many of my former colleagues privately felt leaders should be focused on fighting wars, not looking good in garrison. These arguments will never die.

Despite some points of approval, Army leaders in the field continued to voice concerns about the effectiveness of the pixel pattern. I wore both types of uniform between 1999 and 2008. I also wore them in combat in Iraq from 2003 to 2006. From my personal experience, the woodland and desert patterns were more effective. I remember wearing the grey pixels on night missions in the city and palm groves of Baghdad. We were often the only grey objects in the terrain. The pixel grey doesn’t work as effectively as the terrain-specific patterns. The success or failure of a mission and soldiers’ lives often depend upon stealth or concealment and it is easily understood why one would rather have a pattern made specifically for the environment over one that is all-purpose. Many soldiers and veterans would agree, though some may find the new pixel pattern effective enough. It does cost more money, time, and effort to produce and issue terrain-specific camouflage uniforms and gear before a deployment. An all-purpose uniform would be an answer. It would indeed be more cost effective to have such a uniform in an era of Pentagon spending cuts. But that doesn’t make it effective in combat.

The problem with grading the effectiveness of camouflage patterns comes with finding the proper method to conduct the analysis. Scientific methods rely on the mechanics of how human eyes and electronic sighting devices work, but this may produce a different result than sticking guys in the woods and trying to find them. The pixels are designed to confuse human sight. A person scanning or seeing the pixels only peripherally will not pick up on them as easily. The pixels supposedly also have a blurring effect on electronic night vision sighting devices as well. However, the field method of testing is closer to the reality of the battlefield and fits with the Army’s ‘train as you fight’ mantra.

In any case, the science of sight would appear to have won out with the grey pixel pattern. This also seems to be in keeping with the current trend toward a tech-heavy, ‘transformational’ Army. However, the Army’s mandated adoption in 2010 of a different brown and green non-pixel pattern called ‘MultiCam’ for troops deployed to Afghanistan recognized that there are shortcomings with the all-purpose grey pixels. This uniform again consists of green, brown, and tan blotches of a solid, non-pixelated type. This change came only after Congress passed H.R. 2346 sponsored by now-deceased Korean War veteran Rep. John Murtha (D-PA) who received many complaints from noncommissioned officers.

The Evolution of Camouflage

It is ironic that something designed not to be seen is so instantly recognizable. U.S. Army uniforms remind us of our history, an ever-present visage during our national holidays. There are the blue and grey coats of early America; the brown of WWI; olive drab of WWII and Korea; ‘tigerstripe’ of Vietnam; Woodland of the Cold War and Balkans; ‘Chocolate Chip’ of the Gulf War; the desert pattern of the Iraq War; and the grey pixels and ‘MultiCam’ of Afghanistan.

The U.S. Army’s uniforms have evolved over several centuries along with the conflicts they have fought in, even as the need for camouflage has remained an important constant for the military in the modern era. The twentieth century saw the end of pitched battles between armies in colorful and often heavy wool uniforms arrayed on opposing sides of a large field. America’s first army under George Washington had no official uniform. The Continental Congress ordered Minutemen to dye their clothing brown, but most didn’t have the time or means to do so. As the American experience at Valley Forge showed, they were at times lucky to have coats or shoes at all. The original thirteen colonies fielded their own small organized militias and their uniform styles were as varied as the states they served. Though some were brown, green, or red, those who had uniforms most often wore different types of heavy blue coats with shiny brass buttons, largely similar to that famously adopted by General Washington himself.

Already colorful European uniforms were often augmented with different colored trims to designate the type or function of military units. British Dragoons, a type of light cavalry, wore green rather than red. The type of headgear soldiers wore also informed which and what type of unit they were with. Grenadiers, infantry sometimes armed with grenades and often the biggest and strongest of troops, wore miters, tall pointed hats with a flat front. Mounted cavalry wore light metal or leather helmets with fur or feather plumes. The infantry wore cocked hats. An informed observer of the time would know instantly from looking at a soldier their unit, function, and rank.

The American colonials largely lacked the funds and time to develop and implement such a system during the revolution. Americans often improvised rank insignias by pinning white or blue bands to their arms or hats. Today this tradition is carried on in the U.S. Army with each branch having designated signature colors. For example, infantry is light blue, cavalry and armor are yellow, and artillery is red. Today’s Army rank insignia for noncommissioned officers, known as chevrons, also carries on the tradition.

The impetus behind the uniforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was largely identification. Any school kid in America knows the British wore red. The French and Russians often wore blue or white. There was also an element of pride and flash in the uniforms, as Dukes and Counts often paid to maintain their own regiments and wanted them to look sharp. Some of them paraded them about like their own real toy soldiers. They ideally used colors that stood out well in the fog of battle and were easily distinguished from the enemy. These bright uniforms may seem silly today, but they were worn in a time where there were no electronic communications to relay to commanders what was happening on the battlefield.

The brightly colored uniforms allowed generals to look across the field and see where their troops were holding, failing, or advancing. It was not the kind of warfare where anyone took cover when battle was joined, even amid artillery shelling. Armies rarely dug or constructed bunkers or breastworks unless under siege. Imagine Napoleon and Lord Wellington looking across the smoke-filled battlefield with their field glasses. They knew only what they could see or messengers could relay to them. Their staff officers had to track changes in the battle with pieces on a map. Their uniforms were hot, heavy, and uncomfortable, but they served an important function. Military uniforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were made to be seen.

But even in the era of bright, conspicuous uniforms, the need for concealment was sometimes recognized. Sharpshooters in the Napoleonic Wars were outfitted with green uniforms so they could advance within rifle range to kill individual officers to interrupt lines of authority without being discovered. Some American sharpshooter detachments of the Civil War adopted green uniforms and similar tactics as well. European armies of the 1840’s serving in the jungle and desert climes of Asia and Africa found that khaki uniforms were cooler and allowed for better concealment than their scarlet jackets in the field. Despite its proven use, camouflage was widely viewed with scorn in high military circles as being unprofessional and cowardly until the turn of the twentieth century.

The U.S. Army of the nineteenth century largely did away with the big hats, wigs, and ornamental elements of the military uniforms of the past century as time wore on, though they still retained mostly blue uniforms of thick wool with shiny metal buttons. The army of the independent Republic of Texas adopted grey uniforms. The Confederacy also chose grey to distinguish their soldiers from the federal blues in the Civil War. It was still generally the kind of warfare where units lined up and marched forward into musket or cannon fire with deadly result, as skirmishes such as Pickett’s Charge show. None of the uniforms were very functional, especially in the climate of the American south and west. During the battle for Atlanta in the summer of 1864, hundreds of soldiers on both sides suffered from exhaustion and heat stroke in their wool uniforms under the Georgia sun. Soldiers suffered similar problems in the wars against Mexico and the Native Americans on the Great Plains and in southwestern deserts.

The turn of the twentieth century brought with it the idea that uniforms should be made for utility and concealment. Previous U.S. Army uniforms didn’t take the climate or terrain much into account, other than perhaps to mercifully adjust the wear or weight of their material for summer. In 1902 the U.S. Army, following the British lead from their experiences in colonial Africa and India, adopted the khaki uniform, known as ‘drab.’ In the following years, almost every western military ditched the traditional bright colors and adopted uniform colors that aided concealment in shades of khaki, brown, or grey. At the outbreak of WWI, only the French Army maintained colorful uniforms of blue coats and red trousers.

Grinding trench warfare and the development of machine guns, tanks and warplanes quickly changed things. WWI was a much different war from any ever fought before, enveloping the whole of the continent of Europe and sapping the strength of the workforces and economies of entire countries. Everything came to a standstill. This was war to determine the fate of many nations, a much more serious affair. In 1915 the previously-resistant French military was the first to build a Section de Camouflage, comprised mostly of Parisian artists, devoted to developing military camouflage. America opened the New York Camouflage Society, which performed a similar function, and other European militaries followed suit with their own efforts.

For the first time, military uniforms were not meant to be seen. The U.S. Army changed from brown ‘drab’ to the green ‘olive drab’ in the interwar period. The M-1943 olive drab uniform is what most Americans picture when they think of G.I. Joe serving in WWII. WWII marked the first war where climate and concealment were given primary consideration in developing uniforms. The M-1943 wool uniform and its successors were designed with the cold, wet, and verdant climates of Europe in mind. Uniforms made of tightly-woven cotton ‘Byrd cloth’ were designed for service in the tropics to stop mosquito, flea, and leach bites and allowed for better cooling than wool. However, these uniforms took longer to make and field and there was an acute shortage of them. Some old soldiers found it hard to shed military formality completely in favor of utility. General George S. Patton famously insisted that officers under his command still wear their ties into combat.

The U.S. Army field uniform remained largely unchanged with only a few minor alterations until the 1980’s. When we think of the Korean War, we often picture men freezing in olive drab fatigues and coats huddled around fires wearing their pile caps. Grunts wore generally the same green uniform made of cotton in the jungles of Vietnam. The famous ‘tigerstripe’ camouflage uniform worn in the 1960’s by American advisors and special operations units in Vietnam was never officially authorized, though effective in the dense jungle. It also mimicked the uniforms worn by South Vietnamese soldiers and allowed U.S. troops to blend in with their counterparts as well as the terrain. Beginning in 1968, many U.S. soldiers in Vietnam were issued uniforms in a new interlocking pattern called ‘ERDL’ which for the first time featured blotches of dark green, light green, brown, tan, and black. But the Army returned to solid olive drab uniforms following withdraw from Vietnam in 1973.

In 1981, the U.S. Army adopted the well-known cotton Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) featuring the M81 Woodland camouflage pattern, an enlarged version of the ERDL pattern from the end of Vietnam. This was the uniform soldiers wore during the late Cold War and in Grenada, Bosnia, and Kosovo. This was the first time that the Army adopted into force-wide use a uniform that not only mimicked the color, but also the shapes of the terrain. Natural vegetation includes many shades of green and brown and tan as well as black shadows and mimicking these shades and shapes breaks up the recognizable human outline.

Along with the BDUs and Woodland pattern, the Army adopted the Desert BDU (DBDU), a six color desert pattern comprised of shades of tan, brown, and light green with spots of black and white meant to compare with stones. The pattern was tested in seven different desert landscapes before adopting it. The 1991 Gulf War presented the Army with much different battlefield terrain than it had faced in major combat operations before and the nightly news was filled with pictures of Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf wearing the uniform, which the troops had dubbed ‘chocolate chips’ or ‘cookie dough camouflage.’ It was determined by war’s end that the DBDU was too dark and rocky a pattern for most of the world’s deserts and it was more costly to make than other alternative patterns. It was discontinued in 1992. Many Middle Eastern militaries continue to wear the pattern today.

The Army found itself fighting in desert terrain again in Somalia in 1993. Following the withdrawal of the DBDU after the Gulf War, the Army adopted the three-color Desert Camouflage Uniform (DCU), using shades of light tan, light brown, and lime green. It is often referred to as ‘cafĂ© au lait’ or ‘coffee stain’ camouflage. This was the uniform worn by most troops in early Afghanistan and Iraq and remained the Army’s desert combat uniform until 2005 when the decision to adopt the new pixelated ACUs was made.

Is Camouflage Still Relevant?

A question that must be asked is if all these costly camouflage and uniform changes really are as relevant in modern and future combat. A large share of the fighting in Iraq took place in urban terrain in territory the enemy knew much better. All U.S. movements issued from large fortified camps and bases that were often watched from the outset by enemy observers. A force that rides around in armored Humvees and Abrams tanks accompanied by attack helicopters isn’t exactly hiding. In Afghanistan where the fighting is in much more rural, rocky, and remote terrain, the battle consists of trying to draw the enemy out of hiding among the local populace to be engaged. Pulling the enemy out of hiding is the only way to know they’re there. They usually know where our troops are well before we know where they are. The U.S. Army isn’t sneaking up on anyone anymore. Essentially, U.S. troops want to be attacked by their clandestine enemies so they can engage and destroy them.

The pre-9/11 U.S. Army I first joined was a much lighter force than today. Virtually none of its Humvees or trucks were armored; only tanks and other tracked vehicles were. The old flak vest was usually only worn to the grenade range. Soldiers on combat training maneuvers lived in foxholes they dug or tents in the woods and jumped locations every few days. This is in contrast to today’s Army, where all vehicles are armored, soldiers’ individual body armor makes them seem like the knights of old, and they live and operate from hardened, permanent posts and bases. During my first tour in Iraq in 2003, we wore less personal armor and I was able to, on a few occasions, sprint after bad guys down the streets of Baghdad. By my second trip to Baghdad in 2005, wearing virtually my own body weight in gear made this unlikely. The Army had to change and ‘turtle up’ out of necessity to protect troops and convoys from ambushes and IEDs on supply routes. The U.S. Army of today is not a nimble beast that moves stealthily; it is more like a rhinoceros that is a force to be reckoned with. When fighting like this, camouflage isn’t as important.

It can be argued that the U.S. Army is today fighting in a position more similar to those of the armies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. America’s military leaves an enormous logistical footprint in every conflict it fights today, with the roads, seaports, and airports of countries like Germany, Kuwait, Turkey, Pakistan, and Italy, among others, jammed with U.S. troops, contractors, supplies, and equipment. This all happens in plain sight. We don’t hide it and likely couldn’t if we tried. The U.S. military flies, drives, and floats into battle dressed in armor and essentially says, “Here I am; come out and fight.”

We are in some ways like the British Redcoats of old who stuck out in the fight like a sore thumb. Our enemy today knows they cannot stand up to those kinds of odds, so they hide amongst the locals and choose softer targets to attack. American colonials adopted much the same technique when facing the overwhelming superiority of the British military during our own revolution. It may perhaps be called cowardly by some, but it has been effective nonetheless. Ironically, military commanders of earlier centuries used to think camouflage was cowardly, too. Even the New York Times as late as 1917 called new idea of military camouflage “hocus pocus.” It is no wonder some make comparisons between America today and the empire of Great Britain then.

Special operations forces, especially Green Berets, often operate by speaking the language, living with, and training indigenous populations to fight for or alongside U.S. forces. They operated like this effectively among the Montagnard people in Vietnam, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and the Kurds of northern Iraq, among others. To do this, they often shed their Army uniforms in favor of native dress and mannerisms, grew beards, carried local weaponry, and even took to horseback to gain the support and trust of local populations. This naturally attracted criticism from the rest of the Army, which has very strict uniform and appearance standards. Some regular Army units partially embraced it by encouraging soldiers to grow moustaches and let their hair grow a little longer than usual among Middle Eastern cultures that view facial hair as a sign of masculinity. These special operations units are among the most effective and successful in counterinsurgency operations. What we discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan is that wielding an AK-47, growing a beard, and learning to grin and bear ‘man kisses’ and male hand holding may be better camouflage than any uniform.

Their tactic is to camouflage themselves not with the colors or shapes of the terrain, but to camouflage themselves among the ‘human terrain.’ In doing so, they attract the respect and trust of peoples who have a natural mistrust of western outsiders, especially Americans. This idea of taking advantage of the ‘human terrain’ may be looked at as yet another revolution in camouflage. When the enemy camouflages and infiltrates himself among the rest of the population, it can be effective for U.S. forces to do the same. There is no real reason why other U.S. Army units could not adopt some of the same techniques, other than the large-scale institutional resistance by military purists who see such moves as ‘lax’ and unprofessional in appearance. However, the results speak for themselves.

Camouflage uniforms do remain important in many military scenarios. It is essential to downed pilots and special operators making ground infiltrations. It will always remain important to scouts and snipers in the field or when soldiers are separated from support when an operation begins to go bad and they have to pull back. These are scenarios in which concealment remains and will likely always be very important. One of camouflage’s earliest proponents, Sir Winston Churchill, became convinced of its utility after his escape from a prison camp during the Boer War in South Africa. He went on later to become First Lord of the Admiralty during WWI and, of course, Prime Minister during WWII. Churchill felt camouflage adds an "original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten."

As the U.S. disengages militarily from Iraq and Afghanistan, new possible enemies and conflicts present new challenges. America is engaging other foes in the War on Terror largely from the air using drone strikes and giving financial aid and targeting intelligence to local governments in places like Yemen and Pakistan. The terrain we fight on and way we fight may be changing again. Future conflicts with possible foes in Asia may likely require greater control of the seas. Current Pentagon planning reflects this by making greater budget provisions for the Navy and Air Force. Other than Somali pirates, America hasn’t fought any sea battles since WWII. Conflict with China may involve greater naval engagements than the world has seen in seventy years. China seems to be attempting to put as much distance between itself and America and its allies as possible by pushing forward claims to disputed island chains. As was made clear in the Pacific in WWII, denying ‘island hopping’ and logistical and air bases is important to warfare in that theatre.

As camouflage technology has developed, methods to defeat camouflage have developed as well. A foe, such as China, equipped with modern military technology may have the capability to identify and engage targets in much the same way the U.S. military does, using thermal imaging and night vision capable devices and weaponry. America is continuing to develop its observer drone technology, including variants that will allow ground troops to carry and launch their own small drones to give instant feedback regarding the terrain and troops ahead. Such military technologies, among others, have been the target of directed espionage efforts by the Chinese and other governments. If the U.S. has the capability, it is a sure bet China will attempt to develop its own variant.

Last year China unveiled its own version of the stealth fighter with many reports claiming it is based on acquired U.S. technology. It is well known that Chinese operatives spent a lot of time acquiring pieces of an American stealth bomber that was mysteriously downed in Serbia in 1999. It is also known that operatives of China and other states attempted to buy parts of the advanced U.S. Army helicopter downed in the bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011. These espionage efforts and the technological capabilities developed from them may render scientific and physical camouflage systems irrelevant by providing ways to defeat America’s technology or to use these technologies against us.

Despite our technological advances and military superiority in the air, and on the sea, there will never be a replacement for ‘boots on the ground’ as imagined by Hollywood. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and operations throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Africa have shown that understanding the ‘human terrain’, gathering human intelligence, and winning hearts and minds is very important to modern asymmetric warfare. No computer or drone can replace a soldier in this regard. The Army’s ground troops are and always will be a vital, if not the most vital component of U.S. national security. As long as there are U.S. troops on the ground, they will have the need to be concealed by camouflage systems.

Testing and study of camouflage systems, whether scientific or physical, continues. The military is still looking at pixels, tiger stripes, layered blocks, 3D layering, and ‘fractals’-- roughly background shades and shapes seen naturally in terrain. Some of the technologies being developed sound like something out of a comic book. Laboratories are testing a cloth that has the capability to mimic exactly the background behind it as if it were a chameleon and make objects covered by it virtually disappear before one’s eyes. Projects to develop an ‘exoskeleton’ that gives soldiers greatly increased strength, stamina, and load bearing abilities look promising. Uniforms that use the human body’s electrostatic discharge and conductive properties may mean soldiers themselves will be used to recharge their electronic equipment and send communications signals in the future.

Government funded programs at agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and public-private funding partnerships with defense contractors and universities such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) continue to turn out exciting and innovative ideas that have application in the civilian world as much as to the Army. Despite its controversies and that it sometimes sounds like they’ve been playing too many video games, the U.S. Army remains focused on developing ‘soldier systems’: the idea that the uniforms and equipment should become as useful, intuitive, and integrated for the soldier wearing them as possible so they can win in combat. Camouflage, no matter the type, has become as important to warfare as bullets and bombs.

Picture General Washington’s Minutemen, shuffling around on watch in the snow of the frigid winter at Valley Forge, blowing their warm breaths into frozen hands, shouldering their own hunting muskets and clad in thin linen shirts, old leather breeches, and worn out shoes, thoughts of hearth and home and doubts about the coming spring campaign against the vastly superior British in the back of their minds. The aristocratic English generals and Lords of the Admiralty didn’t take these upstart colonial farmers and merchants seriously, much as they scoffed at the idea of camouflage. Change doesn’t come easy to military culture; it is often resisted. The U.S. Army’s recent uniform fiasco has shown changes may not always be for the better. But for better or worse, America’s Army has shown itself to be a greatly adaptable and resilient organization, a fact often reflected in Army uniforms. U.S. Army soldiers today are the best equipped and outfitted in the entire world’s history. The American fighting man has certainly come a long way from those hard days at Valley Forge. Pixels or no pixels, General Washington would have approved.

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

The U.S. Army Can't Stop Soldiers From Killing Themselves

This article originally appeared in The Atlantic on 12 October 2012.

Any former soldier will tell you that the U.S. Army sometimes goes to rather ridiculous extremes to keep the troops safe. In Kuwait, soldiers are required to wear yellow reflective belts at all times and junior soldiers are not allowed to go anywhere alone. In Iraq, some units require wearing ballistic protective eyewear at all times, even on camp on the way to the latrine. In Germany, the Army forbade soldiers to ride motorcycles because three soldiers died in accidents there. Every Friday, soldiers receive "safety briefs," and on long weekends they must have their personal vehicles checked for safety hazards by their leadership.

But while the Army takes great care not to lose soldiers to injury or accidental death, it has been unable to protect the troops against what is currently the leading cause of their death: suicide. The Army needs to make a cultural change to combat this problem.

This summer, the Army reported that active-duty suicides had reached a record high: 26 in the month of July alone. Last year at exactly the same time, I wrote that July 2011 recorded the most Army-wide suicides ever with 32 (22 of whom were active duty). In June 2010, 31 soldiers committed suicide (21 of them active duty). These numbers are the equivalent of an entire platoon. In most months, more soldiers are lost to suicide than are killed in combat. Additionally, an average of 18 veterans per day commits suicide. That is 540 per month; a battalion of veterans lost to suicide each month.

Compare the attention given when only 10 soldiers die in a single combat action. Imagine the attention and national sorrow if the Army lost an entire battalion, something that hasn't happened since Vietnam. In reality, it is happening every month.

The big question is what should be done to combat this epidemic. The Army and the Department of Veterans Affairs recognize its severity, and recognition is the first step toward addressing it. The next step must be a change in the Army culture. This is not a problem that can be solved with a 30-minute PowerPoint presentation in the post chapel, accompanied by a brochure with a hotline number. Tackling this problem will require leaders at all levels to get out from behind their rank and military instruction manuals and talk about something that is hard for tough guys to talk about: how to support each other emotionally. Any leader who cannot or won't do this shouldn't be in a leadership role.

America today is in the enviable position of being able to fight complex conflicts on several fronts thousands of miles away without causing many bumps in the road back home. There has been no rationing of goods and no draft to support our last decade spent at war. Only 0.5 percent of the U.S. population has served in the active military during this time, and we have had an all-volunteer military for decades. Unless Americans have a friend or family member serving, most see the war only in the media and can easily blot it out of their lives if they like.

Despite genuine support and respect for the troops, there are still many who feel they already get too much "handed to them." One still comes across comments, even among some veterans, that the military is "just a job" that soldiers are paid well to do, and that there are other equally valuable vocations out there that are equally dangerous. These opinions are often held or echoed by people who never served a day in uniform themselves.

What does this have to do with the suicide problem? No one else understands what soldiers go through except other soldiers. There is no way they can. If military leaders, soldiers, and veterans do not or will not support each other, no one else will. To put it bluntly, only good Army leadership and fellow soldiers can solve this problem because no one else can identify with their experience.

Leaders have to build a relationship with their soldiers like big brothers or father figures, not just bosses.

It's true that many of our soldiers come from homes with low income or a poor family structure, but there are just as many who come from tight-knit middle-class backgrounds. Many have their own families at home, but there are just as many single soldiers whose family circle is the guys in the barracks. In the Army, you work hard and play hard. Bi-annual year-long deployments alternate with month-long field training exercises. The military also has a problem with alcoholism and domestic abuse, which can result when the pressure gets to be too much. Regardless of soldiers' backgrounds, the terrible things they see in combat are stuck in their heads forever.

If you listen to veterans of an earlier generation, some will berate troops that left after serving four or eight years and accuse them of not "hacking it." Many of them believe that all this talk of post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury is garbage; they just called it "shell shock" back in their day and moved on. This bitter talk is not helpful, and it re-enforces the avoidance of the suicide problem. As evidenced by the number of suicides among old as well as young veterans, this is a problem for the whole community.

For Army culture to begin to really address the problem of suicide, it needs to give the matter serious attention at all levels of leadership education, both for commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The Army already has a manual on what is required of leaders: FM 6-22. The manual contains sections on empathy, interpersonal tact, and communication, along with building teamwork and esprit de corps. It is already a requirement of good Army leadership to be able interface with soldiers in a way that supports and builds them up from a mental and emotional perspective. Any soldier unable or unwilling to do this should not be a leader.

The Army also already has in place a counseling system whereby every individual soldier has a leader directly responsible for him or her. This leader is required to conduct and document the session individually. Unfortunately, this requirement has become so regimented and regulated by senior leaders that there is almost no element of individual choice or personal relationship left in it. The fast operational tempo of the job means that leaders lack the time to sit down with their soldiers and talk to them outside the constraints of "Task, Condition, Standards."

Every Thursday morning Army-wide used to be set aside as "Sergeant's time," where first-line leaders trained their troops on soldiering tasks. But this concept also suffered from micromanagement by senior leadership, who were concerned that the time wasn't being used properly. The Army has to give to leaders at all levels sufficient and consistent time to speak with their subordinates on a small-group or individual basis. It is a necessity for combatting this problem and is in keeping with what is already required of good Army leadership.

The concept that needs to be gotten across is that the Army is a family and all members need mutual support for it to work well. There is no equipment or manual that can build this sense of togetherness. There is no outside help that is going to cultivate it. Leaders have to build a relationship with their soldiers like big brothers or father figures, not just bosses. They have to talk about the tough times their soldiers will face before, during, and after combat tours. They have to talk about the fact that everyone is going to have difficulty dealing with what they experience, no matter what they might say. A soldier troubled by his experience in combat is normal. A soldier who isn't the slightest bit troubled by the things he has seen is not.

Leaders also have to take the time to look at their own leadership style and adapt it to the present situation. Strict discipline may be the right approach at some times, but taking a gentler tone may be more suitable at others. Making these distinctions is a crucial part of leadership.

Senior officers should also give junior leaders room to exercise their own judgment. Junior noncommissioned officers are on the frontlines and are more in touch with individual soldiers. Yet they are overworked and are often not given the space or time to develop the type of individual, mutually open relationships needed to combat the suicide problem. Once they are thrown into combat with soldiers, they have to quickly develop that relationship or they'll fail. When junior leaders are unable to figure out how to best motivate their soldiers, they take the wrong approach, especially in grinding, high-stress combat. That can lead to the feelings of sorrow and hopelessness that may eventually result in suicide.

Senior noncommissioned officers also have a role. They have to look out for their own junior NCOs in the same manner. Experienced senior NCOs also often have a broader overview of the situation, and from that vantage point, they may be able to pick up on signs that junior leaders can miss in the fray. They also have the advantage of often being a little older than junior soldiers and can more easily fill a "fatherly" role. Their rank also allows them more latitude in taking steps to address individual issues.

Sergeant majors and first sergeants can be the first focal points for this change in Army culture. As the most senior of NCOs, their mission is to provide for the welfare of the troops under them while officers focus on planning and leading military missions and requirements. These senior NCOs are the most respected in the Army. Getting these leaders -- who are often seen as the toughest guys around -- to talk about emotional support, look for the signs and symptoms of suicide, and end the stigma against seeking help can have a tremendous impact on addressing suicide.

Officers are more removed from dealings with individual soldiers, but mission success depends upon unit cohesion. Officers can make it clear that suicide is a serious problem. The impact of a soldier's suicide on his unit as a whole is devastating. Shifting the blame to the victim stands in the way of addressing the problem. Officers also must check on one another and their subordinates and constantly evaluate their own leadership style to ensure it fits properly with the current situation.

There are bad leaders in the Army. Every soldier has had at least one. They come in all different ranks and types. But soldiers and veterans are being lost every day to suicide--far too many to not take this problem seriously. Army leaders who are dismissive about the issue are failing as leaders. In the words of General Colin Powell, "The day the soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help them or concluded that you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership."

Sunday, October 14, 2012

It's Congress That Counts

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 10 October 2012.

With both conventions and the first debate over, the presidential campaign season is moving ahead at full speed. At the heart of this election is the state of America’s economy and who presents the best vision of where to go from here. Republicans make the argument that the President should have done better over the last four years and hasn’t earned reelection. Democrats counter this by pointing out the depth of the 2008 crisis inherited from President Bush and the obstructionism of the GOP-controlled House of Representatives. Who is really to blame for this mess?

To go back to eighth grade government class, the U.S. Constitution mandates our government consists of three branches—legislative, executive, and judiciary. All laws involving government revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. The Senate approves international treaties. Congress regulates business and commerce, naturalization, currency, postal service, roads, promoting arts and sciences, patents and trademarks, declaring war, and funding and regulating the military. The President is the Commander in Chief of the military, negotiates international treaties, appoints ambassadors, judges, and agency heads, and must report to Congress in a State of the Union. That’s it. The U.S. Constitution is nowhere near as long a document as the political claims based upon it.

The founders set out the legislative branch first in Article 1 and devoted twice as many sections to comprehensively setting out its duties and powers than those covering the executive branch. Despite what our elected leaders may say, the President is not primarily responsible for drafting or passing domestic legislation. A President may use the prominence of his office as a ‘bully pulpit’ to suggest, influence, and work with partners to cajole Congress into passing items from a legislative agenda. But it is Congress’ job to enact legislation.

Yet many Americans have come to believe that the President is truly the most powerful person in the country and even the world and is to blame for everything that ails the nation. Any disappointing economic or employment data is his fault. The failure to push through Congress a platform or legislative agenda offered before election is equivalent to a lie or betrayal. If business isn’t growing, roads and bridges aren’t being built, or government services are not serving citizens well, the President is blamed. This is actually quite dishonest.

Why have we let the U.S. Congress off the hook? The truth is plain to see from a simple read of Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Congress is responsible for controlling and regulating all of the domestic areas of importance to the daily lives of average Americans. Their powers are specifically enumerated and they are granted the additional power to do all that is ‘necessary and proper’ to pursue these duties. You don’t have to be a constitutional scholar or lawyer to understand that. Every complaint Americans make about our society or economy falls squarely within the purview of powers granted to Congress, a system the President can only influence from the outside.

Closely tied to this misunderstanding is the acceptance by many of the idea that the President should act as the CEO of America and our government should be run like a corporation. Many Americans believe a President should have business experience. That’s certainly the argument being made by Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan. If this were true, this fundamental misunderstanding would be excusable. However, the truth written into the Constitution is that the power and duty to regulate and control the domestic economy, budget, and taxes rests squarely with Congress. This is a fundamental point. The President doesn’t have the power to control these things alone like a business owner. He must go to Congress, which is rather like a huge, partisan, divided board of directors, to affect any change in the domestic situation.

If a company were run by 535 directors who were divided between two camps, each possessing their own constituents and agenda, any CEO would have a very difficult time getting anything done. Real companies have perhaps a dozen directors at most, some of whom may even be related and most having worked closely together for years. The largest difference is that together they are all still striving to achieve the same fundamental goal.

The goal of any business is to create profit for owners and shareholders. The goal of Government is to protect and serve the interests of its citizens. This is inherently unprofitable from a financial perspective. So long as a firm is profiting, a CEO and board can be seen as doing their jobs. It is much more difficult for a President to succeed in the role of serving average Americans when they do not have direct powers to make the laws necessary to fulfill these duties, though they are seen as responsible for them by voters. If America is a corporation in trouble domestically, according to our Constitution it should be our board of directors—Congress– that should be fired and not the President.

The President is not a CEO and America is a country, not a business. Oddly, Americans don’t vote for Presidents based upon the areas they are directly responsible for according to the Constitution, namely national security and foreign policy. When Americans go to the polls to elect a President, their main considerations are almost exclusively domestic issues. A simple read of Article 2 of the Constitution shows that the President’s named duties are in foreign policy, international agreements, and national security. When asked about which issues most concern them when electing a President, voters consistently rank these issues somewhere in the middle or even at the bottom. His largest domestic duties are to appoint the heads of important federal agencies and federal judges. Federal agencies and judges are still beholden to laws passed by Congress.

Congress has a lower approval rating than when there were fears of communism in America; it is no wonder Representatives and Senators want to deflect voter dissatisfaction toward the executive branch. It is also much easier to place blame on one person than it is to take it up with 535 members of Congress. The disenchantment is bipartisan. Despite Congress’ unpopularity as a whole, most Americans seem satisfied enough with their own Senators and Representatives. They continue to reelect them again and again despite deeply disapproving of their performance. One take away from this is that Americans tend to like their own representatives; it’s everyone else’s representatives that are the problem.

While we’ve come to expect more from our presidents, we’ve come to expect less from Congress. They spend less and less time actually in session. More and more of their time is devoted to fundraising for reelection. While Americans’ net worth has gone down since the 2008 crisis began, Congress’ net worth has actually risen. Almost half of our Representatives and Senators are millionaires. They are overwhelmingly older, whiter, and more male than the rest of the population. We also have the most veteran underrepresented Congress since the end of WWII during a time when America has been at war in the Middle East for over a decade, creating a generation of new veterans who are struggling by many measures.

Despite America’s professed love of our Constitution, we don’t seem to pay much attention to it when it comes to who we vote for and why. If we did, we would blame Congress for the dismal state of our domestic economy and not the President. We wouldn’t keep sending the same Congressmen back to Washington over and over again and blame it all on the President. We would pay a good deal more attention to the foreign and national security experience and policy proposals of presidential candidates. We would put more emphasis on these characteristics than on business experience. We would lay blame where blame is due.

All you have to do is read the job descriptions written into the Constitution as we all learned in eighth grade government class. When voters go to the polls this November, they shouldn’t blame this President for our troubles, or any other President for that matter. Congress is responsible for this mess.

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

The Silent Killer Among Our Troops

This post originally appeared on the Intrepid Life Brewing blog on 24 September 2012.

There is a silent epidemic killing U.S. servicemembers and veterans in America. It takes out a platoon of soldiers each month. Around a battalion of veterans falls victim to it monthly. When you speak to people about the statistics their first reaction is disbelief. Unfortunately, the numbers are correct. This killer is suicide. Eighteen veterans attempt suicide each day. In most months, fifteen to thirty active duty soldiers, sailors, Marines, or airmen commit suicide. In some months, such as July 2012, more troops are lost to suicide than to combat.

Multiple combat deployments, PTSD/TBI, depression, and family or financial troubles cause great hardship. It is indisputable that the military can be a hard life. Men and women who come home and hang up their uniform to enter the civilian world find themselves on new and unfamiliar terrain. America’s current economic troubles don’t help any and young veterans have struggled in particular to find work, more so than their non-veteran counterparts. All of these contribute to the suicide problem.

Recognizing the problem, President Obama has issued an executive order increasing the number of mental health professionals at the VA, increasing cooperation with local community mental health care providers, and increasing funding for research into the problem. Some in Congress have also taken up the issue in hearings and legislation. However, the VA already has thousands of vacant positions for mental health professionals and creating more may not be enough help. Additionally, fights over cuts in federal spending may mean cuts to VA funding in coming years. Whatever the barrier is that is keeping these mental health jobs open must be removed and these positions filled. Cutting funding for vets programs just when a new generation of veterans needs it most is irresponsible.

Funding for veterans programs must not fall victim to cuts. This is a problem that is not going away and ignoring it will likely make it worse. There are things worth paying for. Using taxpayer dollars to ensure someone is there for those who were there when the country needed them is one of these things. This silent epidemic must be stopped. If we continue to treat those who fight for the country so poorly there may be no one there to answer the call of duty.

Saturday, September 22, 2012

Joint Operations in Afghanistan: There Has to Be a Will to Be a Way

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 19 September 2012.

NATO has announced it will limit joint military operations alongside Afghan forces following a recent string of turncoat attacks against ISAF forces. Over 50 NATO soldiers have been killed in ‘green on blue’ attacks in 2012 alone. Anger caused by the accidental trashing and burning of a Koran and recently over an anti-Muslim web video has been blamed for the upsurge in these attacks.

America has been in Afghanistan for over a decade, longer than the USSR. The parties to the two wars are the same. Fortunately America has only suffered one sixth the casualties the Soviets did, despite likely spending more money on the war. It is arguable that the goodwill Afghans felt toward America for forcing out the Taliban is running out. The diversion of money, forces, and attention away from Afghanistan and into Iraq from 2003 may have cost America a better result, though that will never be empirically proven or disproven.

In 2003 I worked closely with Iraqi security forces. In 2004 I assisted in screening new Iraqi police recruits. In 2006 I served as a member of a team of U.S. military advisors to an Iraqi infantry battalion. While, as anywhere, there were certainly varying degrees of quality and commitment among members of these fledgling security forces, there were enough who believed their country was worth fighting for and felt the same commitment to it that U.S. troops feel for theirs.

Regrettably there were some who were agents for the other side. That was a constant worry for our ten-man team, constantly surrounded by Iraqi soldiers. An Iraqi officer at a police station we often visited stabbed one of their U.S. advisors. We had no doubt some police were involved in sectarian violence. But I would have trusted some Iraqi soldiers with my life. Many of them hated insurgents and Baathists as much as we did. They took great personal risk to join, as many were kidnapped from their homes and turned up floating in the Tigris River if the wrong people found out they were soldiers. We had guarded posts to return to, but most of them and their families lived on the streets they were fighting on.

The difference between the moderately successful security transition in Iraq and its less successful counterpart in Afghanistan comes in the understanding and commitment to transitioning to a nominally modern republican state with at least some vestiges of a central government. Iraq is still a violent place today, but it has been ruled by different strong central governments throughout its history—Babylon, Great Britain, and Saddam Hussein among them. Though today’s Iraqi government cannot claim to rule over the entirety of a peaceful nation, most Iraqis understand the necessity of a government that provides certain necessities, including internal and external security through competent police and military forces. There may be sectarian divisions, but this basic need is at least recognized.

Afghanistan has never been ruled by a central government, strong or otherwise. Today, Hamid Karzai’s power extends little past Kabul. Afghanis don’t see the need for a government they feel is remote and corrupt and has thus far been unable to provide them security, nor have they ever had such a government in their history. The understanding of and commitment to building such a government and an accompanying security mechanism is not there.

Afghanis are not ready to make such a change. Perhaps such will could have been developed with a stronger commitment from America early on. But we’ll never know. Such a transition can only be made when the people of Afghanistan are ready for it.

Saturday, September 15, 2012

The Navy SEAL's Bin Laden Raid Bestseller and US National Security

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 14 September 2012.

Everyone holds an opinion, even those who are obligated by law or profession to remain neutral. It is human nature. It can foreseeably become difficult to sit by and listen as everyone around you who is free to gives their opinion, some misguided and others even profiting from it, while professional obligations require you to stay silent. Such is the burden, however, of being a professional in a position of importance to national security.

This conflict is not new, but the pressures and incentives for breaking the rules are growing. With TV pundit spots, big publishing advances, and organizations such as WikiLeaks providing opportunity and motivation, are western democracies even capable of keeping secrets anymore?

Matt Bissonnette, calling himself "Mark Owen", was a member of Navy Seal Team 6 and took part in the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. He has written a book that extensively details the raid and has unleashed a controversy in doing so. Paired with this debate are the attacks of Opsec, a rightwing political action committee started by other former Navy Seals who are attacking President Obama and his administration for releasing generally similar information on the Bin Laden raid to the press.

Both Bissonnette and Opsec have been rebuked by senior military officials at the Pentagon such as special operations commander Admiral William McRaven and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. The US government has not ruled out taking legal action.

When one swears an oath to serve the country as a member of the military or any national security-related agency, a different set of rules applies immediately. A measure of your personal freedom, freedom of speech, and political participation rights are curtailed. Inductees know this beforehand, are well-briefed upon induction, and periodically afterward. They sign non-disclosure statements to the effect, and laws prevent the disclosure of identified security information. You also know that some, much, or all of what you do will remain anonymous and unaccredited. Matt Bissonnette knew this when he wrote his autobiography.

All this is necessary for many reasons, foremost among them being to preserve the dedication to the nation such jobs require. You may be putting your life, or the lives of many others, at risk for the country, and be privy to sensitive information; you should be doing so because you feel a sense of duty, commitment, and patriotism. To allow public servants working in national security roles or members of the military to profit financially or to have an outsize influence on partisan political debate because of what they've done or what they know is detrimental to national security. Allowing this behavior would mean having soldiers and civil servants motivated by the opportunities of fame and fortune, leaving aside the selfless commitment and dedication to duty and country such roles do and ought to require.

This larger point is one many seem to miss. It is arguable that both the information in Bissonette's book and the information disclosed by the White House following the Bin Laden raid were not classified or going to get anyone killed. The difference is that the president has the obligation and duty to inform the public about such an important event, regardless of one's opinion of him personally: he is the commander-in-chief. But soldiers or civil servants profiting personally, or even for charity as Bissonnette claims he is doing, by giving their own personal accounts of the facts calls into question his selfless dedication to country and duty first. Allowing this to continue would attract the wrong sort of people with false motivations into military or government service.

This has become a problem of late for the United States. Television news channels and bookstore shelves are filled with pundits and commentators who are former CIA agents or soldiers. The gap in time between events and the release of bestsellers about them is getting ever smaller. Many of America's intelligence agencies have lax policies toward private-sector recruiters pulling their employees and some are even allowed to "moonlight" and offer their services privately while still employees of the agency. These policies have become a problem with intelligence agencies losing many of their top people to private firms after years of training and service. Disgruntled civil servants and soldiers have released secured government information in the media.

These events call into question the motivations, independence, and commitment to duty of the individuals who take part in them. Serving in the military or government should be about a life dedicated to protecting and serving the country, not serving one's self by securing a nice paycheck and nice retirement.

Many would push back against this by saying that those who occupy positions in the White House or Congress profit greatly from their service, or even the service of others, so why shouldn't people like Matt Bissonnette, who actually put their own lives on the line, be allowed to profit from it? Yet, presidents and congressmen and women should not profit personally from their jobs either – and their perceived abuse and misuse of their offices to do so is a reason why the majority of Americans have lost respect for these institutions and officials. Overwhelming majorities of Americans still hold a great deal of respect and esteem for the military and intelligence services because they are seen as representing selfless commitment to the country above self. They're not seen as corrupt, as other militaries and intelligence agencies around the world are. Allowing such behavior to continue may put this view in jeopardy.

Such events as the Abbottabad raid don't need to remain a secret forever, especially since the fact that the event occurred is public knowledge. It is important to our democracy, history, and society that the public learns what, how, and why events such as this happen. But there should be a space of several years in between.

Matt Bissonnette should be allowed to tell his story, but not while it is still such a present event. There are many possible consequences. Detailing such a raid may amount to providing "open-source" intelligence for our international opponents. Disclosing details of equipment, tactics, techniques, or procedures that may seem harmless and mundane on their own can be pieced together with other information. For Bissonnette to wait a couple years to tell his story would not have reduced its national historical significance – though it may have reduced his big-name television interviews or book sales.

There is a difference between Bissonnette's book and the disclosure of a crime or "whistleblowing". The reporting or disclosure of a felony or fraud, waste or abuse is quite different from writing a bestselling autobiographical book. Whistleblowers rarely profit from making what they know public: frequently, they lose their jobs, and often endure lawsuits or years of abuse afterwards. Their motivation is usually to correct a wrong. Rewards are offered to encourage them to come forward. Bissonnette was not reporting or disclosing some great crime and he stands to enjoy a great deal of positive attention and profit from his book, even if he donates most of the proceeds to a Navy Seal charity (as he has already attempted to do twice unsuccessfully).

It's hard to be too angry with Matt Bissonnette: he is a genuine hero who put his life on the line more than once and is deserving of the profit and attention he's received. It's pretty hard to keep a secret, especially when that secret is that you had a part in killing Osama bin Laden, one of those rare events which most Americans will recall where they were when it happened. Members of Seal Team 6, already famous before the raid, will probably never have to buy their own beers again.

But what Bissonnette and his defenders miss, and what the majority of his Seal colleagues understand, along with most other members of the military and intelligence community, is that the wider consequences to the national security of the country he risked his life many times to defend outweigh the right to fortune and fame for his bravery, even if it is well-deserved.

In order for the sterling reputation of the United States military and intelligence services to be preserved, and the trust placed in them by average Americans maintained, national security professionals cannot be allowed to profit from their acts, even if they go above and beyond duty or what is normally expected. Seeking fortune and fame, even if merited, cannot be allowed to cloud judgment when it comes to defending America. When it concerns our national security, we need those defending it to continue to put duty and country first. This extraordinary selflessness and dedication is what has kept us safe and strong throughout our history.

Matt Bissonnette has an extraordinary story to tell; he should be allowed to tell it. But he should have waited for it to pass from current affairs and into history first. That a small group of brave and dedicated men finally delivered justice for their country is a story not likely to be forgotten by Americans anytime soon.