When Vets Kill

This post originally appeared in Cicero Magazine on 9 May 2014.

Are American vets saints or sinners? When incidents such as the 2009 and 2014 Fort Hood shootings, the 2012 Wisconsin Sikh Temple attack and the 2013 Washington Naval Yard shootings—all involving former military personnel—are combined in the media with reports of the epidemic of veteran suicide, veteran homelessness, military sexual trauma, and domestic violence among soldiers, it paints a grim picture. Yet the portrayal sends a mixed message when paired with the ‘celebrity Generals’ and corporate and political hero worship of serving troops and veterans. Such media depictions only serve to erect the metaphorical wall even higher between those who serve and those who do not, yet creating a kind of collective guilt among the latter that recoils in horror after such shootings, even as they cannot pass someone in uniform without reaffirming their patriotism with a token nod of support. More perplexing is when such shootings get hijacked by media discussions over PTSD, which distracts everyone from the real issue at stake: the presence of handguns on military bases, which are supposed to be citadels of security.So which is it: saints or sinners?

The answer is complicated, and one that is informed by this country’s collective urge to celebrate all things that support the troops, who Boston University’s Andrew Bacevich describes as the real “One Percent”, but without asking Americans to make a shred of sacrifice. God forbid that taxes were raised to pay for two wars or that anybody in Congress mention talk of a draft. In truth, a cynic might say that the troops are unfurled before the public whenever they help move product — whether to sell newspapers, to sell beer, to sell candidates, and so forth. The military and veterans are together one of the few institutions in America that continues to enjoy near-Universal, non-partisan respect. However this ‘respect’ often translates into little more than a pat on the back, a handshake and a ‘thanks for your service’. The struggles of America’s veterans are real. However, they are neither unblemished heroes nor violent mental psychopaths. What is missing from the veterans’ narrative depicted in the media is the veterans themselves.

Vets are portrayed as national saints or victims and perpetrators. Despite having such obvious symbolic power in America, veterans have little real power. Corporate boardrooms do not welcome them. There are virtually no veteran CEOs who do not work for military-related companies or in a project they did not start themselves. The US Congress has the lowest number of veteran members since the end of WWII. Military pay and benefits—long sacrosanct—are now being targeted as entitlements in fiscal battles in Washington. The VA benefits backlog is still a problem after decades of empty political promises. Many of those vets who do make it into powerful circles are often granted access because of who they come to know, not out of some belief that they merit success for their sacrifices. Most veterans organisations, new and old, have chosen or been forced to pick a partisan political side, despite the fact that neither side can claim to have clean hands when it comes to handling military and veterans affairs.
Madison Avenue has also gotten on the troops-are-heroes gravy train. One can hardly pick up a name-brand product at a grocery store in America without it carrying a notice that some of the corporate proceeds go to helping ‘our heroes’ through a tax-deductible veteran’s charity. The opening or halftime ceremony of every major sporting event features tributes to the troops.

While it is encouraging that veterans and charities are receiving this kind of attention, it is clearly not for altruistic motives. Images of US troops are being used to sell products. Almost every major corporate brand in America has a military page on its website where it professes to make special efforts to hire vets—leaving out mention of the tax incentives it receives to do so. For-profit colleges with questionable reputations for quality mercilessly target veterans for their GI Bill funds. Politicians and political action groups are the worst offenders in abusing service-members for their own personal gain, from sources as diverse as gay pride rallies to Ron Paul’s presidential campaign. Despite regulations against it, men and women in uniform are a favorite backdrop for elected officials who hope to gain from the legitimacy and public support the troops enjoy.
One can hardly pick up a name-brand product at a grocery store in America without it carrying a notice that some of the corporate proceeds go to helping ‘our heroes’ through a tax-deductible veteran’s charity.

This year’s Super Bowl featured a Budweiser ad showing a ‘Hero’s Welcome’ for a Lieutenant returning from Afghanistan. Budweiser at one point even claimed to have ‘Army support’ for the ad. Opinion among veterans was split as to whether the commercial stepped over the fine line between recognizing the troops and using them to sell products. It is against military regulations to appear in uniform to sell products or to participate in political activities. The US Army initially considered pursuing a cease-and-desist order to prevent the spot from airing and never adequately explained why it decided to allow Budweiser to go-ahead.

By way of contrast, immediately following the recent shootings at Fort Hood, Texas by Army Specialist Ivan Lopez, media reports were quick to point out that it happened on a military post, the shooter was a soldier, a veteran of the Iraq War, and apparently had Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Parallels were immediately drawn between this incident, the 2009 Fort Hood shootings by Major Nadal Hassan and the 2013 Washington Naval Yard shootings by Navy Reservist Aaron Alexis. Even the killing of three people at a Jewish community center in Kansas by a Klansman was linked to the gunman’s status as a Vietnam vet. With 24-hour television news and most major newspapers providing extensive coverage in the days and weeks following the Lopez shootings, one would be excused for believing there must be an epidemic of violence among American troops and veterans. Inside each of us, the media appears to insinuate, is a Timothy McVeigh itching to be heard.

But the depiction is false. A law enforcement analysis of 29 active shooter incidents between 1999 and 2012 found that most were workplace-related incidents committed by lone young men, the majority of which used semiautomatic pistols and died in the incident, either by their own hand or through the response of law enforcement personnel. Almost all of them had long-term issues with work or family. The most interesting fact is that of these 29 incidents, only 4 were current or former military personnel. One of them, Major Nadal Hassan, cited Islamic terror as his motive. Another, the Wisconsin Sikh Temple shootings, was motivated by racial hatred. The other two exhibited histories and grievances consistent with the other 25 non-veteran shooters. Based on this data, arguably there is no link between military service, PTSD and shooting rampages.

Specialist Ivan Lopez has the same profile as non-veteran active shooters. He was a young, lone male with a semiautomatic pistol who eventually turned his weapon on himself when confronted by law enforcement. The picture that has emerged of Lopez is of someone struggling to adjust to a new home, a new career and difficulties with his superiors—a situation that is not military-specific whatsoever. He just happened to be a soldier. Contrary to common views, Lopez did not just snap; he was likely harboring a long-simmering resentment toward his workplace and what he saw as unfairness in his life. The fact he already had his weapon in his car on the day of the shooting incident suggests a degree of premeditation or that he was already considering the possibility of taking action.

But the media immediately latched onto the fact he was a soldier, had deployed to Iraq and was being evaluated for PTSD. Much has since been made of the fact that he deployed to Iraq for only four months as proof he could not have PTSD. In fairness, one incident on one day is enough to be traumatized if severe enough. Different people are affected in different ways and, contrary to the media narrative, development and severity of PTSD does not depend upon the number of months or tours served in combat. One of the issues of treating PTSD and Traumatic Brain Injury is that they are mental wounds which can only be diagnosed by their symptoms as reported by or observed in the patient.

Perhaps Lopez did have PTSD, perhaps not. There is no way to know now. It actually matters very little. Despite the connection the media immediately draws in such circumstances, there is only a very weak connection between PTSD and violence. However it is clear that Specialist Lopez was struggling to deal with his life in a way that many non-military, non-veteran Americans do every day, a struggle which can lead to violence. However this has not kept the media from playing up the military-PTSD aspect.
When it comes to US troops and veterans, the American media has developed a clearly detectable ‘Madonna/Whore Complex’, in which those who serve are invariably portrayed as either perfections of virtue beyond reproach (see the fawning coverage of David Petraeus prior to 2012) or as victims of the government or society or as perpetrators with festering mental health issues which may lead to suicide, violence or even murder.

Consider the following headline: “Veterans with PTSD Linked to Everything That Could Kill Your Children.” Fortunately, it is from the military satire site The Duffel Blog. Adding to this state of affairs is the (ab)use of service-members and veterans in media campaigns by politicians, political action committees and corporations for their own gain. Troops have become the new talking babies or cute kittens playing with yarn – mere props to move product and check Americans’ box to pay tribute for their service, and maybe even profit off their presence. Whenever events like the Fort Hood shooting presents us with a more nuanced and untidy picture of our veterans’ well-beings, we tend to veer into the other extreme, painting them with a broad brush as PTSD-addled killers. That is not to simply grasp the cliché that the truth is somewhere in between, but rather that most of our veterans are not unlike any other segment of the American population.

Take Specialist Ivan Lopez. On another day, in different circumstances, a former police officer, Iraq War vet and Army reservist who decided to switch to driving trucks on active duty to feed his family would have been a hero. He would have been in a Budweiser commercial or spoke at the local VFW. Instead, the media pictures him as a frustrated loser with PTSD who was ten years older than other troops his rank who could not handle his troubles anymore. The veteran is a war hero one day, an armed killer the next. Within hours of the shootings and his suicide, the story was already creating media churn and being put to political use by politicians and advocacy organisations. It has become the latest chapter in the debate about guns in America. One side argues that active shootings like those in Aurora, Sandy Hook, and Fort Hood could have been prevented if the public, school officials, and off-duty soldiers were allowed to be armed in public. The message has to focus on Lopez’s undiagnosed PTSD and mental health issues. It was not easy access to firearms that caused this shooting; it was Lopez’s mental health issues. Guns don’t kill people; people kill people.

Contrary to popular belief, living on a military post means less access and exposure to privately-owned firearms than living off post. The weapons used by Major Nadal Hassan and Specialist Ivan Lopez were obtained off post at private establishments and kept against military regulations. Though every company-sized military element on a base counts hundreds of firearms among its equipment, access to this weaponry is very tightly controlled by commanders and armorers. Troops cannot simply draw out their assigned rifle at will. It can only be for a purpose authorized by the unit commander. Though military posts such as Fort Hood may contain tens of thousands of small arms weapons, they are kept secure in padlocked racks or cages behind bank vault doors armed with alarms that notify military police directly any time an arms room is accessed. Most military facilities with arms rooms are also manned by soldiers 24 hours a day. Any time a weapon leaves a vault, a paper trail is created as to who signed for it, when, and what armorer allowed it out. Access to weaponry is taken seriously by the US military.

Contrast this with the various disjointed, inconsistent and ill-enforced laws regulating the purchase, use, transport, carrying and storage of civilian firearms outside of bases across the United States. No matter your interpretation of the 2nd Amendment, even transporting a firearm from one town or county to another can lead to an unknowing violation of the law. Each city, county and state seems to have its own rules and regulations and the federal government seems to change its application or interpretation of firearms regulations depending upon who is in Congress or the White House. America’s gun laws, no matter your view of them, are a tragi-comical absolute mess.

Many troops own personal firearms as well. Military policy requires these weapons be registered with their unit and must be stored in the same arms room as military weaponry and are subject to the same controls. As with military-issue weaponry, access to personal weapons is only by arrangement with the armorer with the permission of the unit commander.
Yet some on the right would like to see more guns on military posts. More guns would not stop or deter an active shooter like Ivan Lopez. These are people who have determined they will commit a violent act and will continue to shoot people until they are shot by police or shoot themselves. The Hasan and Lopez shootings took place during the duty day and military police were on the scene within fifteen minutes. Both incidents were over quickly. Introducing an off duty soldier who happened by chance to be in the area and carrying his personal weapon into the situation could serve only to cause confusion among law enforcement as to who the perpetrator is. This would be made worse if word spreads across a post and draws armed soldiers who want to help, creating a tangle of armed troopers without command and control. Soldiers do not behave that way in combat and it makes equally less sense to do so on post. Law Enforcement, with special training, radios and coordination should handle such incidents.

It is rather ironic that the media focused on the military and PTSD aspect of the Lopez shooting rather than use it as an opportunity to discuss responsible gun laws. Instead, they’re portraying soldiers as victim-perpetrators to sell newspapers. In the case of Ivan Lopez, it was not PTSD or a soldier’s fondness for guns or access to military weaponry that allowed this latest Fort Hood shooting to occur. Lopez’s grievances with the world were not military-specific. They were the same issues many civilians have. Military weapons were not involved.

It was the easy access to weaponry off post that allowed Ivan Lopez to obtain a firearm in Killeen, Texas (ironically, from the same gun shop where Major Nadal Hasan bought one of his guns) and bring it onto post to kill his fellow soldiers. This incident had nothing to do with Lopez being a soldier or if he had PTSD or any failure in military policy as the media and some politicians and advocacy groups have claimed. It was the America outside of Fort Hood that allowed this incident to occur. If America outside the walls of military posts had as sensible gun control laws and took weapons as seriously as the America inside them, active shootings like this could be stopped.

Which returns us to the general public’s schizophrenic relationship with its armed forces. So long as there is this metaphorical wall between us and them, there will be this mixed message after tragedies whereby we praise our heroes with our right hand, while condemning their PTSD with our other hand, even as we refuse to do anything to fix our own gun-obsessed culture. Carry on America “supporting the troops,” with tributes, fundraisers, and shout-outs during seventh innings.
Keep patting backs, wearing t-shirts and slapping on bumper stickers. But if you really want to pay tribute to their sacrifice, fix this country. Make it into one that is worth fighting for and that the troops are welcome and safe to return to.

The Inevitability of Intelligence Failure: Sources, Locations and Causes

November 2013

Intelligence failure can be defined as ‘a misunderstanding of the situation that leads a government (or its military forces) to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests’ (Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 62). Explorations of what could or should have been done differently form the basis for millions of pages of government investigations, newspaper articles, books, journals and entire academic careers.

A uniting factor which leads an event to be considered an intelligence failure is that it was or came close to a national disaster, whereas ‘the record of success is less striking because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen’ (Betts, 1978: 62). If one takes this definition of intelligence failure and turns it around, an ‘intelligence success’ occurs when a situation is understood properly and leads a government (or its military forces) to take actions appropriate and productive to its own interests. Concern with intelligence failures always far outstrips that of any intelligence successes, which may not become known until long after the event, if ever.

Intelligence failures are inevitable because there are limits to what intelligence can accomplish. Its proponents are often guilty of overselling its capabilities and its ‘consumers’ and observers are guilty of misunderstanding them (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104-5). This essay will use a framework based upon the work of Betts, Schmitt and Shulsky, and Gill and Phythian, among others, to outline the different ‘sources’ or ‘locations’ of intelligence failure, where they occur in the ‘intelligence cycle’, their ‘causes’ and other factors, followed by the use of the 2003 Iraq WMD controversy as a case study to briefly illustrate real-world examples to show why intelligence failures are inevitable.

Sources & Causes
There are three general locations which can be identified as sources of intelligence failure: ‘Collection’, ‘Analysis’ and ‘Decision-Makers’ (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 103-4, citing Betts, 1978). These categories broadly separate persons involved in the ‘Intelligence Cycle’ by their positions or functional roles within it. CIA defines the Intelligence Cycle as the ‘process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers’ (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).
Collection

The first step in the Intelligence Cycle is to develop directions as to what information is necessary, known as ‘requirements’, and how it will be collected based upon the needs of the eventual consumers of the intelligence, usually senior policymakers (ibid.). Based upon this guidance, intelligence agencies then begin Collection, also known as ‘espionage’, which can be defined as, ‘the practice of using spies to collect information about what another government or company is doing or plans to do’ (Williams, 2011: 1165). Put simply, Collection involves obtaining the information or ‘raw intelligence’ which is required to meet Requirements developed at the first step in the Intelligence Cycle. Collection is performed by all means available to intelligence agencies, including human intelligence, signals intercepts, imagery and scientific and technical measurement, among others, and relates to one or more ‘types’ of intelligence, including military, political, economic or cultural intelligence (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 51).

Collection Failure
Collection Failure can be seen as the ‘unavailability of information when and where needed’ (Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151, citing Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 64-7;) or part of Betts’ ‘Pathologies of Communication’–the lack of timely collection of information (Betts, 1978: 62-3). Essentially, Collection Failure occurs because the information necessary to respond successfully to the situation was not collected or not when needed.

Inevitability?
Planning and directing intelligence requirements and Collection must still deal with the fact that, in the famous words of U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, ‘There are no "knowns." There are thing we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know’ (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2002), a sentiment similar to one expressed earlier by CIA’s Sherman Kent when he stated there are ‘Things which are knowable but happen to be unknown to us, and…things which are not known to anyone at all’ (Kent, 1964). Simply put, Collection Failure can occur when necessary information, known to exist and known to be needed, is not available due to some limitation. Or it can occur because it was not even considered, dismissed or there were no indicators it was necessary to gather such information. Nonetheless, as Betts (1978: 61) states, ‘In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information’.

Analysis
Station three in the Intelligence Cycle is the ‘processing’ of the collected information, followed by the fourth step of Analysis and creation of intelligence ‘products’, such as reports, findings and estimates. This is followed by the fifth step, Dissemination—distributing the intelligence product to decision-makers in a proper format in a timely manner (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).

The analysis stage begins with an evaluation of the truth of the collected material and the validity of the process which acquired it (Butler Panel, 2008: 527-8). For some forms, such as imagery and signals intelligence, this will be easy; for others, especially human intelligence (usually obtained second-hand from an informant by a case officer) it is more onerous to establish. There may be the wish of the collecting officer to have his source believed, giving rise to the need for an independent appraisal of the information (ibid.). Accuracy in reporting or quoting the information from the source to the analyst must be ensured. It must be checked that the source has actual access to the information or an acceptable explanation of how it was obtained. It must be considered if the source has some ulterior motive for providing the information or if they are involved in a counter-intelligence operation. Their previous track record must also be considered (ibid.). If the veracity of the information is not thoroughly tested and established, anything that follows may be derived from false information and will be fruit from a poison tree.

Actual Analysis of the information, after its validity has been established, involves appraising the value of the information in its own right, deciding how much weight should be assigned to it and compiling it into ‘meaningful strands’ based upon what it relates to. These ‘strands’, compiled from all available sources of related information, are then further used to develop ‘estimates’ (‘assessments’ in the UK) of a particular international situation or set of circumstances (ibid.: 528). They can be rapid, low-level appraisals or they can be the premier product composed of the collective wisdom of the entire intelligence community, as with America’s National Intelligence Estimates (Johnson, 2008: 344). The product is then disseminated and/or briefed to decision-makers in an appropriate format.

Collecting information is difficult enough; deciding what should be done in light of it and how it should be presented creates even more problems. Sherman Kent, ‘father figure of CIA analysis’, felt that estimates consist of, ‘knowledge, reasoning and guesswork’ (Johnson, 2008: 344). The pitfalls of analysing information to attempt to piece together accurate appraisals, predictions and/or advice based upon information of varying types and of contestable accuracy or value, often in a short amount of time, in order to develop an intelligence product are apparent. Estimates are used to develop national policy regarding situations vital to national security. If information, analysis or estimates are wrong or wrongly presented, the policy response will be wrong as well, with serious consequences (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 106-112).

Analysis Failure
Analysis Failure is a broader category. It includes ‘Tendency to concentrate on ‘usual suspects’ for ideological or practical purposes’ (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104), ‘Opinion governed by “conventional wisdom” without supporting evidence’, ‘”mirror imaging”, in which unfamiliar situations are judged upon the basis of the familiar’ (Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151, citing Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002, 64-67) and the ‘Paradox of Perception’—failure to properly balance pre-conceived notions based upon previous and historical experience against an unbiased look at information and failure to balance sensitivity of warnings between insufficiency and alarmism (Betts, 1978: 62-3). It also includes failure in ‘effectively communicating with Decision-Makers’, Betts’ other entry under ‘Pathologies of Communication’ (ibid.).

In sum, Analysis Failure can be located in the Processing, Analysis and Production, or Dissemination stages of the Intelligence Cycle. Essentially, Analysis Failure occurs because information is not properly validated or it is improperly dismissed; the wrong degree of emphasis is placed on collected information; opinion developed through collected information is skewed by practical, ideological, or some other cognitive bias, or; where intelligence products do not effectively communicate the necessary information collected to Decision-Makers, either through an ineffective portrayal of the information collected or untimely dissemination to them.

Inevitability?
Writing in defence of the wrongly-concluded 1962 NIE on the likelihood of Soviet nuclear missiles being stationed on Cuba, Sherman Kent (1964) explained the process of estimates thus:

“If NIEs could be confined to statements of indisputable fact the task would be safe and easy. Of course the result could not then be called an estimate. By definition, estimating is an excursion out beyond established fact into the unknown--a venture in which the estimator gets such aid and comfort as he can from analogy, extrapolation, logic, and judgment. In the nature of things he will upon occasion end up with a conclusion which time will prove to be wrong. To recognize this as inevitable does not mean that we estimators are reconciled to our inadequacy; it only means we fully realize that we are engaged in a hazardous occupation.”

If the circumstances for which Decision-Makers require intelligence were unambiguous, then intelligence services could hand them Kent’s ‘indisputable facts’ and leave them to it. However, there are few circumstances in international politics today which possess such clarity that Decision-Makers, often elected officials with little or no security experience, can decide on their own with ‘raw intelligence’. Today the problem may be too much information, as opposed to not enough, when one considers the mass amounts of imagery and signals information collected, processed and analysed (Irwin, 2012). Intelligence analysis remains a necessity.

Schmitt and Schulsky (2002: 72) argue, ’The heart of the problem of intelligence failure, [is] the thought processes of the individual analyst.’ Attempts to counteract the human element in analysis through systemic or procedural reforms, rather than fixing these flaws, may actually serve to build overconfidence in them afterwards through a belief that the problem has been solved and won’t recur (Betts, 1978: 61). However, history shows that the same mistakes continue to be made. At bottom, intelligence analysis is still a flawed human process and will always be as flawed as the human beings conducting the analysis. So long as there are ambiguous situations requiring, as Kent (1964) puts it, ‘guesswork’, there will inevitably be Analysis Failures.
Decision-Makers

In the final step of the Intelligence Cycle, the product, having been disseminated, has been received by its ‘consumers’ and they have informed themselves of the intelligence. They may have further questions or desire more information. This leads to the development of new Requirements, leading back to the first stage of the Intelligence Cycle, which begins anew (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).

Decision-Makers, a mix of high-level elected officials, executive appointees and military officials, then actually use the intelligence produced to inform their decisions. Making decisions that are vital to protecting a nation’s security are inherently difficult, with or without accurate intelligence. Historically, intelligence failures are most frequently located with Decision-Makers (Betts, 1978: 62-3). Policymakers often make one of Johnson’s ‘seven sins of strategic intelligence’—ignoring intelligence that which does not conform to their view of a situation (Johnson, 1982: 182-4). If intelligence is misunderstood or ignored, the policy decision-makers pursue may lead to an intelligence failure.

Decision-Maker Failure
‘Decision-Maker Failure’ is the ‘subordination of Intelligence to policy’ (Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 64-67; Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151) and may influence the initial Planning and Direction stage of the Intelligence Cycle or be exhibited in how or if Decision-Makers use intelligence to make policy. It also occurs when pressure from Decision-Makers is brought to bear on those involved in analysis at the Processing, Analysis and Production or Dissemination stages. According to Betts (1978: 61), ‘In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision-makers who consume the products of intelligence services.’

Decision-Maker Failure often occurs as a result of ‘Politicisation’, one of the central problems of intelligence. In the words of Robert M Gates as Director of Central Intelligence (Gates, 1992):

“Politicization can manifest itself in many ways, but in each case it boils down to the same essential elements: almost all agree that it involves deliberately distorting analysis or judgments to favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence. Most consider `classic' politicization to be only that which occurs if products are forced to conform to policymakers' views. A number believe politicization also results from management pressures to define and drive certain lines of analysis and substantive viewpoints. Still others believe that changes in tone or emphasis made during the normal review or coordination process and limited means for expressing alternative viewpoints, also constitute forms of politicization."

Essentially, Decision-Maker Failure most often occurs because of some form of ‘politicisation’ by Decision-Makers where intelligence is deliberately distorted, ignored or selectively applied.

Inevitability?
According to Johnson (1983: 182), ‘No shortcoming of strategic intelligence is more often cited than the self-delusion of policymakers who brush aside-or bend-facts that fail to conform with their Weltanschauung.’ In Western democracies, Decision-Makers are either elected officials or senior civil servants influenced by elected officials. Politics is their job and it affects all aspects of it, including making security decisions based upon intelligence. Politics affects every form of government, from totalitarian dictatorships to communist collectives. As von Clausewitz is often quoted, ‘War is the continuation of politics by other means.’ Attempting to totally remove politics from war and national security is an impossible task. As stated above, Decision-Maker Failure through politicisation is the most common reason for intelligence failure. So long as politics are involved in security decisions, there will inevitably be intelligence failures.


Other Factors

Systemic Factors
Systemic Factors which may lead to intelligence failure include internal bureaucratic obstacles and failure to share information or cooperate with other agencies (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104). Garciano and Posner (2005: 159) describe this as, ‘lack of prompt and full sharing of intelligence information within intelligence agencies, between different agencies, and between federal, state and local government levels.’ These Systemic Factors may occur at any phase of the Intelligence cycle and lie within Collection, Analysis or with Decision-Makers. If Collection resources or collected information is not shared it cannot be properly analysed and will not make its way to Decision-Makers, leading to intelligence failure.

External Factors
‘External Factors’ are always present. They include the, ‘Intrinsic difficulty in identifying targets’ and the fact that states or organisations which are or may be the target of intelligence agencies cannot be expected to remain passive to intelligence operations against them (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104-5). Simply put, sometimes it is difficult or impossible to collect some forms of information, or, as Kent (1964) puts it, ‘Something literally unknowable by any man alive.’ Knowing the intent of an adversary before even he has formed it is an example of this impossibility. An intelligence failure for one state is often the result of an intelligence success by another. External Factors most often affect Collection, but they may also affect Analysis and Decision-Makers at any stage of the Intelligence Cycle, especially if the particular intelligence failure is the active effort of a foreign intelligence service, such as infiltration, double-agents, strategic deception or a counter-intelligence operation.

Case Study: Iraq WMD
The false belief and assertion by the U.S. and UK governments that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq possessed WMD capabilities in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War is an instructive case which illustrates examples of each of the different causes of intelligence failure. Some of these are explored here, though there are more which could be cited.

Collection Failure
According to Morrison (2011: 520), one of the reasons for the intelligence failure relating to the existence of Iraq’s WMD capabilities was a failure to set a Requirement for Collection of political intelligence to place in context technical information on Saddam’s WMD programs. Collection was instead focused on gathering information about the existence of the programs themselves. This led to failure to consider the question in light of Saddam’s ‘political system, fears, and intentions’ (Jervis, 2006: 41). Collecting such information could have offered an explanation as to why Hussein would refuse to disavow WMD programs and cooperate with UN inspections despite not having active WMD programs. Setting this Requirement may have served to balance the dominant presumption that Iraq had WMD, the justification for the war which turned out to be false.

Analysis Failure
UK and U.S. analysis of Iraq’s WMD relied heavily upon unreliable human intelligence sources which were not properly vetted and, in some cases, have since proven to be fabrications. Information was also being quickly disseminated to policymakers without being properly validated or analysed first (Morrison, 2011: 520). In his study of the major U.S. and UK post-mortems on Iraq, Jervis (2006) cites many examples of Analysis Failure: ‘ICs’ judgments were stated with excessive certainty’ (ibid.: 14), ‘no general alternative explanations for Saddam’s behavior were offered’ (ibid.: 15), ‘lack of imagination’ to develop these alternative views (ibid.: 17), ‘failure to challenge assumptions’ regarding existence of WMD programs and a situation ‘whereby assessments were based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties’ (ibid.: 22), among others. These examples illustrate just some of the places where analysis went wrong.

Decision-Maker Failure
The case of Iraq’s WMD provides a clear example of politicisation of intelligence. The Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP) was specifically established by the Bush administration to develop assessments based upon the assumption that Iraq had WMD and its products were used in preference to other Intelligence Community assessments that contradicted that hypothesis (Ryan, 2006: 304-5). A ‘Red Team’ analysis conducted by CIA’s WINPAC, designed only as an initial ‘devil’s advocate’ view in the face of evidence Iraq did not have WMD, was also selectively used by the administration despite strong evidence from the rest of the Intelligence Community its conclusion was wrong. Assessments by agencies such as U.S. Department of Energy and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence Research provided strong, clear arguments against the central argument made in assessments preferred by the Bush administration, but they were pushed aside by Decision-Makers (Conway, 2012: 490-1).

Systemic Factors
Garciano and Posner (2005: 149) point out the WMD Commission’s finding that there was not enough cooperation or information sharing between agencies, specifically in regard to reports that called into question the credibility of the information by the source ‘Curveball’, whose assertion that he had been involved in active WMD programs in Iraq became a central piece of evidence in the Bush administration’s push for war. Curveball (Rashid al-Janabi) himself has since admitted his evidence was a fabrication (NBC News, 2011). If more than one agency had access to these reports, there may have been more questions asked. However, bureaucratic obstacles and security standards stood in the way. There is a lack of information sharing between U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, seen to have separate functions, which may have led to vital information not being shared and considered (Cilluffo et al, 2002: 70-1).

External Factors
Saddam Hussein and his regime were not inactive players in their fate. There was a systematic denial and deception campaign by the regime and their failure to cooperate with and eventual ejection of UN inspectors supported the belief that Iraq had something to hide regarding its WMD programs. Wherever evidence was not available to prove or disprove hypotheses, Saddam and his regime could be blamed for blocking attempts to collect the necessary intelligence (Jervis, 2006: 27-8). In his debriefing by the FBI, Saddam admitted that he wanted to maintain the façade of possessing WMD to counter enemies, especially Iran (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008). Of course, had Saddam been open regarding WMD and cooperated with UN inspections, the likelihood of war would have been greatly reduced. Intelligence is, ‘a game between hiders and finders, and the former usually have the easier job’ (Jervis, 2006: 11).

Conclusion
As Gill and Phythian (2004: 105) point out, ‘the limits of intelligence dictate that intelligence failure is inevitable. Partly, this is a consequence of the impossibility of perfect predictive success; partly it is a consequence of decision-makers’ (politicians with regard to states) natural tendency to err on the side of caution by subscribing to worst-case scenarios, or to simply ignore intelligence that does not fit their own preferences.’ As discussed, there are other locations within the Intelligence Cycle where things can go wrong and there are other possible causes and factors leading to intelligence failure. The debacle of Iraq’s WMD provides many real-world illustrations.

Jervis (2006: 11) makes clear that, ‘Any specific instance of intelligence failure will, by definition, seem unusual, but the fact of the failure itself is quite ordinary’. If the result of the failure is a great national disaster, it will seem to be a great failure. However, factual examinations of how failures occur inevitably show common, ordinary failures by people and organisations that often occur in situations outside of the intelligence context. Jervis usefully compares the Iraq WMD investigations to enquiries into the 1986 Challenger shuttle disaster and abuse allegations in the Catholic Church (ibid.: 4-5). It is only the consequences of intelligence failure that make them appear much larger than they are—the stakes are simply much higher (Betts, 1978: 62). Despite all of the post-mortems conducted on intelligence failures, there is little evidence their conclusions or the reforms enacted afterwards as a result have translated into an elimination or even significant reduction of failures (ibid.).
These human failures are impossible to ever eliminate for good, especially those of a political or cognitive nature. Intelligence failures are inevitable because they seek to make clear ambiguous, complex situations using information that may be difficult to obtain, validate and understand, either through the resistance of the target or the nature of the information itself, and then present information in a digestible manner to Decision-Makers, who may do as they wish with the intelligence produced. Even minor errors at any point in the Intelligence Cycle may throw off the entire enterprise. The fallible and flawed nature of human beings attempting to put together some unknown puzzle with an incomplete picture means mistakes will inevitably occur at some point in the process. There is an old military maxim: ‘what can go wrong, will go wrong.’ Betts (1978) and Gill and Phythian (2006: 105) believe we must accept that intelligence failures are inevitable. Indeed, given the nature of the work of intelligence and all that can go wrong, it would be more extraordinary if intelligence failures did not occur.





BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barrett, D. (2010) “Why Intelligence Failures Are (Still) Inevitable.” Diplomatic History 34 (1): pp. 207–213.

Betts, R. (1978) “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable.” World Politics 31 (1): pp. 61–89.

———. (2002) “Fixing Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs 81 (1): pp.43–59.

———. (2007) “Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD.” Political Science Quarterly 122 (4): pp. 585–606.

Butler Panel of Inquiry (2008) “The British Experience with Intelligence Failure.” In Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies, edited by Johnson, L. and Wirtz, J., 2nd ed., pp. 526–536. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cilluffo, F., Marks, R., and Salmoiraghi, G. (2002) “The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence.” Washington Quarterly 25 (1): pp. 61–74.

Conway, P. (2012) “Red Team: How the Neoconservatives Helped Cause the Iraq Intelligence Failure.” Intelligence and National Security 27 (4): pp. 488–512.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2008) “Interviewing Saddam: FBI Agent Gets to the Truth.” Federal Bureau of Investigation – Stories. http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/piro012808 [Accessed 4 January 2014].

Garciano, L., and Posner, R. (2005) “Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (4). http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134960 [Accessed 4 January 2014].

Gates, R. (1992) “Guarding Against Politicization.” Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/volume-36-number-1/html/v36i1a01p_0001.htm [Accessed 5 January 2014].

Gill, P., and Phythian, M. (2006) “Why Does Intelligence Fail?” In Intelligence in an Insecure World, 1st ed., pp. 103–124. Cambridge: Polity.

Hatlebrekke, K., and Smith, M. (2010) “Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure.” Intelligence and National Security, 25 (2): pp. 147–182.

Irwin, S. (2012) “Too Much Information, Not Enough Intelligence.” National Defense Magazine. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/May/Pages/TooMuchInformation,NotEnoughIntelligence.aspx [Accessed 6 January 2014].

Jackson, P., and Scott, L. (2004) “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice.” Intelligence and National Security 19 (2): pp. 139–169.

Jervis, R. (2006) “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq.” Journal of Strategic Studies 29 (1): pp. 3–52.

Johnson, L. (1983) “Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence.” World Affairs 146 (2): pp. 176–204.

———. (2008) “Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President’s Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate.” Intelligence and National Security 23 (3): pp. 333–370.

Johnson, L., and Wirtz, J. (2008) “Part II: Collection.” In Intelligence and National Security, 2nd ed., pp. 49–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kent, S. (1964) “A Crucial Estimate Relived.” Studies in Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency). https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol8no2/html/v08i2a01p.htm [Accessed 4 January 2014].

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NBC News (2011) “‘Curveball’: I Lied about WMD to Hasten Iraq War.” NBC News. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41609536/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/curveball-i-lied-about-wmd-hasten-iraq-war/#.Us12Fp5_u8A [Accessed 5 January 2014].

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Roman, P. (1995) “Strategic Bombers over the Missile Horizon.” Journal of Strategic Studies 18 (1): pp. 198–236.

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Schmitt, G., and Shulsky, A. (2002) Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s.

Williams, R. (2011) “(Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action.” George Washington Law Review 79 (4): pp. 1162–1200.

Why NATO Intervened in Libya but not Syria

Authored 31 October, 2013.

Despite calls to intervene militarily in Syria, NATO has remained hesitant to do so despite surface parallels with conditions in 2011 Libya which precipitated a NATO intervention that toppled the regime of Muammar Qaddafi. In Syria today, as in 2011 Libya, much of the population is in armed revolt as part of the Arab Spring and being met by a bloody regime campaign to put down the rebellion. Despite similarities, NATO has held back despite the conflict entering its third year and the August 21st nerve agent attack on civilians in Damascus, attributed by the U.S., UK and France to the Assad government (Reuters, 2013), an event identified as a ‘red line’ that would trigger military action (Reuters, 2012).

There are many factors contributing to NATO’s decision against intervening in Syria. Despite using the same Liberal values-based rhetoric and human rights justifications, the situation in Syria has elicited a different response. Domestic politics in individual NATO states runs against it. The Syrian military is better trained and equipped and more committed to Assad than the Libyan military to Qaddafi. The influx into Syria of foreign Islamic extremist fighters on the rebel side has generated second thoughts for NATO and other actors considering the removal of Assad (Martini et al, 2012: 5-7).

The largest contributing factor—and the one I will focus on—is that the resistance to a NATO campaign in Syria would be more significant than with Libya due to the greater strength of international, regional and internal allies of the Assad regime. In the following sections I will compare and contrast the Libyan and Syrian regimes in turn in reference to their relationships with international, regional and internal allies and then show why their respective effects on NATO’s ‘Realist’ calculation has led to the choice not to act in Syria.

Libya under Qaddafi

In an Arab League conference tirade, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi called himself, ‘an international leader, the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of Muslims’ before going on to insult fellow Arab leaders (Otterman and Mackey, quoting Qaddafi, 2009). From the beginning of his rule following a military coup in 1969, Qaddafi rubbed the world the wrong way. As an Arab Nationalist, he never fit into either camp during the Cold War, but also never managed to use this seeming neutrality to Libya’s advantage in attempting to take up Nasser’s mantle (St. John, 1987: 21). The lack of ability to make and maintain powerful friends to shore up his power or to properly balance allies against foes would eventually lead to his downfall.

Early in Qaddafi’s rule, the U.S. hoped to cultivate him as an anti-communist ally and wanted to maintain strategic airbases in Libya, but hopes were dashed when U.S. troops were expelled in 1970 (Zoubir, 2006: 48-9). The nationalisation of Libyan oil in 1971 and his anti-colonial agitation soured relations with Britain (St. John, 1987: 115). The Pan Am 103 bombing and other terrorist acts in the 1980s and the continued use of Libya as a terror haven into the 1990s (Church, 1992) made him a major NATO enemy in the Middle East and led to harsh UN and U.S. sanctions with severe economic consequences.

His relations were also rocky with the USSR as he ‘grouped the United States and the Soviet Union together as imperialist countries intent on expanding spheres of influence in the Middle East’ and, believing Islam was central to Arab identity, condemned the atheism of the USSR. He was not as skilled as Nasser or Assad at walking the line between Moscow and Washington and neither considered him a reliable partner (St. John, 1987: 29).

Libya was also isolated in the Middle East, with regional leaders, especially monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, viewing negatively Qaddafi’s Arab Nationalist views and misuse of Islam to meet political and policy goals (ibid.: 149). Varying relations with regional powers over OPEC and oil issues (ibid.: 107-24) and support for Iran during its war with Iraq (Associated Press, 1985) further deepened its regional problems.

In order to survive an antagonistic position toward the rest of the world, Qaddafi had to build strength at home. He purposely weakened the Libyan military to prevent any challenge while arming loyal militias and the security services (Hendawi, 2011). Though weakening the military prevented challenges, it also eventually left him virtually defenceless against more capable NATO forces. According to Mokhefi (2011), Qaddafi also consolidated internal control by manipulating the tribal system using a ‘carrot and stick’ policy of granting wealth and government positions to tribes that supported him and legally and violently repressing those that did not.

For the first 30 years of his rule, Qaddafi’s rejection of both camps of the Cold War, support for terrorism, espousal of Arab Nationalism, politicisation of Islam and continuing squabbles with neighbours turned Libya into an isolated state with no Great Power patron or strong regional friends. It was not until years after the fall of the Soviet Union that Qaddafi attempted rapprochement with the West. After years of public and behind-the-scenes diplomacy in which Britain played a large role, a deal surrounding handing over the Lockerbie bombers for trial and paying compensation to the victims’ families led to European states re-establishing relations and UN sanctions against Libya being lifted in 2003. Normalisation and lifting of unilateral U.S. sanctions did not occur until 2004 when, against the backdrop of the Afghan and Iraq wars, Qaddafi further agreed not to seek weapons of mass destruction and to cooperate in the War on Terror (Zoubir, 2006).

Libya was in a weakened state of transition from a pariah state to a full member of the international community when the Arab Spring struck in March 2011. Qaddafi responded to protests with violent crackdowns in which hundreds of Libyans were killed by the security forces, leading his newly-found Western friends to denounce him again. Qaddafi underestimated the national and international response to the violence (Buckley, 2012: 84), which undid years of public and secret diplomacy to rehabilitate his image. The Arab League, usually hesitant to endorse outside interference in Arab affairs, gave approval to military intervention (BBC News, 2011). He was denounced by the UN Security Council, which approved a no-fly zone over Libya. Before the vote and further after implementation began, the Arab League and Russia, China, India, Germany and South Africa expressed consternation with NATO’s interpretation of the UN resolution, (Buckley, 2012: 85). These objections in the UNSC and Arab League were too little, too late to save Qaddafi.

Internally, despite years of patronage, Libyan tribal leaders from the influential Warfalla and Zawiya tribes who controlled militias and the security services condemned Qaddafi for his violent crackdowns on protests in Tripoli and elsewhere (Mokhefi, 2011). With a UN resolution and the Arab League against him and support crumbling at home, they sensed the inevitability of his fall. The Libyan military was kept too weak to save him.

Qaddafi’s forces were quickly overcome by the NATO-led campaign, leading to his death in October 2011. In the end, no one but family and his own tribe stood in support of Muammar Qaddafi. He was not the ‘the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of Muslims.’

Syria under the Assads

Hafez al-Assad seized power in Syria after a 1970 coup—shortly after Qaddafi’s in Libya. As a Ba’athist and military officer, Hafez was largely influenced by the same Arab Nationalist and Nasserist sentiments and even agreed a short-lived 1971 proposal for a federation between Egypt, Libya and Syria (Hopwood, 1988: 55). Hafez al-Assad was a shrewd leader with great ability to maintain strong alliances at home and abroad, a trait passed on to his son, Bashar. Hafez was able to build an equal partnership with the USSR without becoming a satellite (ibid.: 76). The ability to balance alliances and power has kept the Assad regime in power for over forty years and is why it is still holding on despite the Arab Spring and strong international pressure.

The Assad’s are members of the minority Alawite sect of Shi’ia Islam and Hafez was the first Syrian president not from the Sunni majority. Though military officers, fellow Alawites and Ba’athists formed Hafez’s base, in power he legitimised and consolidated his rule by including elements of other ethnic and religious minority communities (including Christian Druze and Kurds) in shaping his government and improved the lot of the middle and lower classes. He co-opted and cooperated with other communist and left-leaning political parties. He pursued policy that consolidated all state power in his own hands, but went further than previous governments by legitimising his rule through inclusion of minorities (Ma’oz, 1986: 28-9).

While forming a strong base at home, Hafez al-Assad also forged international and regional alliances. According to Hopwood (1988: 72-7), Syria refused to become a satellite of the U.S. or USSR after throwing off colonial rule. However, the Soviets would sell arms to Syria with no strings attached, unlike NATO. As the USSR sought parity with the West, it curried favour in Syria before Assad took power by offering large public works projects and siding with Syria in the 1967 war as Syrian pilots were shot down flying Russian aircraft.

The relationship grew closer under Assad, with Moscow agreeing multi-million-dollar arms deals and sending thousands of military advisers. The two countries signed multiple diplomatic and trade agreements and Assad dealt with Moscow as an equal, not a subordinate. Syria fielded Soviet military tanks, missiles and other equipment, which were again replaced by Moscow after the disastrous 1973 war. By 1986, Syria had become Moscow’s largest Third World arms purchaser. Regardless of Hafez’s own opinion, America considered Syria a client of the Soviet Union (ibid.: 76).

In 1980, Syria—Arab, pluralist, Ba’athist-led, with a Sunni-majority—formed a counterintuitive alliance with Iran—a newly-formed Persian Islamic republic with a Shi’ite majority—in their war with Iraq. According to Hirschfeld (1986: 115-21), this was an act of shrewd political Realism by Assad. Despite being counter to its economic interest, Syria shut its border and blocked Iraq’s oil pipeline to the sea, costing Syria millions in oil transit fees. Hafez also turned down $2 billion from Saudi Arabia to reopen it (ibid.: 115). However, giving much-needed assistance to Iran in its early days greatly increased Syria’s influence with Khomeini and its control over Lebanon, where Iran was induced into influencing Shi’ites much more persuasively than Syria could alone. In the early years of the alliance, Syria was the dominant partner. Attacks by Iran-controlled Shi’ite terrorists in 1983-4 led to the withdrawal of Western troops from Lebanon, leaving Syria and Iran squarely in control until 2005. It also increased Syria’s independence and influence in the Middle East as a whole, as it was Syria that set its own course and became a fulcrum point deciding where the balance of regional power would lie. With one decision, Hafez had increased Syria’s influence and made it indispensable in the region (ibid.: 115-121).

This was the situation Bashar al-Assad inherited when his father died in 2000. The Soviet Union had collapsed, but Syria’s alliance carried on with Russia. Moscow, along with Tehran, continues to arm and assist Assad to this day. Nonetheless, there was early hope in 2011 that Bashar would ameliorate relations with the West. With the War on Terror following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Bush administration seemed ready to roll up Middle Eastern dictators. In 2005, America approached Bashar with a ‘Libya-style’ deal similar to that offered in 2004 to Qaddafi: stop interfering in Lebanon, supporting terrorism and supporting the Iraq insurgency and receive normalised relations in return (Beeston and Blanford, 2005). They saw Bashar as vulnerable following a damning UN report blaming members of the Assad family for murdering popular former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Despite the blow to its influence when Syrian troops pulled out of Lebanon and a Western-backed government coming to power there, Bashar al-Assad remained in power in Syria.

Internationally, Russia has stood firmly by Assad. Moscow has defended the regime before the UN and threatened to veto military action. Russia acted as Assad’s proxy in negotiations to avert a U.S. strike following the August 21st nerve agent attacks in Damascus and has offered counter-arguments to NATO assertions supporting intervention. It continues to supply Syria with arms and has even displayed a show of force by dispatching additional warships to its Syrian port at Tartus (Investor’s Business Daily, 2012). Stymying NATO efforts in Syria has reminded many of the bipolar era when Moscow was on par with Washington and has increased Russian influence and power in Syria and elsewhere.

Regionally, Iran also remains committed to Syria in the same manner Syria stood by Iran in 1980 (discussed above). There is evidence the elite Iranian Quds Force is assisting Assad in Syria (Reynolds, 2012). Lebanon-based Hezbollah, dependent upon Syria as its conduit of support from Iran (Martini et al, 2012: 3), is fighting alongside Assad’s forces. Tehran is committed to opposing NATO interests anywhere it can in the Middle East and has done so since its 1979 revolution, most recently by proxy in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO troops or a Western-aligned government in Syria, paired with NATO’s presence elsewhere in the region, would leave Iran surrounded and isolated.

Internally, support from minority factions Hafez al-Assad cobbled together to legitimise his rule—military officers, Ba’athists, Alawites—have remained largely loyal to Bashar. There is fear by many that the tolerance cultivated by the Assad regime would disappear and the country would return to Sunni-dominated rule. There is already evidence of repression of minorities in rebel-held areas of the country (Martini et al, 2012: 5). The Syrian military, despite many defections to the rebels, remains largely loyal to Bashar. Many military officers have benefitted materially from supporting Assad over the years and they stand to lose everything and likely be branded as criminals if he falls. Other minority groups split between supporting the regime or the rebels are not enough of a factor to tip the balance to either side (ibid.: 3-5).

Unlike Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, the military and factions within Syria have not abandoned Assad, nor have allies Russia and Iran. These strong alliances have, thus far, kept Assad in power and their existence has checked NATO from taking military action.

NATO Liberalism and Realism in Libya

When considering military action against Qaddafi in Libya, NATO faced almost no opposition to intervention and was encouraged to act by initial Arab League support for a no-fly zone and Qaddafi’s loss of domestic support. The dearth of opposition and Qaddafi’s utter lack of allies meant that virtually nothing stood in the way of a NATO campaign there. Action in Libya was significantly easier to achieve.

There was no opposition to refute the case for a UN resolution. Russia, China, India, Brazil and Germany abstained from voting and they and other states expressed reservations only after military action had begun, holding they had been duped by NATO as to the meaning and interpretation of the UN resolution, a criticism echoed in the Arab League (Buckley, 2012: 85-7). There was little opposition and little to lose in getting rid of a nuisance dictator murdering his own people, though arguably the feeling they had been tricked increased some states’ opposition to authorising UN action in Syria.

Conducting a Realist calculation, Libya presented no real threat to NATO interests or security since normalising relations in 2004, but some argued toppling Qaddafi would get rid of a troublesome dictator with a dirty past and grant access to high-quality Libyan crude oil, decidedly in NATO interests (Jenkins, 2011). However, NATO states predominantly used Liberal, values-based rhetoric regarding democracy, freedom and human rights to legitimise intervention. Both Realist and Liberal justifications were given to support the case for Libyan action.

NATO Liberalism and Realism in Syria

Syria presents a different case for NATO. The same Liberal arguments used in Libya are being used to justify acting in Syria. For Liberals, supporting democracy, freedom and human rights—values NATO states claim to support—for people facing violence to obtain them is right regardless of the power-political circumstances.

However, according to Coetzee (2012: 312), from a structural Realist perspective, supporting Liberal democracy and freedom during the Arab Spring has already been harmful to security interests—specifically NATO’s—as it has led to gains for militant Islamism in the region. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islamist violence against U.S. targets in Libya, and Islamic militants with ties to al Qaeda operating in Syria are examples. It is the Realist calculation of balancing potential gains against potential losses that has held NATO back.

There are some gains to be made. Ending Assad rule would deprive Russia and Iran of an ally and a source of mutual support, reducing their regional influence. Iran would be isolated with the loss of its last large regional ally. Russia would lose a major trade partner, be booted out of the Middle East and may lose Tartus, its only port on the Mediterranean. These outcomes are in NATO’s interest.

Nonetheless, these gains are not worth the potential hazards. According to Martini et al (2012: 3), NATO and its allies have less at stake and Assad remaining in power does not greatly harm NATO interests. In deciding to intervene, it will face strong opposition and vetoes from Russia and likely China in the UNSC. Taking military action without a UN mandate will undermine the legitimacy of any NATO action. Iran already has fighters on the ground in Syria. Russia continues to arm Assad and has shown military support by dispatching more ‘gunboats’ to Tartus (discussed above). It is unclear how far Russia or Iran may go in defending Assad and their interests. Military action may increase violence in Syria and/or lead, at worst, to a larger, longer regional or international war. NATO does not want that and the gains are not worth risking it.

Assad has promised to confront foreign intervention with full military force. Though it recently signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and agreed to decommission its chemical weapons, Syria still has a sizeable stockpile and Assad has threatened to use them against any outside military intervention. If NATO were to intervene, it would still have to deal with post-war stability and reconstruction efforts and could face an Iraq-style insurgency, not to mention undertaking the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons itself.

Though it is a Machiavellian calculation, all that is at hazard for NATO is that the status quo will be maintained in Syria, though thousands of Syrians will continue to die and become refugees. NATO states may be seen as hypocrites for supporting Liberal ideas like democracy and human rights with military intervention in Libya but not in Syria. Russia, Iran and Assad may receive a boost in power and influence for having seen off the NATO challenge. However, none of these outcomes presents a dire, direct threat to NATO security or interests, while possibly enabling Islamists to increase their influence in a new Syria in the absence of Assad may (Martini et al, 2012: 5-7).


Conclusion

From a Realist perspective, for NATO the possible risks of intervention in Syria outweigh possible rewards. A comparison of the strengths of the allies—or lack thereof—of the regimes in Libya and Syria and what they stand to gain or lose in either case explains why NATO has chosen not to intervene in Syria as it did in Libya. The status quo will be maintained in Syria for now, while the jury is still out on Libya’s future.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Beeston, R., and Blanford, N. (2005) ‘America Offers “Gaddafi Deal” to Bring Syria in from the Cold’ The Times (London), October 15, 2005, Overseas News, p. 45.

Buckley, C. (2012) ‘Learning From Libya, Acting in Syria’. Journal of Strategic Security 5:2, pp. 81-104.

Church, G. (1992) Wanted: A New Hideout [online]. Available from: http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=81cb6491-87cc-404a-9977-405832b485b7%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=123&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=bth&AN=9204061092 [Accessed 10 October 2013]

Coetzee, E. (2013) ‘Democracy, the Arab Spring and the Future (Great Powers) of International Politics: A Structural Realist Perspective’. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 40:2, pp. 299-318 [online]. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpsa20 [Accessed 23 October 2013]

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Destroying Syrian Chemical Stockpiles Won't be Easy

This article originally appeared in The Daily Beast on 6 September 2013.

It is now clear that the Syrian government used sarin nerve gas to attack suspected rebel forces in Damascus on August 21. There is no doubt that the “red line” was breached. With the American public delivering a clear consensus against committing ground forces, the Obama administration will almost certainly limit any intervention to remote attacks. In the best circumstances, destroying chemical weapons is a dangerous and intensive task, but trying to destroy them from the air without spreading their deadly agents makes it even more difficult.

Drawing from my experience serving 9 years in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND) for the U.S. Army, here is a rundown of the options available for destroying chemical weapons with a look at the feasibility of different methods and the complications that each entails.

An air campaign could focus on eliminating chemical munitions, military chemical units, chemical weapons production facilities, any or all of the above. The first step is to identify the targets and fix their locations. Since the first mentions of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime in July 2012, U.S. intelligence has been tracking the movements of Syria’s chemical assets. There is a ready supply of human intelligence from rebel forces and refugees, a steady stream of signals intercepts from Syrian government forces, and near constant visual surveillance using aerial imagery platforms. Social media and news reports from inside Syria also provide open-source intelligence.

Syria is reported to have one of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons in the world. Locating all of these munitions, even with the best intelligence available, will not be easy. Syria is also known to store chemical agents in“binary” form, where two components of the chemical agent are stored separately and only mixed before being loaded into munitions. This makes transport safer and simpler but can vastly expand the number of targets that need to be located and destroyed and makes them easier to conceal.

Syria’s chemical weapons-production facilities are reported to be located near major cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs, while munitions are stored at as many as 50 different sites. As the U.S. prepares for an attack, the regime is likely spreading munitions across cities throughout the country, making detection more difficult, necessitating more strikes, and increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.

Some intelligence reports indicate that the Assad regime lacks the ability to produce certain necessary precursor ingredients, but Syria stockpiled chemicals from European suppliers before export controls became effective. It also doesn’t take much to create many of the chemical agents used; they can be produced by anyone with an advanced chemistry degree given a moderately equipped refinement facility. Targeting Syria’s production facilities is possible, but will be difficult. Tracking movements of Syrian military chemical units and weapons platforms capable of firing chemical munitions would be an easier task.

The hardest part comes after the munitions are located. Once the targets are acquired they must be destroyed without releasing the deadly chemical agents— it’s possible but a bit like bombing a paint factory at long range and expecting not to have any splatter.

Syrian chemical units and their launchers can be targeted using airstrikes, drones, or cruise missiles launched from naval vessels. However, given the likelihood that the Syrians have intentionally moved these weapons systems into populated areas, even precise strikes on them could lead to civilian casualties. On a larger scale, there is also the danger that an attack on launchers loaded with chemical munitions could spread toxic substances as far as Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan or into the Mediterranean Sea.

America must face the possibility that in carrying out attacks to prevent the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons it risks unleashing those deadly agents on a civilian population.

Other than weapon systems and facilities, Syrian soldiers working in chemical units are another likely target for attack. The troops in these units are usually outfitted in identifiable protective gear for their own safety, a clear indicator of the presence of chemical agents and their impending use. But attacking these soldiers presents a similar set of problems—their likely proximity to chemical weapons means that targeting them risks hitting the munitions they are guarding or operating and releasing them into nearby populations.

The care America takes in eliminating its own chemical weapons reflects how dangerous the process is, even when it’s done in a safe and controlled environment. Since 1986, the protocol has been to incinerate the agent at temperatures above 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit or to neutralize it using hot water and a caustic compound. After the destructive phase, the next step involves extensive monitoring and testing of air, water, and soil to ensure no residual release.

Simply dropping a conventional bomb on an ammo dump is not a solution. Besides the initial deadly effect of dispersing chemical agents, their release into air, soil, and water can have severe health effects for years down the road.

A chemical rocket or artillery round does not explode like conventional munitions. They contain a propellant to get the munitions on target and only enough explosive to rupture the round and release their agent, either bursting in the air above a target or upon hitting the ground. This is why there were several rockets found semi-intact after the August 21 attack on Ghutah which were subsequently sampled by U.N. investigators.

The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency has conducted extensive research into anti-chemical strike options. One weapon they have studied is the non-explosive CBU-107 “PAW” which releases 3,700 extremely dense metal rods into a high-altitude free fall that acts like thousands of daggers, penetrating and shredding a target without the use of explosives. This weapon is less likely to cause an explosion at production facilities but it will rupture munitions, releasing their chemical agents and making casualties of anyone in the vicinity.

Thermobaric explosive weapons, like the BLU-119/B “CrashPad” are another option. Thermobaric explosives, essentially the most powerful non-nuclear devices in the U.S. arsenal, work by sucking in all the oxygen in the blast radius and using it to fuel an intense, high-velocity explosion reaching over 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit. In theory, such devices have the potential to suck in and incinerate chemical agents, however, no conclusive testing of such devices on live chemical agents has yet been conducted.

While they may have a better chance of destroying chemical munitions without releasing their agents, the blast and heat generated by thermobaric weapons are intensely deadly. Structures near the blast will be destroyed and persons not killed by the initial explosion or flying debris will suffer lethal damage to internal organs caused by the pressure wave it creates. The effect of their use in a populated urban area would cause casualties comparable to a small nuclear explosion or a chemical attack. Using a nonexplosive penetrator or a thermobaric device in a city such as Damascus could cause more civilian casualties than the regime’s attack on Ghutah, which is just the reason Assad’s forces are likely relocating their chemical assets closer to urban centers.

The ability to safely destroy large stocks of chemical agents with airstrikes is still unconfirmed, though it is theoretically possible. Testing that method now requires accepting that even relative success may mean killing thousands of the very Syrian civilians we would be acting to protect. As the American people and Congress consider the proposals for action made by the president and his cabinet they should be aware of the chances for success, the risks, and the potential cost in lives.

Antagonizing America: Our Enemies Depend Upon us

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 28 March 2013.

There’s a theory that says when you’re the new kid in a rough neighborhood the first thing you should do is find the biggest, toughest kid on the block and punch him in the face. The sheer audacity of the act will make anyone else think twice about tangling with you, especially if you manage to go toe-to-toe for a few rounds before losing. Power perceived is power achieved–until the contrary is proven. America is the biggest, toughest kid on the block. There is value in antagonizing America.

“The people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders … tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.” –Hermann Goering

This is very much the idea that states such as Iran follow. The regime gains its power by focusing the minds of the population on a common enemy—America. The weekly anti-American demonstrations in Tehran, complete with flag burning, occur with such clockwork regularity that they have to come up with new gimmicks just to keep people interested.

It’s been said they pay people from the countryside to come into the city for a day to hold up signs and chant. Who wouldn't like to hop on a bus for a day in the city on the government’s dime? What university student would turn down a few bucks for burning a flag?

There’s nothing like an enemy to focus the mind of the people on external factors. The benefit is that while they’re worried about the enemy outside their borders they won’t give too much thought to life and problems within their own. Keeping the country safe from the enemy is a good justification for all kinds of internal security measures that would be questionable in other circumstances. A perpetual state of wariness exists on a pseudo-wartime footing.

Ironically, the Iranian regime and other dictatorships and theocracies like it throughout the world depend upon the United States. Their continued grip on power depends upon having America as an enemy to rattle their saber against. They derive their power from a manufactured need to bravely resist American imperialism that would destroy their culture and way of life. Every time commodity prices go up and put strain on peoples’ wallets, it can be blamed upon the enemy and their embargo, not on the regime and its actions or policies.

North Korea under the Kim dynasty has made an art of cycling between alternately opposing and folding to America and its allies. They develop nuclear weapons and elicit all manner of inducements from the West to get rid of them. The U.S. has delivered hundreds of thousands of tons of food aid, almost none of which made to ordinary Koreans.

After the Obama administration structured the aid to ensure it reached the people directly, the North called it off, going ahead with missile tests, beginning to rebuild its dismantled nuclear facilities and has recently threatened nuclear war against South Korea and the United States. There are signs the North is preparing for another underground nuclear test.

However, two or three years from now America and its P+5 allies will likely find themselves on the verge of another diplomatic breakthrough with North Korea. But once again, the North will snatch final victory from our mouths and the cycle will begin again. Iran follows a similar pattern in its own nuclear talks with America. Every time a breakthrough is reported through public or back channels and there seems to be progress, it runs off the rails almost like clockwork.

If Iran were really determined to build a nuclear arsenal, they could certainly have done so by now. Pakistan did so as a hedge against India and we couldn't or didn't do a lot to stop it. Some have been predicting a nuclear-armed Iran since the 1990’s. In reality, it isn't the nuclear weapons Iran is seeking; it is the confrontation and antimony with America that it wants and depends upon. Iran has had an open door to developing nuclear weapons for many years now and will likely sit on the fence for years to come.

None of this makes Iran or North Korea stuffed tigers. The Iranian regime has done actual damage to America going back to 1979 and the Cold War. Anywhere America becomes involved in the Middle East, Iran backs the other horse. It funds international terrorist groups, targeting Israel in particular. In Iraq, Iranian intelligence operatives were caught on the ground by U.S. forces and their footprint was easily seen in the training, weapons and explosives training funneled to the insurgency there. Iranian operations have likely killed thousands of Americans directly and indirectly.

The deep cult-of-personality that exists around Kim Jong-un and his father before him is grounds to wonder if North Korea will one day stop being a rational actor. Right now, Kim has decided that he is going to punch tough-kid America in the face to show the world and his people that he is made of sterner stuff. However, if he begins to believe his own propaganda and it turns to mania, he has his fingers on a lot of buttons.

Understanding this behavior is important. Unfortunately our response often seems to be to adopt the same model of these states in our own national political discourse on the topic. The war drums come out and red lines are drawn. Accusations are hurled back and forth and there’s a scramble to take up the patriotic mantle.

The Global War on Terror has been used to excuse many security measures in America wholly unacceptable in other circumstances. If we have learned anything in the last decade of conflict, it is that we should never sleepwalk towards war as inevitability without a full consideration of its necessity and aftermath and a wholehearted commitment to seeing it through to the end if we do.

Sharing the Burden of National Security

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 29 January 2013.

For decades America has been arguing that in order for America to do less, our allies will have to do more. We have been cajoling our international partners to take more action in the world. There are signs it is starting to work, though the efforts have a certain shakiness that can be expected when using skills with which one is somewhat out of practice. Despite being met with scepticism and derision abroad, this is something the U.S. should welcome.

Following the end of WWII and the end of the Cold War, America’s major allies were content to let Uncle Sam take the lead. Some, such as Germany and Japan, remain constitutionally hamstrung from taking part in interventions for other than defensive purposes. There has been some softening in this position. German troops do patrol Afghanistan and Japanese troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan until 2007. American influence following WWII created this condition we’re asking them to push aside.

The United Kingdom has shown willingness to use military force to defend interests. Britain fought alongside America in the Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader ‘War on Terror’. However, Prime Minister David Cameron recently announced further troop reductions, cutting out 5,300 soldiers, making the British military 75% smaller than it was at its Cold War peak. There is debate as to whether the UK should remain a nuclear-armed power or discontinue its programs. Every other EU state is reducing its expenditure on national defense as well.

The end of the Cold War caught America and its allies flatfooted. Failure to adapt culturally, technologically, and bureaucratically led to the intelligence failures that made 9/11 possible ten years on. The same conditions were repeated in Europe and were exacerbated, in some cases, by a souring of political relations with Washington over the Iraq War. Economic conditions since 2008 have not made it any more attractive to increase spending on national security despite the continued threat of Islamism and America’s strategic ‘shift to the east’.

But there are signs that America’s allies are answering the call. Britain and France were the early drivers behind action in Libya, though European military equipment wasn’t as reliable as it should have been and America had to sell them the ammunition. Britain and France have also been vocal regarding action in Syria. France has taken the lead in fighting Islamists in Mali with British logistical support. This hasn’t gone smoothly either with a shipment of supplies held up by maintenance problems with British aircraft. UK PM David Cameron has called for renewed vigilance in the worldwide fight against Islamism following the Algerian terror attack, though doing so after announcing a third round of military cuts.

Despite bumps in the road, the signs are encouraging. America has spent the last decade at war in several places thousands of miles away, in inhospitable terrain, fighting on the home turf of an enemy that cannot be easily identified, often with interference from ‘fair weather’ allies. The U.S. spends more on its national security than any other country, and our troops are the most experienced and professional anywhere. Though the U.S. has certainly had its own bumps in the road, we’re much more experienced in planning and executing military operations.

Hopefully, our allies will work out their kinks now that they’re getting back into the game. After 43 years, France has re-joined NATO. Europe has been carrying its load on the diplomatic front in negotiations and sanctions with states such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Intelligence cooperation continues even with ‘dove’ states such as Germany and Japan. But it would be naïve from a national security perspective to believe that America should continue to carry the weight of the world when it comes to confronting common enemies. No state should be wholly dependent upon another state to provide it security. This has been the condition among America and its allies since the end of the Cold War.

Despite America’s calls for more help from its allies, some criticize this as evidence of a ‘lead from behind’ approach by President Obama. Republicans have cited European-spearheaded operations as a sign of weakness. Yet, at every turn, America has provided support to ensure these operations succeeded. We provided much of the intelligence, coordination, and logistical support. America, the experienced and senior partner, has been the glue that ensured success. Allowing our allies to take the lead and flex their muscle, something we’re asking them to do, is not a weakness. It should be welcomed as a sign of strength.

But there are problems, defense budgets foremost among them. America may be facing its own defense cuts due to a self-laid trap. This is a problem America will have to sort out alone. But Europe should turn toward defense integration. Most EU countries are unable to spend large amounts to create, expand, or maintain a functioning military with all the same costly weapons platforms the U.S. can. We may soon face a European continent with outdated air forces, no heavy armor corps, and undertrained and underequipped troops. Such a force is not worth paying for.

Imagine British, Polish, and Italian infantry supported by Belgian and Dutch tanks and artillery and a Spanish and French air force, all supported by German and Austrian logistics, or a similar constellation, led by a pan-European command structure. This would be more cost-effective force and create a viable fighting force to match the U.S., as opposed to a collection of tiny under-budgeted and outdated national forces.

America and its allies should not make their budgets or long-term strategic plans based upon the idea that we are entering into an era that will be more peaceful than has been our past. We should welcome more vigilance by our allies, not cite it as evidence of decline. Sharing the burden between America and its allies and in turn our allies sharing their burden between themselves is a strategy that prepares for what we may–but hopefully will not—face in future.

Syria: Options for U.S. Invasion, Securing Chemical Weapons

This article originally appeared on PolicyMic on 24 August 2012.

The presence of chemical weapons in Syria has caused much debate since the statement by the Assad regime that they could be used against an outside invasion, but not against Syrians internally. There have also been questionable reports that the Syrian opposition is attempting to obtain or capture chemical weapons to use against regime supporters. "Anonymous diplomatic sources" have said the U.S. may need as many as 60,000 troops to "secure" Syria’s chemical stockpile. Others offer that the U.S. may send in special operations units. President Obama issued a warning to Assad that their use would shift U.S. policy toward intervening. There are many options on the table to deal with Syria’s chemical weapons.

Figures on both the left and right are supporting some form of intervention in Syria. Some hawkish commentators are pushing for an Iraq-style invasion, while others support an incursion similar to the successful Libya campaign and/or enforced "no-fly" zones as in Iraq. I have personally written in support of providing limited anti-armor weapons already present in the region and non-lethal support to the opposition to level the playing field against Assad’s well-equipped military.

The U.S. should not mount a full-scale invasion of Syria as long as the conflict remains local, doesn’t spread beyond Syria’s borders, and no other world or regional power provides large-scale military support to the regime. There is evidence Syria may be a growing proxy conflict on both sides, but not enough to justify the costs of an invasion in American lives and money. American national security is not directly threatened. However, ending the violence there is in our interest. That is another debate.

An invasion would upend the domestic character of the revolution the Obama administration has been careful to respect since the beginning of the Arab Spring two years ago. If the U.S. invades Syria, it would become responsible for the aftermath. A repeat of Iraq is certainly an undesirable outcome for America at this stage. Sending tens of thousands of troops into Syria to secure its chemical weapons is undesirable and unnecessary. The early stages of Afghanistan showed the folly of using "economy of force" or maneuver warfare and ignoring the Powell Doctrine, as did the lack of enough troops on the ground in Iraq to provide security which precipitated the need for a "surge." Sending troops into Syria with the goal of only securing chemical weapons would be a repeat of these conditions. Either send in enough troops to guarantee the success of the mission and security or do not send them in at all. There is no room for half-measures. These are lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq.

Syria’s chemical weapons and production facilities are spread across the country from Aleppo to Homs to Damascus. Putting troops on the ground to secure them would mean splitting our forces, which would necessitate communicable logistical and transport connections. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that enemies who cannot match U.S. troops directly will attack their supply convoys on major roads. The conditions for U.S. troops on the ground in Syria would be similar to those on the ground in Iraq. Adding the difficulty and danger of guarding stockpiles of chemical weapons and transporting them for disposal, most likely wearing thick chemical protective equipment, makes a mass ground invasion the most undesirable option available.

There has been discussion of inserting special operations forces into Syria to secure these weapons. Such an operation would depend upon very accurate, complete information on where and under what conditions these weapons are being stored. The U.S. claims to have good knowledge of where these weapons are, but quickly and quietly removing what are probably hundreds or thousands of chemical munitions doesn’t have a great likelihood of success. They would probably have to be destroyed where they are using explosives that generate enough heat to incinerate the chemical agents, otherwise it risks a chemical agent contamination incident akin to a "dirty bomb" for which the U.S. would be responsible. The risk of a failed mission resulting in the capture or death of U.S. military personnel or the unintentional release of chemical agents causing civilian casualties makes this option undesirable as well.

A third option, the least of evils, would be to use air delivered thermobaric explosives to destroy the chemical munitions. The success of this option would also depend upon precise intelligence as to the location of the stocks and highly accurate placement of the explosive device to minimize the risk of an accidental release. It would also eliminate the need for operators on the ground to transport and place the explosive, though personnel on the ground could certainly provide highly accurate location information or guide an airstrike.

Currently the U.S. decommissions our own chemical weapons by incinerating the raw agents in temperatures above 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Thermobaric explosions exceed 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit in the radius of up to 500 feet around their epicenter, depending upon the size of the device used. Such temperatures would be enough to incinerate chemical agents and minimize the chances of incidental release of the agents or other lethal gasses from the resulting explosion.

This option is also far from perfect. It does have the advantage of reducing or eliminating the need for U.S. personnel on the ground inside Syria. It still depends upon very accurate and complete intelligence regarding the location of Syria’s chemical weapons. There is still great risk of collateral damage to nearby civilian populations, but using this option to eliminate these chemical weapons and preventing their use may save more lives. It must be considered if the use of these weapons is probable and imminent and if the risk of collateral damage from such an airstrike outweighs the outcome of destroying these chemical weapons.

This is indeed a hefty decision to make. We should all hope that the situation in Syria is resolved soon without the need for any intervention by the U.S. or other states. That truly would be the best outcome for everyone involved.