Is a Nuclear Weapons-Free World Possible?

November 2013

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013) recognises only five ‘nuclear states’—the U.S., UK, France, Russia and China. Since 1967, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel have also developed nuclear weapons, almost doubling the size of the group. South Africa stands alone as the only country to develop atomic weapons and give them up (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2013). There has been a slow, steady reduction of the number of nuclear warheads in the world to between 10,000 (Kristensen & Norris, 2013) and 25,000 (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 82), with, according to some, 90% of nuclear warheads produced since 1945 now out of service (Kristensen & Norris, 2013). However, there are still more than enough warheads to destroy civilisation as we know it.

We live in a world today with an increasing number of nuclear states, not decreasing. Nonetheless, the picture is not as bleak as it may seem. President John F. Kennedy predicted that by 1964 the world would see as many as 10-20 nuclear powers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, quoting Kennedy, 2003). There are not even that many today, 50 years later. Since 2007 world leaders have shown renewed interest in nuclear disarmament. With a practical view of nuclear disarmament, an agreement with proper control, verification and enforcement mechanisms, and the necessary political will, it is possible to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world.

‘Abolition’ v. ‘Disarmament’
O’Hanlon (2010) correctly points out an important difference in vocabulary in what one means by ‘a world without nuclear weapons’. ‘Abolishing’ nuclear weapons means not only dismantling all existing weapons, but outlawing their testing, use, reconstruction, development, proliferation and make them wholly illegal in all circumstances. This differs from dismantling or demilitarising all currently existing nuclear arsenals in the world and agreeing an international framework to monitor progress and fissile materials, verify disarmament and mediate disputes, but not totally outlawing them forever in all circumstances. It would also eliminate all current atomic weapons. Both would constitute a ‘nuclear weapons-free world’, but disarmament is more realistic and achievable.

The NPT attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation and elicits an agreement in Article VI (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013) from nuclear states to cease the nuclear arms race, dismantle their nuclear weapons and agree a treaty leading to ‘general and complete disarmament’ under international control, something they have yet to do. Article I (ibid.) stops ‘nuclear states’ from transferring nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear states while Article II (ibid.) prevents signatories which did not already possess nuclear weapons from obtaining them. States which have developed atomic weapons after the NPT have done so as non-members of the treaty. The NPT does not seek to ‘abolish’ nuclear technology in the world. It recognises, at Article I (ibid.), the right of ‘nuclear states’—America, Britain, France, China and Russia—to possess them. NPT Article IV (ibid.) in fact recognises and encourages the development and sharing of the ‘inalienable right’ to peaceful nuclear technology among nuclear and non-nuclear states. NPT Article X (ibid.) gives members the right to leave the treaty in circumstances where they believe it is contrary to their national interest.

Individuals and groups who call for the ‘abolition’ or banishment of nuclear weapons stand on firm moral ground. However, groups such as Greenpeace (2013) and iCan (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 2013) focus on campaigning to motivate individuals at ‘grassroots’ level to apply pressure on officials to abolish atomic weapons, which, while also an important part of the effort, does not address the perennial underlying political and security issues which cause states to cling to or seek to acquire nuclear weapons. These groups have been critical of the 1970 NPT (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013) as legitimising a system of nuclear ‘haves and have-nots’ by giving special recognition to the 5 original nuclear states, charge it has been ineffective in applying pressure to disarm (Brehm et al., 2013: 12-16), and point to a complete ban on nuclear weapons along the same path as treaties for landmines and biological weapons as a better goal. Nonetheless, even some critical of the NPT and piece-meal bilateral agreements acknowledge that forever ‘dis-inventing’ nuclear weapons is not possible and that if one state reconstitutes a nuclear programme, there may be no alternative but for others to do so to confront that threat (Blechmann & Bollfrass, 2010; 583).

The distinction between disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons is not clearly articulated, even by those familiar with nuclear issues. Abolition involves what some have called ‘putting the genie back in the bottle’—(Gusterson, 2008) requiring all states to simultaneously disclaim and disown nuclear weapons for good, an idea that becomes difficult to achieve if even one state refuses to agree or comply, thus causing all others to consider doing so as well. It is unrealistic because it does not take into account the underlying (in)security conditions, discussed by countless security scholars over the last several decades (e.g., Sagan & Waltz, 2013), which lead states to acquire atomic weapons to begin with. If these are not addressed, even incremental steps toward disarmament become difficult and a comprehensive agreement becomes impossible. This differs from nuclear disarmament built on the back of the trust, agreements and institutions of the existing NPT, specifically the Article VI (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013) agreement to pursue a treaty leading to ‘general and complete disarmament’. NPT Article VII (ibid.) also allows states to conclude bi- or multi-lateral agreements relating to nuclear disarmament, something the U.S., Russia/USSR and other members have used to positive effect to agree nuclear reduction treaties, such as SALT, START, SORT, and New START. Nuclear disarmament under the NPT means states continuing (finally) to seriously pursue something they have already agreed to do, making nuclear disarmament more possible than nuclear abolition. Though progress has been slow under the NPT, it still has made progress.

Control, Verification and ‘Virtual Deterrence’
In considering whether a nuclear weapons-free world is possible it must also be considered how any nuclear disarmament agreement, once reached, would be verified, how fissile materials would be controlled and how noncompliance would be confronted. An agreement without such ‘teeth’ would be doomed from the start.

Tracking and controlling nuclear material is the only way to ensure new atomic weapons cannot be developed (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 87). However, environmental, market and economic pressures have brought about the need for energy from a clean, reliable source such as nuclear power. The IAEA itself has called for 1,400 new nuclear reactors to be built worldwide by 2050 to meet world energy demand (ibid.: 88). NPT Article IV upholds the ‘inalienable right’ of states to pursue peaceful nuclear technology (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013). Even if a comprehensive international nuclear disarmament agreement is reached, fissile material will still be available and remain a growing issue. To simultaneously meet the growing international demand for energy and confront the issue of controlling fissile materials, multi-national nuclear power facilities could be built. No single nation would ‘own’ the plant or materials and the facility and nuclear fuel could be easily inspected by an organisation such as the IAEA (Drell & Goodby, 2008: 26-7). A similar solution has been put forward to settle the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme (Forden & Thompson, 2009: 11).

Counterintuitively, none of the nine states known to possess nuclear weapons is currently subject to IAEA inspections. The five NPT ‘nuclear states’ are exempt and the four non-NPT states—India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea—are not subject to them (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 88). This means the overwhelming bulk of nuclear weapons and material in the world is only tracked by these governments. We have to take their word for it. Any comprehensive treaty would have to include control, verification and inspection measures by an organisation, such as the IAEA, which apply to all countries equally. The IAEA, “should be given the authority to inspect any facility, at any time, and anywhere on the territory of every signature state” (Blechmann & Bollfrass, 2010: 571).

Even if all nuclear weapons are demilitarised, fissile material closely controlled and an inspection regime instituted, there will always be the chance that one or more states will reconstitute nuclear weapons at some point in the future. The first steps could be similar to those taken today against states such as North Korea and Iran—sanctions, negotiations and possible military action. However, such a process may take too long to stop the reconstitution of nuclear weapons and allowing it to be subject to a UN Security Council veto could further complicate matters (ibid.: 573). The fear a foe would secretly maintain nuclear weapons or rebuild them is an obstacle to convincing current nuclear-armed states to agree to give them up.

The concept of ‘virtual deterrence’ has been put forward both to calm the security fears of current nuclear states regarding disarmament and as an enforcement and deterrence mechanism against rogue states that would start or reconstitute a nuclear weapons programme after achieving nuclear disarmament (Paloczi-Horvath, 1998). Briefly, the idea is that current nuclear states, such as the P5, could maintain the threshold ability to reconstitute their nuclear programmes in a matter of months in such circumstances in order to confront the threat (ibid.: 3). Nuclear ‘abolitionists’ would object, however nuclear weapons technology cannot be ‘dis-invented’ and the threat will always exist. Nuclear disarmament is possible; abolition of nuclear weapons forever is not.

Political Will
One of the most important factors, if not the most important, in arriving at a world without nuclear weapons is political will. In 2007, U.S. senior policy leaders Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz breathed new life into the movement toward ‘Global Zero’ beginning with a series of opinion pieces in major American newspapers (Kissinger et al., 2007; 2008; 2010; 2011) as part of the Nuclear Security Project. They succeeded in making nuclear disarmament an issue in the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, supported by both then-Senator Barack Obama and Senator John McCain (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 81; Ferguson, 2010: 88).

As President, Barack Obama named nuclear disarmament one of the priorities of his administration and promised in his 2009 Prague Speech that America would take ‘concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons’ (White House Press Office, 2009). In October 2009, President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons (Nobel Prize, 2009). In April 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense released a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in which it reiterated America’s commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, committed to ‘reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy’ and to ‘maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels’ as key priorities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010: iii). In April 2010, President Obama also signed New START with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, reducing and limiting both nuclear arsenals to 1,550 warheads and between 700-800 delivery platforms (U.S. Department of State, 2010). In May 2010 the 5-yearly NPT review conference was held in New York. The final document included recommitment of members to the NPT, specific action-plans regarding nuclear disarmament and proposed steps for creating a ‘WMD-free’ zone in the Middle East (Choubey, 2010). The U.S. National Security Strategy, released in May 2010, also reiterated U.S. commitment to ‘pursue the goal of a world without nuclear weapons’ and strengthening the NPT (White House, 2010: 23).

Senior UK policymakers also got behind the renewed push. In June 2007 Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett spoke in support of the effort by Kissinger, Nunn, Perry and Schultz (Beckett, 2007), as did Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson in 2008, calling for support of New START, a strengthening of the NPT and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Hurd et al., 2008). Prime Minister Gordon Brown (Brown, 2008) and Defence Minister Des Browne shifted UK policy from that under Tony Blair where non-proliferation was the sole focus as opposed to now pursuing both non-proliferation and disarmament (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2008). The United States and United Kingdom have both continued to engage with North Korea and Iran on their nuclear programmes, strengthening sanctions and leading talks alongside allies, culminating in the recent multilateral agreement between the ‘P5 + 1’ nations and Iran to slow development of their nuclear programme (Borgher & Dehghan, 2013).

These events of the past seven years have shown a renewed commitment on behalf of most of the major nuclear states to nuclear disarmament, but it hasn’t all been easy or good news. The U.S. and Russia did sign New START in 2010, though it was only just barely ratified by Congress in 2011 over objections by hawkish Republican Senators (Oliphant, 2010), such as Sen. John McCain, who had had claimed to support nuclear disarmament in his 2008 presidential campaign (Daalder & Lodal, 2008: 81; Ferguson, 2010: 88). After agreeing a 2008 deal with the P5+1 to end its nuclear programme, North Korea destroyed the cooling tower of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon. However the IAEA claims it has restarted work at the facility in recent days (Reuters, 2013).

However, the renewed push for nuclear disarmament since 2007 has been overtaken by other domestic and international events in key states. The 2008 economic downturn, economic crises in EU states, government ‘austerity’ policies in the UK and political fights over tax and fiscal policies and domestic political issues such as ‘Obamacare’ and the ‘debt ceiling’ in the United States continue to absorb much of the world’s political energy and capital. Since 2008 there have been changes in national leadership in the U.S., UK, France, Russia, China, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel—every nuclear state. The 2012 conference called for in the 2010 NPT review to devise a ‘WMD-free zone’ in the Middle East was cancelled as it was unclear whether Israel, having just begun a military incursion into Gaza (Gladstone & Kershner, 2012), or Iran would fully participate and Arab states were angered by further delays in a discussion which began 15 years before at the 1995 NPT review (Malin & Miller, 2013: 1-2). The 2010 Arab Spring uprisings have caused political and national security concerns for the P5 states and others. The U.S., UK and France have clashed with Russia and China in their response to the Syria conflict. The use of chemical weapons in Damascus on 21 August, most-probably by the Assad regime (Gladstone & Chivers, 2013), has focused the world’s attention on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and a different ‘weapon of mass destruction’.

The reinvigorated campaign for nuclear disarmament shows that the political will to push forward the agenda for a nuclear-free world exists, however it is also constantly being stretched to the limit and attention is divided by other world events. O’Hanlon (2010) points out that timing is also crucial on this issue and real progress may not be possible until some of the world’s other major problems which often cause security concerns which complicate the nuclear disarmament issue—Taiwan, Kashmir, Russia and its neighbours, Israel-Palestine—are resolved first. As President Obama acknowledged in his 2009 Prague Speech, “This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us the world cannot change” (White House, 2009). The political will is there, but the attention and timing must also be right and they all must coincide in order for there to be any realistic chance of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

Do We Really Want a World Free of Nuclear Weapons?
Though the accepted dilemma seems to be how to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and whether it is possible, there is not much in-depth discussion as to whether a nuclear weapons-free world would provide security and peace as asserted. Arguably the most famous analysis of this question is the debate in book form between Scott Sagan and the late Ken Waltz (2013).

Briefly, as a Realist, Waltz believes that the world consists of states in global anarchy which must find ways to create security for themselves through the two separate ideas of ‘defence’, the ability to repel an attack, and ‘deterrence’, the ability to inflict enough punishment on an opponent to create a disincentive for them to attack (ibid.: 5). Simply put, possession of nuclear weapons greatly bolsters a state’s ability to defend and deter and when two nuclear states stand opposed to one another, these weapons have an equalising effect which causes them to proceed in a much more considered manner because of what they risk in a nuclear exchange and the knowledge that the other side, rationally, must be proceeding in the same manner creates a more secure condition (ibid.: 5-8). He asserts nuclear weapons allow states to meet the need to provide their own security and secure states do not fight wars (ibid.: 37). When confronted with the question if ‘global zero’ would be better Waltz answers that, “Abolishing the weapons that have caused sixty-seven years of peace would certainly have effects. Such an action would, among other things, make the world safe for the fighting of World War III” (ibid.: 221).

Also briefly, Sagan responds by arguing that nuclear weapons make the world less secure because they are military objects and, institutionally, military organisations are concerned with achieving ‘military victory’ by defeating opponents in war and because nuclear weapons provide unmatched potential to do that, military organisations will always seek to obtain advantage by building more nuclear weapons and will, as all institutions do, seek ever more resources to do so. Many states do not have sufficient civilian control over their military apparatus to counter these tendencies. More states will seek nuclear weapons and states that already possess them will build more, the end state being that they will not provide security for anyone, just more nuclear weapons. He also shows empirically that political and military leaders cannot always be counted on to act rationally in the severe emotional circumstances high-level conflict creates (ibid.: 41-3). On the question of global zero, Sagan answers that the need for nuclear deterrence ended with the Cold War and the threat of loose nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations is greater because they do not fear nuclear retaliation, making the need to reach zero a pressing issue (ibid.: 215-19).

As the title of the book suggests, this is An Enduring Debate. The world was a violent place before nuclear weapons and will still be one if ever we are without them, as Sagan recognises (ibid.: 219), and still be fraught with conflict and the state quest for security, as Waltz asserts (ibid.: 5-7). Unless and until the world arrives at that point, there can be no answer.

Conclusion
It is possible to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. It must be recognised that nuclear weapons cannot be ‘dis-invented’ and the knowledge and technology will always exist even if global zero is achieved. Nuclear disarmament is achievable; nuclear ‘abolition’ is not. The political will to pursue disarmament must be there and there is good evidence it has been renewed since 2007. However, political will must coincide with the right time, when international attention and political capital is not being focused elsewhere on other problems. To succeed, any comprehensive international nuclear disarmament agreement would have to address issues of verification, control of fissile material and mechanisms to confront states in noncompliance. If all of these concerns are addressed, it is indeed possible to reach a nuclear weapons-free world. The question if that world will actually be the one we have envisioned is one that will have to be answered when we get there.



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The Nuclear Revolution: Deterrence, Flexible Response, Massive Retaliation, Medium Nuclear States and the Impossibility of Victory

November, 2013

In August 1945 the United States military dropped nuclear devices on the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, directly or indirectly bringing about the end of WWII. These attacks were the first and—so far—last time atomic weapons have been used in war. I argue these attacks represented a ‘nuclear revolution’, the dawning of a new era in which the character of warfare was dramatically altered. Anyone who then or since has witnessed the consequences of their use understands that the awesome destructive power of atomic weapons is greater than anything the world has seen before. However there is more to this fundamental change. Below I will explore three additional dimensions of this shift in the nature of military conflict: the impossibility of victory in nuclear war, how the revolutionary character of atomic weapons bolstered smaller states as much as large, and how the concept of deterrence turned warfare on its head to explain why the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of this ‘nuclear revolution’, signalling a fundamental change in the character of warfare.

Nuclear War Cannot Be Won
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represented a revolution in that they marked the beginning of a new era of warfare in which neither side could, no matter the outcome, claim military victory. Both parties would stand to lose so much that even if one side were left standing, they would preside only over a ruined world. A mass nuclear first strike and ‘mass retaliation’ would leave the world decimated. This state of affairs is ‘mutually-assured destruction’ (Jervis, 1989:4).

U.S. President Eisenhower (1956, cited ibid.: 5) held that nuclear war means destruction of the enemy and likely ‘suicide’ for the victor. In all previous iterations of warfare, from archaic and ancient to modern up to 1945, there was still some way to determine that one side had come out ahead of the other, whether the measure was military, economic or political. In a full-scale nuclear war, the destruction by both sides following a mass first-strike and mass retaliation would be so total that any national government which scurried out of their bunker after the exchange would have nothing left to rule over. It can hardly be imagined that any political, military or economic goal would be worth risking such an outcome to any rational actor. Ambrose quotes Eisenhower (1954, cited ibid.: 4) as questioning his Joint Chiefs of Staff what could be done with such a victory with society in North America, Europe and Asia destroyed, devoid of communications and virtually devoid of life. That cannot be seen as a victory in any sense. French President Charles de Gaulle held, “[After nuclear war, the] two sides would have neither powers, nor laws, nor cities, nor cultures, nor cradles, nor tombs” (ibid.: 1).

The ‘Flexible Response’ doctrine attempted to address Ike’s bleak picture of mutually-assured destruction through first-strike and mass retaliation. Advocates of the policy such as Colin Gray (1981: 47-9) argued that U.S. nuclear strategy should not be based upon a large-scale unleashing of the full nuclear arsenal upon Soviet cities and industrial areas likely to be met with an equal reaction from Moscow, but rather based upon a more restrained, step-laddered approach where tit-for-tat nuclear strikes, though heavily damaging, would still leave open the possibility for diplomatic negotiations and a political climb-down before the conflict reaches nuclear Armageddon. Such a nuclear exchange would leave open the possibility of one side or the other ‘winning’ without destroying society as we know it (ibid.).

However critics of Flexible Response such as David Dessler (1982: 55-7) argue the idea was wrongheaded. Such a policy could lead to ‘deterrence failure’ if the Soviets did not believe the U.S. would respond massively in kind to a nuclear attack, thus inviting them to try their luck. It also ignored Moscow’s ‘strategic culture’, namely that the USSR utterly rejected a graduated response in favour of massive retaliation. In this view, attempts to lessen the costs of a nuclear war could in fact increase the likelihood of nuclear war occurring (ibid.). According to Schelling (1963: 6), pursuing a ‘lesser evil’ policy of limiting war below massive retaliation detracts from deterrence because the reduced threat this implies may not create enough disincentive for a would-be attacker. Thus if the Soviet Union mounted a mass nuclear attack, the U.S. would be faced with the option of hoping to absorb it and respond with a step-laddered approach or respond immediately in kind. The USSR had stated its policy, thus eliminating any real options in a U.S. response. Thibaut and Kelley (1959, cited in Jervis, 1989: 3) call this the difference between ‘fate-control’ and ‘behaviour-control’—namely that the U.S. and USSR controlled one another’s fates in a nuclear exchange, but U.S. Flexible Response policy could not control Soviet behaviour, only hope to influence it. If the Soviets struck, their policy stated it would be en masse. The only hope was that a limited U.S. action would reciprocate a limited reaction from Moscow—a rather risky idea.

Further, Ball’s (1981) analysis of American and Soviet nuclear command and control systems calls into question the ability of either side in a nuclear exchange to control their response in a coordinated way once a nuclear engagement has begun as communications and firing control systems would likely be destroyed or break down and/or political and military leadership may be eliminated. If true, the advantage will lay with the party conducting the first strike and seriously degrade or even eliminate the possibility of a retaliatory strike if not conducted immediately or simultaneously. This reinforces the idea that nuclear strikes must be an ‘all or nothing’, massive force affair; otherwise the loss of command and control may render any non-immediate response ineffective or impossible (ibid.).

Fortunately the impossibility of victory or the rectitude of mass retaliation or Flexible Response have never been, and hopefully never will be, tested in practice. In any case, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a revolution in that they signalled the beginning of a phase when both sides had to take into account that a nuclear war meant neither side could ever really claim victory, a wholly revolutionary state of affairs in the history of conflict.

A Revolution for ‘Medium’ Nuclear States
Possession of nuclear weapons was also a revolution for powers smaller than the U.S. and USSR. It meant states with relatively small militaries, small population and/or smaller industrial and financial resources—though large enough to develop and maintain nuclear weapons—could keep up with states with vastly more such resources.

This aspect was especially important for Western second-tier nuclear powers such as Britain and France who were able to maintain a degree of influence over collective security in the new bipolar world, unlike satellites of the Soviet Union such as Hungary, East Germany and Bulgaria (Mastny, 2005: 30-1). Because of the military and political influence nuclear weapons granted them, Britain and France arguably maintained more influence in the U.S.-dominated Western bloc than did their Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact opposite numbers. The USSR wholly rejected the idea of arming its satellite states with an independent capability, refusing to help them build their own programs or even to jointly develop Warsaw Pact nuclear strategy (ibid.). In this regard, nuclear weapons were a revolutionary tool for less powerful states to stay in the game militarily and politically.

According to Clark and Wheeler (1989: 43), the 1947 British decision to pursue the bomb was, “So self-evident as to require no compelling strategic assessment in support of it.” Though individual policymakers had their own reasons, there was never any doubt Britain would pursue atomic weapons (ibid.). In 1945, the Soviet military had consisted of 6 million service personnel (Dear and Foot, 2005: 966) and the United States had over 8 million spread across North America, Europe and Asia (ibid.: 931). Britain had only 4.6 million in uniform (ibid.: 884) to cover home and all of its international empire. Britain’s domestic economy was greatly strained under the heavy burden of war-related debt and the costs of conventional forces had to be reduced (Clark and Wheeler, 1989: 25-30). The argument would frequently be put forward, predominantly in the early 1950s, that investment in nuclear arms would translate into cost savings by reducing Britain’s need for conventional forces (ibid.: 27). Though pursuing atomic weapons was not cheap for Britain, they were certainly more obtainable than attempting to build as many conventional bombers, tanks and artillery pieces to stay relevant in the contest between the U.S. and USSR and simultaneously attempting to maintain the standard of living at home. Both the United States and Britain came to see nuclear weapons as a set-off to reducing spending on conventional forces (Pierre, 1972: 87-8). It is arguable that while Britain lost political and economic influence and shed its colonial empire following WWII, developing nuclear arms kept London at the table with Washington and Moscow while it cut spending on conventional forces and rebuilt the economy at home.

According to Stoddart (2007), this lesson was not lost on Charles de Gaulle, who, in a similar situation economically, was already pursuing an independent path for France after splitting with the U.S. and Britain over NATO policy. De Gaulle hoped to convince Britain to help France obtain its own nuclear capability quicker and cheaper and there is good evidence Britain traded atomic know-how, telling French atomic scientists what not to do, for UK accession to the European Economic Community in 1972 (ibid.). Though France was late to enter the Cold War nuclear club, the capability made sure France was still a player in the politics of the era.

The nuclear era, ushered in by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represented a revolution for Britain, France and later smaller powers in that developing their own independent nuclear capabilities allowed them to influence the actions powers such as the United States and USSR, relieved some of their budget pressures, and allowed them to have a significant say in their independent and collective security.

Deterrence Turns War on its Head
One of the major facets of the revolution in the character or warfare that followed the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was that nuclear weapons turned the focus of military power on its head. As Brodie states, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them” (1946, cited in Jervis, 1989: 7). Schelling (1963: 9) called deterrence, “A theory of the skilful nonuse of military forces” (original emphasis).

There were differences in how these states viewed the use of their nuclear weapons and how credible the threat of their use was (Pierre, 1972: 87). Britain and France could not afford to build a nuclear arsenal capable of credibly threatening the Soviet Union with the same level of mutually-assured destruction America could. However atomic weapons meant they possessed their own independent nuclear capabilities which could still inflict a degree of ‘punishment’ on Soviet cities in a nuclear exchange that would be high enough to deter Moscow from attacking (ibid.).

According to Pierre (ibid.), Britain’s 1952 ‘Global Strategy Paper’ called nuclear weapons a revolution in the character of warfare. It was also the first policy paper to call for a strategy based upon the concept of deterrence, picked up in the United States by President Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ policy (ibid.). The idea was for the West to openly state that Soviet military advances would be met with an atomic response, not just local, conventional action. Deterrence would make clear to Moscow that any aggression would be met not solely at distant points of friction between East and West, but would strike at the centre of the USSR itself (ibid.). Moscow would not be allowed to whittle away at the margins by taking calculated risks. The idea was to promise to punish the Soviets severely for any attack on Western interests.

Jervis (1989:6-9) points out that the speed and scale of destruction wrought by atomic weapons is such that their use is almost unthinkable despite the clear offensive advantage they represent. Conventional weapons such as artillery and strategic bombers and methods such as sieges and blockades could rationally deliver as much ‘punishment’ through destruction, but could do so only very slowly, very intensively and very expensively. Such conventional methods are calculated to bring an opponent down before their destruction was total and certainly before the act became destructive to the aggressor as well and still left time for diplomacy and second thoughts (ibid.). Nuclear weapons are of such awesome power and so fast and absolute in their destruction that there can be no real rational basis for their use. When both sides possess nuclear weapons, the destruction is mutual and virtually simultaneous. Cities are destroyed within hours and no time is left for negotiation. Rationally, their character becomes therefore more responsive than active or offensive. Facing such destruction, an opponent will be demur from attacking in the face of this scale of ‘deterrence by punishment’ (ibid.).

Another aspect of nuclear capability is that it defeats ‘deterrence by denial’. In conventional war, the credible ability of a state to repel or defend itself against attack by an opponent is ‘denial capability’ (Snyder, 1961: 3-5). Defence is the actual capability to repel an attack. A state that is credibly seen to be capable of defending itself by inflicting damage on any aggressor will deter an aggressor from attacking—deterrence by denial. However, nuclear weapons make defence impossible and thus eliminate deterrence by denial (ibid.).

The creation of a weapon that can hardly be defended against is a revolution, further exhibited in the unique response to the prospect of developing capability to defend against them. The development of every other weapon in history has logically led to the development of a defence, leading, of course, to further improvements to the weapon or new weapons to overcome that defence. Swords and arrows were countered by shields and armour. Bullets and artillery were countered by flak jackets and Kevlar helmets. As yet, there is no credible defence against a nuclear attack. The position of nuclear weapons in this regard was revolutionary because both the U.S. and USSR agreed not to fully develop a defence against them. U.S thinkers argued stability could be gained through this concept of ‘mutual vulnerability’, though both sides continued to attempt to develop nuclear defences to varying degrees (Yost, 2007: 555). Barnaby (1969: 26-35) writes comprehensively on the arguments for and against developing anti-ballistic missile systems and exhibits the difficulty in coming to any conclusion as to whether developing such a defensive capability actually provides increased security or if it decreases security. In the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the U.S. and USSR agreed to limit their capability to destroy each other’s incoming nuclear missiles to one battery of interceptors each. Later, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or ‘Star Wars’, missile defence programme threatened to derail nuclear arms reduction talks. Though the feasibility of such a program was questioned, it presented enough of a threat to the balance of nuclear power to Moscow that Premier Mikhail Gorbechev was induced to sign the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement, a bilateral treaty to eliminate IRBMs and SRBMs, in exchange U.S. promises regarding the SDI (Boyd and Scouras, 2013; Norman, 1986). Never before had a weapon of war been considered so essential or given so much credence as to induce two powers to agree not to develop a defence against it in order to maintain peace.

Conclusion
Besides the great destructive power nuclear weapons represent as shown through the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were a revolution that changed the character of warfare. Conflicts in which both opponents possess nuclear weapons made victory in war for either side impossible, despite risky attempts to control the destruction through Flexible Response. Atomic weapons gave smaller states such as Britain and France more leverage, independence, and economic relief than they would have otherwise had, shown more clearly in contrast with their Warsaw Pact counterparts who were denied the capability. The deterrent effect nuclear weapons created and virtual impossibility of defending against them meant that military strategy was now more concerned with avoiding war than with winning it. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki truly marked a ‘nuclear revolution’ that brought about a fundamental shift in the character of warfare.




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Destroying Syrian Chemical Stockpiles Won't be Easy

This article originally appeared in The Daily Beast on 6 September 2013.

It is now clear that the Syrian government used sarin nerve gas to attack suspected rebel forces in Damascus on August 21. There is no doubt that the “red line” was breached. With the American public delivering a clear consensus against committing ground forces, the Obama administration will almost certainly limit any intervention to remote attacks. In the best circumstances, destroying chemical weapons is a dangerous and intensive task, but trying to destroy them from the air without spreading their deadly agents makes it even more difficult.

Drawing from my experience serving 9 years in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND) for the U.S. Army, here is a rundown of the options available for destroying chemical weapons with a look at the feasibility of different methods and the complications that each entails.

An air campaign could focus on eliminating chemical munitions, military chemical units, chemical weapons production facilities, any or all of the above. The first step is to identify the targets and fix their locations. Since the first mentions of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime in July 2012, U.S. intelligence has been tracking the movements of Syria’s chemical assets. There is a ready supply of human intelligence from rebel forces and refugees, a steady stream of signals intercepts from Syrian government forces, and near constant visual surveillance using aerial imagery platforms. Social media and news reports from inside Syria also provide open-source intelligence.

Syria is reported to have one of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons in the world. Locating all of these munitions, even with the best intelligence available, will not be easy. Syria is also known to store chemical agents in“binary” form, where two components of the chemical agent are stored separately and only mixed before being loaded into munitions. This makes transport safer and simpler but can vastly expand the number of targets that need to be located and destroyed and makes them easier to conceal.

Syria’s chemical weapons-production facilities are reported to be located near major cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs, while munitions are stored at as many as 50 different sites. As the U.S. prepares for an attack, the regime is likely spreading munitions across cities throughout the country, making detection more difficult, necessitating more strikes, and increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.

Some intelligence reports indicate that the Assad regime lacks the ability to produce certain necessary precursor ingredients, but Syria stockpiled chemicals from European suppliers before export controls became effective. It also doesn’t take much to create many of the chemical agents used; they can be produced by anyone with an advanced chemistry degree given a moderately equipped refinement facility. Targeting Syria’s production facilities is possible, but will be difficult. Tracking movements of Syrian military chemical units and weapons platforms capable of firing chemical munitions would be an easier task.

The hardest part comes after the munitions are located. Once the targets are acquired they must be destroyed without releasing the deadly chemical agents— it’s possible but a bit like bombing a paint factory at long range and expecting not to have any splatter.

Syrian chemical units and their launchers can be targeted using airstrikes, drones, or cruise missiles launched from naval vessels. However, given the likelihood that the Syrians have intentionally moved these weapons systems into populated areas, even precise strikes on them could lead to civilian casualties. On a larger scale, there is also the danger that an attack on launchers loaded with chemical munitions could spread toxic substances as far as Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan or into the Mediterranean Sea.

America must face the possibility that in carrying out attacks to prevent the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons it risks unleashing those deadly agents on a civilian population.

Other than weapon systems and facilities, Syrian soldiers working in chemical units are another likely target for attack. The troops in these units are usually outfitted in identifiable protective gear for their own safety, a clear indicator of the presence of chemical agents and their impending use. But attacking these soldiers presents a similar set of problems—their likely proximity to chemical weapons means that targeting them risks hitting the munitions they are guarding or operating and releasing them into nearby populations.

The care America takes in eliminating its own chemical weapons reflects how dangerous the process is, even when it’s done in a safe and controlled environment. Since 1986, the protocol has been to incinerate the agent at temperatures above 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit or to neutralize it using hot water and a caustic compound. After the destructive phase, the next step involves extensive monitoring and testing of air, water, and soil to ensure no residual release.

Simply dropping a conventional bomb on an ammo dump is not a solution. Besides the initial deadly effect of dispersing chemical agents, their release into air, soil, and water can have severe health effects for years down the road.

A chemical rocket or artillery round does not explode like conventional munitions. They contain a propellant to get the munitions on target and only enough explosive to rupture the round and release their agent, either bursting in the air above a target or upon hitting the ground. This is why there were several rockets found semi-intact after the August 21 attack on Ghutah which were subsequently sampled by U.N. investigators.

The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency has conducted extensive research into anti-chemical strike options. One weapon they have studied is the non-explosive CBU-107 “PAW” which releases 3,700 extremely dense metal rods into a high-altitude free fall that acts like thousands of daggers, penetrating and shredding a target without the use of explosives. This weapon is less likely to cause an explosion at production facilities but it will rupture munitions, releasing their chemical agents and making casualties of anyone in the vicinity.

Thermobaric explosive weapons, like the BLU-119/B “CrashPad” are another option. Thermobaric explosives, essentially the most powerful non-nuclear devices in the U.S. arsenal, work by sucking in all the oxygen in the blast radius and using it to fuel an intense, high-velocity explosion reaching over 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit. In theory, such devices have the potential to suck in and incinerate chemical agents, however, no conclusive testing of such devices on live chemical agents has yet been conducted.

While they may have a better chance of destroying chemical munitions without releasing their agents, the blast and heat generated by thermobaric weapons are intensely deadly. Structures near the blast will be destroyed and persons not killed by the initial explosion or flying debris will suffer lethal damage to internal organs caused by the pressure wave it creates. The effect of their use in a populated urban area would cause casualties comparable to a small nuclear explosion or a chemical attack. Using a nonexplosive penetrator or a thermobaric device in a city such as Damascus could cause more civilian casualties than the regime’s attack on Ghutah, which is just the reason Assad’s forces are likely relocating their chemical assets closer to urban centers.

The ability to safely destroy large stocks of chemical agents with airstrikes is still unconfirmed, though it is theoretically possible. Testing that method now requires accepting that even relative success may mean killing thousands of the very Syrian civilians we would be acting to protect. As the American people and Congress consider the proposals for action made by the president and his cabinet they should be aware of the chances for success, the risks, and the potential cost in lives.

Why Chemical Weapons are a 'Red Line' the World Must Enforce

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 4 September 2013.

Echoing President Barack Obama's remarks of a year ago, US Secretary of State John Kerry has called the use of chemical weapons a "red line for the world", asserting that evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the Assad regime used Sarin nerve gas against its own people. Failing to act now would push that red line back and send a message that the use of chemical weapons will be frowned upon, but that nothing will result other than stern international admonitions.

This would reverse the tide that has been rolling back the use of chemical warfare for the last 25 years. Chemical weapons are a world red line, and action is necessary to protect hard-won international progress against chemical weapons proliferation.

The long war against chemical weapons use

The first world war was the first occasion on which chemical weapons were used on a large scale in war. The results of these attacks, mostly on British and German soldiers, were so horrendous that a prohibition of their use was included in the 1925 Geneva Protocol – subsequently ratified by 138 nations. This was the first formal recognition that the use of chemical weapons is a red line for the world community.

The US and USSR took another step against chemical weapons by agreeing to cease production and set up an inspection regime in the1989 Wyoming Agreement. Then, in 1993, the world again pushed forward the red line to halt the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The rest of the world has kept these agreements, and the reduction of chemical weapons has progressed steadily ever since. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the enforcement agency of the CWC, has reported that 72% of the world's declared stockpiles have been eliminated, as of 2011. The rest are scheduled to decommissioned within the next few years. These are mostly located in Libya and Iraq, but crucially, they are secured and will be eliminated with co-operation from other CWC signatory states. The US has eliminated 90% of its chemical weapons and Russia over 60%.

There are reports of chemical weapons use by Russia, Vietnam, and Cambodia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Saddam Hussein notoriously used chemical weapons against Kurds around Halabja, and during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. However, there have now been no proven lethal chemical attacks in 25 years. Worldwide, the use of chemical weapons in war has virtually ceased since the 1993 adoption of the CWC.

Only Syria has continually chosen to ignore the world's red line on chemical weapons; it is one of only seven nations in the world that refuses to ratify the CWC. (It is joined only by Angola, North Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan; Israel and Burma/Myanmar have signed the CWC, but not ratified it.) At a time when the rest of the world was eliminating chemical weapons, Syria was actively stockpiling precursor chemicals and building what has become one of the largest chemical weapons arsenals in the world.

In July 2012, an official Assad regime spokesman, Jihad Makdissi, declared it was Syrian government policy that chemical weapons would not be used against Syrians, but reserved the right to use them against any external forces. So, Assad could not even keep his own declared red line on chemical weapons use. Unleashing nerve gas on noncombatants in Damascus was a big step over the line.

What about other conflict-zone 'red lines'?

Throughout the last century, the world has borne witness to violence throughout the world, including violent political crackdowns, ethnic cleansing, religious conflict, assassinations and border wars. In virtually every one, international law, norms and values – "red lines", if you will – have been stretched or broken. Victims and refugees caught in these conflicts have repeatedly called for intervention by outside powers. Most of these calls have been made on the United States and other western powers.

Sometimes, we have answered; most often, we have not. So what makes this "red line" different and why should we act this time?

The world order has been in turmoil since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 upended the geopolitical bipolarity of the previous 50 years. Former Soviet satellites in eastern Europe and the Caucasus continue to struggle for their own identity and to remain independent. The Arab Spring uprisings are tearing apart the old political order in the Middle East, while the rise of China is making its Asian neighbours nervous and attracting American attention. South American nations continue their journey out of poverty and away from repressive regimes.

Meanwhile, the US is coming to the end of over a decade at war, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, we have already witnessed over 100,000 deaths in Syria.

Not all of the benefits the world was promised when the US and its allies prevailed in the cold war anti-Communist struggle have materialised. In some parts of the world, things seem to be regressing, rather than improving. That is why it is important to preserve and jealously guard what progress has been made in working toward a more peaceful world – even if that means turning to military action against rogue states in order to do so. The steady worldwide reduction of chemical weapons is a prime example of that progress – one that we cannot allow to be eroded so easily.

A failure to act after the Assad regime has crossed that red line would be akin to the world retreating and setting a new, weaker standard without a fight. No state other than Syria has dared to cross the line of chemical weapons use in a quarter-century. If we do not act today, we have set a new world precedent that says the use of chemical weapons is frowned upon, but there will be no serious consequences. We should not retreat so easily without serious consideration of what we would be sacrificing for the future.

Until this moment, the world was on the cusp of eliminating one of the unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction. Quietly, steadily, we had been approaching the point where we would one day be able to say we had eliminated chemical weapons.

This is progress toward a safer world we can only hope to achieve with nuclear or biological weapons. Worldwide, proliferation of nuclear weapons has increased. Since the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel have developed new nuclear weapons. Other states, such as Iran, may be trying to join the nuclear club. Meanwhile, the nature of biological weapons makes tracking or controlling them difficult and there is no major international agreement specifically to enforce their prohibition. Though it receives less attention, the Chemical Weapons Convention is a real success story in comparison.

Syria is the last country in the world with a large stockpile of chemical weapons that refuses to eliminate them. Now, the Assad regime has used them on its own people. And Syria has threatened to use them against any outside forces which threaten the Assad regime. No other country in the world has dared do that since 1988.

President Assad is the last major roadblock to achieving a world free from the horror of chemical weapons. That is why the world, led by the United States, must take action in Syria.

Syria: Options for U.S. Invasion, Securing Chemical Weapons

This article originally appeared on PolicyMic on 24 August 2012.

The presence of chemical weapons in Syria has caused much debate since the statement by the Assad regime that they could be used against an outside invasion, but not against Syrians internally. There have also been questionable reports that the Syrian opposition is attempting to obtain or capture chemical weapons to use against regime supporters. "Anonymous diplomatic sources" have said the U.S. may need as many as 60,000 troops to "secure" Syria’s chemical stockpile. Others offer that the U.S. may send in special operations units. President Obama issued a warning to Assad that their use would shift U.S. policy toward intervening. There are many options on the table to deal with Syria’s chemical weapons.

Figures on both the left and right are supporting some form of intervention in Syria. Some hawkish commentators are pushing for an Iraq-style invasion, while others support an incursion similar to the successful Libya campaign and/or enforced "no-fly" zones as in Iraq. I have personally written in support of providing limited anti-armor weapons already present in the region and non-lethal support to the opposition to level the playing field against Assad’s well-equipped military.

The U.S. should not mount a full-scale invasion of Syria as long as the conflict remains local, doesn’t spread beyond Syria’s borders, and no other world or regional power provides large-scale military support to the regime. There is evidence Syria may be a growing proxy conflict on both sides, but not enough to justify the costs of an invasion in American lives and money. American national security is not directly threatened. However, ending the violence there is in our interest. That is another debate.

An invasion would upend the domestic character of the revolution the Obama administration has been careful to respect since the beginning of the Arab Spring two years ago. If the U.S. invades Syria, it would become responsible for the aftermath. A repeat of Iraq is certainly an undesirable outcome for America at this stage. Sending tens of thousands of troops into Syria to secure its chemical weapons is undesirable and unnecessary. The early stages of Afghanistan showed the folly of using "economy of force" or maneuver warfare and ignoring the Powell Doctrine, as did the lack of enough troops on the ground in Iraq to provide security which precipitated the need for a "surge." Sending troops into Syria with the goal of only securing chemical weapons would be a repeat of these conditions. Either send in enough troops to guarantee the success of the mission and security or do not send them in at all. There is no room for half-measures. These are lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq.

Syria’s chemical weapons and production facilities are spread across the country from Aleppo to Homs to Damascus. Putting troops on the ground to secure them would mean splitting our forces, which would necessitate communicable logistical and transport connections. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that enemies who cannot match U.S. troops directly will attack their supply convoys on major roads. The conditions for U.S. troops on the ground in Syria would be similar to those on the ground in Iraq. Adding the difficulty and danger of guarding stockpiles of chemical weapons and transporting them for disposal, most likely wearing thick chemical protective equipment, makes a mass ground invasion the most undesirable option available.

There has been discussion of inserting special operations forces into Syria to secure these weapons. Such an operation would depend upon very accurate, complete information on where and under what conditions these weapons are being stored. The U.S. claims to have good knowledge of where these weapons are, but quickly and quietly removing what are probably hundreds or thousands of chemical munitions doesn’t have a great likelihood of success. They would probably have to be destroyed where they are using explosives that generate enough heat to incinerate the chemical agents, otherwise it risks a chemical agent contamination incident akin to a "dirty bomb" for which the U.S. would be responsible. The risk of a failed mission resulting in the capture or death of U.S. military personnel or the unintentional release of chemical agents causing civilian casualties makes this option undesirable as well.

A third option, the least of evils, would be to use air delivered thermobaric explosives to destroy the chemical munitions. The success of this option would also depend upon precise intelligence as to the location of the stocks and highly accurate placement of the explosive device to minimize the risk of an accidental release. It would also eliminate the need for operators on the ground to transport and place the explosive, though personnel on the ground could certainly provide highly accurate location information or guide an airstrike.

Currently the U.S. decommissions our own chemical weapons by incinerating the raw agents in temperatures above 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Thermobaric explosions exceed 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit in the radius of up to 500 feet around their epicenter, depending upon the size of the device used. Such temperatures would be enough to incinerate chemical agents and minimize the chances of incidental release of the agents or other lethal gasses from the resulting explosion.

This option is also far from perfect. It does have the advantage of reducing or eliminating the need for U.S. personnel on the ground inside Syria. It still depends upon very accurate and complete intelligence regarding the location of Syria’s chemical weapons. There is still great risk of collateral damage to nearby civilian populations, but using this option to eliminate these chemical weapons and preventing their use may save more lives. It must be considered if the use of these weapons is probable and imminent and if the risk of collateral damage from such an airstrike outweighs the outcome of destroying these chemical weapons.

This is indeed a hefty decision to make. We should all hope that the situation in Syria is resolved soon without the need for any intervention by the U.S. or other states. That truly would be the best outcome for everyone involved.

We Can Eliminate Chemical Weapons

This post originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 17 August, 2012.

The Syrian conflict has caused great international concern with daily reports of fighting. The humanitarian situation is worsening with Syrians in major cities left without medicine, food, or water. To add to the difficulty, an Assad spokesman recently discussed the possibility that Syria’s sizable chemical weapons stockpile could be used on any outside invasion force, though asserting they would not be used on Syrians. The questions lingering about Syria’s chemical weapons show why international weapons control regimes are important. The world needs to pay more attention to chemical weapons.

Among weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons have long been the most prominent in international concern. Along with the U.S., there are eight states armed with nuclear weapons, Israel likely an undeclared ninth. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), regulated by the IAEA, is the central international agreement governing nuclear weapons. Parties agree not to acquire nuclear weapons, to eventually pursue nuclear disarmament, and to use nuclear technology peacefully. The NPT became effective in 1970, some forty years ago, and it was predicted then that there would be as many as 30 nuclear states by now.

It has been estimated that as many as forty states have the knowledge to develop nuclear capability. Yet only four new states have joined the nuclear club. None are members of the NPT. The U.S. still possesses the most active nuclear weapons, but the bilateral New START with Russia promises to make progress toward the zero goal of the NPT. Despite problems with North Korea and ongoing multiparty talks with Iran on its nuclear program, the NPT and bilateral agreements on nuclear weapons reduction have gone a long way in slowing nuclear proliferation.

The outlook is not as positive with chemical weapons. It is thought that as many as seventeen states currently possess offensive chemical weapons capability. Despite chemical weapon use as early as WWI, the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC), regulated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), was only implemented in 1997. Nuclear weapons have not been used offensively since 1945, but chemical weapons have been used offensively in the Middle East as recently as the 1980’s.

Chemical weapons are also much easier to develop than nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons require more advanced technical knowledge and enrichment of nuclear material and the components required to build a bomb create a larger identifiable footprint. An advanced chemistry degree and common chemical plants are all that is necessary. Deadly nerve agents are made from phosphates that are readily available throughout the world and are widely used in agricultural production.

Concerns about chemical weapons aren’t limited to Syria. North Korea and Myanmar, non-CWC states, are suspected of possessing them. Evidence suggests non-member Israel may have them as well. Iran and China are accused of having clandestine programs, despite being parties to the CWC. There have also been successes. Albania, South Korea, and India have completely eliminated their stores. The U.S. has destroyed 90% of its stockpile. Russia, Serbia, and Libya are more than halfway complete. America, Britain, and other nations have contributed millions to overseas programs to assist other nations in eliminating their stockpiles.

The world needs to do more to eradicate chemical weapons. If similar focus is placed on them as on nuclear weapons, we can eliminate known stockpiles in member states by the end of the decade. This is something we can only dream of with nuclear weapons. International weapons control regimes work. The successes of the NPT and bilateral nuclear agreements show that the Chemical Weapons Convention can rid the world of these terrible and dangerous weapons of mass destruction.