Showing posts with label army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label army. Show all posts

Friday, August 29, 2014

The 'Hot' War in Cold War Southeast Asia



This article originally appeared in Cicero Magazine on 3 July 2014.

The popular understanding of wars past is an important determining factor how wars in the future will be received or perceived by the general public. Policymakers have come to understand this and turn it to their advantage. Equating an intervention with upholding democracy plays well when compared with WWI, when the world was “made safe for democracy”. Interventions involving the liberation of oppressed masses or a gathering existential threat are compared with WWII. Opponents of interventions latch on to these comparisons as well, equating them with quagmires in Vietnam and Iraq. As time goes on, the general memory and popular factual understanding of these wars weakens despite more historical and archival evidence presenting a truer picture being opened by governments or discovered by academics. Despite having ended only 25 years ago, the Cold War presents such a case.


The Cold War was not one war fought in one place, but several wars fought in different theatres in different ways. The most familiar narrative of the Cold War focuses on the struggle in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union. The American view of the Indochina Wars was that they were but another theatre in the war against international communism—the Global Cold War. For the French and Southeast Asians, it was a different battle. The French fought to preserve a dying colonial system; Southeast Asians, for national liberation and/or a new system based on communist principles.

The Cold War in Southeast Asia bore little resemblance to the Cold War in the West. The Southeast Asian Cold War was not “cold” at all…

The Cold War in Southeast Asia bore little resemblance to the Cold War in the West. The Southeast Asian Cold War was not ‘cold’ at all and, rather than a state-centric battle fought with nuclear threats, espionage and military-industrial production across clearly drawn map lines, the Indochina Wars were ‘hot’ wars featuring weak central governments with soft borders, the main driver of which was to capture the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people of Southeast Asia, who largely determined the course of the wars.
The Western Cold War
The Cold War in the West was a battle between states in two clear blocs along clear national borders. The map-lines of Cold War Europe were drawn at the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. The “Iron Curtain” fell along the Oder-Neisse Line, running from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Czech border in the south, then traced southwards to the Mediterranean through Austria and Italy, divided in half between joint occupations. Control of defeated Germany and its capital, Berlin, was also split between the US, UK, France and the USSR. Following 1948 elections, Italy joined NATO as a full member of the West bloc. In 1955 Austria became a neutral state and occupation troops withdrew. Otherwise, national borders and lines between East and West in Cold War Europe remained largely unchanged for 45 years until German re-unification and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta, 1945.
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta, 1945.
The Cold War was an ‘imaginary war’ in which the two sides threatened each other with annihilation, but no direct military battles were fought. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons and collective security guarantees of NATO and the Warsaw Pact made the cost of war in Europe too high. The sides confronted one another along their border. Many such scenes played in Berlin, including the 1948 Blockade and Airlift and the 1961 confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie. The two sides also tried to out-produce one another, engaging in a statistical battle in which agricultural, industrial and military production were weapons. They engaged in an arms race to produce and field more and better nuclear weapons in different forms and faster than the other. The only fighting in any real sense was between intelligence services in a “shadow war of espionage, counter-espionage and covert actions. The armies were the security and intelligence agencies of West and East, the CIA and the KGB, and the multitude of other forces lined up on one or the other side. In the war that could never become a real war…”
The Western Cold War was a state-centric conflict prosecuted through nuclear posturing, national military-industrial production and covert intelligence operations fought across tightly-controlled national borders. It is telling that many of the most intense military confrontations of the European Cold War–and much espionage activity–hinged on the ‘German question’ and the fate of a single city, Berlin, issues not finally resolved until the fall of the Wall and the collapse of European communism.
The ideological battle to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Europeans was an important component, but the “center of gravity” in the European conflict–to use Karl von Clausewitz’s phrase–was the governments of the states involved. Governments and their security apparatuses could control the behavior of their citizens. Though the threat of nuclear war hung over their heads, the fighting was not real in its literal sense. Which side the average European fell on depended on where they lived, determined for them by the Big Three at conference tables in Yalta and Potsdam.
The Cold War in Southeast Asia
Pandora’s Box
Pham Van Dong & Ho Chi Minh, 1966.
Pham Van Dong & Ho Chi Minh, 1966.
In contrast to the West, the Southeast Asian Cold War, rather than ushering in the beginning of a new struggle, was the continuation of a struggle which had begun for some, such as Ho Chi Minh, as early as the 1920s. The struggle for Indochina predated the Cold War. The Japanese invasion in 1941 and return of the French in 1945 “opened Pandora’s box”, creating the opportunity to fight return of French rule to Indochina—something Southeast Asians may not have pursued nor achieved without the break in French control created by the war. The post-WWII period for Indochinese marked the resumption of two intertwined battles—that of liberation from French colonial rule and between communist and anti-communist forces to determine which system would govern independent Indochina.
Hot War
Arguably, the Cold War in Asia was not ‘cold’ at all. Unlike in Europe, where opposing forces stared each other down across borders but never fired a shot, the Southeast Asian Cold War was ‘hot’. Real armed battles were fought between colonial and nationalist and communist and anti-communist forces almost from the very beginning. During the First Indochina War, there would also be violent ethnic, religious and factional fighting among differentIndochinese populations alongside the battle for independence. Over two decades, troops would invade, occupy and fight in, to varying degrees, all of the Indochinese states in the First and Second Indochina War, resulting in hundreds of thousands of total casualties—something unthinkable in Cold War Europe.
Soft Borders
The battle in Southeast Asia was not between governments behind clearly drawn borders on either side of a clear line of demarcation between democracy and communism. Borders mattered little in the Southeast Asian Cold War. There was no Oder-Neisse Line in Indochina. The 1954 17th parallel border between North and South Vietnam came to matter very little due to communist infiltration and American bombing.

In Southeast Asia, Western governments were unwilling to commit fully to total war and unwilling or unable to take, occupy and hold territory they had won.

Under French rule, the states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos had all been one large colony–Indochina. There had always been interchange between these regions-cum-states, each with significant diaspora in the others. Many national leaders of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos would be born or spend significant time in neighboring states. Close lingual, religious, cultural and ethnic relations facilitated ‘softer’ borders.
Much of the fighting during the Second Indochina War took place in South Vietnam and spilled over the border into Cambodia and Laos. Communist and anti-communist forces throughout Southeast Asia cooperated with kindred factions and used each other’s territories to transit through or as a sanctuary from their own fight across the border. The famous Ho Chi Minh and King Sihanouk Trails used by communist forces to transit the borders of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are examples. Governments in distant Saigon, Phnom Penh or Vientiane could do little to control their frontiers. The porous nature of these borders has been blamed specifically for “enlarging” the Second Indochina War beyond Vietnam.
Weak Eastern Governments and Lack of Western Will
French propaganda poster following defeat at Dien Bien Phu, 1954.
French propaganda poster following defeat at Dien Bien Phu, 1954.
Governments had far less power in Southeast Asia than their counterparts in Europe. Throughout most of the Cold War, Southeast Asian states had two or more governments which claimed rule. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia experienced periods in which territory in each was controlled by opposing governments, dividing the country, each claiming to hold legitimate power over the whole.
The sides hurled propaganda. South Vietnam was called a puppet of the United States, while North Vietnam was a creature of Beijing. The governments of Cambodia and Laos claimed neutrality, but received aid from all sides in a constant tug of war between North Vietnam, America, Russia and China. There was no grand post-WWII modernization and development plan like the Marshall Plan for Europe. Efforts to form effective Asian collective security regimes, such as SEATO, were stymied by the Geneva Accords requirement Indochinese states remain neutral.
Government heads did not stay in power long and there were constant overthrow attempts by both communist and anti-communist forces. There were multiple mutiny or coup attempts from 1960 against Ngo Dinh Diem in the lead up to his 1963 assassination, a trend which continued with his successors until 1966. Loyalties also shifted. King Sihanouk of Cambodia was seemingly onevery side of the struggle in Cambodia at one time or another—monarchist, republican, anti-communist and finally with the Khmer Rouge communists.

Ngo Dinh Diem, 1955
In previous modern wars such as WWI and WWII, large-scale troop deployments and naval, air, armor and artillery support were central features and the war was prosecuted largely by one army defeating the enemy militarily and advancing to occupy ever more territory until the state leadership was destroyed or it capitulated. Capitols, major population centers and industrial areas were particular targets of bombing campaigns. It was total war. Both world wars ended when belligerent governments surrendered. Their troops stopped fighting and normal life returned.
In Southeast Asia, Western governments were unwilling to commit fully to total war and unwilling or unable to take, occupy and hold territory they had won. French commanders decided, rather than occupy Indochina with enough troops to guarantee security, they would pursue a “hedgehog” strategy of fighting the war through forays into enemy territory from a series of heavily fortified encampments, leading to their encirclement and 1954 surrender at Dien Bien Phu. The US, having just fought an unpopular war in Korea, was unwilling to commit to another war in Asia. Eisenhower did not want America to be seen as supporting French imperialism in Indochina and would not act without diplomatic support from Britain and Australia.
There was no line of advance as there had been during WWII, behind which the war was over and civilians viewed themselves as ‘liberated’. Conversely, Southeast Asians saw the Westerners, especially the French, as ‘occupiers’. Communist forces, in territory and a culture much more home to them than their white counterparts, returned wherever they left. The moment Western troops left an area, they lost control of it. They controlled Vietnam only “100 yards on either side of all major roads”. Though America used its fire support assets to great effect and multiplied the effectiveness of its troops, the enemy did not abate for it.
Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Robert McNamara, John F. Kennedy, 1963.
Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Robert McNamara, John F. Kennedy, 1963.
The U.S. government policy, championed by Robert McNamara, of relying on “body counts” and statistics as metrics to determine victory led America tolose focus on other factors. Despite the focus on killing the enemy, America often refrained from bombing North Vietnamese government targets in the capital, Hanoi, as a tactic to keep them at the negotiating table while using B-52’s to carpet bomb entire swathes elsewhere in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This angered civilians and turned them into refugees, fleeing into the arms of communists—particularly benefiting the Khmer Rouge. The French and American governments sought to end their wars in Southeast Asia as soon as they began and both eventually pursued negotiated settlements. They did not win the wars.
Those Who Forget History…
The popular conception of past wars and what, where, how, who and why they were conducted is often incomplete and the accuracy of the picture fades over time despite the clearer image produced by years of academic study after the fact. The Cold War is a perfect example, with the story of the Western or European Cold War the dominant narrative over what was a “hot war” in Southeast Asia. Since the dominant narratives or popular conception of wars past determines how wars are perceived in the future, it becomes all the more important to look deeper into even recent history for an accurate picture of events. Why? As ever—those who forget history are doomed to repeat it.

Wednesday, August 20, 2014

Warrior Culture: Ditch ‘Redskins’, but Keep Apache



This article originally appeared in Cicero Magazine on 30 June 2014.

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office have cancelled the trademark registration of the Washington Redskins football team, convinced the team’s logo and name is an offensive racial slur against Native Americans. It is an offensive name, more so than any other sports mascot with an ethnic connection. The decision followed a widespread public campaign and letters from 50 U.S. Senators urging a name change. Following the ruling, some, such as Simon Waxman, claim the effort needs to go further. He claims the U.S. military is guilty of the same racist conduct in using Native American tribal names and the names of Native leaders for equipment and operations. Is there a difference between the Washington Redskins and an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter?

Waxman claims that the use by the U.S. military of the tribal names such as Kiowa and Chinook, weapons such as the tomahawk, or names such as Grey Eagle and Geronimo are offensive. His evidence is the systematic U.S. campaign of “manifest destiny” which saw America expand its way across the whole of the continent, crushing Native tribes in the process.

It is true. The United States fought, tricked, cajoled, murdered and coerced Native tribes into moving off their own land and the U.S. military was the tool most often used to achieve it. By the turn of the 20th century, Native tribes had all but vanished from America. According to Waxman, the campaign was racist and it is therefore racially offensive for the military to use Native terms.

The U.S. military does honor Native American tribes for their warrior culture and fighting spirit because it is worthy of respect and honor and the American military requires and fosters a similar warrior culture.
However, there is no such thing as a “Redskin” helicopter or a “Native Savage” cruise missile. The military does have Kiowa helicopters and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Kiowa were a real tribe and the tomahawk was a real weapon and Geronimo and Grey Eagle were real Native leaders. There is no racist connotation in the use of the names themselves. Waxman’s assertion is that since the U.S. military crushed Native tribes it is racist for the military to use terms associated with peoples it defeated. Waxman compares it, citing Noam Chomsky, with the hypothetical situation if the Nazi’s would have called their tanks or fighters “Jew” or “Gypsy”.

So why is it different? The U.S. military almost always uses themed names for different series’ of equipment. Aircraft carriers are named after U.S. Presidents or other leaders. Battleships were named after U.S. states. Submarines are often named after aquatic animals. Fighter jets are christened with birds of prey. Armored vehicles are named after Generals. The military does this to impart an association to that system of characteristics of its namesake and to honor them, not to disparage a vanquished foe. The association helps to build esprit de corps among those who are stationed on, maintain, use or operate the system.

How can it be that the U.S. military named its helicopters after Native tribes for racist motivations, but named its aircraft carriers after Presidents and Senators out of respect and to honor them? Was it racist against the British to commission the USS George Washington? How about the Sherman tank against white Southerners? If military equipment is named after vanquished foes, why don’t we have a “King George III” submarine, a “Nazi” landing craft, or “Hammer and Sickle” tanks. Waxman would surely argue that it is cynical to believe that the U.S. military, which spent decades hunting the Natives in the Southwest, would honor the same tribes today. That is because Waxman—who never served in the military—like many other people does not understand the concept of warrior culture.

Most Native American tribes had some form of warrior culture. They trained their young men not only to peacefully hunt animals and gather berries in the woods, as naïve and unbalanced narratives picture them, but to fight against neighboring bands, sometimes from the same tribe. They developed and conducted religious rituals in preparation and upon return from war. For many Native tribes, war was a way of life. They were not just the wide-eyed peaceful daisies waiting to be plucked as many postmodernist thinkers—like Noam Chomsky—portray them as. They were proud warriors, not just victims.

They believed there was no greater feat than to meet and defeat a foe in battle and no greater honor than to die in battle one’s self. When white settlers moved into their territory, they conducted raids upon them. It was on their land and therefore fair game. They knew violence would be met with violence. That was life. However, the tribes did not have the technological ability or the population to defeat a European foe which had systematic designs on making the entire continent their own. Despite the overwhelming odds against them, they resisted the white man for decades. The Comanche stopped the northern advance of Spain from Mexico, the westward advance of France out of Louisiana, and the advances of both Texas and the United States as well. Not a bad return for a people forced to live in the Llano Estacado, a desert corner of west Texas which even today is barren land. The warrior culture and fighting spirit of Native Americans is indeed worthy of respect.
Ask an American soldier today if they consider Native Americans defeated enemies of the country or if they consider them warriors worthy of respect. They will answer with respect, hands down.
The United States military has a warrior culture of its own. American troops believe that, as George Orwell says, “People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.” Today less than 1% of America serves in the all-volunteer military and they come home to a country that does not understand them when they do. American veterans turn to one another for support. It reinforces a warrior culture. No one pays the costs of war more than the soldier. They understand that the world is a real and dangerous place where there are other people who want to see America fail and to harm and kill Americans. It is not something that just happens to someone else on TV. It is because of America’s warriors and their warrior culture that people such as Waxman and Chomsky never have to see or experience this first-hand. America’s warriors keep the wolf from the door.

So, yes, the U.S. military does honor Native American tribes for their warrior culture and fighting spirit because it is worthy of respect and honor and the American military requires and fosters a similar warrior culture. But those who do not understand warrior culture or violence and reject it in all of its forms would not understand such a feeling. They would have to believe that is just cynical, racist mocking to name a weapons system a Tomahawk, or a deadly attack helicopter an Apache, or a drone Grey Eagle. Ask an American soldier today if they consider Native Americans defeated enemies of the country or if they consider them warriors worthy of respect. They will answer with respect, hands down.

Washington Redskins owner Dan Snyder has attempted to justify the racist name of his team by using a similar argument. He argues that the Redskins moniker is a “badge of honor” and its use is meant to impart to his football team the fierce warrior fighting spirit associated with Native tribes. So what’s the difference?

It may come as a shock to some, but football is just a game. No one dies. Nothing tangible for the country rides upon victory or loss by one side or the other. While players are skilful and do risk injury, they also get paid ridiculous sums of money and receive excellent health care. Real soldiers are lucky to receive either. Many professional athletes act more like prima donnas than warriors. The tired old metaphors that equate sports with combat should be retired. They are offensive to those who really do fight. Many professional and amateur athletes themselves recognize that. There is no real warrior culture in football. It is just a game. Dan Snyder should not equate his team’s racist mascot with honor. Retire the “Redskins”.

On the other hand, Simon Waxman and likeminded individuals should suspend their disbelief that the U.S. military can in fact honor Native Americans and that it is not just cynical racism. It is clear to see why they have made the mistake and misunderstand the difference. It is an alien concept to them. The U.S government, the U.S. military and the American people of the time all took part in an act of genocide against Native Americans. That is a fact. That cannot be undone. However, no one alive today took part in those actions. The people who named these weapons systems after Native Americans did not have it in mind as a cynical ‘endzone dance’ against a defeated opponent when they did so.

The U.S. military chose to adopt Native American terms for these weapons and platforms in order to honor the warrior culture associated with them, to build esprit de corps among those servicemembers associated with them, and because the U.S. military has a proud warrior culture of its own. That is not racist. Get rid of the Washington “Redskins”, but keep the AH-64 Apache.

Friday, August 15, 2014

Will U.S. Military Advisors Face ‘Mission Creep’ in Iraq?



This article originally appeared in Cicero Magazine on 23 June 2014.

President Obama announced as many as 300 U.S. military advisers may be deployed to Iraq to assist the government in fighting the Sunni extremist group ISIS, which has invaded areas of western Iraq. The White House is also considering airstrikes. In 2012 President Obama withdrew the last U.S. troops from Iraq, keeping a campaign pledge to end the American presence there. The President has promised that “American forces will not be returning to combat in Iraq” and that military advisers will only be there to assist Iraqi forces to repel the ISIS invaders. But some have called this misleading and pointed out that U.S. military advisors certainly have engaged in combat in the past and will again if sent back to Iraq. But would the deployment of U.S. military advisers mean U.S. troops will be engaged in combat in Iraq again?

I served as a U.S. military adviser while attached to a Military Transition Team (MiTT) in Iraq in 2005 and 2006. Our job was to provide for our assigned Iraqi infantry battalion what they did not have themselves–namely medical evacuation capability (MEDEVAC), air and artillery support, and certain forms of intelligence. We also facilitated training in administration, logistics, equipment and weapons maintenance, electronic communications, and operational and tactical strategy—all the skills of professional soldiers. We acted as liaison between our Iraqi battalion and its sister U.S. battalion responsible for the same sector. We also evaluated and reported on the readiness of the Iraqi unit to function autonomously. We were certainly engaged in combat, accompanying Iraqi units on patrols and cordon and search operations. Several U.S. members of our unit were killed and seriously injured in combat operations, along with scores of Iraqi soldiers.

Throughout WWII, U.S. military adviser General ‘Vinegar Joe’ Stilwell and his staff provided high-level military assistance to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and commanded Chinese and Western troops as Chiang’s Chief of Staff. Though their role was originally envisioned to be purely advisory in nature, the United States pushed for Stilwell to be placed in charge of all allied forces in the Chinese theatre, something Chiang resisted until the last. Stilwell and his staff had to fight their way out of Burma following Chinese defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1941, and Stilwell spent the rest of his time in China fighting with Chiang rather than the Japanese.
The re-deployment of U.S. military advisors to Iraq will not automatically mean putting American troops back into combat. But it could.
Perhaps the clearest example of U.S. military advisors becoming engaged in combat comes from Vietnam. Following the 1945 Japanese surrender, France attempted to regain control of its pre-war colony, Indochina. They returned to strong nationalist and communist resistance in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos which they lacked the understanding or will to fight. A small contingent of U.S. advisers were first dispatched to Indochina in 1950 to support the French military, still recovering from WWII and desperately trying to fight the communist insurgency with antiquated equipment. The U.S. mission was to train French forces on new military equipment the U.S. had supplied them to aid France in its fight against the communists.

After the final French defeat of the First Indochina War at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the U.S. began to directly advise the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem in its fight against communist North Vietnam and their indigenous Viet Cong allies. From 1955 to 1960, the U.S. mission grew to as many as 1,500 military advisors. As the Viet Cong insurgency grew in the South, the number of U.S. military advisors grew exponentially, with over 16,000 U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam by 1963. In an extreme example of ‘mission creep’, the soldiers of the Military Assistance Advisory Group-Vietnam (MAAG-V) and the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MAC-V) from 1950 to 1973 moved from a small advisory role to an allied Western military to an open combat role in a grinding Cold War counterinsurgency. They did much more than engage in ‘self-defence’, as once claimed by the Kennedy administration.

Not all U.S. military advisory missions have led to U.S. troops engaging in combat, however. Following WWII, U.S. military advisors assisted in the rebuilding of Germany, the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe, and reconstruction efforts in Japan, China and Korea. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. military advisers trained South American military forces to stabilise their governments against communist rebels during Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions. More recently, the United States has increased its military advisory presence in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. U.S. military advisers have trained troops and advised governments in Nigeria, South Sudan, Chad, Congo, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Yemen and the Philippines, among others, in recent years. Civilian civil servants with the U.S. Department of Defense also engage in military advisory missions through programs such as the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MoDA). The U.S. has frequently deployed civilian and military defence advisors during peacetime to assist allies through structures such as NATO in Europe and the defunct Cold War-era SEATO in Asia. The re-deployment of U.S. military advisors to Iraq will not automatically mean putting American troops back into combat.

But it could. U.S. Special Operations Forces, especially U.S. Army Green Berets, were originally conceived with the intent of training and organising indigenous troops to become a competent and coherent fighting force to engage in unconventional warfare or to train allied government troops in Foreign Internal Defence or counter-insurgency missions. Building an effective fighting force can hardly be done solely in a theoretical, classroom environment, and even field training under simulated fighting conditions is no substitute for real combat. Special Operations Forces often provide theoretical instruction, followed by field training, and progressing into leading, advising and evaluating performance in combat operations when necessary. If U.S. military advisers are deployed to Iraq, they will likely be Special Operations Forces who possess language and cultural skills and years of previous experience on the ground in Iraq. Anonymous U.S. officials have said the Pentagon would ask for U.S. Special Operations Forces to be on the ground in order to support advisory and intelligence operations there.

The U.S. has already invested billions of dollars, scores of American lives, and six years into training and equipping Iraqi government troops. That is more years of U.S. military training and experience than I had when I first deployed to Iraq myself in 2003. The Iraqi military has been engaged in a counterinsurgency battle on their home turf for years so are not novices to combat. They have already been trained by U.S. advisors. Difficulties in agreeing to an acceptable SOFA agreement with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki are the reason there has been no U.S. military advisory presence in Iraq since 2012. Now al-Maliki and the Iraqi government want U.S. forces to return.

There is a historical danger a renewed U.S. military advisory mission in Iraq could “creep” from helping Iraq to help itself into doing it for them. The U.S. may launch airstrikes against ISIS forces—something President Obama has announced he is considering—but they could not do so effectively without trained American controllers on the front lines, which would necessarily place them ‘in combat’—something the President has promised not to do. During the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, President Obama promised there would be no U.S. presence on the ground and that the U.S. would take a backseat to its European allies. Behind the scenes, paramilitary forces from U.S. intelligence were indeed on the ground in Libya and the U.S. military played a much larger role than was publicly acknowledged.

JCS Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, once in overall charge of the American effort to train police and military forces in Iraq, warned that the U.S. does not have the intelligence capability to effectively lead and target airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. The Iraqi army was not trained or equipped with communications equipment which would enable them to effectively guide U.S. airstrikes. The U.S. was rightly hesitant to train and equip a foreign military with that capability. Arguably only U.S. boots on the ground—filled by troops trained in combat air control—could make the difference.

In sum, U.S. military advisors have historically been deployed in both combat and non-combat roles. While there is a precedent, it does not necessarily follow that the re-deployment of U.S. military advisors to Iraq will lead to “mission creep” or putting American troops into combat there again. For the option of U.S. airstrikes being employed against ISIS in Iraq to be effective, however, U.S. controllers would most likely have to be on the ground at the front lines. So how does one definitively determine if U.S. troops are “in combat”? This is probably the question that is easiest answer. Forget what the President, Congress, the lawyers, the experts or the media say on the issue. To quote one of Murphy’s Laws: “If you are being shot at, you are in combat.”

Thursday, July 10, 2014

When Vets Kill



This post originally appeared in Cicero Magazine on 9 May 2014.

Are American vets saints or sinners? When incidents such as the 2009 and 2014 Fort Hood shootings, the 2012 Wisconsin Sikh Temple attack and the 2013 Washington Naval Yard shootings—all involving former military personnel—are combined in the media with reports of the epidemic of veteran suicide, veteran homelessness, military sexual trauma, and domestic violence among soldiers, it paints a grim picture. Yet the portrayal sends a mixed message when paired with the ‘celebrity Generals’ and corporate and political hero worship of serving troops and veterans. Such media depictions only serve to erect the metaphorical wall even higher between those who serve and those who do not, yet creating a kind of collective guilt among the latter that recoils in horror after such shootings, even as they cannot pass someone in uniform without reaffirming their patriotism with a token nod of support. More perplexing is when such shootings get hijacked by media discussions over PTSD, which distracts everyone from the real issue at stake: the presence of handguns on military bases, which are supposed to be citadels of security.So which is it: saints or sinners?

The answer is complicated, and one that is informed by this country’s collective urge to celebrate all things that support the troops, who Boston University’s Andrew Bacevich describes as the real “One Percent”, but without asking Americans to make a shred of sacrifice. God forbid that taxes were raised to pay for two wars or that anybody in Congress mention talk of a draft. In truth, a cynic might say that the troops are unfurled before the public whenever they help move product — whether to sell newspapers, to sell beer, to sell candidates, and so forth. The military and veterans are together one of the few institutions in America that continues to enjoy near-Universal, non-partisan respect. However this ‘respect’ often translates into little more than a pat on the back, a handshake and a ‘thanks for your service’. The struggles of America’s veterans are real. However, they are neither unblemished heroes nor violent mental psychopaths. What is missing from the veterans’ narrative depicted in the media is the veterans themselves.

Vets are portrayed as national saints or victims and perpetrators. Despite having such obvious symbolic power in America, veterans have little real power. Corporate boardrooms do not welcome them. There are virtually no veteran CEOs who do not work for military-related companies or in a project they did not start themselves. The US Congress has the lowest number of veteran members since the end of WWII. Military pay and benefits—long sacrosanct—are now being targeted as entitlements in fiscal battles in Washington. The VA benefits backlog is still a problem after decades of empty political promises. Many of those vets who do make it into powerful circles are often granted access because of who they come to know, not out of some belief that they merit success for their sacrifices. Most veterans organisations, new and old, have chosen or been forced to pick a partisan political side, despite the fact that neither side can claim to have clean hands when it comes to handling military and veterans affairs.
Madison Avenue has also gotten on the troops-are-heroes gravy train. One can hardly pick up a name-brand product at a grocery store in America without it carrying a notice that some of the corporate proceeds go to helping ‘our heroes’ through a tax-deductible veteran’s charity. The opening or halftime ceremony of every major sporting event features tributes to the troops.

While it is encouraging that veterans and charities are receiving this kind of attention, it is clearly not for altruistic motives. Images of US troops are being used to sell products. Almost every major corporate brand in America has a military page on its website where it professes to make special efforts to hire vets—leaving out mention of the tax incentives it receives to do so. For-profit colleges with questionable reputations for quality mercilessly target veterans for their GI Bill funds. Politicians and political action groups are the worst offenders in abusing service-members for their own personal gain, from sources as diverse as gay pride rallies to Ron Paul’s presidential campaign. Despite regulations against it, men and women in uniform are a favorite backdrop for elected officials who hope to gain from the legitimacy and public support the troops enjoy.
One can hardly pick up a name-brand product at a grocery store in America without it carrying a notice that some of the corporate proceeds go to helping ‘our heroes’ through a tax-deductible veteran’s charity.

This year’s Super Bowl featured a Budweiser ad showing a ‘Hero’s Welcome’ for a Lieutenant returning from Afghanistan. Budweiser at one point even claimed to have ‘Army support’ for the ad. Opinion among veterans was split as to whether the commercial stepped over the fine line between recognizing the troops and using them to sell products. It is against military regulations to appear in uniform to sell products or to participate in political activities. The US Army initially considered pursuing a cease-and-desist order to prevent the spot from airing and never adequately explained why it decided to allow Budweiser to go-ahead.

By way of contrast, immediately following the recent shootings at Fort Hood, Texas by Army Specialist Ivan Lopez, media reports were quick to point out that it happened on a military post, the shooter was a soldier, a veteran of the Iraq War, and apparently had Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Parallels were immediately drawn between this incident, the 2009 Fort Hood shootings by Major Nadal Hassan and the 2013 Washington Naval Yard shootings by Navy Reservist Aaron Alexis. Even the killing of three people at a Jewish community center in Kansas by a Klansman was linked to the gunman’s status as a Vietnam vet. With 24-hour television news and most major newspapers providing extensive coverage in the days and weeks following the Lopez shootings, one would be excused for believing there must be an epidemic of violence among American troops and veterans. Inside each of us, the media appears to insinuate, is a Timothy McVeigh itching to be heard.

But the depiction is false. A law enforcement analysis of 29 active shooter incidents between 1999 and 2012 found that most were workplace-related incidents committed by lone young men, the majority of which used semiautomatic pistols and died in the incident, either by their own hand or through the response of law enforcement personnel. Almost all of them had long-term issues with work or family. The most interesting fact is that of these 29 incidents, only 4 were current or former military personnel. One of them, Major Nadal Hassan, cited Islamic terror as his motive. Another, the Wisconsin Sikh Temple shootings, was motivated by racial hatred. The other two exhibited histories and grievances consistent with the other 25 non-veteran shooters. Based on this data, arguably there is no link between military service, PTSD and shooting rampages.

Specialist Ivan Lopez has the same profile as non-veteran active shooters. He was a young, lone male with a semiautomatic pistol who eventually turned his weapon on himself when confronted by law enforcement. The picture that has emerged of Lopez is of someone struggling to adjust to a new home, a new career and difficulties with his superiors—a situation that is not military-specific whatsoever. He just happened to be a soldier. Contrary to common views, Lopez did not just snap; he was likely harboring a long-simmering resentment toward his workplace and what he saw as unfairness in his life. The fact he already had his weapon in his car on the day of the shooting incident suggests a degree of premeditation or that he was already considering the possibility of taking action.

But the media immediately latched onto the fact he was a soldier, had deployed to Iraq and was being evaluated for PTSD. Much has since been made of the fact that he deployed to Iraq for only four months as proof he could not have PTSD. In fairness, one incident on one day is enough to be traumatized if severe enough. Different people are affected in different ways and, contrary to the media narrative, development and severity of PTSD does not depend upon the number of months or tours served in combat. One of the issues of treating PTSD and Traumatic Brain Injury is that they are mental wounds which can only be diagnosed by their symptoms as reported by or observed in the patient.

Perhaps Lopez did have PTSD, perhaps not. There is no way to know now. It actually matters very little. Despite the connection the media immediately draws in such circumstances, there is only a very weak connection between PTSD and violence. However it is clear that Specialist Lopez was struggling to deal with his life in a way that many non-military, non-veteran Americans do every day, a struggle which can lead to violence. However this has not kept the media from playing up the military-PTSD aspect.
When it comes to US troops and veterans, the American media has developed a clearly detectable ‘Madonna/Whore Complex’, in which those who serve are invariably portrayed as either perfections of virtue beyond reproach (see the fawning coverage of David Petraeus prior to 2012) or as victims of the government or society or as perpetrators with festering mental health issues which may lead to suicide, violence or even murder.

Consider the following headline: “Veterans with PTSD Linked to Everything That Could Kill Your Children.” Fortunately, it is from the military satire site The Duffel Blog. Adding to this state of affairs is the (ab)use of service-members and veterans in media campaigns by politicians, political action committees and corporations for their own gain. Troops have become the new talking babies or cute kittens playing with yarn – mere props to move product and check Americans’ box to pay tribute for their service, and maybe even profit off their presence. Whenever events like the Fort Hood shooting presents us with a more nuanced and untidy picture of our veterans’ well-beings, we tend to veer into the other extreme, painting them with a broad brush as PTSD-addled killers. That is not to simply grasp the cliché that the truth is somewhere in between, but rather that most of our veterans are not unlike any other segment of the American population.

Take Specialist Ivan Lopez. On another day, in different circumstances, a former police officer, Iraq War vet and Army reservist who decided to switch to driving trucks on active duty to feed his family would have been a hero. He would have been in a Budweiser commercial or spoke at the local VFW. Instead, the media pictures him as a frustrated loser with PTSD who was ten years older than other troops his rank who could not handle his troubles anymore. The veteran is a war hero one day, an armed killer the next. Within hours of the shootings and his suicide, the story was already creating media churn and being put to political use by politicians and advocacy organisations. It has become the latest chapter in the debate about guns in America. One side argues that active shootings like those in Aurora, Sandy Hook, and Fort Hood could have been prevented if the public, school officials, and off-duty soldiers were allowed to be armed in public. The message has to focus on Lopez’s undiagnosed PTSD and mental health issues. It was not easy access to firearms that caused this shooting; it was Lopez’s mental health issues. Guns don’t kill people; people kill people.

Contrary to popular belief, living on a military post means less access and exposure to privately-owned firearms than living off post. The weapons used by Major Nadal Hassan and Specialist Ivan Lopez were obtained off post at private establishments and kept against military regulations. Though every company-sized military element on a base counts hundreds of firearms among its equipment, access to this weaponry is very tightly controlled by commanders and armorers. Troops cannot simply draw out their assigned rifle at will. It can only be for a purpose authorized by the unit commander. Though military posts such as Fort Hood may contain tens of thousands of small arms weapons, they are kept secure in padlocked racks or cages behind bank vault doors armed with alarms that notify military police directly any time an arms room is accessed. Most military facilities with arms rooms are also manned by soldiers 24 hours a day. Any time a weapon leaves a vault, a paper trail is created as to who signed for it, when, and what armorer allowed it out. Access to weaponry is taken seriously by the US military.

Contrast this with the various disjointed, inconsistent and ill-enforced laws regulating the purchase, use, transport, carrying and storage of civilian firearms outside of bases across the United States. No matter your interpretation of the 2nd Amendment, even transporting a firearm from one town or county to another can lead to an unknowing violation of the law. Each city, county and state seems to have its own rules and regulations and the federal government seems to change its application or interpretation of firearms regulations depending upon who is in Congress or the White House. America’s gun laws, no matter your view of them, are a tragi-comical absolute mess.

Many troops own personal firearms as well. Military policy requires these weapons be registered with their unit and must be stored in the same arms room as military weaponry and are subject to the same controls. As with military-issue weaponry, access to personal weapons is only by arrangement with the armorer with the permission of the unit commander.
Yet some on the right would like to see more guns on military posts. More guns would not stop or deter an active shooter like Ivan Lopez. These are people who have determined they will commit a violent act and will continue to shoot people until they are shot by police or shoot themselves. The Hasan and Lopez shootings took place during the duty day and military police were on the scene within fifteen minutes. Both incidents were over quickly. Introducing an off duty soldier who happened by chance to be in the area and carrying his personal weapon into the situation could serve only to cause confusion among law enforcement as to who the perpetrator is. This would be made worse if word spreads across a post and draws armed soldiers who want to help, creating a tangle of armed troopers without command and control. Soldiers do not behave that way in combat and it makes equally less sense to do so on post. Law Enforcement, with special training, radios and coordination should handle such incidents.

It is rather ironic that the media focused on the military and PTSD aspect of the Lopez shooting rather than use it as an opportunity to discuss responsible gun laws. Instead, they’re portraying soldiers as victim-perpetrators to sell newspapers. In the case of Ivan Lopez, it was not PTSD or a soldier’s fondness for guns or access to military weaponry that allowed this latest Fort Hood shooting to occur. Lopez’s grievances with the world were not military-specific. They were the same issues many civilians have. Military weapons were not involved.

It was the easy access to weaponry off post that allowed Ivan Lopez to obtain a firearm in Killeen, Texas (ironically, from the same gun shop where Major Nadal Hasan bought one of his guns) and bring it onto post to kill his fellow soldiers. This incident had nothing to do with Lopez being a soldier or if he had PTSD or any failure in military policy as the media and some politicians and advocacy groups have claimed. It was the America outside of Fort Hood that allowed this incident to occur. If America outside the walls of military posts had as sensible gun control laws and took weapons as seriously as the America inside them, active shootings like this could be stopped.

Which returns us to the general public’s schizophrenic relationship with its armed forces. So long as there is this metaphorical wall between us and them, there will be this mixed message after tragedies whereby we praise our heroes with our right hand, while condemning their PTSD with our other hand, even as we refuse to do anything to fix our own gun-obsessed culture. Carry on America “supporting the troops,” with tributes, fundraisers, and shout-outs during seventh innings.
Keep patting backs, wearing t-shirts and slapping on bumper stickers. But if you really want to pay tribute to their sacrifice, fix this country. Make it into one that is worth fighting for and that the troops are welcome and safe to return to.

Thursday, November 22, 2012

U.S. Military owes more to combat Joes than a four-star General


This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 14 November 2012.

The pressure on those in positions of great responsibility is tremendous. Although constantly surrounded, they are, in fact, alone. Men like General David Petraeus and General John Allen could never live up to the myths that surround them, pedestals they never asked to be placed upon as fame-seekers do – though, certainly in Petraeus' case, they haven't shied from it. To expect them to live up to the standards of perfection others have set for them is an impossible task no one could succeed at. They're not saints. They're soldiers. Marines.

Yet, at some point, "celebrity generals" pass out of the realm of being troopers and into being politicians. Similar uproar occurred when President Obama required General Stanley McChrystal, another admirable commander, to resign after he and his staff publicly criticised the commander-in-chief, a well-known "don't" in the military. That was a case of over-confidently taking shots in the press. The Petraeus affair is worse, in that it may have presented a real threat to national security as an opportunity for a foreign intelligence service to exploit.

I'm a two-tour army veteran of the Iraq war. I've spent the majority of my adult life as a soldier. We're no angels. Guys and girls like me come in any colour, from inner-city or rural America, places like the south side of Chicago or Lovelady, Texas. We're regular middle- or lower-class kids (average age: 19). Some joined for college money; some to get away from home; others out of a sense of duty. We like to fight, we like to swear, get tattoos, and we enjoy a good drink. We remain pretty much anonymous. We don't have biographers or make it onto the social circuit.

We're the absolute backbone of the country – Uncle Sam's misguided children. We're the men and women without any of the advantages in life. We're not supposed to succeed, but we do. In fact, it's the very flaws in each of our individual characters that make it all the more extraordinary what the US military has achieved in its 236 years. As we're reminded every Veteran's Day, victory was never certain and the sacrifices by our troops are great. These were the men and women fighting in Afghanistan while this melodrama was going on back home.

One can see how allowances can be made for the personal indiscretions of such people. Yet, I somehow can't help but feel let down by the expanding circle of this controversy, which has brought down General Petraeus and threatens to do the same to General Allen. I expected more of them, and the behaviour thus far revealed seems petty and melodramatic – a military soap opera complete with affairs, threatening notes, twins and fancy parties.

There are some who believe that this affair is nothing compared to the work General Petraeus has done for the country. Despite the great respect I have for the general, I find myself less willing to grant such allowances.

It is a military principle that a leader cannot impose a standard on others he doesn't impose on himself. This situation started out innocently enough, but seems to have gotten out of control. As director of an intelligence agency, the general would certainly have seen the danger this scenario presented if he had been looking at it from the outside. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recognised that – and required Petraeus' resignation.

General Petraeus is widely respected by the military and veterans. But he is utterly exalted in both liberal and conservative Washington circles, which see him as a sort of noble warrior-philosopher, with credentials from West Point, Princeton and Georgetown. I was taught in the military that none of us is indispensable. We're all cogs in the wheel, and two minutes after we walk out the door, there will be an adequate replacement. The machine keeps going. The success or failure of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and of the United States as a whole, do not depend upon the fate of one or two men, no matter how exemplary their service. This country is stronger than that.

In fact, as study of our recent military campaigns has gone on, we have arguably been successful in many respects, despite the failures and inadequacies of some of our top military commanders and elected leadership. The credit for our limited successes should go to the great mass of regular, everyday troops who have been called upon to be not just soldiers, but police officers, doctors, aid workers, public works directors and social scientists.

The tough kids with high school diplomas got it done, not the administration in Washington, Ivy League professors, the brass in the Pentagon or generals at garden parties. These average Americans have done more than was asked of them and theirs should be all the credit.

The combat Joes are the ones who have been let down by this scandal. General Petraeus shouldn't have been placed on an exalted pedestal, even if he welcomed it. That very isolation may have clouded his judgment and created the risk of a security breach. In the end, though, he is a man just like other men: he is a cog in the wheel and the United States will go on without General Petraeus.

Friday, November 9, 2012

American Military Decline? Not When Force is Used Properly


This post originally appeared in Small Wars Journal on 7 November 2012.

In recent years many have cited America’s military struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan as signs of decline. Political wrangling over the size, use, and budget of the U.S. military, withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, the fault and effects of impending sequestration, and the Arab Spring and its follow-on effects have, among other issues, put wind in the sails of this theory. Others hold using military force for ‘wars of choice’ is no longer a viable option for America. However, to think that America can’t or shouldn’t project its power globally when necessary is a mistake. America’s military struggles in the post-9/11 era have stemmed from improper application of military force. Put simply, our recent counterinsurgency efforts haven’t been using it right. When used as it should be, using military force is still an effective choice.

A soldier’s job is to fight and win in combat and to prepare to do so. Nowhere in the job description is being an international aid worker mentioned. It is a testament to the commitment and adaptability of the U.S. military that they have been as successful as they have been at it in Iraq and Afghanistan. Providing public works, policing, community political relations, and social services is something that should be done by educated and experienced professionals in that area. The U.S. military is a hammer, not a scalpel. However, our troops have been asked to fill these sensitive roles on a steep learning curve over the last decade because of our own domestic politics have required it.

Our highest elected leaders are responsible for this. Americans don’t like to spend money on ‘foreign aid.’ Politicians, especially of the conservative variety, characterize this spending as wasteful and beat the drum against it as fiscally irresponsible. Foreign development assistance actually comprises less than one percent of the federal budget, but the returns received are much more cost effective, though hard to quantify. It costs much more to send one soldier to Afghanistan for a year than it does to build a school or new market building that will stand to be used for decades in places the sorely need them.

These were the programs Gen. Petraeus, Gen. McChrystal, and other military leaders asked for to help win hearts and minds. But conservative resistance to spending on any programs considered foreign aid means the professionals at places like the U.S. State Department and USAID or even the UN and non-governmental organizations weren’t going to get the job. Our troopers had to add it to their already long to-do list. Funneling it through the military was the only way it would get done at all. That’s not doing it right.

Following NATO’s decision to severely curtail joint patrols with Afghan security forces, the wisdom and effectiveness of training and equipping indigenous forces to eventually replace U.S. troops has also been questioned. This is a tactic the U.S. has been used often in places like Korea, Vietnam, South America, and the Philippines, among others, and again in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of these efforts were moderately successful, but not successful enough that the U.S. has ever been able to fully disengage in these places. We still have troops in Korea, Vietnam was overrun, and we’re still engaged in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. These efforts can be successful as an auxiliary to a military campaign, but not as its main effort.

Often these efforts revolve around cooperating with a marginalized minority, such as the Montagnards in Vietnam, Kurds in Iraq, and Hazara in Afghanistan. When the U.S. eventually departs, these people can become even more marginalized as a result. These forces also lack the air, logistical, financial, and political support needed to be self-sustaining afterwards and can at times feel abandoned by America when finally do leave, as with Osama bin Laden and the Mujahedeen in 1980’s Afghanistan. Building security capacity essentially from scratch after effecting a regime change, especially in states with vast cultural differences from our own, is a very tall order to fill.

However, there is benefit to the U.S. in building military-to-military relations outside of conflict. There is a great difference between a modern, professional military and a ragtag militia when they’re called to respond to internal conflicts. Despite controversy over America’s military support of Egypt during Mubarak’s rule, the Egyptian military’s show of relative restraint was not just a sign of support for the people, but of an institution that believes it has a responsibility to the nation. A less professional force may have answered the calls by some to crush demonstrations or so reacted of their own volition. The Egyptian military has had a great deal of exchange with the U.S. military and the British military before it. The role of a professional military as a neutral arbiter in national conflicts can also be seen in Turkey, Thailand, and Pakistan. However, such relationships should be built in peacetime, not after a conflict has occurred.

Another example of the misuse of American military power has come in the weak, middling size of troop numbers sent into major combat—numbers fixed by the administration. America’s elected leadership opted for smaller, faster, lighter, more-economical force packages that, while winning all the battles, have arguably not won the wars. The small number of U.S. troops on the ground and reliance on indigenous forces early on in Afghanistan allowed al Qaeda and the Taliban to slip away into Pakistan, where they continue to operate today by straddling the border. The lack of sufficient troop numbers in Iraq meant America couldn’t provide adequate security when it decided to stay put and later necessitated the ‘surge’ to stave off sectarian civil war and allow the return of commerce, also emulated later in Afghanistan. Though these were certainly major troop commitments, they weren’t enough to get the job done from the outset.

The problems that insufficient troop numbers created have proven wrong those critical of the Powell Doctrine, such as Paul Wolfowitz, and vindicated its supporters, such as Gen. Eric Shinseki. It is arguable that a stronger commitment of troops from the very beginning in both Afghanistan and Iraq would have turned up better results. The mission in Afghanistan suffered in particular from the loss of attention and resources caused by the Iraq War. The administration was keen to commit to the wars, but having decided to take the course, was unwilling to commit to it as much as necessary to guarantee victory from the beginning. Bring back the Powell Doctrine.

However that does not mean that every American intervention should become D-Day. There still is scope for America to intervene militarily in world events on moral or humanitarian grounds. When or what those grounds are is another discussion. The past twenty years have shown that U.S. interventions can be successful when they have clear, concise objectives that are consistent throughout the action and on a short timeline in which to achieve them. Limiting campaigns to air strikes with intelligence, material, medical, and humanitarian support for local allies on the ground and keeping our own conventional ground troops out has been successful. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya are examples. Iraq and Afghanistan are examples where intervening has gone wrong because they did not stick to these principles. Even in small, limited interventions, the commitment of force must be sufficient to meet a clear objective from the outset. The 1992 adventure in Somalia is an example where this failed.

It can be said that when it comes to using U.S. military power, it should be an all or nothing affair. If a major commitment of ground troops is required, it should follow the Powell Doctrine. If a small-scale intervention is decided upon, it should attract as full a commitment of force and support proportionate to meet the objective without ground troops. The past decade has shown that opting for a middling, unclear, inconsistent approach does not work.

Fighting grinding counterinsurgency campaigns has apparently become acceptable to America. CIA Director Gen. David Petraeus wrote his doctoral thesis and the military manual on it. It’s the topic of thousands of professional journal articles, newspaper columns, and PowerPoint slideshows. However, we do not have to accept the idea of confronting an insurgency as an inevitability or necessity of modern warfare. In fact, America would do well to avoid having to apply COIN tactics at all by avoiding insurgencies altogether.

Insurgencies are a case of catching the tiger by his tail. Once America invades a country on the ground and decides to accept the responsibility of rebuilding it or, rather, making it into something it never was, it will meet resistance. Not only local resistance, but regional as planting our flag also becomes a beacon for like-minded opponents to come and fight us. The argument that holds we have to stay, occupy, and rebuild a nation is that if we do not, we’ll be facing the same threat again down the road, not to mention moral obligations to fix what we’ve broken.

After WWII we decided not to repeat the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty following WWI and invested in rebuilding our foes under the Marshall Plan. But Afghanistan and Iraq are not Germany and Japan. Current history shows the results of following this logic are just as unpalatable as not following it. After ten years, Afghanistan and Iraq are much the same countries for average citizens as they were when we started. Only the cast of characters at the top has changed.

We have applied a strategy that worked well fifty years ago in two industrialized nations with previously-existing strong central governments to two underdeveloped Middle Eastern states with significant cultural differences, one of which has never had a strong central government in its entire history. That was a mistake. Leaving aside discussion about justifications for either war, the fact is that the U.S. should not have stayed in Afghanistan or Iraq, let alone both simultaneously. It is an aggravating factor that we also did not plan for the immediate aftermath or a long occupation afterward, yet went ahead with them anyway.

What should we have done? Leaving aside discussion of justification for going to war, we should have set very clear, concise, and consistent objectives and, having achieved them, left. In both cases, one objective was clearly unconditional surrender. In Afghanistan, the goal should have been to capture Osama bin Laden and his identified lieutenants, along with the whole of the Taliban leadership. Iraq is a more controversial case. It is clear now that the weapons of mass destruction did not exist. Another goal there should have been to capture Saddam Hussein and his identified lieutenants.

We should have followed the Powell Doctrine. The invasion should have been preceded by a build-up of troop levels sufficient to secure the whole of the country and should have proceeded at a pace expeditiously enough to block all escape routes and eliminate all resistance on a steady march toward the center. We should have blocked the escape across the Tora Bora Mountains or, failing that, pursued al Qaeda and the Taliban into Pakistan if necessary. We should have destroyed all Baathist or Fedayeen Saddam units we encountered, rather than bypassing some of them in a race to Baghdad.

We should have seen necessarily to humanitarian needs with programs administered through the State Department, USAID, the UN, and NGOs, secured by the U.S. military. At most, we should have facilitated and secured a gathering of national leaders, but not interfered in its decisions. Our troop drawdown should have begun within six months. We should have continued to provide humanitarian aid and assistance during and after withdrawal. All assistance beyond that should only have been given upon request from the self-determined leadership of Afghanistan or Iraq.

If years later a threat to America or its allies or vital interests is presented by the same nation, then America uses military force to eliminate it once again following the same template. The best way to defeat an insurgency is not to give it time or be present for it to develop. This strategy can be repeated ad infinium. America should always expect to face an insurgency, but never accept that it must. Nowhere in the rulebook does it say the U.S. must remain in or occupy a country it has invaded. Recently, we have chosen to. Once the threat has been removed, we have accomplished the objective. Anything beyond that is territory where the wisdom of continued use of military force becomes questionable, the rules of engagement become shaky, the objectives become unclear and inconsistent, and an insurgency is likely to develop.

The campaign in Libya was a success because it had a clear, concise, and consistent goal—namely to end the rule of Muammar Qaddafi. After some initial hesitation, America decided to intervene. The successful result shows that when a correct assessment of the amount of force needed to achieve the objective is applied proportionately, we will succeed. Had we limited our involvement to non-military support, the mission likely would have failed as the resistance was defeated by Qaddafi’s superior military forces. Sending troops in was never an option. If we had sent U.S. troops into Libya, following the model of Afghanistan and Iraq, they would likely still be there and perhaps face an insurgency. Despite toppling the oppressive Qaddafi regime there, the recent anti-American violence in Benghazi shows not everyone would have accepted our presence. The program of directed airstrikes and tactical support was strong enough to tip the balance. American involvement there was over in less than ninety days and with zero U.S. casualties.

It would be a mistake to believe America’s military power is in decline. America, even with proposed cuts, still spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. No other nation can match the United States’ ability to project power anywhere in the world on just a few days or hours’ notice. Though multiple combat deployments have taken their toll, America’s military is the most experienced in the world. It has been fighting two grinding wars on multiple fronts tens of thousands of miles from home in some of the most inhospitable terrain imaginable. Most of our opponents are still stuck at home, parading their troops and aging equipment down the streets of their own capitols. Despite sometimes bad policy decisions by its elected civilian leadership regarding the use of force, the United States military has risen to meet its challenges and succeeded despite them. That’s no sign of decline.

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

The (Camouflage) Things They Carried


This article originally appeared in Small Wars Journal on 23 October 2012.

Those who never served in the military would find it hard to believe the degree to which a soldier’s appearance is regulated. Army Regulation 670-1 governs the wear and appearance of the Army uniform and is constantly revised. But it goes far beyond just uniforms. It covers shaving, haircuts, and hairstyles, fingernail polish, length, and cleanliness, tattoos, piercings, dental work, and even extends to appearance off duty. AR 670-1 is the reason you won’t find soldiers with their hands in their pockets. Admittedly, this degree of micromanagement is one of many reasons I decided not to make the Army my career and left after nine years. I followed regulations like a professional soldier, but after I came back from combat each time I found it increasingly difficult to care about trivia like what color gym bag I could or couldn’t carry or enforce it on others. These regulations naturally extend to the camouflage fatigues soldiers wear into battle.

After years of testing and developing new colors and patterns, the Army decided in 2005 to adopt a new all-purpose field uniform, the Army Combat Uniform (ACU), of pixelated grey hues. The decision was met with a great deal of skepticism among troops and veterans. The first day I wore the pixels an old Army retiree told me, “You look like a truck hit you with a mud puddle.” Many leaders in the field complained that the new pattern didn’t blend in with vegetation at all. Delays in fielding and replacing equipment and uniforms in Woodland or Desert camouflage led to units deploying with a confusing mixture of uniforms, wearing a grey pixel uniform with a Desert ballistic vest and Woodland ammunition pouches. My Sergeant Major remarked at the time, “We look like a ragtag circus.”

The blend of pixelated colors is officially dubbed ‘urban grey ’, ‘desert sand’, and ‘foliage green’ arranged in a digital pattern. The grey pixels were selected in an effort to find an all-purpose uniform fit for any terrain. Though predominantly grey in appearance, when viewed in a woodline at a distance the colors appear green when combined with the shadows in vegetation and differing intensities of sunlight. The grey and khaki colors also compare with shades of grey and brown in urban terrain. In testing, the pattern was referred to as ‘urban track.’ The khaki color also melds with brown rock or sand. The shades also compare with the skyline when silhouetted against the horizon. It has been claimed that this relates to the historically-informed military tactic that attacks often take place in the grey of early dawn. These are the arguments made in its favor.

The new uniform came with changes other than the camouflage pattern. They allow units to automatically reorder replacement uniforms for deployed soldiers after a field-life of six months – a great logistical improvement. In early 2003, many Army units, including my own, deployed to Iraq with only two sets of so-called desert camouflage uniforms, or DCUs, because they couldn’t be produced and fielded fast enough to meet the demand. They were also quickly and poorly sewn and didn’t stand up well to the effects of daily combat. Our uniforms would be ringed in white salt stains from sweating profusely in the heat. We had to constantly wash them in buckets by hand like old washerwomen and hang them out to dry like a back-alley laundry. Some of the desert uniforms were threadbare and almost white in color, not to mention all the oil, dirt, and bloodstains picked up from daily combat, when we returned from Iraq in 2004. We were all issued new DCUs to fly home from Kuwait in. On the plane, we all felt like we were being prettied up for the public. Things improved once the procurement and supply system caught up, but not fast enough for troops in Iraq with ripped pants or cut-up tops. But, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked when pressed on Army equipment shortages at the time, to much consternation, “You go to war with the Army you have, not with the one you want.”

In the end, after $5 billion worth of testing and fielding the uniform to every American soldier and eight years of discussion and complaints from leaders in the field, the Army has decided to nix the grey all-purpose pixels in the coming years. The Natick Army Soldier Center in Massachusetts, the organization charged with developing Army camouflage, says they have a replacement for the pixels, what some have come to call an expensive mistake. Officials at Natick have claimed that the original decision to go with the pattern was rushed and influenced by politics among top Army leaders, not based on a complete, full assessment by field and scientific testing. But one question lingers: Is all this costly concern about camouflage as relevant as it once was to future combat for the Army?

The Science of Camouflage Uniforms


The dead man knows that camouflage is all in the mind./ He has seen in the human need for shape the undoing of shape./ He has witnessed the displacement of up-and-down, across and slantwise./ He has curled the straight lines and unbent the curves, he has split the wishbone and painted outside the lines./ The dead man has undone the map by which to get there./ It is not what the dead man looks like, but what he no longer resembles.

-Marvin Bell, from More About the Dead Man in Camouflage

As science has progressed, so has the study and use of camouflage. In layman’s terms, the job of a camouflage pattern is to break up the familiar outline of the head, shoulders, torso, and legs of the human body while standing or crouching. Uniforms of various colors help soldiers blend in with terrain colors. Desert and wooded patterns mimic the shapes of features of the terrain and shadows in addition to their colors. Pixels, rather than focusing on color or shape, rely on the confusion they create in human eyesight. From further distances, the pixels become just blotchy patches of color.

So why grey? American armies do have some traditional connections with grey. Cadets at West Point, members of ‘The Long Grey Line’, have worn grey since its founding. The army of the Republic of Texas wore grey uniforms, as did the Confederacy. German armies wore ‘field gray’ from the turn of the century up until the early Cold War period. Though green is the first color that comes to mind when one thinks of the Army, grey also has a place. Politics and economics, as always, had their effect on the decision as well.

Indeed, the decision to go grey didn’t come from Natick. In fact, testing consistently rated the current grey as the worst among four competitors, one of which was MultiCam. The call to go with a pattern that did not contain strong shades of green or black was questioned from the beginning. This has led many to ask who and why the decision was made and what considerations it was based on. No answers seem to be forthcoming. In another possible change, Natick has also developed four different terrain-specific patterns for desert, snow, and urban environments to possibly be issued in the future as well. The Army will now repeat the cost and time of fielding a new uniform again by around 2014.

The new all-purpose uniforms have greatly improved utility from previous uniforms, the basic design of which hadn’t changed much since WWII. The material is a lighter mix of cotton and nylon. The old uniform tops had four pockets on the torso, all of which were covered over while wearing a ballistic vest. The new uniform tops eliminate the waist pockets and move them to the shoulders where they aren’t covered under the vest. The tops are shorter to allow better ventilation. New tops made specifically to be worn under the ballistic vest feature torsos made of moisture wicking material. The pants have two new pockets below the knees in addition to the usual cargo pockets. Buttons were eliminated in favor of Velcro, zippers, and drawstrings. Rank and insignia are velcroed or pinned to the uniform rather than sewn on.

To the cheers or jeers of many, the ACU doesn’t require ironing and the ‘rough side out’ leather boots don’t require polishing. This provided for quite a wave in Army culture. When I joined the U.S. Army in 1999, I wore the standard Woodland camouflage fatigues. As an eager young soldier I starched and pressed my uniform every day with creases so sharp you could cut bread with them. I polished my boots to a shine so high you could see your soul in it. Some soldiers used to soak their uniforms in buckets of starch and iron them until they could stand up on their own. Others used hair dryers to melt and re-melt their boot polish. A few used floor wax. Many would turn their uniforms in to the cleaners every week to be pressed. Some even bought their own industry-grade machines. Every Monday morning at 9:00 am there was a showdown to see which platoon had the sharpest looking troopers.

The elimination of the old traditions of pressed and starched uniforms and spit-shined boots has generated much discussion. After I came home from Iraq the first time in 2004, a pressed uniform and shined boots just weren’t that important to me anymore. Other things seemed more important, such as teaching soldiers who hadn’t been to Iraq yet skills that would help them fight there. I found it increasingly hard to care about trivia such as what color gym bag I could carry while in uniform, much less enforce it on others. Many were sad to see the press-and-shine Army go. They felt it built esprit de corps and showed discipline and commitment. Some were not sad, however. Soldiers had easily spent around a thousand dollars annually on uniform maintenance. Some leaders were too easily impressed by a ‘squared away’ uniform over a soldier’s actual ability to do their job at war. Many of my former colleagues privately felt leaders should be focused on fighting wars, not looking good in garrison. These arguments will never die.

Despite some points of approval, Army leaders in the field continued to voice concerns about the effectiveness of the pixel pattern. I wore both types of uniform between 1999 and 2008. I also wore them in combat in Iraq from 2003 to 2006. From my personal experience, the woodland and desert patterns were more effective. I remember wearing the grey pixels on night missions in the city and palm groves of Baghdad. We were often the only grey objects in the terrain. The pixel grey doesn’t work as effectively as the terrain-specific patterns. The success or failure of a mission and soldiers’ lives often depend upon stealth or concealment and it is easily understood why one would rather have a pattern made specifically for the environment over one that is all-purpose. Many soldiers and veterans would agree, though some may find the new pixel pattern effective enough. It does cost more money, time, and effort to produce and issue terrain-specific camouflage uniforms and gear before a deployment. An all-purpose uniform would be an answer. It would indeed be more cost effective to have such a uniform in an era of Pentagon spending cuts. But that doesn’t make it effective in combat.

The problem with grading the effectiveness of camouflage patterns comes with finding the proper method to conduct the analysis. Scientific methods rely on the mechanics of how human eyes and electronic sighting devices work, but this may produce a different result than sticking guys in the woods and trying to find them. The pixels are designed to confuse human sight. A person scanning or seeing the pixels only peripherally will not pick up on them as easily. The pixels supposedly also have a blurring effect on electronic night vision sighting devices as well. However, the field method of testing is closer to the reality of the battlefield and fits with the Army’s ‘train as you fight’ mantra.

In any case, the science of sight would appear to have won out with the grey pixel pattern. This also seems to be in keeping with the current trend toward a tech-heavy, ‘transformational’ Army. However, the Army’s mandated adoption in 2010 of a different brown and green non-pixel pattern called ‘MultiCam’ for troops deployed to Afghanistan recognized that there are shortcomings with the all-purpose grey pixels. This uniform again consists of green, brown, and tan blotches of a solid, non-pixelated type. This change came only after Congress passed H.R. 2346 sponsored by now-deceased Korean War veteran Rep. John Murtha (D-PA) who received many complaints from noncommissioned officers.

The Evolution of Camouflage

It is ironic that something designed not to be seen is so instantly recognizable. U.S. Army uniforms remind us of our history, an ever-present visage during our national holidays. There are the blue and grey coats of early America; the brown of WWI; olive drab of WWII and Korea; ‘tigerstripe’ of Vietnam; Woodland of the Cold War and Balkans; ‘Chocolate Chip’ of the Gulf War; the desert pattern of the Iraq War; and the grey pixels and ‘MultiCam’ of Afghanistan.

The U.S. Army’s uniforms have evolved over several centuries along with the conflicts they have fought in, even as the need for camouflage has remained an important constant for the military in the modern era. The twentieth century saw the end of pitched battles between armies in colorful and often heavy wool uniforms arrayed on opposing sides of a large field. America’s first army under George Washington had no official uniform. The Continental Congress ordered Minutemen to dye their clothing brown, but most didn’t have the time or means to do so. As the American experience at Valley Forge showed, they were at times lucky to have coats or shoes at all. The original thirteen colonies fielded their own small organized militias and their uniform styles were as varied as the states they served. Though some were brown, green, or red, those who had uniforms most often wore different types of heavy blue coats with shiny brass buttons, largely similar to that famously adopted by General Washington himself.

Already colorful European uniforms were often augmented with different colored trims to designate the type or function of military units. British Dragoons, a type of light cavalry, wore green rather than red. The type of headgear soldiers wore also informed which and what type of unit they were with. Grenadiers, infantry sometimes armed with grenades and often the biggest and strongest of troops, wore miters, tall pointed hats with a flat front. Mounted cavalry wore light metal or leather helmets with fur or feather plumes. The infantry wore cocked hats. An informed observer of the time would know instantly from looking at a soldier their unit, function, and rank.

The American colonials largely lacked the funds and time to develop and implement such a system during the revolution. Americans often improvised rank insignias by pinning white or blue bands to their arms or hats. Today this tradition is carried on in the U.S. Army with each branch having designated signature colors. For example, infantry is light blue, cavalry and armor are yellow, and artillery is red. Today’s Army rank insignia for noncommissioned officers, known as chevrons, also carries on the tradition.

The impetus behind the uniforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was largely identification. Any school kid in America knows the British wore red. The French and Russians often wore blue or white. There was also an element of pride and flash in the uniforms, as Dukes and Counts often paid to maintain their own regiments and wanted them to look sharp. Some of them paraded them about like their own real toy soldiers. They ideally used colors that stood out well in the fog of battle and were easily distinguished from the enemy. These bright uniforms may seem silly today, but they were worn in a time where there were no electronic communications to relay to commanders what was happening on the battlefield.

The brightly colored uniforms allowed generals to look across the field and see where their troops were holding, failing, or advancing. It was not the kind of warfare where anyone took cover when battle was joined, even amid artillery shelling. Armies rarely dug or constructed bunkers or breastworks unless under siege. Imagine Napoleon and Lord Wellington looking across the smoke-filled battlefield with their field glasses. They knew only what they could see or messengers could relay to them. Their staff officers had to track changes in the battle with pieces on a map. Their uniforms were hot, heavy, and uncomfortable, but they served an important function. Military uniforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were made to be seen.

But even in the era of bright, conspicuous uniforms, the need for concealment was sometimes recognized. Sharpshooters in the Napoleonic Wars were outfitted with green uniforms so they could advance within rifle range to kill individual officers to interrupt lines of authority without being discovered. Some American sharpshooter detachments of the Civil War adopted green uniforms and similar tactics as well. European armies of the 1840’s serving in the jungle and desert climes of Asia and Africa found that khaki uniforms were cooler and allowed for better concealment than their scarlet jackets in the field. Despite its proven use, camouflage was widely viewed with scorn in high military circles as being unprofessional and cowardly until the turn of the twentieth century.

The U.S. Army of the nineteenth century largely did away with the big hats, wigs, and ornamental elements of the military uniforms of the past century as time wore on, though they still retained mostly blue uniforms of thick wool with shiny metal buttons. The army of the independent Republic of Texas adopted grey uniforms. The Confederacy also chose grey to distinguish their soldiers from the federal blues in the Civil War. It was still generally the kind of warfare where units lined up and marched forward into musket or cannon fire with deadly result, as skirmishes such as Pickett’s Charge show. None of the uniforms were very functional, especially in the climate of the American south and west. During the battle for Atlanta in the summer of 1864, hundreds of soldiers on both sides suffered from exhaustion and heat stroke in their wool uniforms under the Georgia sun. Soldiers suffered similar problems in the wars against Mexico and the Native Americans on the Great Plains and in southwestern deserts.

The turn of the twentieth century brought with it the idea that uniforms should be made for utility and concealment. Previous U.S. Army uniforms didn’t take the climate or terrain much into account, other than perhaps to mercifully adjust the wear or weight of their material for summer. In 1902 the U.S. Army, following the British lead from their experiences in colonial Africa and India, adopted the khaki uniform, known as ‘drab.’ In the following years, almost every western military ditched the traditional bright colors and adopted uniform colors that aided concealment in shades of khaki, brown, or grey. At the outbreak of WWI, only the French Army maintained colorful uniforms of blue coats and red trousers.

Grinding trench warfare and the development of machine guns, tanks and warplanes quickly changed things. WWI was a much different war from any ever fought before, enveloping the whole of the continent of Europe and sapping the strength of the workforces and economies of entire countries. Everything came to a standstill. This was war to determine the fate of many nations, a much more serious affair. In 1915 the previously-resistant French military was the first to build a Section de Camouflage, comprised mostly of Parisian artists, devoted to developing military camouflage. America opened the New York Camouflage Society, which performed a similar function, and other European militaries followed suit with their own efforts.

For the first time, military uniforms were not meant to be seen. The U.S. Army changed from brown ‘drab’ to the green ‘olive drab’ in the interwar period. The M-1943 olive drab uniform is what most Americans picture when they think of G.I. Joe serving in WWII. WWII marked the first war where climate and concealment were given primary consideration in developing uniforms. The M-1943 wool uniform and its successors were designed with the cold, wet, and verdant climates of Europe in mind. Uniforms made of tightly-woven cotton ‘Byrd cloth’ were designed for service in the tropics to stop mosquito, flea, and leach bites and allowed for better cooling than wool. However, these uniforms took longer to make and field and there was an acute shortage of them. Some old soldiers found it hard to shed military formality completely in favor of utility. General George S. Patton famously insisted that officers under his command still wear their ties into combat.

The U.S. Army field uniform remained largely unchanged with only a few minor alterations until the 1980’s. When we think of the Korean War, we often picture men freezing in olive drab fatigues and coats huddled around fires wearing their pile caps. Grunts wore generally the same green uniform made of cotton in the jungles of Vietnam. The famous ‘tigerstripe’ camouflage uniform worn in the 1960’s by American advisors and special operations units in Vietnam was never officially authorized, though effective in the dense jungle. It also mimicked the uniforms worn by South Vietnamese soldiers and allowed U.S. troops to blend in with their counterparts as well as the terrain. Beginning in 1968, many U.S. soldiers in Vietnam were issued uniforms in a new interlocking pattern called ‘ERDL’ which for the first time featured blotches of dark green, light green, brown, tan, and black. But the Army returned to solid olive drab uniforms following withdraw from Vietnam in 1973.

In 1981, the U.S. Army adopted the well-known cotton Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) featuring the M81 Woodland camouflage pattern, an enlarged version of the ERDL pattern from the end of Vietnam. This was the uniform soldiers wore during the late Cold War and in Grenada, Bosnia, and Kosovo. This was the first time that the Army adopted into force-wide use a uniform that not only mimicked the color, but also the shapes of the terrain. Natural vegetation includes many shades of green and brown and tan as well as black shadows and mimicking these shades and shapes breaks up the recognizable human outline.

Along with the BDUs and Woodland pattern, the Army adopted the Desert BDU (DBDU), a six color desert pattern comprised of shades of tan, brown, and light green with spots of black and white meant to compare with stones. The pattern was tested in seven different desert landscapes before adopting it. The 1991 Gulf War presented the Army with much different battlefield terrain than it had faced in major combat operations before and the nightly news was filled with pictures of Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf wearing the uniform, which the troops had dubbed ‘chocolate chips’ or ‘cookie dough camouflage.’ It was determined by war’s end that the DBDU was too dark and rocky a pattern for most of the world’s deserts and it was more costly to make than other alternative patterns. It was discontinued in 1992. Many Middle Eastern militaries continue to wear the pattern today.

The Army found itself fighting in desert terrain again in Somalia in 1993. Following the withdrawal of the DBDU after the Gulf War, the Army adopted the three-color Desert Camouflage Uniform (DCU), using shades of light tan, light brown, and lime green. It is often referred to as ‘café au lait’ or ‘coffee stain’ camouflage. This was the uniform worn by most troops in early Afghanistan and Iraq and remained the Army’s desert combat uniform until 2005 when the decision to adopt the new pixelated ACUs was made.

Is Camouflage Still Relevant?

A question that must be asked is if all these costly camouflage and uniform changes really are as relevant in modern and future combat. A large share of the fighting in Iraq took place in urban terrain in territory the enemy knew much better. All U.S. movements issued from large fortified camps and bases that were often watched from the outset by enemy observers. A force that rides around in armored Humvees and Abrams tanks accompanied by attack helicopters isn’t exactly hiding. In Afghanistan where the fighting is in much more rural, rocky, and remote terrain, the battle consists of trying to draw the enemy out of hiding among the local populace to be engaged. Pulling the enemy out of hiding is the only way to know they’re there. They usually know where our troops are well before we know where they are. The U.S. Army isn’t sneaking up on anyone anymore. Essentially, U.S. troops want to be attacked by their clandestine enemies so they can engage and destroy them.

The pre-9/11 U.S. Army I first joined was a much lighter force than today. Virtually none of its Humvees or trucks were armored; only tanks and other tracked vehicles were. The old flak vest was usually only worn to the grenade range. Soldiers on combat training maneuvers lived in foxholes they dug or tents in the woods and jumped locations every few days. This is in contrast to today’s Army, where all vehicles are armored, soldiers’ individual body armor makes them seem like the knights of old, and they live and operate from hardened, permanent posts and bases. During my first tour in Iraq in 2003, we wore less personal armor and I was able to, on a few occasions, sprint after bad guys down the streets of Baghdad. By my second trip to Baghdad in 2005, wearing virtually my own body weight in gear made this unlikely. The Army had to change and ‘turtle up’ out of necessity to protect troops and convoys from ambushes and IEDs on supply routes. The U.S. Army of today is not a nimble beast that moves stealthily; it is more like a rhinoceros that is a force to be reckoned with. When fighting like this, camouflage isn’t as important.

It can be argued that the U.S. Army is today fighting in a position more similar to those of the armies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. America’s military leaves an enormous logistical footprint in every conflict it fights today, with the roads, seaports, and airports of countries like Germany, Kuwait, Turkey, Pakistan, and Italy, among others, jammed with U.S. troops, contractors, supplies, and equipment. This all happens in plain sight. We don’t hide it and likely couldn’t if we tried. The U.S. military flies, drives, and floats into battle dressed in armor and essentially says, “Here I am; come out and fight.”

We are in some ways like the British Redcoats of old who stuck out in the fight like a sore thumb. Our enemy today knows they cannot stand up to those kinds of odds, so they hide amongst the locals and choose softer targets to attack. American colonials adopted much the same technique when facing the overwhelming superiority of the British military during our own revolution. It may perhaps be called cowardly by some, but it has been effective nonetheless. Ironically, military commanders of earlier centuries used to think camouflage was cowardly, too. Even the New York Times as late as 1917 called new idea of military camouflage “hocus pocus.” It is no wonder some make comparisons between America today and the empire of Great Britain then.

Special operations forces, especially Green Berets, often operate by speaking the language, living with, and training indigenous populations to fight for or alongside U.S. forces. They operated like this effectively among the Montagnard people in Vietnam, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and the Kurds of northern Iraq, among others. To do this, they often shed their Army uniforms in favor of native dress and mannerisms, grew beards, carried local weaponry, and even took to horseback to gain the support and trust of local populations. This naturally attracted criticism from the rest of the Army, which has very strict uniform and appearance standards. Some regular Army units partially embraced it by encouraging soldiers to grow moustaches and let their hair grow a little longer than usual among Middle Eastern cultures that view facial hair as a sign of masculinity. These special operations units are among the most effective and successful in counterinsurgency operations. What we discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan is that wielding an AK-47, growing a beard, and learning to grin and bear ‘man kisses’ and male hand holding may be better camouflage than any uniform.

Their tactic is to camouflage themselves not with the colors or shapes of the terrain, but to camouflage themselves among the ‘human terrain.’ In doing so, they attract the respect and trust of peoples who have a natural mistrust of western outsiders, especially Americans. This idea of taking advantage of the ‘human terrain’ may be looked at as yet another revolution in camouflage. When the enemy camouflages and infiltrates himself among the rest of the population, it can be effective for U.S. forces to do the same. There is no real reason why other U.S. Army units could not adopt some of the same techniques, other than the large-scale institutional resistance by military purists who see such moves as ‘lax’ and unprofessional in appearance. However, the results speak for themselves.

Camouflage uniforms do remain important in many military scenarios. It is essential to downed pilots and special operators making ground infiltrations. It will always remain important to scouts and snipers in the field or when soldiers are separated from support when an operation begins to go bad and they have to pull back. These are scenarios in which concealment remains and will likely always be very important. One of camouflage’s earliest proponents, Sir Winston Churchill, became convinced of its utility after his escape from a prison camp during the Boer War in South Africa. He went on later to become First Lord of the Admiralty during WWI and, of course, Prime Minister during WWII. Churchill felt camouflage adds an "original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten."

As the U.S. disengages militarily from Iraq and Afghanistan, new possible enemies and conflicts present new challenges. America is engaging other foes in the War on Terror largely from the air using drone strikes and giving financial aid and targeting intelligence to local governments in places like Yemen and Pakistan. The terrain we fight on and way we fight may be changing again. Future conflicts with possible foes in Asia may likely require greater control of the seas. Current Pentagon planning reflects this by making greater budget provisions for the Navy and Air Force. Other than Somali pirates, America hasn’t fought any sea battles since WWII. Conflict with China may involve greater naval engagements than the world has seen in seventy years. China seems to be attempting to put as much distance between itself and America and its allies as possible by pushing forward claims to disputed island chains. As was made clear in the Pacific in WWII, denying ‘island hopping’ and logistical and air bases is important to warfare in that theatre.

As camouflage technology has developed, methods to defeat camouflage have developed as well. A foe, such as China, equipped with modern military technology may have the capability to identify and engage targets in much the same way the U.S. military does, using thermal imaging and night vision capable devices and weaponry. America is continuing to develop its observer drone technology, including variants that will allow ground troops to carry and launch their own small drones to give instant feedback regarding the terrain and troops ahead. Such military technologies, among others, have been the target of directed espionage efforts by the Chinese and other governments. If the U.S. has the capability, it is a sure bet China will attempt to develop its own variant.

Last year China unveiled its own version of the stealth fighter with many reports claiming it is based on acquired U.S. technology. It is well known that Chinese operatives spent a lot of time acquiring pieces of an American stealth bomber that was mysteriously downed in Serbia in 1999. It is also known that operatives of China and other states attempted to buy parts of the advanced U.S. Army helicopter downed in the bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011. These espionage efforts and the technological capabilities developed from them may render scientific and physical camouflage systems irrelevant by providing ways to defeat America’s technology or to use these technologies against us.

Despite our technological advances and military superiority in the air, and on the sea, there will never be a replacement for ‘boots on the ground’ as imagined by Hollywood. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and operations throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Africa have shown that understanding the ‘human terrain’, gathering human intelligence, and winning hearts and minds is very important to modern asymmetric warfare. No computer or drone can replace a soldier in this regard. The Army’s ground troops are and always will be a vital, if not the most vital component of U.S. national security. As long as there are U.S. troops on the ground, they will have the need to be concealed by camouflage systems.

Testing and study of camouflage systems, whether scientific or physical, continues. The military is still looking at pixels, tiger stripes, layered blocks, 3D layering, and ‘fractals’-- roughly background shades and shapes seen naturally in terrain. Some of the technologies being developed sound like something out of a comic book. Laboratories are testing a cloth that has the capability to mimic exactly the background behind it as if it were a chameleon and make objects covered by it virtually disappear before one’s eyes. Projects to develop an ‘exoskeleton’ that gives soldiers greatly increased strength, stamina, and load bearing abilities look promising. Uniforms that use the human body’s electrostatic discharge and conductive properties may mean soldiers themselves will be used to recharge their electronic equipment and send communications signals in the future.

Government funded programs at agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and public-private funding partnerships with defense contractors and universities such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) continue to turn out exciting and innovative ideas that have application in the civilian world as much as to the Army. Despite its controversies and that it sometimes sounds like they’ve been playing too many video games, the U.S. Army remains focused on developing ‘soldier systems’: the idea that the uniforms and equipment should become as useful, intuitive, and integrated for the soldier wearing them as possible so they can win in combat. Camouflage, no matter the type, has become as important to warfare as bullets and bombs.

Picture General Washington’s Minutemen, shuffling around on watch in the snow of the frigid winter at Valley Forge, blowing their warm breaths into frozen hands, shouldering their own hunting muskets and clad in thin linen shirts, old leather breeches, and worn out shoes, thoughts of hearth and home and doubts about the coming spring campaign against the vastly superior British in the back of their minds. The aristocratic English generals and Lords of the Admiralty didn’t take these upstart colonial farmers and merchants seriously, much as they scoffed at the idea of camouflage. Change doesn’t come easy to military culture; it is often resisted. The U.S. Army’s recent uniform fiasco has shown changes may not always be for the better. But for better or worse, America’s Army has shown itself to be a greatly adaptable and resilient organization, a fact often reflected in Army uniforms. U.S. Army soldiers today are the best equipped and outfitted in the entire world’s history. The American fighting man has certainly come a long way from those hard days at Valley Forge. Pixels or no pixels, General Washington would have approved.