Destroying Syrian Chemical Stockpiles Won't be Easy

This article originally appeared in The Daily Beast on 6 September 2013.

It is now clear that the Syrian government used sarin nerve gas to attack suspected rebel forces in Damascus on August 21. There is no doubt that the “red line” was breached. With the American public delivering a clear consensus against committing ground forces, the Obama administration will almost certainly limit any intervention to remote attacks. In the best circumstances, destroying chemical weapons is a dangerous and intensive task, but trying to destroy them from the air without spreading their deadly agents makes it even more difficult.

Drawing from my experience serving 9 years in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND) for the U.S. Army, here is a rundown of the options available for destroying chemical weapons with a look at the feasibility of different methods and the complications that each entails.

An air campaign could focus on eliminating chemical munitions, military chemical units, chemical weapons production facilities, any or all of the above. The first step is to identify the targets and fix their locations. Since the first mentions of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime in July 2012, U.S. intelligence has been tracking the movements of Syria’s chemical assets. There is a ready supply of human intelligence from rebel forces and refugees, a steady stream of signals intercepts from Syrian government forces, and near constant visual surveillance using aerial imagery platforms. Social media and news reports from inside Syria also provide open-source intelligence.

Syria is reported to have one of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons in the world. Locating all of these munitions, even with the best intelligence available, will not be easy. Syria is also known to store chemical agents in“binary” form, where two components of the chemical agent are stored separately and only mixed before being loaded into munitions. This makes transport safer and simpler but can vastly expand the number of targets that need to be located and destroyed and makes them easier to conceal.

Syria’s chemical weapons-production facilities are reported to be located near major cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs, while munitions are stored at as many as 50 different sites. As the U.S. prepares for an attack, the regime is likely spreading munitions across cities throughout the country, making detection more difficult, necessitating more strikes, and increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.

Some intelligence reports indicate that the Assad regime lacks the ability to produce certain necessary precursor ingredients, but Syria stockpiled chemicals from European suppliers before export controls became effective. It also doesn’t take much to create many of the chemical agents used; they can be produced by anyone with an advanced chemistry degree given a moderately equipped refinement facility. Targeting Syria’s production facilities is possible, but will be difficult. Tracking movements of Syrian military chemical units and weapons platforms capable of firing chemical munitions would be an easier task.

The hardest part comes after the munitions are located. Once the targets are acquired they must be destroyed without releasing the deadly chemical agents— it’s possible but a bit like bombing a paint factory at long range and expecting not to have any splatter.

Syrian chemical units and their launchers can be targeted using airstrikes, drones, or cruise missiles launched from naval vessels. However, given the likelihood that the Syrians have intentionally moved these weapons systems into populated areas, even precise strikes on them could lead to civilian casualties. On a larger scale, there is also the danger that an attack on launchers loaded with chemical munitions could spread toxic substances as far as Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan or into the Mediterranean Sea.

America must face the possibility that in carrying out attacks to prevent the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons it risks unleashing those deadly agents on a civilian population.

Other than weapon systems and facilities, Syrian soldiers working in chemical units are another likely target for attack. The troops in these units are usually outfitted in identifiable protective gear for their own safety, a clear indicator of the presence of chemical agents and their impending use. But attacking these soldiers presents a similar set of problems—their likely proximity to chemical weapons means that targeting them risks hitting the munitions they are guarding or operating and releasing them into nearby populations.

The care America takes in eliminating its own chemical weapons reflects how dangerous the process is, even when it’s done in a safe and controlled environment. Since 1986, the protocol has been to incinerate the agent at temperatures above 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit or to neutralize it using hot water and a caustic compound. After the destructive phase, the next step involves extensive monitoring and testing of air, water, and soil to ensure no residual release.

Simply dropping a conventional bomb on an ammo dump is not a solution. Besides the initial deadly effect of dispersing chemical agents, their release into air, soil, and water can have severe health effects for years down the road.

A chemical rocket or artillery round does not explode like conventional munitions. They contain a propellant to get the munitions on target and only enough explosive to rupture the round and release their agent, either bursting in the air above a target or upon hitting the ground. This is why there were several rockets found semi-intact after the August 21 attack on Ghutah which were subsequently sampled by U.N. investigators.

The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency has conducted extensive research into anti-chemical strike options. One weapon they have studied is the non-explosive CBU-107 “PAW” which releases 3,700 extremely dense metal rods into a high-altitude free fall that acts like thousands of daggers, penetrating and shredding a target without the use of explosives. This weapon is less likely to cause an explosion at production facilities but it will rupture munitions, releasing their chemical agents and making casualties of anyone in the vicinity.

Thermobaric explosive weapons, like the BLU-119/B “CrashPad” are another option. Thermobaric explosives, essentially the most powerful non-nuclear devices in the U.S. arsenal, work by sucking in all the oxygen in the blast radius and using it to fuel an intense, high-velocity explosion reaching over 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit. In theory, such devices have the potential to suck in and incinerate chemical agents, however, no conclusive testing of such devices on live chemical agents has yet been conducted.

While they may have a better chance of destroying chemical munitions without releasing their agents, the blast and heat generated by thermobaric weapons are intensely deadly. Structures near the blast will be destroyed and persons not killed by the initial explosion or flying debris will suffer lethal damage to internal organs caused by the pressure wave it creates. The effect of their use in a populated urban area would cause casualties comparable to a small nuclear explosion or a chemical attack. Using a nonexplosive penetrator or a thermobaric device in a city such as Damascus could cause more civilian casualties than the regime’s attack on Ghutah, which is just the reason Assad’s forces are likely relocating their chemical assets closer to urban centers.

The ability to safely destroy large stocks of chemical agents with airstrikes is still unconfirmed, though it is theoretically possible. Testing that method now requires accepting that even relative success may mean killing thousands of the very Syrian civilians we would be acting to protect. As the American people and Congress consider the proposals for action made by the president and his cabinet they should be aware of the chances for success, the risks, and the potential cost in lives.

Why Chemical Weapons are a 'Red Line' the World Must Enforce

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 4 September 2013.

Echoing President Barack Obama's remarks of a year ago, US Secretary of State John Kerry has called the use of chemical weapons a "red line for the world", asserting that evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the Assad regime used Sarin nerve gas against its own people. Failing to act now would push that red line back and send a message that the use of chemical weapons will be frowned upon, but that nothing will result other than stern international admonitions.

This would reverse the tide that has been rolling back the use of chemical warfare for the last 25 years. Chemical weapons are a world red line, and action is necessary to protect hard-won international progress against chemical weapons proliferation.

The long war against chemical weapons use

The first world war was the first occasion on which chemical weapons were used on a large scale in war. The results of these attacks, mostly on British and German soldiers, were so horrendous that a prohibition of their use was included in the 1925 Geneva Protocol – subsequently ratified by 138 nations. This was the first formal recognition that the use of chemical weapons is a red line for the world community.

The US and USSR took another step against chemical weapons by agreeing to cease production and set up an inspection regime in the1989 Wyoming Agreement. Then, in 1993, the world again pushed forward the red line to halt the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The rest of the world has kept these agreements, and the reduction of chemical weapons has progressed steadily ever since. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the enforcement agency of the CWC, has reported that 72% of the world's declared stockpiles have been eliminated, as of 2011. The rest are scheduled to decommissioned within the next few years. These are mostly located in Libya and Iraq, but crucially, they are secured and will be eliminated with co-operation from other CWC signatory states. The US has eliminated 90% of its chemical weapons and Russia over 60%.

There are reports of chemical weapons use by Russia, Vietnam, and Cambodia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Saddam Hussein notoriously used chemical weapons against Kurds around Halabja, and during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. However, there have now been no proven lethal chemical attacks in 25 years. Worldwide, the use of chemical weapons in war has virtually ceased since the 1993 adoption of the CWC.

Only Syria has continually chosen to ignore the world's red line on chemical weapons; it is one of only seven nations in the world that refuses to ratify the CWC. (It is joined only by Angola, North Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan; Israel and Burma/Myanmar have signed the CWC, but not ratified it.) At a time when the rest of the world was eliminating chemical weapons, Syria was actively stockpiling precursor chemicals and building what has become one of the largest chemical weapons arsenals in the world.

In July 2012, an official Assad regime spokesman, Jihad Makdissi, declared it was Syrian government policy that chemical weapons would not be used against Syrians, but reserved the right to use them against any external forces. So, Assad could not even keep his own declared red line on chemical weapons use. Unleashing nerve gas on noncombatants in Damascus was a big step over the line.

What about other conflict-zone 'red lines'?

Throughout the last century, the world has borne witness to violence throughout the world, including violent political crackdowns, ethnic cleansing, religious conflict, assassinations and border wars. In virtually every one, international law, norms and values – "red lines", if you will – have been stretched or broken. Victims and refugees caught in these conflicts have repeatedly called for intervention by outside powers. Most of these calls have been made on the United States and other western powers.

Sometimes, we have answered; most often, we have not. So what makes this "red line" different and why should we act this time?

The world order has been in turmoil since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 upended the geopolitical bipolarity of the previous 50 years. Former Soviet satellites in eastern Europe and the Caucasus continue to struggle for their own identity and to remain independent. The Arab Spring uprisings are tearing apart the old political order in the Middle East, while the rise of China is making its Asian neighbours nervous and attracting American attention. South American nations continue their journey out of poverty and away from repressive regimes.

Meanwhile, the US is coming to the end of over a decade at war, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, we have already witnessed over 100,000 deaths in Syria.

Not all of the benefits the world was promised when the US and its allies prevailed in the cold war anti-Communist struggle have materialised. In some parts of the world, things seem to be regressing, rather than improving. That is why it is important to preserve and jealously guard what progress has been made in working toward a more peaceful world – even if that means turning to military action against rogue states in order to do so. The steady worldwide reduction of chemical weapons is a prime example of that progress – one that we cannot allow to be eroded so easily.

A failure to act after the Assad regime has crossed that red line would be akin to the world retreating and setting a new, weaker standard without a fight. No state other than Syria has dared to cross the line of chemical weapons use in a quarter-century. If we do not act today, we have set a new world precedent that says the use of chemical weapons is frowned upon, but there will be no serious consequences. We should not retreat so easily without serious consideration of what we would be sacrificing for the future.

Until this moment, the world was on the cusp of eliminating one of the unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction. Quietly, steadily, we had been approaching the point where we would one day be able to say we had eliminated chemical weapons.

This is progress toward a safer world we can only hope to achieve with nuclear or biological weapons. Worldwide, proliferation of nuclear weapons has increased. Since the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel have developed new nuclear weapons. Other states, such as Iran, may be trying to join the nuclear club. Meanwhile, the nature of biological weapons makes tracking or controlling them difficult and there is no major international agreement specifically to enforce their prohibition. Though it receives less attention, the Chemical Weapons Convention is a real success story in comparison.

Syria is the last country in the world with a large stockpile of chemical weapons that refuses to eliminate them. Now, the Assad regime has used them on its own people. And Syria has threatened to use them against any outside forces which threaten the Assad regime. No other country in the world has dared do that since 1988.

President Assad is the last major roadblock to achieving a world free from the horror of chemical weapons. That is why the world, led by the United States, must take action in Syria.

Will Military Action Be Necessary to Stop Iran's Nuclear Program?

The article appeared on Truman Doctrine and PolicyMic in December, 2012.

At times America has hesitated to act when it should or could have. Earlier action against Iran could have halted their nuclear program, as in the case of Israel’s strikes against Syria’s and Iraq’s nascent nuclear programs. Decisive action could have prevented genocide in Sudan or the proliferation of nuclear technology to Pakistan and North Korea. Many question if we have hesitated too long to act in Syria, against spreading Islamism in Africa or in closer conflicts such as the cartel wars in Mexico. However, U.S. interventions in the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya were swift, clearly defined and decisive.

At times over the last few decades it has been hard to answer the question of what America seeks to achieve in the world. Our overarching national security goal should be to secure American victory. It may seem a semantic point at first, but there is a major difference in thought between protecting America and its interests and pushing America and its interests forward. It is the difference between reaching acceptable compromises to live with our foes or defeating our opponents finally and decisively.

Many Western countries are guilty of drawing lines in the sand and when the line is crossed they just draw a new one. Israel has been drawing red lines regarding Iran’s nuclear program and stepping back every time. Some have recently argued the U.S. should draw a line alongside them. It arguably erodes credibility to characterise certain conditions as ‘unacceptable’ and then accept them. However, the important point is not that we should fight when our line is crossed, but that we should be more considered about when and where we draw them.

There is just as much danger in pushing your chips forward too early, or not pushing forward enough of them, as there is in hesitating too long. Iraq and Afghanistan are illustrations of this point. Iraq was a war commenced on false pretences which never had clearly defined goals and drew focus away from Afghanistan, a war which could have been won in the beginning but was allowed to drift into today’s stalemate. Both of these conflicts suffered from insufficient troop numbers, divided focus, and unclear goals.

It is for these reasons that America should be hesitant to draw red lines when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program now. We should not allow sabre rattling and rhetoric to draw us into a fight before we are ready or before it is necessary. The propaganda spiral moved America to war in Iraq with the argument we couldn’t afford to wait. Had we waited and asked more questions it may have become clear how unnecessary it was and how profligate it became. Once the propaganda cycle has begun in earnest, it becomes very hard to back away from the precipice. We should not be in a rush to reach this point of no return. It may pull us into a third conflict before we have ended or recovered from the other two.

And that would indeed be a great tragedy. A truly nuclear armed Iranian military presents a greater national security threat to the United States than Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden ever did. If or when that point is reached, we should be rested and ready to devote our full strength and attention to confronting it. The spectre of a nuclear armed Iran is not just a straw man. Iran and the U.S. and its allies have been fighting proxy wars in the Middle East for 30 years. Iran is already directly and indirectly responsible for the death of thousands of Americans and our allies in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and in acts of terror elsewhere. Those who portray Iran as an innocent victim of U.S. or Western aggression simply defending itself or being made a target because they challenge our hegemony are wrong.

The truth is that Iran is much further from this point than often portrayed. There are disagreements as to the amount of fissile material Iran has and America and its allies have already scored big hits against their refinement capability using the embargo and the Stuxnet virus. But refinement is only a part of the process. Nuclear warheads require a delivery vehicle with a complex guidance capability — an intercontinental ballistic missile system. Though this technology is easier to master and obtain than nuclear technology on the market, it can be effectively curtailed by embargo. Iran has not had much success with its missile tests.

But waiting to act should not be understood as hesitancy to act decisively. It is a strategic pause we should take advantage of to plan and prepare to confront this threat when or if it becomes necessary. If the Iranian regime is indeed set upon obtaining nuclear weapons and draw indisputably closer to reaching that point, we will have to confront them decisively and eliminate the capability. They have not reached that point. We should use the period between now and then to take our troops out of combat elsewhere and prepare for this more necessary fight if it comes. If it comes, it may likely be a tougher fight than any we’ve faced in the Middle East yet and an opportunity to show we have learned from our strategic and planning mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq.

There is still the possibility it will not be necessary and a diplomatic solution may be reached. It should always remain preferable to us to confront and dissolve these conflicts without a fight. Taking the time to do so is not a sign of weakness, but of strategic caution and, in any case, gives us a strategic pause. We should not rush to failure. In any case, we have the upper hand in the conflict from the outset and should not be in a hurry. When tens or maybe hundreds of thousands of lives are in the balance, the nick of time will do. The time to militarily confront Iran may come. Now is not that time.