Two Views of Intelligence

This article originally appeared in Cicero Magazine on 19 June 2014.

The purpose of intelligence is to speak truth to power. Intelligence agencies exist to provide decision-makers with absolute, unbiased facts or, failing to obtain absolute facts, to provide as clear, unbiased and true a picture of a situation as possible using what facts are available to enable decision-makers to reach informed conclusions as to what course of action to take. Rarely is it the case that Intelligence can present a picture of a situation that is purely fact-based. There are common intelligence requirements, such as determining the intent of another party, which can never be known for certain because their very nature prevents certain, permanent determination. ‘Gaps’ in fact while attempting to form as clear, accurate and true a picture of a situation as possible can only be filled with conjecture or informed ‘guesswork’ based upon past actions, history, logic and/or statistical probability. Informed ‘guesswork’ is what intelligence analysts do.

One of the central arguments in the field of intelligence analysis regards which angle estimative or predictive strategic intelligence analysis should be approached. Two schools of thought have emerged: Straussians, based around University of Chicago political scientist Leo Strauss, and Kentians, around Sherman Kent, founding father of CIA’s estimative process.

Values or Truths?

The Straussian view of analysis is founded on the idea that the ‘regime’—specifically the form of government and society a state adopts—provides a window through which the political thought, intentions and actions of a state can be observed and predicted. It assumes there is a continual human search for which form of regime is ‘best’ and a qualitative analysis of the differences between these different forms is the route to determining which regime is ideal. For example, Strauss believed during the Cold War that the essential qualitative differences between American democracy and Soviet communism was the most important issue of the day.

At first read, there appears to be nothing controversial about that idea. However, the Straussian view requires that the judgment of the quality of a regime be based upon how well it provides public goods such as liberty, freedom, justice and so forth. This invites what can be called a ‘values’-based judgment into the process using determinants which are subjective in nature. This conflicts with the objective focus of mainstream notions of the social scientific approach which focusses on facts over values judgments and pictures measureable differences between regimes as a matter of different degrees of focus in pursuit of universal human pursuits.

The Kentian view of analysis is based firmly in the belief that intelligence analysis should be approached as an intellectual subject in the liberal social science tradition. Analysts were certainly not to make values judgments, but rather search for the underlying universal ‘truths’ common to man. Kent, a Yale historian, shied away from establishing or applying theoretical analysis based in international relations to intelligence, preferring instead more practical empirical frameworks and methods. He held that the intellectual and emotional detachment of his analysts allowed them to produce better estimates than military analysts or policymakers and their staffs because they focused on academic ‘truth’ as their goal without an attached or vested interest in their particular ‘regime’. Kent’s belief in the value of this objective analytical system was such that he held it to be more valuable than clandestine intelligence collection. No number of microphones or satellite photos could substitute for the value of being able to objectively divine the meaning of long-term trends in order to accurately estimate future actions.

While Kentian objective analysis can lead analysts down blind alleys due to strategic deception, Straussian analysis can lead one to look at regimes such as the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in light of worst-case scenarios because of their (supposed) diametrical opposition to the U.S. regime.

Kent created a system for intelligence analysis with the goal of creating ‘institutional memory’ so knowledge would become cumulative and not be lost between generations. While building CIA’s analysis structures Kent was very much committed to the professionalization of intelligence analysis. Besides its academic commitment to neutrality, the Kentian view was also shaped by organisational factors. The positioning of CIA’s early estimative body between the military and political leaders required it to maintain a reputation for objectivity so as not to become a target for either. Kent held up the CIA’s performance in more accurately estimating Soviet capabilities during the Bomber and Missile Gaps of the late 1950s compared with military intelligence estimates as an example of its detached view of analysis discouraging it from inflating estimates to support its own organisational goals. The Air Force was accused of inflating Soviet bomber and ICBM estimates in order to justify an ever greater share of the defence budget going to its SAC and U.S. ICBM programmes.

Leo Strauss never worked, studied or wrote about intelligence analysis. He was a political scientist. However, as Gary Schmitt and Abram Schulsky argue, Strauss’ work on political analysis can be related to intelligence analysis. Strauss argued that political and social sciences could never be true or ‘hard’ sciences because of ‘deception’. Atoms and particles do not attempt to hide, conceal or deceive their observers. Human beings can and do. Strategic deception should always be a consideration in intelligence analysis, especially when dealing with a foe aware of interest in their activity and have counterintelligence capability.

Hall of Mirrors

When applying a detached, academic analysis to a problem, how can one account for strategic deception by the enemy? The annals of intelligence are filled with tales of strategic deception. Prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese diplomats continued to conduct negotiations, not allowing U.S. analysts to narrow the field of Japanese intentions. Operation Mincemeat saw the body of an RAF officer carrying fake plans released into Spanish waters by submarine and successfully duped German intelligence into believing the allies would invade Greece rather than Sicily. Operation Bodyguard supported the pre-conceived German view that D-Day would come at Calais, not Normandy.

Some deception debates still continue today. Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a GRU military intelligence officer, was the highest ranking source the West had in Moscow during the Cold War. The intelligence he provided on Soviet nuclear capabilities is claimed to have directly influenced President Kennedy’s actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, he was compromised, arrested, put on show trial and apparently executed. Questions remain. Penkovsky’s job did not give him access to the material he provided, so how did he get it? At what point was he compromised and how? Was he executed as a spy or was it a Soviet deception operation from the beginning?

Strangely, after his execution the CIA went to unprecedented lengths to get Penkovsky’s story out, granting full access to the authors of the generously-named The Spy Who Saved the World. Was it to exploit the psychological effect of such a high-ranking source against the USSR? Or was it to cover up the fact they had been comprehensively duped themselves? All this to say that strategic deception is a vital consideration in intelligence analysis and part of James Jesus Angleton’s ‘hall of mirrors’. Is this what they are doing? Or is it what they want me to think they are doing?

While Kentian objective analysis can lead analysts down blind alleys due to strategic deception, Straussian analysis has led in some equally undesirable directions. The values-based judgment Straussian analysis invites can lead one to look at regimes such as the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in light of worst-case scenarios because of their (supposed) almost diametrical opposition to the U.S. regime. Those who place primacy on a qualitative analysis of regimes and their ideology and view another regime as possessing an opposing ideology come to view that foe as a major threat where an objective analysis of the same regime considering its past actions, current posture and capability might see the same foe as posing only a minor threat.

From Cuba to Iraq

In 1976, President Ford approved an exercise in competitive analysis, pitting a junior team of CIA analysts applying standard Kentian methods against an external team applying Straussian methods to an analysis of Soviet nuclear capabilities. The episode has come to be known as ‘Team B’. Team B accused CIA of ‘mirror imaging’—assuming the foe holds the same universal principles and goals as the analyst does. Its analysis focused on Soviet intentions, ideas, aspirations and motivations rather than capabilities. It drew conclusions as to intentions based upon an assumption that the Soviet regime not only wanted to defeat the U.S. militarily, but destroy its regime politically, socially and economically. Team B began its analysis from that anchor point and used data to reinforce the assumption as opposed to drawing conclusions from data.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Team B’s analysis of Soviet capabilities was conclusively proven to be flawed. As an example of how far off path such methods can lead, Team B cited the lack of proof that the Soviet Union had developed an advanced submarine detection system as proof that it did in fact have it. They found it hard to believe the Soviets had not yet done so, so assumed that they had. The continued application of this kind of thinking is exhibited by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s 2002 statement on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction that ‘the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.’

However, Kentian analysis has also failed at times, most famously in failing in successive National Intelligence Estimates, utilising the entirety of America’s intelligence machinery, to predict the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba, leading to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1964, Sherman Kent authored his own well-written post-mortem of how it came to pass, since becoming a classic of intelligence literature. He writes that one of the hazards of the profession of intelligence analysis is filling in gaps in fact with informed guesswork. These gaps are filled with conjecture based upon past actions. That Khrushchev would place missiles on Cuba exhibited a different posture from any of his past actions. Khrushchev ‘zigged’ when they expected him to ‘zag’. Kent goes so far as to say CIA got the estimates wrong because Khrushchev had made such a poor decision that it caught them by surprise.

Returning to the Straussian argument about the Kentian susceptibility to strategic deception, Khrushchev clearly intended to surprise the United States with nuclear missile placements on Cuba and to use them as a bargaining chip against President Kennedy. By suddenly changing posture in a way out of character for Soviet leadership, the Soviet Union was able to fool CIA analysts. Applying Straussian thinking to the situation may have led analysts to assume the USSR would attempt to place missiles on Cuba at some point because of its strategic intent to destroy the United States and look for data to support the assumption. U.S. imagery intelligence did discover missile placements on Cuba, but only because DCI John McCone had suspicions about Khrushchev’s intentions and told them to keep watch over Cuba despite Sherman Kent’s estimates. If estimators began with the assumption Khrushchev would try, they may have been discovered earlier.

This argument about which method of analysis is best suited to producing strategic intelligence estimates has gone on since the beginning of the U.S. Intelligence Community. As episodes from WWII through the Cold War to the Iraq War show, there is no sign of it being decided any time soon. The purpose of intelligence is to speak the truth to power, but the job of analysts is to determine what the ‘truth’ will be before it happens. Whether thinking like Sherman Kent or Leo Strauss, attempting to peer into the future while surrounded by the hall of mirrors is a task anyone is bound to fail at from time to time.

The Inevitability of Intelligence Failure: Sources, Locations and Causes

November 2013

Intelligence failure can be defined as ‘a misunderstanding of the situation that leads a government (or its military forces) to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests’ (Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 62). Explorations of what could or should have been done differently form the basis for millions of pages of government investigations, newspaper articles, books, journals and entire academic careers.

A uniting factor which leads an event to be considered an intelligence failure is that it was or came close to a national disaster, whereas ‘the record of success is less striking because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen’ (Betts, 1978: 62). If one takes this definition of intelligence failure and turns it around, an ‘intelligence success’ occurs when a situation is understood properly and leads a government (or its military forces) to take actions appropriate and productive to its own interests. Concern with intelligence failures always far outstrips that of any intelligence successes, which may not become known until long after the event, if ever.

Intelligence failures are inevitable because there are limits to what intelligence can accomplish. Its proponents are often guilty of overselling its capabilities and its ‘consumers’ and observers are guilty of misunderstanding them (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104-5). This essay will use a framework based upon the work of Betts, Schmitt and Shulsky, and Gill and Phythian, among others, to outline the different ‘sources’ or ‘locations’ of intelligence failure, where they occur in the ‘intelligence cycle’, their ‘causes’ and other factors, followed by the use of the 2003 Iraq WMD controversy as a case study to briefly illustrate real-world examples to show why intelligence failures are inevitable.

Sources & Causes
There are three general locations which can be identified as sources of intelligence failure: ‘Collection’, ‘Analysis’ and ‘Decision-Makers’ (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 103-4, citing Betts, 1978). These categories broadly separate persons involved in the ‘Intelligence Cycle’ by their positions or functional roles within it. CIA defines the Intelligence Cycle as the ‘process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers’ (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).
Collection

The first step in the Intelligence Cycle is to develop directions as to what information is necessary, known as ‘requirements’, and how it will be collected based upon the needs of the eventual consumers of the intelligence, usually senior policymakers (ibid.). Based upon this guidance, intelligence agencies then begin Collection, also known as ‘espionage’, which can be defined as, ‘the practice of using spies to collect information about what another government or company is doing or plans to do’ (Williams, 2011: 1165). Put simply, Collection involves obtaining the information or ‘raw intelligence’ which is required to meet Requirements developed at the first step in the Intelligence Cycle. Collection is performed by all means available to intelligence agencies, including human intelligence, signals intercepts, imagery and scientific and technical measurement, among others, and relates to one or more ‘types’ of intelligence, including military, political, economic or cultural intelligence (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 51).

Collection Failure
Collection Failure can be seen as the ‘unavailability of information when and where needed’ (Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151, citing Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 64-7;) or part of Betts’ ‘Pathologies of Communication’–the lack of timely collection of information (Betts, 1978: 62-3). Essentially, Collection Failure occurs because the information necessary to respond successfully to the situation was not collected or not when needed.

Inevitability?
Planning and directing intelligence requirements and Collection must still deal with the fact that, in the famous words of U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, ‘There are no "knowns." There are thing we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know’ (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2002), a sentiment similar to one expressed earlier by CIA’s Sherman Kent when he stated there are ‘Things which are knowable but happen to be unknown to us, and…things which are not known to anyone at all’ (Kent, 1964). Simply put, Collection Failure can occur when necessary information, known to exist and known to be needed, is not available due to some limitation. Or it can occur because it was not even considered, dismissed or there were no indicators it was necessary to gather such information. Nonetheless, as Betts (1978: 61) states, ‘In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information’.

Analysis
Station three in the Intelligence Cycle is the ‘processing’ of the collected information, followed by the fourth step of Analysis and creation of intelligence ‘products’, such as reports, findings and estimates. This is followed by the fifth step, Dissemination—distributing the intelligence product to decision-makers in a proper format in a timely manner (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).

The analysis stage begins with an evaluation of the truth of the collected material and the validity of the process which acquired it (Butler Panel, 2008: 527-8). For some forms, such as imagery and signals intelligence, this will be easy; for others, especially human intelligence (usually obtained second-hand from an informant by a case officer) it is more onerous to establish. There may be the wish of the collecting officer to have his source believed, giving rise to the need for an independent appraisal of the information (ibid.). Accuracy in reporting or quoting the information from the source to the analyst must be ensured. It must be checked that the source has actual access to the information or an acceptable explanation of how it was obtained. It must be considered if the source has some ulterior motive for providing the information or if they are involved in a counter-intelligence operation. Their previous track record must also be considered (ibid.). If the veracity of the information is not thoroughly tested and established, anything that follows may be derived from false information and will be fruit from a poison tree.

Actual Analysis of the information, after its validity has been established, involves appraising the value of the information in its own right, deciding how much weight should be assigned to it and compiling it into ‘meaningful strands’ based upon what it relates to. These ‘strands’, compiled from all available sources of related information, are then further used to develop ‘estimates’ (‘assessments’ in the UK) of a particular international situation or set of circumstances (ibid.: 528). They can be rapid, low-level appraisals or they can be the premier product composed of the collective wisdom of the entire intelligence community, as with America’s National Intelligence Estimates (Johnson, 2008: 344). The product is then disseminated and/or briefed to decision-makers in an appropriate format.

Collecting information is difficult enough; deciding what should be done in light of it and how it should be presented creates even more problems. Sherman Kent, ‘father figure of CIA analysis’, felt that estimates consist of, ‘knowledge, reasoning and guesswork’ (Johnson, 2008: 344). The pitfalls of analysing information to attempt to piece together accurate appraisals, predictions and/or advice based upon information of varying types and of contestable accuracy or value, often in a short amount of time, in order to develop an intelligence product are apparent. Estimates are used to develop national policy regarding situations vital to national security. If information, analysis or estimates are wrong or wrongly presented, the policy response will be wrong as well, with serious consequences (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 106-112).

Analysis Failure
Analysis Failure is a broader category. It includes ‘Tendency to concentrate on ‘usual suspects’ for ideological or practical purposes’ (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104), ‘Opinion governed by “conventional wisdom” without supporting evidence’, ‘”mirror imaging”, in which unfamiliar situations are judged upon the basis of the familiar’ (Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151, citing Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002, 64-67) and the ‘Paradox of Perception’—failure to properly balance pre-conceived notions based upon previous and historical experience against an unbiased look at information and failure to balance sensitivity of warnings between insufficiency and alarmism (Betts, 1978: 62-3). It also includes failure in ‘effectively communicating with Decision-Makers’, Betts’ other entry under ‘Pathologies of Communication’ (ibid.).

In sum, Analysis Failure can be located in the Processing, Analysis and Production, or Dissemination stages of the Intelligence Cycle. Essentially, Analysis Failure occurs because information is not properly validated or it is improperly dismissed; the wrong degree of emphasis is placed on collected information; opinion developed through collected information is skewed by practical, ideological, or some other cognitive bias, or; where intelligence products do not effectively communicate the necessary information collected to Decision-Makers, either through an ineffective portrayal of the information collected or untimely dissemination to them.

Inevitability?
Writing in defence of the wrongly-concluded 1962 NIE on the likelihood of Soviet nuclear missiles being stationed on Cuba, Sherman Kent (1964) explained the process of estimates thus:

“If NIEs could be confined to statements of indisputable fact the task would be safe and easy. Of course the result could not then be called an estimate. By definition, estimating is an excursion out beyond established fact into the unknown--a venture in which the estimator gets such aid and comfort as he can from analogy, extrapolation, logic, and judgment. In the nature of things he will upon occasion end up with a conclusion which time will prove to be wrong. To recognize this as inevitable does not mean that we estimators are reconciled to our inadequacy; it only means we fully realize that we are engaged in a hazardous occupation.”

If the circumstances for which Decision-Makers require intelligence were unambiguous, then intelligence services could hand them Kent’s ‘indisputable facts’ and leave them to it. However, there are few circumstances in international politics today which possess such clarity that Decision-Makers, often elected officials with little or no security experience, can decide on their own with ‘raw intelligence’. Today the problem may be too much information, as opposed to not enough, when one considers the mass amounts of imagery and signals information collected, processed and analysed (Irwin, 2012). Intelligence analysis remains a necessity.

Schmitt and Schulsky (2002: 72) argue, ’The heart of the problem of intelligence failure, [is] the thought processes of the individual analyst.’ Attempts to counteract the human element in analysis through systemic or procedural reforms, rather than fixing these flaws, may actually serve to build overconfidence in them afterwards through a belief that the problem has been solved and won’t recur (Betts, 1978: 61). However, history shows that the same mistakes continue to be made. At bottom, intelligence analysis is still a flawed human process and will always be as flawed as the human beings conducting the analysis. So long as there are ambiguous situations requiring, as Kent (1964) puts it, ‘guesswork’, there will inevitably be Analysis Failures.
Decision-Makers

In the final step of the Intelligence Cycle, the product, having been disseminated, has been received by its ‘consumers’ and they have informed themselves of the intelligence. They may have further questions or desire more information. This leads to the development of new Requirements, leading back to the first stage of the Intelligence Cycle, which begins anew (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).

Decision-Makers, a mix of high-level elected officials, executive appointees and military officials, then actually use the intelligence produced to inform their decisions. Making decisions that are vital to protecting a nation’s security are inherently difficult, with or without accurate intelligence. Historically, intelligence failures are most frequently located with Decision-Makers (Betts, 1978: 62-3). Policymakers often make one of Johnson’s ‘seven sins of strategic intelligence’—ignoring intelligence that which does not conform to their view of a situation (Johnson, 1982: 182-4). If intelligence is misunderstood or ignored, the policy decision-makers pursue may lead to an intelligence failure.

Decision-Maker Failure
‘Decision-Maker Failure’ is the ‘subordination of Intelligence to policy’ (Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 64-67; Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151) and may influence the initial Planning and Direction stage of the Intelligence Cycle or be exhibited in how or if Decision-Makers use intelligence to make policy. It also occurs when pressure from Decision-Makers is brought to bear on those involved in analysis at the Processing, Analysis and Production or Dissemination stages. According to Betts (1978: 61), ‘In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision-makers who consume the products of intelligence services.’

Decision-Maker Failure often occurs as a result of ‘Politicisation’, one of the central problems of intelligence. In the words of Robert M Gates as Director of Central Intelligence (Gates, 1992):

“Politicization can manifest itself in many ways, but in each case it boils down to the same essential elements: almost all agree that it involves deliberately distorting analysis or judgments to favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence. Most consider `classic' politicization to be only that which occurs if products are forced to conform to policymakers' views. A number believe politicization also results from management pressures to define and drive certain lines of analysis and substantive viewpoints. Still others believe that changes in tone or emphasis made during the normal review or coordination process and limited means for expressing alternative viewpoints, also constitute forms of politicization."

Essentially, Decision-Maker Failure most often occurs because of some form of ‘politicisation’ by Decision-Makers where intelligence is deliberately distorted, ignored or selectively applied.

Inevitability?
According to Johnson (1983: 182), ‘No shortcoming of strategic intelligence is more often cited than the self-delusion of policymakers who brush aside-or bend-facts that fail to conform with their Weltanschauung.’ In Western democracies, Decision-Makers are either elected officials or senior civil servants influenced by elected officials. Politics is their job and it affects all aspects of it, including making security decisions based upon intelligence. Politics affects every form of government, from totalitarian dictatorships to communist collectives. As von Clausewitz is often quoted, ‘War is the continuation of politics by other means.’ Attempting to totally remove politics from war and national security is an impossible task. As stated above, Decision-Maker Failure through politicisation is the most common reason for intelligence failure. So long as politics are involved in security decisions, there will inevitably be intelligence failures.


Other Factors

Systemic Factors
Systemic Factors which may lead to intelligence failure include internal bureaucratic obstacles and failure to share information or cooperate with other agencies (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104). Garciano and Posner (2005: 159) describe this as, ‘lack of prompt and full sharing of intelligence information within intelligence agencies, between different agencies, and between federal, state and local government levels.’ These Systemic Factors may occur at any phase of the Intelligence cycle and lie within Collection, Analysis or with Decision-Makers. If Collection resources or collected information is not shared it cannot be properly analysed and will not make its way to Decision-Makers, leading to intelligence failure.

External Factors
‘External Factors’ are always present. They include the, ‘Intrinsic difficulty in identifying targets’ and the fact that states or organisations which are or may be the target of intelligence agencies cannot be expected to remain passive to intelligence operations against them (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104-5). Simply put, sometimes it is difficult or impossible to collect some forms of information, or, as Kent (1964) puts it, ‘Something literally unknowable by any man alive.’ Knowing the intent of an adversary before even he has formed it is an example of this impossibility. An intelligence failure for one state is often the result of an intelligence success by another. External Factors most often affect Collection, but they may also affect Analysis and Decision-Makers at any stage of the Intelligence Cycle, especially if the particular intelligence failure is the active effort of a foreign intelligence service, such as infiltration, double-agents, strategic deception or a counter-intelligence operation.

Case Study: Iraq WMD
The false belief and assertion by the U.S. and UK governments that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq possessed WMD capabilities in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War is an instructive case which illustrates examples of each of the different causes of intelligence failure. Some of these are explored here, though there are more which could be cited.

Collection Failure
According to Morrison (2011: 520), one of the reasons for the intelligence failure relating to the existence of Iraq’s WMD capabilities was a failure to set a Requirement for Collection of political intelligence to place in context technical information on Saddam’s WMD programs. Collection was instead focused on gathering information about the existence of the programs themselves. This led to failure to consider the question in light of Saddam’s ‘political system, fears, and intentions’ (Jervis, 2006: 41). Collecting such information could have offered an explanation as to why Hussein would refuse to disavow WMD programs and cooperate with UN inspections despite not having active WMD programs. Setting this Requirement may have served to balance the dominant presumption that Iraq had WMD, the justification for the war which turned out to be false.

Analysis Failure
UK and U.S. analysis of Iraq’s WMD relied heavily upon unreliable human intelligence sources which were not properly vetted and, in some cases, have since proven to be fabrications. Information was also being quickly disseminated to policymakers without being properly validated or analysed first (Morrison, 2011: 520). In his study of the major U.S. and UK post-mortems on Iraq, Jervis (2006) cites many examples of Analysis Failure: ‘ICs’ judgments were stated with excessive certainty’ (ibid.: 14), ‘no general alternative explanations for Saddam’s behavior were offered’ (ibid.: 15), ‘lack of imagination’ to develop these alternative views (ibid.: 17), ‘failure to challenge assumptions’ regarding existence of WMD programs and a situation ‘whereby assessments were based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties’ (ibid.: 22), among others. These examples illustrate just some of the places where analysis went wrong.

Decision-Maker Failure
The case of Iraq’s WMD provides a clear example of politicisation of intelligence. The Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP) was specifically established by the Bush administration to develop assessments based upon the assumption that Iraq had WMD and its products were used in preference to other Intelligence Community assessments that contradicted that hypothesis (Ryan, 2006: 304-5). A ‘Red Team’ analysis conducted by CIA’s WINPAC, designed only as an initial ‘devil’s advocate’ view in the face of evidence Iraq did not have WMD, was also selectively used by the administration despite strong evidence from the rest of the Intelligence Community its conclusion was wrong. Assessments by agencies such as U.S. Department of Energy and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence Research provided strong, clear arguments against the central argument made in assessments preferred by the Bush administration, but they were pushed aside by Decision-Makers (Conway, 2012: 490-1).

Systemic Factors
Garciano and Posner (2005: 149) point out the WMD Commission’s finding that there was not enough cooperation or information sharing between agencies, specifically in regard to reports that called into question the credibility of the information by the source ‘Curveball’, whose assertion that he had been involved in active WMD programs in Iraq became a central piece of evidence in the Bush administration’s push for war. Curveball (Rashid al-Janabi) himself has since admitted his evidence was a fabrication (NBC News, 2011). If more than one agency had access to these reports, there may have been more questions asked. However, bureaucratic obstacles and security standards stood in the way. There is a lack of information sharing between U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, seen to have separate functions, which may have led to vital information not being shared and considered (Cilluffo et al, 2002: 70-1).

External Factors
Saddam Hussein and his regime were not inactive players in their fate. There was a systematic denial and deception campaign by the regime and their failure to cooperate with and eventual ejection of UN inspectors supported the belief that Iraq had something to hide regarding its WMD programs. Wherever evidence was not available to prove or disprove hypotheses, Saddam and his regime could be blamed for blocking attempts to collect the necessary intelligence (Jervis, 2006: 27-8). In his debriefing by the FBI, Saddam admitted that he wanted to maintain the façade of possessing WMD to counter enemies, especially Iran (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008). Of course, had Saddam been open regarding WMD and cooperated with UN inspections, the likelihood of war would have been greatly reduced. Intelligence is, ‘a game between hiders and finders, and the former usually have the easier job’ (Jervis, 2006: 11).

Conclusion
As Gill and Phythian (2004: 105) point out, ‘the limits of intelligence dictate that intelligence failure is inevitable. Partly, this is a consequence of the impossibility of perfect predictive success; partly it is a consequence of decision-makers’ (politicians with regard to states) natural tendency to err on the side of caution by subscribing to worst-case scenarios, or to simply ignore intelligence that does not fit their own preferences.’ As discussed, there are other locations within the Intelligence Cycle where things can go wrong and there are other possible causes and factors leading to intelligence failure. The debacle of Iraq’s WMD provides many real-world illustrations.

Jervis (2006: 11) makes clear that, ‘Any specific instance of intelligence failure will, by definition, seem unusual, but the fact of the failure itself is quite ordinary’. If the result of the failure is a great national disaster, it will seem to be a great failure. However, factual examinations of how failures occur inevitably show common, ordinary failures by people and organisations that often occur in situations outside of the intelligence context. Jervis usefully compares the Iraq WMD investigations to enquiries into the 1986 Challenger shuttle disaster and abuse allegations in the Catholic Church (ibid.: 4-5). It is only the consequences of intelligence failure that make them appear much larger than they are—the stakes are simply much higher (Betts, 1978: 62). Despite all of the post-mortems conducted on intelligence failures, there is little evidence their conclusions or the reforms enacted afterwards as a result have translated into an elimination or even significant reduction of failures (ibid.).
These human failures are impossible to ever eliminate for good, especially those of a political or cognitive nature. Intelligence failures are inevitable because they seek to make clear ambiguous, complex situations using information that may be difficult to obtain, validate and understand, either through the resistance of the target or the nature of the information itself, and then present information in a digestible manner to Decision-Makers, who may do as they wish with the intelligence produced. Even minor errors at any point in the Intelligence Cycle may throw off the entire enterprise. The fallible and flawed nature of human beings attempting to put together some unknown puzzle with an incomplete picture means mistakes will inevitably occur at some point in the process. There is an old military maxim: ‘what can go wrong, will go wrong.’ Betts (1978) and Gill and Phythian (2006: 105) believe we must accept that intelligence failures are inevitable. Indeed, given the nature of the work of intelligence and all that can go wrong, it would be more extraordinary if intelligence failures did not occur.





BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Conway, P. (2012) “Red Team: How the Neoconservatives Helped Cause the Iraq Intelligence Failure.” Intelligence and National Security 27 (4): pp. 488–512.

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Why Chemical Weapons are a 'Red Line' the World Must Enforce

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 4 September 2013.

Echoing President Barack Obama's remarks of a year ago, US Secretary of State John Kerry has called the use of chemical weapons a "red line for the world", asserting that evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the Assad regime used Sarin nerve gas against its own people. Failing to act now would push that red line back and send a message that the use of chemical weapons will be frowned upon, but that nothing will result other than stern international admonitions.

This would reverse the tide that has been rolling back the use of chemical warfare for the last 25 years. Chemical weapons are a world red line, and action is necessary to protect hard-won international progress against chemical weapons proliferation.

The long war against chemical weapons use

The first world war was the first occasion on which chemical weapons were used on a large scale in war. The results of these attacks, mostly on British and German soldiers, were so horrendous that a prohibition of their use was included in the 1925 Geneva Protocol – subsequently ratified by 138 nations. This was the first formal recognition that the use of chemical weapons is a red line for the world community.

The US and USSR took another step against chemical weapons by agreeing to cease production and set up an inspection regime in the1989 Wyoming Agreement. Then, in 1993, the world again pushed forward the red line to halt the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The rest of the world has kept these agreements, and the reduction of chemical weapons has progressed steadily ever since. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the enforcement agency of the CWC, has reported that 72% of the world's declared stockpiles have been eliminated, as of 2011. The rest are scheduled to decommissioned within the next few years. These are mostly located in Libya and Iraq, but crucially, they are secured and will be eliminated with co-operation from other CWC signatory states. The US has eliminated 90% of its chemical weapons and Russia over 60%.

There are reports of chemical weapons use by Russia, Vietnam, and Cambodia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Saddam Hussein notoriously used chemical weapons against Kurds around Halabja, and during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. However, there have now been no proven lethal chemical attacks in 25 years. Worldwide, the use of chemical weapons in war has virtually ceased since the 1993 adoption of the CWC.

Only Syria has continually chosen to ignore the world's red line on chemical weapons; it is one of only seven nations in the world that refuses to ratify the CWC. (It is joined only by Angola, North Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan; Israel and Burma/Myanmar have signed the CWC, but not ratified it.) At a time when the rest of the world was eliminating chemical weapons, Syria was actively stockpiling precursor chemicals and building what has become one of the largest chemical weapons arsenals in the world.

In July 2012, an official Assad regime spokesman, Jihad Makdissi, declared it was Syrian government policy that chemical weapons would not be used against Syrians, but reserved the right to use them against any external forces. So, Assad could not even keep his own declared red line on chemical weapons use. Unleashing nerve gas on noncombatants in Damascus was a big step over the line.

What about other conflict-zone 'red lines'?

Throughout the last century, the world has borne witness to violence throughout the world, including violent political crackdowns, ethnic cleansing, religious conflict, assassinations and border wars. In virtually every one, international law, norms and values – "red lines", if you will – have been stretched or broken. Victims and refugees caught in these conflicts have repeatedly called for intervention by outside powers. Most of these calls have been made on the United States and other western powers.

Sometimes, we have answered; most often, we have not. So what makes this "red line" different and why should we act this time?

The world order has been in turmoil since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 upended the geopolitical bipolarity of the previous 50 years. Former Soviet satellites in eastern Europe and the Caucasus continue to struggle for their own identity and to remain independent. The Arab Spring uprisings are tearing apart the old political order in the Middle East, while the rise of China is making its Asian neighbours nervous and attracting American attention. South American nations continue their journey out of poverty and away from repressive regimes.

Meanwhile, the US is coming to the end of over a decade at war, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, we have already witnessed over 100,000 deaths in Syria.

Not all of the benefits the world was promised when the US and its allies prevailed in the cold war anti-Communist struggle have materialised. In some parts of the world, things seem to be regressing, rather than improving. That is why it is important to preserve and jealously guard what progress has been made in working toward a more peaceful world – even if that means turning to military action against rogue states in order to do so. The steady worldwide reduction of chemical weapons is a prime example of that progress – one that we cannot allow to be eroded so easily.

A failure to act after the Assad regime has crossed that red line would be akin to the world retreating and setting a new, weaker standard without a fight. No state other than Syria has dared to cross the line of chemical weapons use in a quarter-century. If we do not act today, we have set a new world precedent that says the use of chemical weapons is frowned upon, but there will be no serious consequences. We should not retreat so easily without serious consideration of what we would be sacrificing for the future.

Until this moment, the world was on the cusp of eliminating one of the unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction. Quietly, steadily, we had been approaching the point where we would one day be able to say we had eliminated chemical weapons.

This is progress toward a safer world we can only hope to achieve with nuclear or biological weapons. Worldwide, proliferation of nuclear weapons has increased. Since the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel have developed new nuclear weapons. Other states, such as Iran, may be trying to join the nuclear club. Meanwhile, the nature of biological weapons makes tracking or controlling them difficult and there is no major international agreement specifically to enforce their prohibition. Though it receives less attention, the Chemical Weapons Convention is a real success story in comparison.

Syria is the last country in the world with a large stockpile of chemical weapons that refuses to eliminate them. Now, the Assad regime has used them on its own people. And Syria has threatened to use them against any outside forces which threaten the Assad regime. No other country in the world has dared do that since 1988.

President Assad is the last major roadblock to achieving a world free from the horror of chemical weapons. That is why the world, led by the United States, must take action in Syria.

Contracting Out U.S. National Security

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 2 July 2013.

Despite the cheers and jeers at leakers such as Julian Assange, Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden over the last few years, it would seem access to such information is less protected than ever. Serving intelligence officers are allowed to sell their skills to corporations. High-level intelligence work, once closely guarded, is farmed out to contractors, who leak information like a sieve.

The Obama White House has conducted more leak investigations than any previous administration, now including the leak of a cyber-warfare campaign against Iran by a top US army general, James Cartwright. We are selling our national security in an effort to save a buck – and we will continue to pay for it in other ways.

In 2010, Eamon Javers reported on CIA's controversial "moonlighting" policy, which allowed active intelligence officers to seek permission to work in the private sector on the side if they made full disclosure and it did not conflict with their duties. Generally, the same standard applies to all federal employees who are not political appointees.

But not all federal employees are CIA officers. No statistics of how many took advantage of the policy were forthcoming, but the policy itself was disturbing enough to lead to questions before Congress.

Why is this allowed? Defenders hold it is important to stop the "brain drain", where the best and brightest depart the agency for better pay. Supporters argue the level of compensation at CIA doesn't stack up against other federal or private-sector employment. This "discrepancy" leads talented employees to look elsewhere – for roles in which their skills fetch better prices. The CIA thus finds itself in competition with the private sector to keep personnel on whom it has expended a great deal of money and effort in training.

Demand for intelligence work has ballooned since 9/11, though government belt-tightening in recent years has had an effect. Washington has decided, rather than expanding intelligence services in a permanent sense, to farm out the increased workload to private contractors. This has advantages, as for any business seeking to outsource operations. When the need for the work reduces, it is easier to allow a contract to expire than it is to lay off excess federal employees or to keep them on, under-employed.

But there are drawbacks as well. Rather than paying solely for the service, the price also reflects the contractor's own costs – their HR, finance, management and marketing departments' wages, office costs, even redundancies. It is questionable if contracting saves anything at all. One doesn't have to look hard to find stories of wasted costs, foul-ups or even corruption in security contracting.

Just last week, USIS, the contractor responsible for performing background checks for security clearances – including Edward Snowden's – was accused of misleading the government as to the thoroughness of their investigations. Lawmakers have been told that thousands of background checks may have been improperly conducted. (The firm has made no comment, but issued a statement saying it was co-operating with an investigation.)

Private intelligence contractors look to hire employees who already have active clearances and intelligence experience – requirements not easily obtained elsewhere than an intelligence agency. The problem becomes circular. Farming out intelligence work to contractors creates its own demand. Agency employees leave for jobs with higher pay because the government itself has created a market for them, creating the very "brain drain" it seeks to stem. This is because bean-counters are worried about the effect on the budget – namely, of salary, benefits and pension obligations to employees. In the CIA's defence, these decisions are made in Washington, DC, not Langley, Virginia.

A second argument is that no harm is being done and these individuals have dedicated years to the country and are entitled to "feather their nests". However, the US military shares the same commitment to the country – yet service personnel get paid even less, and veterans are coming home to high unemployment rates.

While the job has its risks, most CIA employees still have desk jobs. The more academic nature of the job does not automatically entitle analysts to higher pay. There are also brainy folks at the Department of Interior or Forest Service who are overworked and underpaid. Many other less fortunate Americans would be happy to have such pay and benefits as CIA officers enjoy.

That our national security apparatus feels it must compete with the private sector to attract the best talent now means attracting the wrong kind of talent. Those who work in such a vital role should not do so for the salary, even if that is a great recruitment tool. One recruit who signs up for the right reasons is worth five who sign up for others. This should be familiar to US intelligence officers from the CIA's chief architect, Allen Dulles, who believed the most dependable sources are those not in it for pay.

The net effect on security is that it has become impossible for America to keep secrets. Security information is being handled by private companies poaching the intelligence community's talent and selling it back to the government, who paid to develop it in the first place. Government budget cuts and a failure to invest in intelligence infrastructure have created this problem.

National security challenges do not simply go away because we are having budget fights. If we are not willing to pay for this now, we'll pay for it later – in another, more sinister sense. Some things are worth paying for; our national security is one of them.

Will Military Action Be Necessary to Stop Iran's Nuclear Program?

The article appeared on Truman Doctrine and PolicyMic in December, 2012.

At times America has hesitated to act when it should or could have. Earlier action against Iran could have halted their nuclear program, as in the case of Israel’s strikes against Syria’s and Iraq’s nascent nuclear programs. Decisive action could have prevented genocide in Sudan or the proliferation of nuclear technology to Pakistan and North Korea. Many question if we have hesitated too long to act in Syria, against spreading Islamism in Africa or in closer conflicts such as the cartel wars in Mexico. However, U.S. interventions in the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya were swift, clearly defined and decisive.

At times over the last few decades it has been hard to answer the question of what America seeks to achieve in the world. Our overarching national security goal should be to secure American victory. It may seem a semantic point at first, but there is a major difference in thought between protecting America and its interests and pushing America and its interests forward. It is the difference between reaching acceptable compromises to live with our foes or defeating our opponents finally and decisively.

Many Western countries are guilty of drawing lines in the sand and when the line is crossed they just draw a new one. Israel has been drawing red lines regarding Iran’s nuclear program and stepping back every time. Some have recently argued the U.S. should draw a line alongside them. It arguably erodes credibility to characterise certain conditions as ‘unacceptable’ and then accept them. However, the important point is not that we should fight when our line is crossed, but that we should be more considered about when and where we draw them.

There is just as much danger in pushing your chips forward too early, or not pushing forward enough of them, as there is in hesitating too long. Iraq and Afghanistan are illustrations of this point. Iraq was a war commenced on false pretences which never had clearly defined goals and drew focus away from Afghanistan, a war which could have been won in the beginning but was allowed to drift into today’s stalemate. Both of these conflicts suffered from insufficient troop numbers, divided focus, and unclear goals.

It is for these reasons that America should be hesitant to draw red lines when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program now. We should not allow sabre rattling and rhetoric to draw us into a fight before we are ready or before it is necessary. The propaganda spiral moved America to war in Iraq with the argument we couldn’t afford to wait. Had we waited and asked more questions it may have become clear how unnecessary it was and how profligate it became. Once the propaganda cycle has begun in earnest, it becomes very hard to back away from the precipice. We should not be in a rush to reach this point of no return. It may pull us into a third conflict before we have ended or recovered from the other two.

And that would indeed be a great tragedy. A truly nuclear armed Iranian military presents a greater national security threat to the United States than Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden ever did. If or when that point is reached, we should be rested and ready to devote our full strength and attention to confronting it. The spectre of a nuclear armed Iran is not just a straw man. Iran and the U.S. and its allies have been fighting proxy wars in the Middle East for 30 years. Iran is already directly and indirectly responsible for the death of thousands of Americans and our allies in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and in acts of terror elsewhere. Those who portray Iran as an innocent victim of U.S. or Western aggression simply defending itself or being made a target because they challenge our hegemony are wrong.

The truth is that Iran is much further from this point than often portrayed. There are disagreements as to the amount of fissile material Iran has and America and its allies have already scored big hits against their refinement capability using the embargo and the Stuxnet virus. But refinement is only a part of the process. Nuclear warheads require a delivery vehicle with a complex guidance capability — an intercontinental ballistic missile system. Though this technology is easier to master and obtain than nuclear technology on the market, it can be effectively curtailed by embargo. Iran has not had much success with its missile tests.

But waiting to act should not be understood as hesitancy to act decisively. It is a strategic pause we should take advantage of to plan and prepare to confront this threat when or if it becomes necessary. If the Iranian regime is indeed set upon obtaining nuclear weapons and draw indisputably closer to reaching that point, we will have to confront them decisively and eliminate the capability. They have not reached that point. We should use the period between now and then to take our troops out of combat elsewhere and prepare for this more necessary fight if it comes. If it comes, it may likely be a tougher fight than any we’ve faced in the Middle East yet and an opportunity to show we have learned from our strategic and planning mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq.

There is still the possibility it will not be necessary and a diplomatic solution may be reached. It should always remain preferable to us to confront and dissolve these conflicts without a fight. Taking the time to do so is not a sign of weakness, but of strategic caution and, in any case, gives us a strategic pause. We should not rush to failure. In any case, we have the upper hand in the conflict from the outset and should not be in a hurry. When tens or maybe hundreds of thousands of lives are in the balance, the nick of time will do. The time to militarily confront Iran may come. Now is not that time.

U.S. Military owes more to combat Joes than a four-star General

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 14 November 2012.

The pressure on those in positions of great responsibility is tremendous. Although constantly surrounded, they are, in fact, alone. Men like General David Petraeus and General John Allen could never live up to the myths that surround them, pedestals they never asked to be placed upon as fame-seekers do – though, certainly in Petraeus' case, they haven't shied from it. To expect them to live up to the standards of perfection others have set for them is an impossible task no one could succeed at. They're not saints. They're soldiers. Marines.

Yet, at some point, "celebrity generals" pass out of the realm of being troopers and into being politicians. Similar uproar occurred when President Obama required General Stanley McChrystal, another admirable commander, to resign after he and his staff publicly criticised the commander-in-chief, a well-known "don't" in the military. That was a case of over-confidently taking shots in the press. The Petraeus affair is worse, in that it may have presented a real threat to national security as an opportunity for a foreign intelligence service to exploit.

I'm a two-tour army veteran of the Iraq war. I've spent the majority of my adult life as a soldier. We're no angels. Guys and girls like me come in any colour, from inner-city or rural America, places like the south side of Chicago or Lovelady, Texas. We're regular middle- or lower-class kids (average age: 19). Some joined for college money; some to get away from home; others out of a sense of duty. We like to fight, we like to swear, get tattoos, and we enjoy a good drink. We remain pretty much anonymous. We don't have biographers or make it onto the social circuit.

We're the absolute backbone of the country – Uncle Sam's misguided children. We're the men and women without any of the advantages in life. We're not supposed to succeed, but we do. In fact, it's the very flaws in each of our individual characters that make it all the more extraordinary what the US military has achieved in its 236 years. As we're reminded every Veteran's Day, victory was never certain and the sacrifices by our troops are great. These were the men and women fighting in Afghanistan while this melodrama was going on back home.

One can see how allowances can be made for the personal indiscretions of such people. Yet, I somehow can't help but feel let down by the expanding circle of this controversy, which has brought down General Petraeus and threatens to do the same to General Allen. I expected more of them, and the behaviour thus far revealed seems petty and melodramatic – a military soap opera complete with affairs, threatening notes, twins and fancy parties.

There are some who believe that this affair is nothing compared to the work General Petraeus has done for the country. Despite the great respect I have for the general, I find myself less willing to grant such allowances.

It is a military principle that a leader cannot impose a standard on others he doesn't impose on himself. This situation started out innocently enough, but seems to have gotten out of control. As director of an intelligence agency, the general would certainly have seen the danger this scenario presented if he had been looking at it from the outside. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recognised that – and required Petraeus' resignation.

General Petraeus is widely respected by the military and veterans. But he is utterly exalted in both liberal and conservative Washington circles, which see him as a sort of noble warrior-philosopher, with credentials from West Point, Princeton and Georgetown. I was taught in the military that none of us is indispensable. We're all cogs in the wheel, and two minutes after we walk out the door, there will be an adequate replacement. The machine keeps going. The success or failure of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and of the United States as a whole, do not depend upon the fate of one or two men, no matter how exemplary their service. This country is stronger than that.

In fact, as study of our recent military campaigns has gone on, we have arguably been successful in many respects, despite the failures and inadequacies of some of our top military commanders and elected leadership. The credit for our limited successes should go to the great mass of regular, everyday troops who have been called upon to be not just soldiers, but police officers, doctors, aid workers, public works directors and social scientists.

The tough kids with high school diplomas got it done, not the administration in Washington, Ivy League professors, the brass in the Pentagon or generals at garden parties. These average Americans have done more than was asked of them and theirs should be all the credit.

The combat Joes are the ones who have been let down by this scandal. General Petraeus shouldn't have been placed on an exalted pedestal, even if he welcomed it. That very isolation may have clouded his judgment and created the risk of a security breach. In the end, though, he is a man just like other men: he is a cog in the wheel and the United States will go on without General Petraeus.

The Navy SEAL's Bin Laden Raid Bestseller and US National Security

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 14 September 2012.

Everyone holds an opinion, even those who are obligated by law or profession to remain neutral. It is human nature. It can foreseeably become difficult to sit by and listen as everyone around you who is free to gives their opinion, some misguided and others even profiting from it, while professional obligations require you to stay silent. Such is the burden, however, of being a professional in a position of importance to national security.

This conflict is not new, but the pressures and incentives for breaking the rules are growing. With TV pundit spots, big publishing advances, and organizations such as WikiLeaks providing opportunity and motivation, are western democracies even capable of keeping secrets anymore?

Matt Bissonnette, calling himself "Mark Owen", was a member of Navy Seal Team 6 and took part in the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. He has written a book that extensively details the raid and has unleashed a controversy in doing so. Paired with this debate are the attacks of Opsec, a rightwing political action committee started by other former Navy Seals who are attacking President Obama and his administration for releasing generally similar information on the Bin Laden raid to the press.

Both Bissonnette and Opsec have been rebuked by senior military officials at the Pentagon such as special operations commander Admiral William McRaven and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. The US government has not ruled out taking legal action.

When one swears an oath to serve the country as a member of the military or any national security-related agency, a different set of rules applies immediately. A measure of your personal freedom, freedom of speech, and political participation rights are curtailed. Inductees know this beforehand, are well-briefed upon induction, and periodically afterward. They sign non-disclosure statements to the effect, and laws prevent the disclosure of identified security information. You also know that some, much, or all of what you do will remain anonymous and unaccredited. Matt Bissonnette knew this when he wrote his autobiography.

All this is necessary for many reasons, foremost among them being to preserve the dedication to the nation such jobs require. You may be putting your life, or the lives of many others, at risk for the country, and be privy to sensitive information; you should be doing so because you feel a sense of duty, commitment, and patriotism. To allow public servants working in national security roles or members of the military to profit financially or to have an outsize influence on partisan political debate because of what they've done or what they know is detrimental to national security. Allowing this behavior would mean having soldiers and civil servants motivated by the opportunities of fame and fortune, leaving aside the selfless commitment and dedication to duty and country such roles do and ought to require.

This larger point is one many seem to miss. It is arguable that both the information in Bissonette's book and the information disclosed by the White House following the Bin Laden raid were not classified or going to get anyone killed. The difference is that the president has the obligation and duty to inform the public about such an important event, regardless of one's opinion of him personally: he is the commander-in-chief. But soldiers or civil servants profiting personally, or even for charity as Bissonnette claims he is doing, by giving their own personal accounts of the facts calls into question his selfless dedication to country and duty first. Allowing this to continue would attract the wrong sort of people with false motivations into military or government service.

This has become a problem of late for the United States. Television news channels and bookstore shelves are filled with pundits and commentators who are former CIA agents or soldiers. The gap in time between events and the release of bestsellers about them is getting ever smaller. Many of America's intelligence agencies have lax policies toward private-sector recruiters pulling their employees and some are even allowed to "moonlight" and offer their services privately while still employees of the agency. These policies have become a problem with intelligence agencies losing many of their top people to private firms after years of training and service. Disgruntled civil servants and soldiers have released secured government information in the media.

These events call into question the motivations, independence, and commitment to duty of the individuals who take part in them. Serving in the military or government should be about a life dedicated to protecting and serving the country, not serving one's self by securing a nice paycheck and nice retirement.

Many would push back against this by saying that those who occupy positions in the White House or Congress profit greatly from their service, or even the service of others, so why shouldn't people like Matt Bissonnette, who actually put their own lives on the line, be allowed to profit from it? Yet, presidents and congressmen and women should not profit personally from their jobs either – and their perceived abuse and misuse of their offices to do so is a reason why the majority of Americans have lost respect for these institutions and officials. Overwhelming majorities of Americans still hold a great deal of respect and esteem for the military and intelligence services because they are seen as representing selfless commitment to the country above self. They're not seen as corrupt, as other militaries and intelligence agencies around the world are. Allowing such behavior to continue may put this view in jeopardy.

Such events as the Abbottabad raid don't need to remain a secret forever, especially since the fact that the event occurred is public knowledge. It is important to our democracy, history, and society that the public learns what, how, and why events such as this happen. But there should be a space of several years in between.

Matt Bissonnette should be allowed to tell his story, but not while it is still such a present event. There are many possible consequences. Detailing such a raid may amount to providing "open-source" intelligence for our international opponents. Disclosing details of equipment, tactics, techniques, or procedures that may seem harmless and mundane on their own can be pieced together with other information. For Bissonnette to wait a couple years to tell his story would not have reduced its national historical significance – though it may have reduced his big-name television interviews or book sales.

There is a difference between Bissonnette's book and the disclosure of a crime or "whistleblowing". The reporting or disclosure of a felony or fraud, waste or abuse is quite different from writing a bestselling autobiographical book. Whistleblowers rarely profit from making what they know public: frequently, they lose their jobs, and often endure lawsuits or years of abuse afterwards. Their motivation is usually to correct a wrong. Rewards are offered to encourage them to come forward. Bissonnette was not reporting or disclosing some great crime and he stands to enjoy a great deal of positive attention and profit from his book, even if he donates most of the proceeds to a Navy Seal charity (as he has already attempted to do twice unsuccessfully).

It's hard to be too angry with Matt Bissonnette: he is a genuine hero who put his life on the line more than once and is deserving of the profit and attention he's received. It's pretty hard to keep a secret, especially when that secret is that you had a part in killing Osama bin Laden, one of those rare events which most Americans will recall where they were when it happened. Members of Seal Team 6, already famous before the raid, will probably never have to buy their own beers again.

But what Bissonnette and his defenders miss, and what the majority of his Seal colleagues understand, along with most other members of the military and intelligence community, is that the wider consequences to the national security of the country he risked his life many times to defend outweigh the right to fortune and fame for his bravery, even if it is well-deserved.

In order for the sterling reputation of the United States military and intelligence services to be preserved, and the trust placed in them by average Americans maintained, national security professionals cannot be allowed to profit from their acts, even if they go above and beyond duty or what is normally expected. Seeking fortune and fame, even if merited, cannot be allowed to cloud judgment when it comes to defending America. When it concerns our national security, we need those defending it to continue to put duty and country first. This extraordinary selflessness and dedication is what has kept us safe and strong throughout our history.

Matt Bissonnette has an extraordinary story to tell; he should be allowed to tell it. But he should have waited for it to pass from current affairs and into history first. That a small group of brave and dedicated men finally delivered justice for their country is a story not likely to be forgotten by Americans anytime soon.

Syria: Options for U.S. Invasion, Securing Chemical Weapons

This article originally appeared on PolicyMic on 24 August 2012.

The presence of chemical weapons in Syria has caused much debate since the statement by the Assad regime that they could be used against an outside invasion, but not against Syrians internally. There have also been questionable reports that the Syrian opposition is attempting to obtain or capture chemical weapons to use against regime supporters. "Anonymous diplomatic sources" have said the U.S. may need as many as 60,000 troops to "secure" Syria’s chemical stockpile. Others offer that the U.S. may send in special operations units. President Obama issued a warning to Assad that their use would shift U.S. policy toward intervening. There are many options on the table to deal with Syria’s chemical weapons.

Figures on both the left and right are supporting some form of intervention in Syria. Some hawkish commentators are pushing for an Iraq-style invasion, while others support an incursion similar to the successful Libya campaign and/or enforced "no-fly" zones as in Iraq. I have personally written in support of providing limited anti-armor weapons already present in the region and non-lethal support to the opposition to level the playing field against Assad’s well-equipped military.

The U.S. should not mount a full-scale invasion of Syria as long as the conflict remains local, doesn’t spread beyond Syria’s borders, and no other world or regional power provides large-scale military support to the regime. There is evidence Syria may be a growing proxy conflict on both sides, but not enough to justify the costs of an invasion in American lives and money. American national security is not directly threatened. However, ending the violence there is in our interest. That is another debate.

An invasion would upend the domestic character of the revolution the Obama administration has been careful to respect since the beginning of the Arab Spring two years ago. If the U.S. invades Syria, it would become responsible for the aftermath. A repeat of Iraq is certainly an undesirable outcome for America at this stage. Sending tens of thousands of troops into Syria to secure its chemical weapons is undesirable and unnecessary. The early stages of Afghanistan showed the folly of using "economy of force" or maneuver warfare and ignoring the Powell Doctrine, as did the lack of enough troops on the ground in Iraq to provide security which precipitated the need for a "surge." Sending troops into Syria with the goal of only securing chemical weapons would be a repeat of these conditions. Either send in enough troops to guarantee the success of the mission and security or do not send them in at all. There is no room for half-measures. These are lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq.

Syria’s chemical weapons and production facilities are spread across the country from Aleppo to Homs to Damascus. Putting troops on the ground to secure them would mean splitting our forces, which would necessitate communicable logistical and transport connections. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that enemies who cannot match U.S. troops directly will attack their supply convoys on major roads. The conditions for U.S. troops on the ground in Syria would be similar to those on the ground in Iraq. Adding the difficulty and danger of guarding stockpiles of chemical weapons and transporting them for disposal, most likely wearing thick chemical protective equipment, makes a mass ground invasion the most undesirable option available.

There has been discussion of inserting special operations forces into Syria to secure these weapons. Such an operation would depend upon very accurate, complete information on where and under what conditions these weapons are being stored. The U.S. claims to have good knowledge of where these weapons are, but quickly and quietly removing what are probably hundreds or thousands of chemical munitions doesn’t have a great likelihood of success. They would probably have to be destroyed where they are using explosives that generate enough heat to incinerate the chemical agents, otherwise it risks a chemical agent contamination incident akin to a "dirty bomb" for which the U.S. would be responsible. The risk of a failed mission resulting in the capture or death of U.S. military personnel or the unintentional release of chemical agents causing civilian casualties makes this option undesirable as well.

A third option, the least of evils, would be to use air delivered thermobaric explosives to destroy the chemical munitions. The success of this option would also depend upon precise intelligence as to the location of the stocks and highly accurate placement of the explosive device to minimize the risk of an accidental release. It would also eliminate the need for operators on the ground to transport and place the explosive, though personnel on the ground could certainly provide highly accurate location information or guide an airstrike.

Currently the U.S. decommissions our own chemical weapons by incinerating the raw agents in temperatures above 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Thermobaric explosions exceed 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit in the radius of up to 500 feet around their epicenter, depending upon the size of the device used. Such temperatures would be enough to incinerate chemical agents and minimize the chances of incidental release of the agents or other lethal gasses from the resulting explosion.

This option is also far from perfect. It does have the advantage of reducing or eliminating the need for U.S. personnel on the ground inside Syria. It still depends upon very accurate and complete intelligence regarding the location of Syria’s chemical weapons. There is still great risk of collateral damage to nearby civilian populations, but using this option to eliminate these chemical weapons and preventing their use may save more lives. It must be considered if the use of these weapons is probable and imminent and if the risk of collateral damage from such an airstrike outweighs the outcome of destroying these chemical weapons.

This is indeed a hefty decision to make. We should all hope that the situation in Syria is resolved soon without the need for any intervention by the U.S. or other states. That truly would be the best outcome for everyone involved.

Lightly Arming Syrian Opposition U.S.' Best Option

This article appeared on the Truman Doctrine and The Diplomat in August 2012.

The media presents daily reports of the escalating violence in Syria. There have been confirmed reports of mass executions by the regime. Women are being raped and men are disappearing.

Thousands of civilians and combatants are dying from shelling and firefights every day. The cities of Homs, Damascus, and Aleppo, among others, stand in ruins. Russia and China continue to block UN action in the Security Council. Thus far in the Arab uprisings, America has taken the successful approach of developing the situation from the outside to ensure the revolutions maintain their own national character. The threat of chemical weapons makes any ground intervention more difficult. America should build on past success and break the Syria stalemate by arming the Syrian opposition with anti-tank weaponry and non-lethal supplies.

It is well-known the Assad regime possesses a large stockpile of chemical weapons. They’ve been manufacturing them domestically for decades. A regime spokesman stated chemical weapons could be used against any outside invasion force, though the statement was later walked back. Even for well-equipped and trained militaries such as America’s, conducting operations in a lethal nerve agent environment multiplies the difficulty level and will greatly increase casualties in ground combat. An invasion of Syria is a much more difficult prospect than some imagine.

The same regime spokesman asserted Syria would not use chemical weapons on their own people, no matter the situation. Contaminating large swathes of countryside, effective when necessary against outside invasions, is undesirable domestically. It can present short and long-term contamination hazards for people, animals, crops, and water, not to mention the international mores it would break. Outside of Saddam Hussein, even brutal dictators have hesitated to use these weapons. The Syrian regime using nerve agents could lead to evaporation of Russian or Chinese support.

Arming the Syrian opposition is a better option. The Assad regime has shown no hesitation in using artillery and armor against the Syrian people. Equipping Syrian rebels with light anti-tank weapons such as RPG-7s will allow them to combat the regime’s T-55 and T-72 tanks. RPG-7s and lighter anti-tank weaponry are not capable of penetrating U.S. M1 Abrams tanks.

The Middle East is already awash in such weaponry so America wouldn’t be introducing anything new. Getting them quickly and directly into the hands of Syrian resistance fighters will bring the timely turning point needed to end the violence. Keeping an eye on the future after the Assad regime falls, America should stop short of providing small-arms weaponry, such as machine guns which may be used in the turmoil after the regime falls.

The U.S. should provide the opposition with non-lethal effects as well. Providing radio and other equipment to opposition commanders will allow them to coordinate their forces locally and nationally. Medical and food supplies are vital as well as the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. Providing such supplies directly to Syrians already on the ground will get them closer to those who need them as America and its allies develop a coordinated response to the humanitarian situation following the fighting.

Providing light anti-tank weaponry and other non-lethal support for the opposition combined with continued international diplomatic and economic pressure on the regime, followed by a coordinated international humanitarian response to the aftermath, is America’s best course to end the Syria stalemate.