The Inevitability of Intelligence Failure: Sources, Locations and Causes

November 2013

Intelligence failure can be defined as ‘a misunderstanding of the situation that leads a government (or its military forces) to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests’ (Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 62). Explorations of what could or should have been done differently form the basis for millions of pages of government investigations, newspaper articles, books, journals and entire academic careers.

A uniting factor which leads an event to be considered an intelligence failure is that it was or came close to a national disaster, whereas ‘the record of success is less striking because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen’ (Betts, 1978: 62). If one takes this definition of intelligence failure and turns it around, an ‘intelligence success’ occurs when a situation is understood properly and leads a government (or its military forces) to take actions appropriate and productive to its own interests. Concern with intelligence failures always far outstrips that of any intelligence successes, which may not become known until long after the event, if ever.

Intelligence failures are inevitable because there are limits to what intelligence can accomplish. Its proponents are often guilty of overselling its capabilities and its ‘consumers’ and observers are guilty of misunderstanding them (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104-5). This essay will use a framework based upon the work of Betts, Schmitt and Shulsky, and Gill and Phythian, among others, to outline the different ‘sources’ or ‘locations’ of intelligence failure, where they occur in the ‘intelligence cycle’, their ‘causes’ and other factors, followed by the use of the 2003 Iraq WMD controversy as a case study to briefly illustrate real-world examples to show why intelligence failures are inevitable.

Sources & Causes
There are three general locations which can be identified as sources of intelligence failure: ‘Collection’, ‘Analysis’ and ‘Decision-Makers’ (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 103-4, citing Betts, 1978). These categories broadly separate persons involved in the ‘Intelligence Cycle’ by their positions or functional roles within it. CIA defines the Intelligence Cycle as the ‘process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers’ (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).
Collection

The first step in the Intelligence Cycle is to develop directions as to what information is necessary, known as ‘requirements’, and how it will be collected based upon the needs of the eventual consumers of the intelligence, usually senior policymakers (ibid.). Based upon this guidance, intelligence agencies then begin Collection, also known as ‘espionage’, which can be defined as, ‘the practice of using spies to collect information about what another government or company is doing or plans to do’ (Williams, 2011: 1165). Put simply, Collection involves obtaining the information or ‘raw intelligence’ which is required to meet Requirements developed at the first step in the Intelligence Cycle. Collection is performed by all means available to intelligence agencies, including human intelligence, signals intercepts, imagery and scientific and technical measurement, among others, and relates to one or more ‘types’ of intelligence, including military, political, economic or cultural intelligence (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 51).

Collection Failure
Collection Failure can be seen as the ‘unavailability of information when and where needed’ (Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151, citing Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 64-7;) or part of Betts’ ‘Pathologies of Communication’–the lack of timely collection of information (Betts, 1978: 62-3). Essentially, Collection Failure occurs because the information necessary to respond successfully to the situation was not collected or not when needed.

Inevitability?
Planning and directing intelligence requirements and Collection must still deal with the fact that, in the famous words of U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, ‘There are no "knowns." There are thing we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know’ (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2002), a sentiment similar to one expressed earlier by CIA’s Sherman Kent when he stated there are ‘Things which are knowable but happen to be unknown to us, and…things which are not known to anyone at all’ (Kent, 1964). Simply put, Collection Failure can occur when necessary information, known to exist and known to be needed, is not available due to some limitation. Or it can occur because it was not even considered, dismissed or there were no indicators it was necessary to gather such information. Nonetheless, as Betts (1978: 61) states, ‘In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information’.

Analysis
Station three in the Intelligence Cycle is the ‘processing’ of the collected information, followed by the fourth step of Analysis and creation of intelligence ‘products’, such as reports, findings and estimates. This is followed by the fifth step, Dissemination—distributing the intelligence product to decision-makers in a proper format in a timely manner (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).

The analysis stage begins with an evaluation of the truth of the collected material and the validity of the process which acquired it (Butler Panel, 2008: 527-8). For some forms, such as imagery and signals intelligence, this will be easy; for others, especially human intelligence (usually obtained second-hand from an informant by a case officer) it is more onerous to establish. There may be the wish of the collecting officer to have his source believed, giving rise to the need for an independent appraisal of the information (ibid.). Accuracy in reporting or quoting the information from the source to the analyst must be ensured. It must be checked that the source has actual access to the information or an acceptable explanation of how it was obtained. It must be considered if the source has some ulterior motive for providing the information or if they are involved in a counter-intelligence operation. Their previous track record must also be considered (ibid.). If the veracity of the information is not thoroughly tested and established, anything that follows may be derived from false information and will be fruit from a poison tree.

Actual Analysis of the information, after its validity has been established, involves appraising the value of the information in its own right, deciding how much weight should be assigned to it and compiling it into ‘meaningful strands’ based upon what it relates to. These ‘strands’, compiled from all available sources of related information, are then further used to develop ‘estimates’ (‘assessments’ in the UK) of a particular international situation or set of circumstances (ibid.: 528). They can be rapid, low-level appraisals or they can be the premier product composed of the collective wisdom of the entire intelligence community, as with America’s National Intelligence Estimates (Johnson, 2008: 344). The product is then disseminated and/or briefed to decision-makers in an appropriate format.

Collecting information is difficult enough; deciding what should be done in light of it and how it should be presented creates even more problems. Sherman Kent, ‘father figure of CIA analysis’, felt that estimates consist of, ‘knowledge, reasoning and guesswork’ (Johnson, 2008: 344). The pitfalls of analysing information to attempt to piece together accurate appraisals, predictions and/or advice based upon information of varying types and of contestable accuracy or value, often in a short amount of time, in order to develop an intelligence product are apparent. Estimates are used to develop national policy regarding situations vital to national security. If information, analysis or estimates are wrong or wrongly presented, the policy response will be wrong as well, with serious consequences (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 106-112).

Analysis Failure
Analysis Failure is a broader category. It includes ‘Tendency to concentrate on ‘usual suspects’ for ideological or practical purposes’ (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104), ‘Opinion governed by “conventional wisdom” without supporting evidence’, ‘”mirror imaging”, in which unfamiliar situations are judged upon the basis of the familiar’ (Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151, citing Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002, 64-67) and the ‘Paradox of Perception’—failure to properly balance pre-conceived notions based upon previous and historical experience against an unbiased look at information and failure to balance sensitivity of warnings between insufficiency and alarmism (Betts, 1978: 62-3). It also includes failure in ‘effectively communicating with Decision-Makers’, Betts’ other entry under ‘Pathologies of Communication’ (ibid.).

In sum, Analysis Failure can be located in the Processing, Analysis and Production, or Dissemination stages of the Intelligence Cycle. Essentially, Analysis Failure occurs because information is not properly validated or it is improperly dismissed; the wrong degree of emphasis is placed on collected information; opinion developed through collected information is skewed by practical, ideological, or some other cognitive bias, or; where intelligence products do not effectively communicate the necessary information collected to Decision-Makers, either through an ineffective portrayal of the information collected or untimely dissemination to them.

Inevitability?
Writing in defence of the wrongly-concluded 1962 NIE on the likelihood of Soviet nuclear missiles being stationed on Cuba, Sherman Kent (1964) explained the process of estimates thus:

“If NIEs could be confined to statements of indisputable fact the task would be safe and easy. Of course the result could not then be called an estimate. By definition, estimating is an excursion out beyond established fact into the unknown--a venture in which the estimator gets such aid and comfort as he can from analogy, extrapolation, logic, and judgment. In the nature of things he will upon occasion end up with a conclusion which time will prove to be wrong. To recognize this as inevitable does not mean that we estimators are reconciled to our inadequacy; it only means we fully realize that we are engaged in a hazardous occupation.”

If the circumstances for which Decision-Makers require intelligence were unambiguous, then intelligence services could hand them Kent’s ‘indisputable facts’ and leave them to it. However, there are few circumstances in international politics today which possess such clarity that Decision-Makers, often elected officials with little or no security experience, can decide on their own with ‘raw intelligence’. Today the problem may be too much information, as opposed to not enough, when one considers the mass amounts of imagery and signals information collected, processed and analysed (Irwin, 2012). Intelligence analysis remains a necessity.

Schmitt and Schulsky (2002: 72) argue, ’The heart of the problem of intelligence failure, [is] the thought processes of the individual analyst.’ Attempts to counteract the human element in analysis through systemic or procedural reforms, rather than fixing these flaws, may actually serve to build overconfidence in them afterwards through a belief that the problem has been solved and won’t recur (Betts, 1978: 61). However, history shows that the same mistakes continue to be made. At bottom, intelligence analysis is still a flawed human process and will always be as flawed as the human beings conducting the analysis. So long as there are ambiguous situations requiring, as Kent (1964) puts it, ‘guesswork’, there will inevitably be Analysis Failures.
Decision-Makers

In the final step of the Intelligence Cycle, the product, having been disseminated, has been received by its ‘consumers’ and they have informed themselves of the intelligence. They may have further questions or desire more information. This leads to the development of new Requirements, leading back to the first stage of the Intelligence Cycle, which begins anew (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008: 49).

Decision-Makers, a mix of high-level elected officials, executive appointees and military officials, then actually use the intelligence produced to inform their decisions. Making decisions that are vital to protecting a nation’s security are inherently difficult, with or without accurate intelligence. Historically, intelligence failures are most frequently located with Decision-Makers (Betts, 1978: 62-3). Policymakers often make one of Johnson’s ‘seven sins of strategic intelligence’—ignoring intelligence that which does not conform to their view of a situation (Johnson, 1982: 182-4). If intelligence is misunderstood or ignored, the policy decision-makers pursue may lead to an intelligence failure.

Decision-Maker Failure
‘Decision-Maker Failure’ is the ‘subordination of Intelligence to policy’ (Schmitt & Shulsky, 2002: 64-67; Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010: 151) and may influence the initial Planning and Direction stage of the Intelligence Cycle or be exhibited in how or if Decision-Makers use intelligence to make policy. It also occurs when pressure from Decision-Makers is brought to bear on those involved in analysis at the Processing, Analysis and Production or Dissemination stages. According to Betts (1978: 61), ‘In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision-makers who consume the products of intelligence services.’

Decision-Maker Failure often occurs as a result of ‘Politicisation’, one of the central problems of intelligence. In the words of Robert M Gates as Director of Central Intelligence (Gates, 1992):

“Politicization can manifest itself in many ways, but in each case it boils down to the same essential elements: almost all agree that it involves deliberately distorting analysis or judgments to favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence. Most consider `classic' politicization to be only that which occurs if products are forced to conform to policymakers' views. A number believe politicization also results from management pressures to define and drive certain lines of analysis and substantive viewpoints. Still others believe that changes in tone or emphasis made during the normal review or coordination process and limited means for expressing alternative viewpoints, also constitute forms of politicization."

Essentially, Decision-Maker Failure most often occurs because of some form of ‘politicisation’ by Decision-Makers where intelligence is deliberately distorted, ignored or selectively applied.

Inevitability?
According to Johnson (1983: 182), ‘No shortcoming of strategic intelligence is more often cited than the self-delusion of policymakers who brush aside-or bend-facts that fail to conform with their Weltanschauung.’ In Western democracies, Decision-Makers are either elected officials or senior civil servants influenced by elected officials. Politics is their job and it affects all aspects of it, including making security decisions based upon intelligence. Politics affects every form of government, from totalitarian dictatorships to communist collectives. As von Clausewitz is often quoted, ‘War is the continuation of politics by other means.’ Attempting to totally remove politics from war and national security is an impossible task. As stated above, Decision-Maker Failure through politicisation is the most common reason for intelligence failure. So long as politics are involved in security decisions, there will inevitably be intelligence failures.


Other Factors

Systemic Factors
Systemic Factors which may lead to intelligence failure include internal bureaucratic obstacles and failure to share information or cooperate with other agencies (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104). Garciano and Posner (2005: 159) describe this as, ‘lack of prompt and full sharing of intelligence information within intelligence agencies, between different agencies, and between federal, state and local government levels.’ These Systemic Factors may occur at any phase of the Intelligence cycle and lie within Collection, Analysis or with Decision-Makers. If Collection resources or collected information is not shared it cannot be properly analysed and will not make its way to Decision-Makers, leading to intelligence failure.

External Factors
‘External Factors’ are always present. They include the, ‘Intrinsic difficulty in identifying targets’ and the fact that states or organisations which are or may be the target of intelligence agencies cannot be expected to remain passive to intelligence operations against them (Gill & Phythian, 2006: 104-5). Simply put, sometimes it is difficult or impossible to collect some forms of information, or, as Kent (1964) puts it, ‘Something literally unknowable by any man alive.’ Knowing the intent of an adversary before even he has formed it is an example of this impossibility. An intelligence failure for one state is often the result of an intelligence success by another. External Factors most often affect Collection, but they may also affect Analysis and Decision-Makers at any stage of the Intelligence Cycle, especially if the particular intelligence failure is the active effort of a foreign intelligence service, such as infiltration, double-agents, strategic deception or a counter-intelligence operation.

Case Study: Iraq WMD
The false belief and assertion by the U.S. and UK governments that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq possessed WMD capabilities in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War is an instructive case which illustrates examples of each of the different causes of intelligence failure. Some of these are explored here, though there are more which could be cited.

Collection Failure
According to Morrison (2011: 520), one of the reasons for the intelligence failure relating to the existence of Iraq’s WMD capabilities was a failure to set a Requirement for Collection of political intelligence to place in context technical information on Saddam’s WMD programs. Collection was instead focused on gathering information about the existence of the programs themselves. This led to failure to consider the question in light of Saddam’s ‘political system, fears, and intentions’ (Jervis, 2006: 41). Collecting such information could have offered an explanation as to why Hussein would refuse to disavow WMD programs and cooperate with UN inspections despite not having active WMD programs. Setting this Requirement may have served to balance the dominant presumption that Iraq had WMD, the justification for the war which turned out to be false.

Analysis Failure
UK and U.S. analysis of Iraq’s WMD relied heavily upon unreliable human intelligence sources which were not properly vetted and, in some cases, have since proven to be fabrications. Information was also being quickly disseminated to policymakers without being properly validated or analysed first (Morrison, 2011: 520). In his study of the major U.S. and UK post-mortems on Iraq, Jervis (2006) cites many examples of Analysis Failure: ‘ICs’ judgments were stated with excessive certainty’ (ibid.: 14), ‘no general alternative explanations for Saddam’s behavior were offered’ (ibid.: 15), ‘lack of imagination’ to develop these alternative views (ibid.: 17), ‘failure to challenge assumptions’ regarding existence of WMD programs and a situation ‘whereby assessments were based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties’ (ibid.: 22), among others. These examples illustrate just some of the places where analysis went wrong.

Decision-Maker Failure
The case of Iraq’s WMD provides a clear example of politicisation of intelligence. The Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP) was specifically established by the Bush administration to develop assessments based upon the assumption that Iraq had WMD and its products were used in preference to other Intelligence Community assessments that contradicted that hypothesis (Ryan, 2006: 304-5). A ‘Red Team’ analysis conducted by CIA’s WINPAC, designed only as an initial ‘devil’s advocate’ view in the face of evidence Iraq did not have WMD, was also selectively used by the administration despite strong evidence from the rest of the Intelligence Community its conclusion was wrong. Assessments by agencies such as U.S. Department of Energy and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence Research provided strong, clear arguments against the central argument made in assessments preferred by the Bush administration, but they were pushed aside by Decision-Makers (Conway, 2012: 490-1).

Systemic Factors
Garciano and Posner (2005: 149) point out the WMD Commission’s finding that there was not enough cooperation or information sharing between agencies, specifically in regard to reports that called into question the credibility of the information by the source ‘Curveball’, whose assertion that he had been involved in active WMD programs in Iraq became a central piece of evidence in the Bush administration’s push for war. Curveball (Rashid al-Janabi) himself has since admitted his evidence was a fabrication (NBC News, 2011). If more than one agency had access to these reports, there may have been more questions asked. However, bureaucratic obstacles and security standards stood in the way. There is a lack of information sharing between U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, seen to have separate functions, which may have led to vital information not being shared and considered (Cilluffo et al, 2002: 70-1).

External Factors
Saddam Hussein and his regime were not inactive players in their fate. There was a systematic denial and deception campaign by the regime and their failure to cooperate with and eventual ejection of UN inspectors supported the belief that Iraq had something to hide regarding its WMD programs. Wherever evidence was not available to prove or disprove hypotheses, Saddam and his regime could be blamed for blocking attempts to collect the necessary intelligence (Jervis, 2006: 27-8). In his debriefing by the FBI, Saddam admitted that he wanted to maintain the façade of possessing WMD to counter enemies, especially Iran (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008). Of course, had Saddam been open regarding WMD and cooperated with UN inspections, the likelihood of war would have been greatly reduced. Intelligence is, ‘a game between hiders and finders, and the former usually have the easier job’ (Jervis, 2006: 11).

Conclusion
As Gill and Phythian (2004: 105) point out, ‘the limits of intelligence dictate that intelligence failure is inevitable. Partly, this is a consequence of the impossibility of perfect predictive success; partly it is a consequence of decision-makers’ (politicians with regard to states) natural tendency to err on the side of caution by subscribing to worst-case scenarios, or to simply ignore intelligence that does not fit their own preferences.’ As discussed, there are other locations within the Intelligence Cycle where things can go wrong and there are other possible causes and factors leading to intelligence failure. The debacle of Iraq’s WMD provides many real-world illustrations.

Jervis (2006: 11) makes clear that, ‘Any specific instance of intelligence failure will, by definition, seem unusual, but the fact of the failure itself is quite ordinary’. If the result of the failure is a great national disaster, it will seem to be a great failure. However, factual examinations of how failures occur inevitably show common, ordinary failures by people and organisations that often occur in situations outside of the intelligence context. Jervis usefully compares the Iraq WMD investigations to enquiries into the 1986 Challenger shuttle disaster and abuse allegations in the Catholic Church (ibid.: 4-5). It is only the consequences of intelligence failure that make them appear much larger than they are—the stakes are simply much higher (Betts, 1978: 62). Despite all of the post-mortems conducted on intelligence failures, there is little evidence their conclusions or the reforms enacted afterwards as a result have translated into an elimination or even significant reduction of failures (ibid.).
These human failures are impossible to ever eliminate for good, especially those of a political or cognitive nature. Intelligence failures are inevitable because they seek to make clear ambiguous, complex situations using information that may be difficult to obtain, validate and understand, either through the resistance of the target or the nature of the information itself, and then present information in a digestible manner to Decision-Makers, who may do as they wish with the intelligence produced. Even minor errors at any point in the Intelligence Cycle may throw off the entire enterprise. The fallible and flawed nature of human beings attempting to put together some unknown puzzle with an incomplete picture means mistakes will inevitably occur at some point in the process. There is an old military maxim: ‘what can go wrong, will go wrong.’ Betts (1978) and Gill and Phythian (2006: 105) believe we must accept that intelligence failures are inevitable. Indeed, given the nature of the work of intelligence and all that can go wrong, it would be more extraordinary if intelligence failures did not occur.





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The Nuclear Revolution: Deterrence, Flexible Response, Massive Retaliation, Medium Nuclear States and the Impossibility of Victory

November, 2013

In August 1945 the United States military dropped nuclear devices on the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, directly or indirectly bringing about the end of WWII. These attacks were the first and—so far—last time atomic weapons have been used in war. I argue these attacks represented a ‘nuclear revolution’, the dawning of a new era in which the character of warfare was dramatically altered. Anyone who then or since has witnessed the consequences of their use understands that the awesome destructive power of atomic weapons is greater than anything the world has seen before. However there is more to this fundamental change. Below I will explore three additional dimensions of this shift in the nature of military conflict: the impossibility of victory in nuclear war, how the revolutionary character of atomic weapons bolstered smaller states as much as large, and how the concept of deterrence turned warfare on its head to explain why the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of this ‘nuclear revolution’, signalling a fundamental change in the character of warfare.

Nuclear War Cannot Be Won
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represented a revolution in that they marked the beginning of a new era of warfare in which neither side could, no matter the outcome, claim military victory. Both parties would stand to lose so much that even if one side were left standing, they would preside only over a ruined world. A mass nuclear first strike and ‘mass retaliation’ would leave the world decimated. This state of affairs is ‘mutually-assured destruction’ (Jervis, 1989:4).

U.S. President Eisenhower (1956, cited ibid.: 5) held that nuclear war means destruction of the enemy and likely ‘suicide’ for the victor. In all previous iterations of warfare, from archaic and ancient to modern up to 1945, there was still some way to determine that one side had come out ahead of the other, whether the measure was military, economic or political. In a full-scale nuclear war, the destruction by both sides following a mass first-strike and mass retaliation would be so total that any national government which scurried out of their bunker after the exchange would have nothing left to rule over. It can hardly be imagined that any political, military or economic goal would be worth risking such an outcome to any rational actor. Ambrose quotes Eisenhower (1954, cited ibid.: 4) as questioning his Joint Chiefs of Staff what could be done with such a victory with society in North America, Europe and Asia destroyed, devoid of communications and virtually devoid of life. That cannot be seen as a victory in any sense. French President Charles de Gaulle held, “[After nuclear war, the] two sides would have neither powers, nor laws, nor cities, nor cultures, nor cradles, nor tombs” (ibid.: 1).

The ‘Flexible Response’ doctrine attempted to address Ike’s bleak picture of mutually-assured destruction through first-strike and mass retaliation. Advocates of the policy such as Colin Gray (1981: 47-9) argued that U.S. nuclear strategy should not be based upon a large-scale unleashing of the full nuclear arsenal upon Soviet cities and industrial areas likely to be met with an equal reaction from Moscow, but rather based upon a more restrained, step-laddered approach where tit-for-tat nuclear strikes, though heavily damaging, would still leave open the possibility for diplomatic negotiations and a political climb-down before the conflict reaches nuclear Armageddon. Such a nuclear exchange would leave open the possibility of one side or the other ‘winning’ without destroying society as we know it (ibid.).

However critics of Flexible Response such as David Dessler (1982: 55-7) argue the idea was wrongheaded. Such a policy could lead to ‘deterrence failure’ if the Soviets did not believe the U.S. would respond massively in kind to a nuclear attack, thus inviting them to try their luck. It also ignored Moscow’s ‘strategic culture’, namely that the USSR utterly rejected a graduated response in favour of massive retaliation. In this view, attempts to lessen the costs of a nuclear war could in fact increase the likelihood of nuclear war occurring (ibid.). According to Schelling (1963: 6), pursuing a ‘lesser evil’ policy of limiting war below massive retaliation detracts from deterrence because the reduced threat this implies may not create enough disincentive for a would-be attacker. Thus if the Soviet Union mounted a mass nuclear attack, the U.S. would be faced with the option of hoping to absorb it and respond with a step-laddered approach or respond immediately in kind. The USSR had stated its policy, thus eliminating any real options in a U.S. response. Thibaut and Kelley (1959, cited in Jervis, 1989: 3) call this the difference between ‘fate-control’ and ‘behaviour-control’—namely that the U.S. and USSR controlled one another’s fates in a nuclear exchange, but U.S. Flexible Response policy could not control Soviet behaviour, only hope to influence it. If the Soviets struck, their policy stated it would be en masse. The only hope was that a limited U.S. action would reciprocate a limited reaction from Moscow—a rather risky idea.

Further, Ball’s (1981) analysis of American and Soviet nuclear command and control systems calls into question the ability of either side in a nuclear exchange to control their response in a coordinated way once a nuclear engagement has begun as communications and firing control systems would likely be destroyed or break down and/or political and military leadership may be eliminated. If true, the advantage will lay with the party conducting the first strike and seriously degrade or even eliminate the possibility of a retaliatory strike if not conducted immediately or simultaneously. This reinforces the idea that nuclear strikes must be an ‘all or nothing’, massive force affair; otherwise the loss of command and control may render any non-immediate response ineffective or impossible (ibid.).

Fortunately the impossibility of victory or the rectitude of mass retaliation or Flexible Response have never been, and hopefully never will be, tested in practice. In any case, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a revolution in that they signalled the beginning of a phase when both sides had to take into account that a nuclear war meant neither side could ever really claim victory, a wholly revolutionary state of affairs in the history of conflict.

A Revolution for ‘Medium’ Nuclear States
Possession of nuclear weapons was also a revolution for powers smaller than the U.S. and USSR. It meant states with relatively small militaries, small population and/or smaller industrial and financial resources—though large enough to develop and maintain nuclear weapons—could keep up with states with vastly more such resources.

This aspect was especially important for Western second-tier nuclear powers such as Britain and France who were able to maintain a degree of influence over collective security in the new bipolar world, unlike satellites of the Soviet Union such as Hungary, East Germany and Bulgaria (Mastny, 2005: 30-1). Because of the military and political influence nuclear weapons granted them, Britain and France arguably maintained more influence in the U.S.-dominated Western bloc than did their Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact opposite numbers. The USSR wholly rejected the idea of arming its satellite states with an independent capability, refusing to help them build their own programs or even to jointly develop Warsaw Pact nuclear strategy (ibid.). In this regard, nuclear weapons were a revolutionary tool for less powerful states to stay in the game militarily and politically.

According to Clark and Wheeler (1989: 43), the 1947 British decision to pursue the bomb was, “So self-evident as to require no compelling strategic assessment in support of it.” Though individual policymakers had their own reasons, there was never any doubt Britain would pursue atomic weapons (ibid.). In 1945, the Soviet military had consisted of 6 million service personnel (Dear and Foot, 2005: 966) and the United States had over 8 million spread across North America, Europe and Asia (ibid.: 931). Britain had only 4.6 million in uniform (ibid.: 884) to cover home and all of its international empire. Britain’s domestic economy was greatly strained under the heavy burden of war-related debt and the costs of conventional forces had to be reduced (Clark and Wheeler, 1989: 25-30). The argument would frequently be put forward, predominantly in the early 1950s, that investment in nuclear arms would translate into cost savings by reducing Britain’s need for conventional forces (ibid.: 27). Though pursuing atomic weapons was not cheap for Britain, they were certainly more obtainable than attempting to build as many conventional bombers, tanks and artillery pieces to stay relevant in the contest between the U.S. and USSR and simultaneously attempting to maintain the standard of living at home. Both the United States and Britain came to see nuclear weapons as a set-off to reducing spending on conventional forces (Pierre, 1972: 87-8). It is arguable that while Britain lost political and economic influence and shed its colonial empire following WWII, developing nuclear arms kept London at the table with Washington and Moscow while it cut spending on conventional forces and rebuilt the economy at home.

According to Stoddart (2007), this lesson was not lost on Charles de Gaulle, who, in a similar situation economically, was already pursuing an independent path for France after splitting with the U.S. and Britain over NATO policy. De Gaulle hoped to convince Britain to help France obtain its own nuclear capability quicker and cheaper and there is good evidence Britain traded atomic know-how, telling French atomic scientists what not to do, for UK accession to the European Economic Community in 1972 (ibid.). Though France was late to enter the Cold War nuclear club, the capability made sure France was still a player in the politics of the era.

The nuclear era, ushered in by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represented a revolution for Britain, France and later smaller powers in that developing their own independent nuclear capabilities allowed them to influence the actions powers such as the United States and USSR, relieved some of their budget pressures, and allowed them to have a significant say in their independent and collective security.

Deterrence Turns War on its Head
One of the major facets of the revolution in the character or warfare that followed the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was that nuclear weapons turned the focus of military power on its head. As Brodie states, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them” (1946, cited in Jervis, 1989: 7). Schelling (1963: 9) called deterrence, “A theory of the skilful nonuse of military forces” (original emphasis).

There were differences in how these states viewed the use of their nuclear weapons and how credible the threat of their use was (Pierre, 1972: 87). Britain and France could not afford to build a nuclear arsenal capable of credibly threatening the Soviet Union with the same level of mutually-assured destruction America could. However atomic weapons meant they possessed their own independent nuclear capabilities which could still inflict a degree of ‘punishment’ on Soviet cities in a nuclear exchange that would be high enough to deter Moscow from attacking (ibid.).

According to Pierre (ibid.), Britain’s 1952 ‘Global Strategy Paper’ called nuclear weapons a revolution in the character of warfare. It was also the first policy paper to call for a strategy based upon the concept of deterrence, picked up in the United States by President Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ policy (ibid.). The idea was for the West to openly state that Soviet military advances would be met with an atomic response, not just local, conventional action. Deterrence would make clear to Moscow that any aggression would be met not solely at distant points of friction between East and West, but would strike at the centre of the USSR itself (ibid.). Moscow would not be allowed to whittle away at the margins by taking calculated risks. The idea was to promise to punish the Soviets severely for any attack on Western interests.

Jervis (1989:6-9) points out that the speed and scale of destruction wrought by atomic weapons is such that their use is almost unthinkable despite the clear offensive advantage they represent. Conventional weapons such as artillery and strategic bombers and methods such as sieges and blockades could rationally deliver as much ‘punishment’ through destruction, but could do so only very slowly, very intensively and very expensively. Such conventional methods are calculated to bring an opponent down before their destruction was total and certainly before the act became destructive to the aggressor as well and still left time for diplomacy and second thoughts (ibid.). Nuclear weapons are of such awesome power and so fast and absolute in their destruction that there can be no real rational basis for their use. When both sides possess nuclear weapons, the destruction is mutual and virtually simultaneous. Cities are destroyed within hours and no time is left for negotiation. Rationally, their character becomes therefore more responsive than active or offensive. Facing such destruction, an opponent will be demur from attacking in the face of this scale of ‘deterrence by punishment’ (ibid.).

Another aspect of nuclear capability is that it defeats ‘deterrence by denial’. In conventional war, the credible ability of a state to repel or defend itself against attack by an opponent is ‘denial capability’ (Snyder, 1961: 3-5). Defence is the actual capability to repel an attack. A state that is credibly seen to be capable of defending itself by inflicting damage on any aggressor will deter an aggressor from attacking—deterrence by denial. However, nuclear weapons make defence impossible and thus eliminate deterrence by denial (ibid.).

The creation of a weapon that can hardly be defended against is a revolution, further exhibited in the unique response to the prospect of developing capability to defend against them. The development of every other weapon in history has logically led to the development of a defence, leading, of course, to further improvements to the weapon or new weapons to overcome that defence. Swords and arrows were countered by shields and armour. Bullets and artillery were countered by flak jackets and Kevlar helmets. As yet, there is no credible defence against a nuclear attack. The position of nuclear weapons in this regard was revolutionary because both the U.S. and USSR agreed not to fully develop a defence against them. U.S thinkers argued stability could be gained through this concept of ‘mutual vulnerability’, though both sides continued to attempt to develop nuclear defences to varying degrees (Yost, 2007: 555). Barnaby (1969: 26-35) writes comprehensively on the arguments for and against developing anti-ballistic missile systems and exhibits the difficulty in coming to any conclusion as to whether developing such a defensive capability actually provides increased security or if it decreases security. In the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the U.S. and USSR agreed to limit their capability to destroy each other’s incoming nuclear missiles to one battery of interceptors each. Later, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or ‘Star Wars’, missile defence programme threatened to derail nuclear arms reduction talks. Though the feasibility of such a program was questioned, it presented enough of a threat to the balance of nuclear power to Moscow that Premier Mikhail Gorbechev was induced to sign the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement, a bilateral treaty to eliminate IRBMs and SRBMs, in exchange U.S. promises regarding the SDI (Boyd and Scouras, 2013; Norman, 1986). Never before had a weapon of war been considered so essential or given so much credence as to induce two powers to agree not to develop a defence against it in order to maintain peace.

Conclusion
Besides the great destructive power nuclear weapons represent as shown through the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were a revolution that changed the character of warfare. Conflicts in which both opponents possess nuclear weapons made victory in war for either side impossible, despite risky attempts to control the destruction through Flexible Response. Atomic weapons gave smaller states such as Britain and France more leverage, independence, and economic relief than they would have otherwise had, shown more clearly in contrast with their Warsaw Pact counterparts who were denied the capability. The deterrent effect nuclear weapons created and virtual impossibility of defending against them meant that military strategy was now more concerned with avoiding war than with winning it. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki truly marked a ‘nuclear revolution’ that brought about a fundamental shift in the character of warfare.




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Why Chemical Weapons are a 'Red Line' the World Must Enforce

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 4 September 2013.

Echoing President Barack Obama's remarks of a year ago, US Secretary of State John Kerry has called the use of chemical weapons a "red line for the world", asserting that evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the Assad regime used Sarin nerve gas against its own people. Failing to act now would push that red line back and send a message that the use of chemical weapons will be frowned upon, but that nothing will result other than stern international admonitions.

This would reverse the tide that has been rolling back the use of chemical warfare for the last 25 years. Chemical weapons are a world red line, and action is necessary to protect hard-won international progress against chemical weapons proliferation.

The long war against chemical weapons use

The first world war was the first occasion on which chemical weapons were used on a large scale in war. The results of these attacks, mostly on British and German soldiers, were so horrendous that a prohibition of their use was included in the 1925 Geneva Protocol – subsequently ratified by 138 nations. This was the first formal recognition that the use of chemical weapons is a red line for the world community.

The US and USSR took another step against chemical weapons by agreeing to cease production and set up an inspection regime in the1989 Wyoming Agreement. Then, in 1993, the world again pushed forward the red line to halt the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The rest of the world has kept these agreements, and the reduction of chemical weapons has progressed steadily ever since. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the enforcement agency of the CWC, has reported that 72% of the world's declared stockpiles have been eliminated, as of 2011. The rest are scheduled to decommissioned within the next few years. These are mostly located in Libya and Iraq, but crucially, they are secured and will be eliminated with co-operation from other CWC signatory states. The US has eliminated 90% of its chemical weapons and Russia over 60%.

There are reports of chemical weapons use by Russia, Vietnam, and Cambodia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Saddam Hussein notoriously used chemical weapons against Kurds around Halabja, and during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. However, there have now been no proven lethal chemical attacks in 25 years. Worldwide, the use of chemical weapons in war has virtually ceased since the 1993 adoption of the CWC.

Only Syria has continually chosen to ignore the world's red line on chemical weapons; it is one of only seven nations in the world that refuses to ratify the CWC. (It is joined only by Angola, North Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan; Israel and Burma/Myanmar have signed the CWC, but not ratified it.) At a time when the rest of the world was eliminating chemical weapons, Syria was actively stockpiling precursor chemicals and building what has become one of the largest chemical weapons arsenals in the world.

In July 2012, an official Assad regime spokesman, Jihad Makdissi, declared it was Syrian government policy that chemical weapons would not be used against Syrians, but reserved the right to use them against any external forces. So, Assad could not even keep his own declared red line on chemical weapons use. Unleashing nerve gas on noncombatants in Damascus was a big step over the line.

What about other conflict-zone 'red lines'?

Throughout the last century, the world has borne witness to violence throughout the world, including violent political crackdowns, ethnic cleansing, religious conflict, assassinations and border wars. In virtually every one, international law, norms and values – "red lines", if you will – have been stretched or broken. Victims and refugees caught in these conflicts have repeatedly called for intervention by outside powers. Most of these calls have been made on the United States and other western powers.

Sometimes, we have answered; most often, we have not. So what makes this "red line" different and why should we act this time?

The world order has been in turmoil since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 upended the geopolitical bipolarity of the previous 50 years. Former Soviet satellites in eastern Europe and the Caucasus continue to struggle for their own identity and to remain independent. The Arab Spring uprisings are tearing apart the old political order in the Middle East, while the rise of China is making its Asian neighbours nervous and attracting American attention. South American nations continue their journey out of poverty and away from repressive regimes.

Meanwhile, the US is coming to the end of over a decade at war, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, we have already witnessed over 100,000 deaths in Syria.

Not all of the benefits the world was promised when the US and its allies prevailed in the cold war anti-Communist struggle have materialised. In some parts of the world, things seem to be regressing, rather than improving. That is why it is important to preserve and jealously guard what progress has been made in working toward a more peaceful world – even if that means turning to military action against rogue states in order to do so. The steady worldwide reduction of chemical weapons is a prime example of that progress – one that we cannot allow to be eroded so easily.

A failure to act after the Assad regime has crossed that red line would be akin to the world retreating and setting a new, weaker standard without a fight. No state other than Syria has dared to cross the line of chemical weapons use in a quarter-century. If we do not act today, we have set a new world precedent that says the use of chemical weapons is frowned upon, but there will be no serious consequences. We should not retreat so easily without serious consideration of what we would be sacrificing for the future.

Until this moment, the world was on the cusp of eliminating one of the unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction. Quietly, steadily, we had been approaching the point where we would one day be able to say we had eliminated chemical weapons.

This is progress toward a safer world we can only hope to achieve with nuclear or biological weapons. Worldwide, proliferation of nuclear weapons has increased. Since the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel have developed new nuclear weapons. Other states, such as Iran, may be trying to join the nuclear club. Meanwhile, the nature of biological weapons makes tracking or controlling them difficult and there is no major international agreement specifically to enforce their prohibition. Though it receives less attention, the Chemical Weapons Convention is a real success story in comparison.

Syria is the last country in the world with a large stockpile of chemical weapons that refuses to eliminate them. Now, the Assad regime has used them on its own people. And Syria has threatened to use them against any outside forces which threaten the Assad regime. No other country in the world has dared do that since 1988.

President Assad is the last major roadblock to achieving a world free from the horror of chemical weapons. That is why the world, led by the United States, must take action in Syria.

Belief in 'American Exceptionalism' is No Basis for National Security Policy

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 2 July 2012.

As American power grew over the last century, our strategic goals were often defined by who our opponents were. We’ve defeated competitors over the last hundred years and have emerged at the top of a heap where it is no longer clear how threatening our opponents are.

Neocons continue to seek enemies to confront. The far left argue we only have ‘manufactured’ enemies. Despite America’s ascent over the last century, many argue America is now in decline. In response, many other Americans have rejected this idea and come to accept as an article of faith ‘American exceptionalism’: that we are preordained to succeed because our system or people are superior. GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney has essentially adopted it as part of his platform.

It is false and dangerous to assume American success was and is a foregone conclusion. It ignores the hard work, hazards, and sacrifice successful national security policy requires.

Victory was far from certain in both World Wars and the Cold War, though in retrospect as the subject of intense academic study it becomes easily seen as such. Those who fought and lived through these conflicts, especially on the frontlines, certainly didn’t see it that way. America’s modern conflicts fought thousands of miles away by an all-volunteer military make that easy to forget.

Belief in ‘exceptionalism’ reflects the fact that security today is considered by some to be an issue of political belief rather than realism, pragmatism, or experience. It reflects an attitude that national security is a worldview to be projected upon others, not actions based upon an evaluation and understanding of the situation as it exists.It is the modern-day equivalent of ‘manifest destiny’ of the 19th century in that it smooths over the rough spots in favor of those that put America in a more favorable light and adds a sense of inevitability.

But those who believe too sincerely in their own infallibility plant the seeds of their own downfall. The problem is compounded when politicians, most of whom personally lack national security experience, take political positions on national security issues to a politically divided American electorate, most of whom also lack real security experience.

This lack of experience, the intense politicization of national security, and its inclusion in mainstream media banter has caused much international difficulty and division in America. The national security views espoused by Romney campaign advisors John Bolton, Max Boot, and Eliot Cohen are recent and obvious examples. It used to be a maxim that politics stopped at the water’s edge, but this is arguably not true anymore.

America needs leadership with real, practical, personal national security experience. National security policy should be based upon facts and strategic considerations, not politics or beliefs. ‘American exceptionalism’ is a nice idea, but it is dangerous to allow it to have an outsized influence on our strategic thinking.

Victory is never assured; it requires hard work and sacrifice. The American men and women who fight our wars know this lesson better than anyone.