Russia's NATO Expansion Myth

This article originally appeared in Cicero Magazine on 28 May 2014.

It has recently been argued by some that Russia’s invasion and intrigue in the Ukraine was foreseeable and a natural consequence of NATO’s broken promise to Mikhail Gorbachev and the collapsing USSR not to expand eastwards into its former domains. Russian President Vladimir Putin is, so the theory goes, reacting to a 24-year program of US/NATO eastward expansion stemming from that broken promise. This is a grievance Russia has put forward in arguments against Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic States joining NATO and again in 2008 when possible NATO membership for Georgia and the Ukraine was discussed. The ‘broken promise’ thesis was also offered to explain Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. The claim is that this course of events, or a similar one, was reasonably foreseeable, that some predicted it, and that it is a natural consequence. You reap what you sow. The problem is that NATO did not sow these seeds.

The myth that such a promise was made has been allowed to grow by assertion, speculation and incomplete information. More and more primary sources and memoirs of the participants in the negotiations between Washington, Bonn and Moscow have become available over time. There is a rich background of study of this particular controversy by academics such as Fred Oldenberg, Mark Kramer, Mary Elise Sarotte, and Kristina Spohr, among others. From the available interviews, memoirs, written documents, agreements, transcripts and notes on the multiple bilateral negotiations—from Soviet and East German sources as well as Western—it is clear the subject of the eastward expansion of NATO into former East bloc states was never discussed as a stand-alone issue and no such agreement or promise was given by Washington to Moscow. At a recent Council on Foreign Relations event, for example, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said U.S. negotiators never agreed to such a thing at the time.

The closest the participants ever came to directly tackling the issue was at the very beginning of the negotiations quickly following the collapse of Eastern European governments and the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. West Germany’s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher—more concerned with German issues than the larger Cold War—was concerned Moscow would take a hard line and wanted to make a pre-emptive offer to smooth their feathers—before the issue had ever been formally discussed between East and West—that a unified Germany would not be a member of NATO, but rather either neutral or a member of another strictly European organisation, the OSCE. Interestingly, Genscher became Chairman of the OSCE in 1991.

If NATO expansion was as vital an issue to Russia then as is claimed today, Moscow would and could have insisted on a clear statement of it in writing.
However, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl did not endorse even this view. It would essentially mean West Germany leaving NATO. The U.S. and UK also disagreed. NATO without West Germany would have significantly weakened the organisation, making it an almost solely an Anglo-American affair after France all but exited in 1966. The official West German, U.S. and UK positions in negotiations with Moscow never included Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s idea. NATO’s eastward expansion was only discussed in clear text in the context of German reunification—namely whether NATO troops would be allowed on former-East German soil. NATO took the position that they had to be, as it would make no sense to have unified Germany as a full member with security guarantees for only half the country. Moscow agreed in the 1990 Treaty on Final Settlement with Respect to Germany that, yes, reunited Germany would remain in NATO, but no NATO troops should be moved into former East Germany until after all Soviet troops had departed. NATO was held to and kept this promise. Arguably, as NATO’s security blanket now also covered eastern Germany, it already represented an eastward expansion of NATO—by way of agreement with Moscow.

If NATO expansion was as vital an issue to Russia then as is claimed today, Moscow would and could have insisted on a clear statement of it in writing. It certainly would and should have wanted more than verbal assurances given during ongoing and evolving diplomatic negotiations. Of course some argue this away by claiming Moscow was outsmarted or outmanoeuvred by George HW Bush and Helmut Kohl and that the Soviets were under pressure to move quickly because of the impending collapse of Eastern European governments. Such a vital point must surely have been apparent to the Soviets. That former East bloc states may want to join the alliance one day was not so far outside the realm of possibilities. The idea had occurred to the U.S. State Department and Hungary and Poland were already discussing NATO membership in February 1990.

One important question should be asked: Why would NATO agree not to expand NATO eastwards? In 1990 the world held its breath at the prospect of the end of 45 years of Cold War. The United States and its trans-Atlantic partners had come out on top. Many in the Bush administration saw the job now as to help Gorbachev hold the situation together so that it did not descend into violent chaos. However, it would be extremely naïve to believe that the U.S. and its allies would agree to leave everything east of the Oder-Neisse Line alone, especially when they had finally won the Cold War. To do such a thing would fly in the face of 45 years of fighting a battle for democracy, capitalism and freedom against a communist vision of collectivism, oppression and stagnation. Why would NATO agree to forgo the fruits of victory? There is no written provision addressing NATO expansion contained in any of the agreements or communiques stemming from any of the negotiations. Those, such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Americans such as former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara and former US Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock, who assert such a promise was made have no concrete evidence to point to. They rely on retellings of flawed memories or the myths built from an assertion over time, all refuted by primary-source evidence. No such promise was ever made.

Regardless of the truth, the Russian government asserts, and many Russians undoubtedly believe, that such a promise was made and has been broken by NATO and the US specifically. Many others outside of Russia also believe it as an article of faith. Many want to believe it because it conforms to their Weltanschauung—worldview. With such cases, the truth is—sadly—unhelpful. Regardless of what was not promised, no less a personage than George Kennan asserted in 1998 that NATO expansion was unnecessary, that with the USSR gone there was no longer any threat and US support for continued expansion placed Russia up against a wall. Russia had to struggle to rebuild itself in a new post-Soviet image with a new role in Europe. Unable to join NATO or the EU, it watched as its former foe swallowed up more and more of its former satellites and crept into its ‘near abroad’. A reaction was to be expected. If this view is true, Vladimir Putin maintains a lingering Cold War imperialist mindset. Putin must see the 1990 negotiations, not as the final testament and rites of a dying empire, but as a sort of Neo-Potsdam Conference in which the Oder-Neisse Line was still being maintained, just with open borders, friendlier relations and looser control over satellites. Perhaps he considers it a bit like a much wider and more severe Polish or Prague Spring. He believes Russia was promised something by the US—that it would leave its near-abroad alone. He must also still believe Russia has a right to and should maintain dominance over its bordering states, as in the time of the Czar and Stalin after him. He does not believe these nations have a right to independent self-determination.

Putin must refuse to believe that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Georgia and now the Ukraine determined themselves they wanted to join NATO and/or the EU. For Russia, it can only be that America—and its partners Britain and France—conned or cajoled these states into coming over to their side of the ‘Iron Curtain’. For Putin, there is only Russia and the US and every other state is just a piece on the game board. If this is all true, it is understandable why Vladimir Putin wants to believe the US promised to leave Eastern Europe to him and Russia in 1990. This thinking also portrays some wishful thinking on America’s part, hoping against hope for the ‘end of history’ and the ‘peace dividend’. It is true that NATO was conceived to collectively confront the Soviet threat, now gone. However, to believe that the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact meant that NATO was no longer necessary because the last great evil had been defeated portrays naïve thinking and perhaps the doomed repetition of history.

The West still has not learned some lessons. We believed WWI was the ‘war to end all wars’. It was not. We believed the same at the end of WWII in 1945 and again at the end of the Cold War in 1990. While threats from Islamic terror and atomic rogue states have been exaggerated over the last 15 years, the history of the 20th century shows that America and Europe still need NATO. The world is still a dangerous place in which collective security remains necessary. In fact, looking at individual European military forces and defence budgets, collective security under NATO is all they have. None maintains a fighting force capable of mounting any sizeable operation without US support. History always returns. As with the dominant narrative of the Cold War, this thinking also leaves out the agency and will of other states besides the US and Russia. If the Cold War is truly over, then the Baltic and Eastern European states such as the Ukraine are not anymore just pawns or peons or customers to be convinced or coerced into choosing one side or the other. Even if such a promise had been made between NATO and Moscow 24 years ago—and it was not—they do not have the power to make decisions for these other countries today. They are sovereign, independent nations.

These states, their governments and their people control their own relations and chose to be members of NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and etcetera. After all, this freedom is what the US claimed to be fighting the Cold War for. It is within the Western rhetoric of freedom, independence and democracy. It was not the US or Europe who overthrew the Russian puppet government in the Ukraine in some Cold War-esque covert action—it was the Ukrainian people taking to the streets to demand change as they have several times over the last decade. To say that the US and its allies should have predicted and it was foreseeable that expanding NATO and considering Ukrainian EU membership would lead to a backlash from Russia is to ignore the individual will of Ukrainians, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians and reduce what they want to a secondary consideration. Anyone who claims this future was predictable based upon a false version of the past should be seriously questioned. Vladimir Putin believes Russia is entitled to control its neighbouring states as in the days of the USSR and the Russian Empire. It is not entitled to, no matter what it falsely believes it was promised 24 years ago.

High Time for a US-EU Trade Agreement

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 20 June 2013.

Despite our differences, many of which have come to a head in recent years over the War on Terror, the United States and its allies in the European Union share overwhelming common interests. Beyond shared values, culture, and military and political systems, these interests are also the result of diplomatic design and modern history. The U.S.-EU free trade negotiations recently announced at the G8 summit in Enniskillen are a natural progression of this relationship and are an important step for both blocs in responding not only to today’s problems, but tomorrow’s problems as well.

WWII left the European continent devastated for the second time in only 30 years. The labour force was decimated, production had ground to a halt and national treasuries were empty, with crushing inflation and debt. Determined that European states should never go to war with each other again over resources or ‘balance of power’ politics, European leaders formed the European Coal and Steel Community, which evolved into the European Union of today. The EU is the world’s largest common market for goods and services. Though often misunderstood and even demonized, the EU is in great measure responsible for the continental peace that has followed its creation. Economic integration has created overriding mutual interests among EU states. Those who trade together, stay together.

The Marshall Plan helped to rebuild Western Europe’s economy. Continuing cooperation between intelligence agencies has been vital to both sides of the Atlantic. The joint military structure of NATO ensured that the U.S. and Europe remained engaged in each other’s national security. NATO is still a vital tool through which America and Europe engage with the world in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era. The U.S. and its western European allies recognized the need for intelligence and military cooperation to confront the Soviet Union and the spread of communism during the Cold War and again in the fight against terrorism.

But an over-arching agreement on transatlantic trade has been missing for many decades due to national protectionist instincts that often kick in on both sides. Many Americans blame ‘globalization’ and trade agreements such as NAFTA for the loss of jobs. Many Euro-sceptics wrongly blame the EU for the same. Britain often finds itself at odds with the EU, most memorably in relation to weights and measurements when Imperial units became a nationalist rally point. France has been guilty of setting emissions standards that strangely only Peugeots and Citroens could pass. Even in this most recent agreement announced at Enniskillen an exception, pushed for in France and Poland, was made for the European film industry, which fears it would be driven to extinction by Hollywood blockbusters.

A bilateral U.S.-EU trade agreement would give American and European businesses access to millions of new customers for goods and services. The increased competition and elimination of tariffs should lead to better prices for consumers on both sides. The opening of new markets will create new jobs, something sorely needed in both Europe and America. It will also help cut through a lot of the red tape for importers and exporters already in the transatlantic trade.

But there are also bigger strategic reasons to hail such an agreement. Both sides of the Atlantic have suffered attacks and face the continuing threat of international terrorism. The 2008 economic downturn was fuelled by questionable lending policies by major banks in both America and Europe and are where the effects have been most acutely felt. U.S. and EU governments have faced similar struggles regarding foreclosures, government austerity, ‘bailouts’, bonuses and tax evasion. Both the U.S. and Europe continue to require fossil fuel energy. Despite better efforts than America to increase use of renewables, Europe must often depend upon Russia for oil and gas, giving Moscow a larger share of leverage than they may ordinarily be due. War and instability in the Middle East and Africa have shown the folly of America’s continued dependence on foreign oil, an issue the Obama administration has set out to tackle to the opposition of many in Congress. The world’s insatiable appetite for energy is growing at an even faster rate. The rise of China and India and other smaller tigers mean that the dominance the U.S. has enjoyed since the end of WWII may be challenged. This increase in global competition for energy resources may lead to conflict sometime in the near future.

This is no time for the EU or the U.S. to call ‘every man for himself’ and turn to their own tasks. The two blocs face the same challenges and the success or failure of one side is of great consequence for the other. China and India did not grow themselves in a vacuum. American and European consumers, investors and business out-sourcing have fuelled their growth. The same capital employed there could have flowed back and forth between American and European states, but the want of cheap labour and materials, less or non-existent regulation and reduced government red tape caused it to flow eastward instead. The U.S. and EU have been fuelling the growth of their own competitors at a time when both are in dire need of economic growth.

Hopefully that will change or slow with a successful U.S.-EU trade agreement. It is high time for one.

Sharing the Burden of National Security

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 29 January 2013.

For decades America has been arguing that in order for America to do less, our allies will have to do more. We have been cajoling our international partners to take more action in the world. There are signs it is starting to work, though the efforts have a certain shakiness that can be expected when using skills with which one is somewhat out of practice. Despite being met with scepticism and derision abroad, this is something the U.S. should welcome.

Following the end of WWII and the end of the Cold War, America’s major allies were content to let Uncle Sam take the lead. Some, such as Germany and Japan, remain constitutionally hamstrung from taking part in interventions for other than defensive purposes. There has been some softening in this position. German troops do patrol Afghanistan and Japanese troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan until 2007. American influence following WWII created this condition we’re asking them to push aside.

The United Kingdom has shown willingness to use military force to defend interests. Britain fought alongside America in the Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader ‘War on Terror’. However, Prime Minister David Cameron recently announced further troop reductions, cutting out 5,300 soldiers, making the British military 75% smaller than it was at its Cold War peak. There is debate as to whether the UK should remain a nuclear-armed power or discontinue its programs. Every other EU state is reducing its expenditure on national defense as well.

The end of the Cold War caught America and its allies flatfooted. Failure to adapt culturally, technologically, and bureaucratically led to the intelligence failures that made 9/11 possible ten years on. The same conditions were repeated in Europe and were exacerbated, in some cases, by a souring of political relations with Washington over the Iraq War. Economic conditions since 2008 have not made it any more attractive to increase spending on national security despite the continued threat of Islamism and America’s strategic ‘shift to the east’.

But there are signs that America’s allies are answering the call. Britain and France were the early drivers behind action in Libya, though European military equipment wasn’t as reliable as it should have been and America had to sell them the ammunition. Britain and France have also been vocal regarding action in Syria. France has taken the lead in fighting Islamists in Mali with British logistical support. This hasn’t gone smoothly either with a shipment of supplies held up by maintenance problems with British aircraft. UK PM David Cameron has called for renewed vigilance in the worldwide fight against Islamism following the Algerian terror attack, though doing so after announcing a third round of military cuts.

Despite bumps in the road, the signs are encouraging. America has spent the last decade at war in several places thousands of miles away, in inhospitable terrain, fighting on the home turf of an enemy that cannot be easily identified, often with interference from ‘fair weather’ allies. The U.S. spends more on its national security than any other country, and our troops are the most experienced and professional anywhere. Though the U.S. has certainly had its own bumps in the road, we’re much more experienced in planning and executing military operations.

Hopefully, our allies will work out their kinks now that they’re getting back into the game. After 43 years, France has re-joined NATO. Europe has been carrying its load on the diplomatic front in negotiations and sanctions with states such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Intelligence cooperation continues even with ‘dove’ states such as Germany and Japan. But it would be naïve from a national security perspective to believe that America should continue to carry the weight of the world when it comes to confronting common enemies. No state should be wholly dependent upon another state to provide it security. This has been the condition among America and its allies since the end of the Cold War.

Despite America’s calls for more help from its allies, some criticize this as evidence of a ‘lead from behind’ approach by President Obama. Republicans have cited European-spearheaded operations as a sign of weakness. Yet, at every turn, America has provided support to ensure these operations succeeded. We provided much of the intelligence, coordination, and logistical support. America, the experienced and senior partner, has been the glue that ensured success. Allowing our allies to take the lead and flex their muscle, something we’re asking them to do, is not a weakness. It should be welcomed as a sign of strength.

But there are problems, defense budgets foremost among them. America may be facing its own defense cuts due to a self-laid trap. This is a problem America will have to sort out alone. But Europe should turn toward defense integration. Most EU countries are unable to spend large amounts to create, expand, or maintain a functioning military with all the same costly weapons platforms the U.S. can. We may soon face a European continent with outdated air forces, no heavy armor corps, and undertrained and underequipped troops. Such a force is not worth paying for.

Imagine British, Polish, and Italian infantry supported by Belgian and Dutch tanks and artillery and a Spanish and French air force, all supported by German and Austrian logistics, or a similar constellation, led by a pan-European command structure. This would be more cost-effective force and create a viable fighting force to match the U.S., as opposed to a collection of tiny under-budgeted and outdated national forces.

America and its allies should not make their budgets or long-term strategic plans based upon the idea that we are entering into an era that will be more peaceful than has been our past. We should welcome more vigilance by our allies, not cite it as evidence of decline. Sharing the burden between America and its allies and in turn our allies sharing their burden between themselves is a strategy that prepares for what we may–but hopefully will not—face in future.