Revisiting COIN Strategies in Vietnam

This post originally appeared in Cicero Magazine 14 July 2014.

That “Generals are always fighting the last war” may be true, but this is often because they are fighting a different war from their opponent. According to Clausewitz, it is key to military strategy to find the “center of gravity” in any war. If one does not, or focuses on the wrong ‘center’, the battles and ultimately the war will be lost. In Vietnam, the United States did not come to recognize the people of Indochina as the center of gravity and focused on them too little and too late. Many post-mortems on the Vietnam War have recognized this fact. Yet in recent conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq—despite the battle cry of “hearts and minds”—America still believed it could win through “thunder runs”, “economy of force”, “dynamic maneuver warfare”, and remote or walled combat fortresses. Arguably, these tactics won battles, but they have not won the wars.

Mao’s Teachings

The goal and strategy of indigenous communist forces was related directly to winning over the people of Southeast Asia. They wanted to change society, not just change governments. They sought to communicate this goal to the people and mobilise them to support it, not just build a government and centrally-controlled army to fight pitched battles, though they did show ability to do so against the French and, in later stages, against the United States.

Communist forces devised effective tactics to further their strategy of revolutionary guerrilla warfare largely based upon the teachings of China’s Mao Zedong and Vietnam’s General Vo Nguyen Giap. They viewed the wars as a “struggle”—dau tranh—broken further into the “military struggle”—dau tranh vu trang—and the “political struggle”—dau tranh chinh tri. Included in the political struggle was “action among the enemy”—dich van. “Action among the enemy” referred to actions behind enemy lines taken by communist forces among the local population in areas controlled or contested by anti-communist forces. Almost all communist actions conducted in South Vietnam included detailed plans and directives for propagandizing and re-training “liberated citizens”.

The primary and most effective vehicle through which communist forces undertook these actions was the “Agit-Prop Team”, also referred to as the “Armed Propaganda Team” (APT). These teams were first used by the Viet Minh to quickly disseminate news of the 1945 Japanese surrender and standing up of the communist government throughout the countryside—quickly pushed aside byBritish troops. They continued to be employed by communist forces throughout the conflict. Travelling minstrels and drama troupes had been part of Southeast Asian culture for centuries. As retired Army Sergeant Major and veteran of psychological operations in Vietnam,Herb Friedman explains: “Because of the widespread familiarity of the peasant with culture-drama teams and the wide acceptance of this traditional culture form, the communists seized upon the concept and developed it as a PSYOP weapon.”

APTs were a non-violent, culturally-attuned and effective way of communicating the communist message and mobilizing rural South Vietnamese to their cause. As a 1968 article in Military Review puts it: “If the United States had given a higher priority to finding out precisely what the Communists were doing psychologically in remote areas of South Vietnam between 1955 and 1959, and to urging the government of [South] Vietnam to develop and use a counter-psychological operation strategy, the Viet Cong would have been less able to exploit peasant resentments and to get them organized to support a guerrilla war the people did not want.”

Hearts & Minds in Saigon 

Perhaps the greatest testament to the success of the communist Armed Propaganda Teams is the fact that South Vietnamese and U.S. forces adopted the same tactics after coming to understand their effectiveness. These and similar missions were referred to as ‘psychological operations’—PSYOPS—by the U.S. military. Anti-communist APTs conducted operations similar to their communist counterparts and consisted of South Vietnamese cadre accompanied by U.S. troops.

The first two Anti-communist APT companies were organised in 1964 and many of the cadre were former communists who could speak with credibility of the actions and conditions on both sides of the fight. The program grew to 75 companies by 1969. Anti-communist forces also employed entertainment through ‘Culture-Drama Teams’. Their tactics were similar to the communists. They would engage villagers in singing, including teaching the people the South Vietnamese national anthem, teaching them the positive goals of the Saigon government, and giving news of government successes, programs and improvements.

In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. does not seem to have fully taken these lessons from the Vietnam War on board.

American efforts to combat communism and win hearts and minds in Southeast Asia, and those of the French before them, were referred to generally as “pacification”. For most rural South Vietnamese in 1954, the newly independent government in Saigon was far away and not very relevant to their lives. Many government bureaucrats adopted the hands-off approach French colonial administrators had taken, remaining remote from citizens and more concerned with forms than people.

However, with the 1954 Geneva Accords dividing of the nation along the 17th parallel,  Ngo Dinh Diem’s government had to gain support from its citizens, not least of all because within two years there would—supposedly—be national elections encompassing both North and South Vietnam  in which Vietnamese would decide between communism and democracy. Saigon would have two years to reach the people outside of the provincial capitals before the July 1956 elections and do it better than the communists.

The Special Commissariat for Civic Action (CDV)—Cong Dan Vu—was the brainchild of Kieu Cong Cung, a nationalist former soldier and police chief. He had also been Viet Minh in the fight against the French return in 1945, so knew the communist’s tactics first-hand. The idea was to get the government out of offices and into villages, showing it could improve lives. It “attempted to place the resources of the South Vietnamese state behind an effort to duplicate the tactics of the communists at the village level and beat them at their own game”.

Mobile groups of CDV cadre, with support from local government, would connect with the people by living alongside them while working with them on civil projects to improve local living conditions. The first groups deployed in 1955 and began working in villages on information campaigns, attitude surveys and distributing medical aid. Their role expanded to holding classes on government services, ensuring each village had a school, a council, a village hall and a medical station, helping locals to build whichever they did not have. Once they achieved some success in an area, they moved on to another. Initial reports were optimistic.

Unfortunately, the CDV program met with resistance from the beginning. The provincial governors resisted it as encroaching on their power and budgets. Provincial administrators felt the work below their status. Village chiefs did not like the intrusion of outsiders from Saigon. Language and dialects proved to be a barrier. Often when CDV teams left, things would return to their previous state without support to maintain improvements. CDV cadres were being targeted for assassination by communist insurgents. U.S. advisers thought the program too ambitious and costly for Diem’s budget.

Despite its great promise, there simply was not enough support, time, money or cadres. In the end, the July 1956 elections which the CDV was envisioned to help Diem win never took place. It became clear the communists would win them by a wide margin. On the advice of the U.S., the South claimed it had not been party to the Geneva Accords and could therefore ignore them. The temporary split of Vietnam became permanent and set the stage for the Vietnam War.

Early on anti-communist forces recognized the need to control the population to prevent communist communication and weed out communists. One of the tenets of revolutionary guerrilla warfare was Mao’s exhortation that “the guerrilla must move among the people as a fish swims the sea.” Communist guerrillas depended upon the local population for information, shelter, money, food, and new recruits. Separating the guerrilla “fish” from their “sea” of people would do them harm.

During the Malayan Emergency, British forces experienced some success with the “Briggs Plan”, which saw rural populations relocated to fortified, defensible “New Villages” with controlled entry and exit, separating the insurgents from the people and drawing them into the open to find support. As part of his effort to install democracy in Vietnam “from the bottom up”, Ngo Dinh Diem instituted the Agroville Programme in 1959—later Strategic Hamlet Program or New Life Hamlets—in an effort to isolate communists from the people.

The fortified, controlled villages—guarded, moated, barbed-wired and bamboo-fenced—prevented communists from entering to exploit them for supplies and recruits. Residents gave up their ID card upon exiting the village to work the fields and their identity was checked upon return. The program was incentivized by providing electricity, schools and medical facilities. A network of roads linked the hamlets. Hamlet councils linked residents to the government for the first time and the government felt the villages safe enough to extend credit to farmers. Villagers were organised into a self-defense force and devoted one day a week to maintaining defenses. Communication between villages and news awareness improved with the installation of radios. By 1962, the Diem government claimed 39% of South Vietnamese lived in such communities .

The program created as many problems as it solved. Thousands were uprooted from their farms and made to build new homes—unpaid—within controlled villages, often far from their ancestral homes. For Vietnamese, veneration of ancestors is important and leaving behind graves caused great social disruption. In its zeal to complete the project, initially the government uprooted 20,000 people to build a village for that could only hold 6,000, leaving 14,000 angry peasants. Many of those forced to move and into labor held smoldering resentment against the U.S. and the Diem government for uprooting them, something the communists exploited. Communist propaganda against the hamlets pictured them as concentration camps or prisons and they made great efforts to infiltrate the hamlets to agitate against the South from inside.

To America, the program was a way to isolate and starve communists. To the communists, it created further propaganda opportunities to show the repression suffered under the U.S. and Diem. To Ngo Dinh Diem, it was a way for his government to reach and control the people.

Lessons For Counterinsurgents Today

• For government to gain the support of the people, the government must reach the people positively. The newly-independent democratic government was a wholly new beast to its people who had only lived under French colonial administration and had to convince them of its worth. Insurgent forces were more effective at reaching even the most rural of communities. U.S. and government efforts were too little, too late despite their potential to deliver tangible public benefits to rural populations insurgent forces could not have. American and local government efforts were less successful at reaching and convincing the people of their worth than insurgent forces.

• Barriers keep bad things out, but they also keep them in.While barriers separated insurgents from the population they depended upon for support, their use also reinforced the propaganda image of local government and U.S. oppression. It disrupted social cohesion and fostered resentment among the people. The government reached the people in a negative way. Walls can keep people out, but not ideas. People frustrated by the obstacles to normal life constructed by COIN forces presented fertile ground for the insurgent’s ideology—the center of gravity and the focus of their effort to win the war.

In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. does not seem to have fully taken these lessons from the Vietnam War on board. America’s effort to establish governments that have positive reach outside of Baghdad and Kabul has returned mixed results at best despite billions of dollars and thousands of lives invested in building them. Local governments have been unable to prove their value to their people—or at least no better than their opponents have—despite the claimed importance of winning “hearts and minds” to the American effort. Perhaps it is indeed true that our Generals were still fighting the last war

De-Stalinisation: A Fatal Blow for International Socialism?

May 2014

Introduction
Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’ of 25 February 1956 to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) served as the first clear, unequivocal and public notice that overdue reform had indeed come to Soviet policy. As Khrushchev made clear, for the Soviet Union it marked the full commencement of ‘de-Stalinsation’ in which Stalin’s ‘Cult of the Individual’ would be denounced; subjective history would be corrected; his paranoia and purges would be condemned; gulags would be emptied and party members rehabilitated, and; rule of law would be reinstated. It also provided a way for current CPSU leaders to win public support while shifting the blame for excesses onto the late Stalin and his executed security chief, Lavrentiy Beria. The Secret Speech and De-Stalinisation had major political effects for international communism.

De-Stalinisation had different effects in different places. To provide some (but surely not all) particular examples, the 1956 revolt and government changes in Poland were clearly results of Khrushchev’s speech and new policy. In China, Mao Zedong opposed de-Stalinisation and contributed to the Sino-Soviet split. In North Korea, Kim Il Sung viewed de-Stalinisation as a personal threat which led to an attempt to unseat him. This essay will rely predominantly on primary sources, beginning with the Secret Speech and continuing with correspondence with national leaders involved, to show that de-Stalinsation, while not dealing a fatal blow, certainly created cracks and fissures within the foundation of international communism.

De-Stalinisation and the Secret Speech
In order to understand why de-Stalinisation created such problems for international communism, it is necessary to analyse what de-Stalinisation meant. As Jones (2006:2) points out, there is more than one definition of ‘de-Stalinisation’. It can refer to the wider context of not only the program of government policy reform and programs of the Khrushchev era from 1956 to 1964, but also to social, cultural and artistic changes over the same period, a larger concept used often by post-USSR and Western journalists and academics to study all of these changes over the period. However, here de-Stalinisation will refer to the narrower concept contemporary to the era itself which focused on ‘de-mythologization of the leader cult’ (ibid.). Khrushchev’s Secret Speech (1956) reads like an instruction manual laying out what Khrushchev and the Presidium intended to achieve with the new policy and provides an explanation of what was controversial about de-Stalinisation so as to cause rifts in international communism.

Background: Soviet Succession and de-Stalinisation, 1953-1956
According to Filtzer (1993:12), ‘even before Stalin’s death the need for economic and even some political reforms had been mooted’ and ‘immediately after Stalin’s death there were cautious movements toward de-Stalinisation.’ In the period preceding Stalin’s death in March 1953 up to 1956, cautiously floating ideas for judicial, economic and political reform became part of the power struggle to succeed Stalin involving Khrushchev, Levrentiy Beria, Georgy Malenkov, and Vyacheslav Molotov (Morgan et al, 2000:103).

'In order to understand why de-Stalinisation created such problems for international communism, it is necessary to analyse what de-Stalinisation meant.'

Beria, seen as the most ready proponent of reform, was quickly out of the picture, denounced in 1953 for a supposed coup plot and eventually executed. The following month, a plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU became a forum for the first joint criticisms of Stalin by Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov in private, but the public plenum report ‘fantastically’ blamed Beria for the nation’s troubles (Filtzer, 1993:13-5). No member of the CC, each struggling for power against the others, could rule alone as Stalin had and consequently had to win support for their policies. Whoever emerged as leader would have to rule the Soviet Union by persuasion rather than fear. However, each of them had come to their position in collusion with Stalin and it would be difficult to criticise him without inviting criticism of their own actions. They also worried signalling radical change too quickly could invite more political unrest as had been triggered by Stalin’s death, such as the uprising in East Berlin in June 1953. Laying the blame on Beria solved the problem for the time being (ibid.).

The power struggle continued, with Malenkov, Prime Minister and head of the government, facing off against Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU and head of the party, rising to the top. Malenkov, favouring more conciliatory policy toward the West, was discredited following what was perceived as more confrontational US and NATO policy, allowing Khrushchev to become leader of the Soviet Union by 1954 (Morgan et al, 2000:104). In 1955 the CC CPSU established a committee to investigate Stalin’s crimes, but limited it to investigating his ‘abuses of power’. It distinguished between Stalin’s ‘legitimate’ or ‘necessary’ actions against supporters of other competing Bolsheviks such as Leon Trotsky and Nikolai Bukharin in the 1920’s and 1930’s as opponents of ‘Lenin’s Party’ and Stalin’s illegitimate denunciations of innocent party members, artists and intellectuals who could now be released from gulags and rehabilitated into society. Again fearing the report would trigger unrest and questions regarding the involvement of CC members, Malenkov, Molotov and others opposed it. However, a strengthened Khrushchev argued it would be better to discuss the matter now at a time of their choosing. The goal would be to place blame on Stalin and Beria to support the need for the coming policy changes. The report formed much of the basis for Khrushchev’s February 1956 ‘Secret Speech’ (Filtzer, 1993:14-6). An analysis of its contents is necessary to understand why it caused such a stir in the communist world.

The Secret Speech
Khrushchev announced the topic and set the tone of his Secret Speech (1956) with reference to the ‘founding fathers’ of the Soviet Union. He quotes Karl Marx:‘Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual…Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my merits and which annoyed me…Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute...’(ibid.:para 2).

He moved on to Vladimir Lenin, stating ‘Lenin at the same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the individual’ and continuing (ibid.:para 5):‘During Lenin's life the central committee of the party was a real expression of collective leadership of the party and of the Nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers. He tried to convince; he patiently explained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently observed that the norms of party life were realized, that the party statute was enforced, that the party congresses and the plenary sessions of the central committee took place at the proper intervals (ibid.:para 7).

Khrushchev made clear that the founders were firmly against the Cult of Personality; were believers in collective leadership of the party and state; discussed views rather than imposing them, and; allowed the party apparatus to function as it was organised to. Stalin had not been for these things.

Khrushchev opened direct criticism of Stalin by quoting Lenin:‘Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, that lies capriciously, and abuses his power...Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man, who above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness, and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper…’(ibid.:paras 8-9).

Khrushchev used the words of Lenin himself to begin criticism of Stalin and there is a suggestion that Khrushchev could fulfill Lenin’s wish that Stalin be replaced as head of the party by a more worthy man.

He went on to describe in detail Stalin’s transgressions as ‘grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party’ (ibid.:para 11), that ‘many prominent party leaders and rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism...’ (ibid.:para 12) in a system that ‘rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven’ which ‘actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this or that issue’ and where ‘confessions were acquired through physical pressures against the accused...’ (ibid.:para 13). He carefully explained why current CC leaders could do nothing: ‘The majority of the Political Bureau members did not, at that time, know all of the circumstances in these matters, and could not therefore intervene...’(ibid.:para 55).

He built toward his conclusion, announcing ‘Comrades, we must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological, theoretical and practical work’ (ibid.:para 76). He then laid out what de-Stalinsation would entail: ‘First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another…’ (ibid.:para 78). Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the party's central committee during the last years…characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, characterized by the observation of the norms of party life described in the statutes of our party, and,finally, characterized by the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism’ (ibid.:para 81).‘Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet Socialist democracy expressed in the constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight willfulness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary Socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected…’ (ibid.:para 82). He drew the speech and the 20th Party Conference to a close to resounding applause throughout the hall.

The Secret Speech made clear the Soviet view that the Cult of Personality was inimical to Marxism-Leninism and was to be eradicated; that collective leadership of the state by a functioning party apparatus was to be restored, and; that abuse of power was to end and rule of law was to be restored.

International Communism and the Problems of de-Stalinsation
A look around the communist world in Europe and Asia as it existed in 1956 reveals that it was actually home to many ‘little Stalins’ who had built their own Cults of Personality, who did not want collective leadership or a functioning party apparatus, and who were happy to continue dictatorial rule. Poland’s Boleslaw Bierut, China’s Mao Zedong and North Korea’s Kim Il Sung were men who had very much consolidated power and ruled their countries as Stalin had had ruled the Soviet Union. Criticism of Stalin meant criticism of them by implication. The people they ruled now had legitimate grounds--straight from Moscow--to grumble and criticise their own leaders. De-Stalinisation caused real problems in the relationship between Moscow and its international communist brethren.

De-Stalinisation and the Polish October
In Poland, events following the Secret Speech seemed to align in a way guaranteed to lead to turmoil. Only a week after the 20th Party Conference, Poland’s ‘little Stalin’--Boleslaw Bierut--died mysteriously in Moscow. With the goal of winning popular support and to head off any unrest following Bierut’s death as had followed Stalin’s, the Polish government distributed Khrushchev’s speech more widely than any other socialist government to show readiness to break with Stalin and for national reform. Between late March and early April 1956, over 10,000 Polish socialists had participated in meetings discussing the Secret Speech (Machcewicz, 2006: 144). These new ideas contributed to a violent uprising, beginning in the city of Poznan, and eventually led the government to invite the popular Vladislaw Gomulka, a socialist formerly imprisoned for resisting Stalin and viewed as a reformer, to become Prime Minister. He immediately began to pursue a more balanced, independent relationship with Moscow, including advocating removal of all Soviet troops from Poland. This alarmed Khrushchev and the CC who in October 1956 ordered troops poised at the Polish border to intervene. Khrushchev and most of the CC flew unannounced to Poland. In an all-night conference at the Belweder Palace in Warsaw, Gomulka was finally able to convince a furious Khrushchev that Poland was not leaving the socialist orbit and was only pursuing a looser relationship with Moscow, averting a full-scale Soviet invasion (ibid.: 149-51).

Gomulka’s Notes on the Belweder Conference
Vladislaw Gomulka’s (1956) shorthand notes reveal the great Soviet concern about the more independent Polish course. The Poles had not informed or discussed with Moscow these party and policy changes, had then ignored Moscow’s request for a conference, and left the Kremlin concerned about American media reports of a split between Moscow and Warsaw (ibid.:para 2). The Soviets made clear that ‘From Poland they need nothing’, but they were ready to invest 2.2 million roubles into a Polish iron ore facility and pointed out that Soviet officers had turned the Polish military into a ‘high calibre force’ (ibid.:paras 3-5). The Soviets urged war should be avoided and unity of socialist camp maintained (ibid.:paras 6-8) and a ‘wedge’ should not be forced between them (ibid.:para 9). They feared the Poles did not understand the danger of the situation—though it is unclear if the ‘danger’ they meant was of a Soviet invasion or that posed to the Polish government by the workers revolts (ibid.). The Soviets were very concerned with anti-Soviet sentiment in the Polish press and comparing it to criticisms in Yugoslavia, a socialist state which had left the Soviet orbit. They were also concerned with the effects if Poland were to leave the Warsaw Pact. They also were disgruntled with the continued personnel changes in the Polish communist party—a reference to Gomulka himself (ibid.:paras 9-15).

From Gomulka’s notes it is clear that the Polish events of 1956, set in motion by de-Stalinisation and the death of Bierut, caused a rift between Warsaw and Moscow which brought them to the brink of war to repair. Moscow acquiesced to Warsaw’s will for a looser relationship. Over the coming weeks, those hoping for change in Hungary as a result of de-Stalinisation would not fare as well as those in Poland.

De-Stalinsation and the Sino-Soviet Split
The effect of de-Stalinisation following the Secret Speech was equally if not more pronounced in Sino-Soviet relations. In 1959, the Soviet Foreign Ministry instructed Mikhael Zimyanin to author a report on the Moscow-Beijing relationship to assist efforts to alleviate ‘a growing rift between Moscow and Beijing—a rift that had not yet flared up in public’ (Kramer, 1995:170). Among the report’s conclusions was that the official commencement of de-Stalinisation following the 20th Party Conference had a detrimental effect upon Sino-Soviet relations (ibid.:171).

According to the report, in months following the conference ‘the CPC CC, while not speaking about this directly, took a position different from ours when evaluating the activity of J. V. Stalin’ (Zimyanin, 1959:para 4), namely one that was critical of Soviet policy toward China as a whole. The difference was exhibited during the ‘hundred flowers’ campaign in the activity of those: ‘Who denounced the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing to uphold principles of equality and mutuality, and they alleged that Soviet assistance was self-interested and of inferior quality. They also asserted that the Soviet Union had not provided compensation for equipment taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that the Soviet Union was extracting money from China in return for weapons supplied to Korea, which were already paid for with the blood of Chinese volunteers. In addition, they lodged a number of territorial demands against the USSR’… It is also worth noting that the Chinese friends, despite crushing the rightist elements, did not offer any open condemnation of statements expressed by them about so-called “territorial claims on the USSR”’(ibid.:para 5).

Mao Zedong’s View of De-Stalinsation
Mao Zedong makes it even clearer that de-Stalinisation contributed to the Sino-Soviet split and therefore problems for international communism as a whole. In a 1962 meeting with Albanian officials, he offered: 'At the beginning we did not foresee the effects that would flow from the spirit of the 20th Congress. Later the 21st and the 22nd Congresses were held. From them we saw that N. Khrushchev was not calm; he once again showed that he is very worried about Stalin. That is why he once again attacked Stalin at the 22nd Congress until he achieved his goal of removing Stalin’s body from the mausoleum and burning it. But we know well that N. Khrushchev is not so much afraid of dead people; he is afraid of the living, he is afraid of those that support Stalin’ (Zedong, 1962:para 14).

Mao most clearly stated his opposition to Moscow’s de-Stalinisation--lumping it together with fighting against the Japanese and Americans--in a 1969 conversation with North Korea’s Choe Yong-Geon: ‘During the years of resistance against Japan, the Korean comrades fought against the enemy together with us for a long time. During the war against the Americans, we also fought side by side with the Korean comrades…In opposing Khrushchev's revisionism, we stood together on the same side!....We have been old friends. We both opposed de-Stalinization, and we reached a consensus on this issue a long time ago’ (Zedong, 1969).

It is clear from the views of both the Kremlin and Mao Zedong himself that de-Stalinisation following the 20th Party Congress contributed greatly to the Sino-Soviet split and to problems for international communism as a whole which would only worsen in following years.

De-Stalinisation and Kim Il Sung’s Cult of Personality
The opening of de-Stalinisation following the 20th Party Congress led to a break between the USSR and North Korea in fall 1956. Khrushchev’s speech against the Cult of Personality was of direct concern to Kim, who had very much adopted Stalin’s leadership style since coming to power. Lankov (1999:46) states ‘The North Korean political and social system had been modelled on the Stalinist system, and the personality cult of Kim Il Sung—the cult of "the little leader"—had been patterned after the cult of "the big leader" Stalin; any diminution of Stalin's prestige spelled danger for Kim's own authority. Kim had good reason to fear that his rivals would employ the "little leader, big leader" analogy to accuse him of establishing his own personality cult.’ Kim had already taken steps to repress the Soviet faction of the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) as early as 1955 (ibid.). However, at the 30 August 1956 plenum of KWP CC, only 6 months after the CPSU’s 20th Party Congress, the leaders of the so-called Yanan and Soviet factions attempted to move against Kim, denouncing him in speeches as ‘an adherent of outdated Stalinist methods and personally responsible for numerous “distortions of the socialist legality’’ and a headlong rush toward heavy industrialization’, much in the line of the general criticisms of Stalinists following the Secret Speech. In the end, Kim was able to see off the challengers, promptly expelling them from the party and arresting them, besides the few able to escape to China (Lankov, 2002:90). Following these events, Kim moved further from Moscow and closer to Beijing, consolidating his power and maintaining his Cult of Personality, which continues unabated today.

Ambassdor Ivanov’s Notes from a Discussion with Kim Il Sung
The day after the turbulent KWP CC plenum, Kim met with Soviet Ambassador Ivanov and described the events to him: ‘At the Plenum…[Minister of Trade] Yun Gong-heum arose. In his speech he brought accusations that the Workers’ Party had rejected the decisions of the Twentieth Congress and does not follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism; he described matters such that the very serious consequences of the cult of personality are being retained inside the KWP and had repudiated the general line of the party’ (Ivanov(a), 1956:para 5).

Kim was able to see off their challenge with other members of the CC who had conspired with Yun had been expelled from the KWP and some had fled to the Chinese border (ibid.:paras 6-9). It is clear that Kim considered de-Stalinisation stemming from the 20th Party Congress as the main driver of this attempted putsch.

Ambassador Ivanov’s Notes from a Discussion with PRC Ambassador Qiao
A few days later Ambassador Ivanov met with the Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK, Xiaoguang Qiao who confirmed that the KWP plenum refugees were indeed in China. Qing relayed that, according to his information, Yun’s speech had: ‘Contained malicious and libellous attacks on the leadership of the KWP. He accused the leadership of the KWP of poorly putting into practice the decree of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU about the personality cult. As a result the leadership of the KWP had supposedly committed serious mistakes, conveying in the absence of democracy within the party incorrect distribution of cadres, and displaying incompetence in handling the difficult welfare situation of the Korean people’ (Ivanov(b), 1956:para 7).

Oddly, despite the clear references to de-Stalinisation and the 20th Party Congress, both ambassadors somehow agreed later in the meeting, seeking to dodge blame, that the Korean events ‘were not stimulated by any outside factors, Soviet or Chinese, but were a domestic process taking place within the KWP’ (ibid.:para 12). However, it is clear from these documents and events that de-Stalinisation stimulated the August 1956 KWP CC uprising against Kim and created the rift between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Conclusion
The official onset of de-Stalinisation following Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’ to the 20th Party Congress on 25 February 1956 set in motion events throughout the world that caused great turmoil within international communism. These events were not fatal; the Soviet Union, China and its socialist partner states remained, as a bloc, a world force for at least another 35 years. Despite their differences, their ships still sailed in generally the same direction when it came to opposing the West and capitalism. Nonetheless, the 1956 revolt and party leadership changes in Poland were clearly results of de-Stalinisation; in China, Mao Zedong’s opposition to de-Stalinisation contributed to the Sino-Soviet split, and; in North Korea, Kim Il Sung viewed de-Stalinisation as a personal threat which had led to an attempt to unseat him. Though not fatal, de-Stalinisation clearly created cracks and fissures within the foundations of international communism.




BIBLIOGRAPHY

Filtzer, D. (1993) The Khrushchev Era: De-Stalinisation and the Limits of Reform in the USSR, 1953-1964. London: Macmillan.

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