Bush's Freedom Agenda: Claiming Victory Without Victory

November, 2013.

The claim put forward by some (Raz, 2011; Daily Beast, 2011) that U.S. President George W. Bush’s ‘Freedom Agenda’ contributed to the ‘democratic wave’ that engulfed the Middle East and North Africa in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is one that is prima facie hard to prove. A deeper examination of this tall claim shows there is, in fact, little basis to support it at all. In this essay I describe what the Freedom Agenda is, who is putting forward this claim and why it should be viewed with scepticism.

President Bush followed a policy course that ignored or contradicted the tenets of his own Freedom Agenda as much as it promoted it, making any claim that it had the designed or desired effect questionable. Additionally, it is also questionable that there has been a democratic wave resulting from the Arab Spring judging by the results thus far. It is far too early to begin to make assertions about the causes or outcomes of the Arab Spring at all, let alone that U.S. policy contributed to it. The contributing factors and causes of the Arab Spring will be debated for many years into the future, but the Freedom Agenda should not seriously be considered a major factor among them.

The Freedom Agenda
According to President G.W. Bush’s White House, the Freedom Agenda promotes freedom and democracy in the world as alternatives to ‘repression and radicalism’ (White House Press Office, 2007). It asserts that besides the moral imperative to promote freedom, international democracy provides increased security for America and its allies at home. As evidence of President Bush’s support for the agenda, the White House exhibited a long list of political activists and dissidents from oppressive states Bush met with between 2003 and 2007; touts the creation of a $1 million U.S. government legal fund to support the defence of captive dissidents; a presidential ‘Freedom Defender’ award for activists or NGOs who strongly commit to ‘defending liberty and courage in the face of adversity’; and another ‘Diplomacy for Freedom’ award for the U.S. ambassador who does most to promote the Freedom Agenda (ibid.). It mentions the doubling of funding for ‘Democracy, Governance and Human Rights’ and for the National Endowment for Democracy. It includes the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the struggle against anti-democratic forces, as well as diplomatic efforts to support movement toward freedom and democracy in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (ibid.).

Bush’s 2007 Prague Speech (White House, 2007) is the President at his rhetorical best when speaking about his Freedom Agenda. Before an audience including the national leaders of several former Soviet satellite states and political dissidents from many different nations, Bush spoke about the courage of Eastern Europe facing the Nazis and enduring the ‘long darkness’ of the Soviet Union. He calls their democratisation a ‘triumph of freedom in the battle of ideas’. He claims the post-9/11 struggles of America and its allies against Islamic extremism in the War on Terror are an equal struggle in the battle of ideas and that freedom and democracy are not only a moral imperative, but also the greatest weapon in this struggle. He goes on to hold that America is pressing for democratic reform in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, among others. Bush acknowledges that democratic change may lead to violence, but that it is necessary and preferable to pursuing stability and asserts that fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq are caused by extremists attacking democratic reform and freedom. He puts forward America’s wars in the Middle East as proof that the Freedom Agenda is eliciting a response from these extremist opponents who fear freedom and democracy.

Perhaps the greatest proponent and Bush-era official who has publicly cited the Freedom Agenda the most as a factor in the Arab uprisings is Elliot Abrams, a Deputy National Security Advisor to G.W. Bush. As early as February 2011, with the Arab Spring only in its third month, Abrams was making media rounds promoting the Freedom Agenda as a factor in the revolts and called for the Obama administration to push for freedom and democracy in the region (Raz, 2011). Abrams criticises President Obama as a state-centred Realist for rejecting the Freedom Agenda by continuing to focus on and attempting to negotiate with Middle Eastern dictators in preference to supporting a dialogue with their peoples striving for freedom and cited ‘slow and unenthusiastic’ Obama administration policy in support of protestors in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria as examples (Abrams, 2011). Abrams and his allies believe that President Obama should have supported the uprisings by seeing them as the will of the people and engaging with them, even if that means regime change, as opposed to solely diplomatically engaging with their embattled dictators (LaFranchi, 2011).

As Muammar Qaddafi’s regime was falling in Libya in October 2011 under the pressure of a NATO air campaign, President Bush’s National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice held that the Bush administration, “pursued the Freedom Agenda not only because it was right but also because it was necessary. There is both a moral case and a practical one for the proposition that no man, woman or child should live in tyranny . . . In the long run, it is authoritarianism that is unstable and unrealistic.” Rice predicted a positive ending to the revolts and cites the Freedom Agenda as a contributing factor to the uprisings (Daily Beast, 2011).

In summary, the Freedom Agenda developed by President G.W. Bush and his national security team holds that pursuing international democracy, reform and freedom are a moral and security imperative for the United States and its allies in a battle of ideas against oppression and extremism and should be pursued in preference to a policy of maintaining stability by engaging with dictators and heads of state, though accepting that this course may lead to increased tensions and violence. U.S. diplomacy, accompanied by military force where necessary, is the tool to be used to pursue the agenda. From the outset of the Arab Spring, the policy’s architects have asserted that the Freedom Agenda was a factor in triggering the uprisings.

Contradicting the Agenda
The most significant evidence to undermine the claim that Bush’s Freedom Agenda contributed to the Arab Spring uprisings is that it was not adhered to as claimed. Though the Freedom Agenda can be seen as Bush’s legacy and signal foreign policy agenda (Miniter, 2007), Bush and his national security team created policy that contradicted the Freedom Agenda as much as followed it. It does not follow that the agenda was a cause of the Arab Spring if it was not followed in practice.

The administration holds out discussions on democratic reform and increasing freedoms with the leaders of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, among others, as proof of pursuing the agenda (White House Press Office, 2007). Pervez Musharraf seized power in Pakistan in a 1999 military coup and subsequently banned his opponents from participating in elections, initially appointed all members of National Assembly, and threatened politicians with criminal investigations if they were critical (Bennett Jones, 2002: 274). Despite continuing moves to consolidate his power and to amend the constitution, this undemocratic behaviour was met only with assurances that ‘private messages’ were being sent to Musharraf by the administration (Carothers, 2003: 85). Pakistan was given $600 million in U.S. aid by the Bush administration in 2002 (ibid.). Musharraf’s decision to support President Bush’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq garnered a further $3 billion from the United States in 2003 (Bennet Jones, 2002: 3), with many more millions to follow until he stepped down in 2008. By way of comparison, according to a 2007 White House ‘Fact Sheet’ on the Freedom Agenda (White House Press Office, 2007), in 2008 President Bush, at the height of his Freedom Agenda legacy-building, budgeted $1.5 billion for all Democracy, Governance and Human Rights projects and $80 million for the Endowment for Democracy. If money translates into support, the administration’s support for Pervez Musharraf was almost twice as strong as its touted commitment to democracy and freedom.

Saudi Arabia provides an even clearer example of the Bush administration contradicting its Freedom Agenda. Unger’s House of Bush, House of Saud (2007) documents the long, close relationship between the Bush’s and the Saudi royal family. Despite these strong ties and influence, Bush has little to exhibit as far as real freedom and democratic reform is concerned. Much as with Pakistan, the Bush administration exerted little pressure other than to privately discuss democratic change with the al-Sauds (Carothers, 2003: 87). Initially following the 9/11 attacks and terror attacks in Saudi Arabia itself in 2004 and 2005, it was argued by advisors inside and outside the Kingdom that democratic reform may be needed to quell unrest within the Kingdom (Fattah, 2007). This liberalisation fit in well the Bush’s agenda. However, only very small changes occurred: laws oppressive to women were eased a bit; half the seats in local councils were opened up for democratic elections; and restrictions on public protest were relaxed (ibid.). By 2007, the moment of reform had passed. Petitions for establishing constitutional monarchy continue to be rejected. Though royal family members often mention reform in speeches, little is actually being done (ibid.). Restrictions have in fact tightened again since the Arab Spring, especially in areas such as media and free speech (AFP, 2011). What democratic reforms have been made in the Kingdom during Bush’s era and since have been small, cosmetic and, in some cases, been fully reversed (Fattah, 2007). In fact, Saudi Arabia lands on Freedom House’s Worst of the Worst list as among the world’s most oppressive societies in every year of President Bush’s term and since, frequently receiving the lowest rankings possible in ‘Freedom’, ‘Civil Liberties’, and ‘Political Rights’ (Freedom House, 2001-2013 inclusive).

Bush has a bit more to show for Egypt, but not much. In 2002 the administration decided against increasing the massive military aid Egypt receives from the United States because of Hosni Mubarak’s persecution of Egyptian activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Carothers, 2003: 92). Nonetheless, Mubarak still received nearly $2 billion in U.S. military aid that year, though the Bush administration did reduce annual military aid to Egypt by several hundred million dollars every year until he left office (Sowa, 2013). Egypt is yet another state that, if, as with Pakistan, money translates into support, the Bush administration supported nearly twice as much as it supported freedom and democracy. According to Pressman (2009: 162), the Egyptian regime, as in Saudi Arabia, just ‘tinkered at the margins’. The 2005 presidential election in Egypt was a democratic farce, featuring widespread vote-tampering, state media remaining a Mubarak propaganda tool, and the arrest of his main opponent, Ayman Nour (ibid.). When the Muslim Brotherhood did much better than expected in parliamentary elections, the regime responded with arrests and crackdowns on Islamist and secular parties and vote-tampering in later rounds (ibid.). Though the Bush administration did take some small actions against Mubarak’s anti-democratic excesses, in the round the United States remained his largest foreign donor and supporter.

Besides saying one thing and doing another in Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the reputation of American democracy promotion in the region as a whole suffered during the Bush administration. While America ignored the oppressive and anti-democratic policies of allied dictators and monarchs such as Musharraf, the al-Saud’s and Mubarak, it pushed democracy in states it attacked and invaded. Though Bush claimed to be for democracy in Afghanistan following the toppling of the Taliban, the U.S. campaign depended upon tribal warlords and the Northern Alliance, reinforcing Afghan tribalism to further military goals and sent the message that the U.S. would support warlords over democracy promotion (Hassan and Hammond, 2011: 537). The democratic Karzai government it built after the fall of the Taliban has little authority outside of Kabul and the diversion of resources to the Iraq effort further weakened its power and legitimacy (Carothers, 2003: 88).

Bridoux (2011: 558) points out that in Iraq, the Bush administration did not begin to focus on democracy promotion until it became apparent that the main justification for the war, Saddam’s alleged WMD, did not exist and this is exhibited by the fact that U.S. civilian and military pre-war planning and the initial interim administration in Iraq and the U.S. military command were focussed solely on immediate security and humanitarian needs, not long-term ‘nation-building’ or democracy promotion. Democracy promotion became a reserve justification when the actual security justification fell through. It also calls into question Bush’s assertion of the ‘moral imperative’ (White House Press Office, 2007) to pursue democracy when it is used for politically expedient purposes. Bush’s claim (White House Press Office, 2007) that Taliban and insurgent attacks on coalition troops in Afghanistan and Iraq are attacks on freedom and democracy brought on by the enemy’s fear of them is also questionable. After all, the U.S. and its allies showed up in their neighbourhood and began to impose it upon them, not the other way around.

The U.S. seemed, to many, to be targeting its enemies in the Middle East with the ‘threat’ of democracy, but not its friends. The different treatment shown to friends and foes in the Middle East and North Africa generated the criticism that U.S. freedom and democracy promotion was really a tool for punishing or destabilising opponents rather than being truly concerned with granting them to local populations (Pressman, 2009: 160). Bush administration policy, in the words of Carothers (2003: 94), “wrapp[ed] security goals in the language of democracy promotion and then confus[ed] democracy promotion with the search for particular political outcomes that enhance those security goals.” The Bush administration supported the 2006 elections in the Palestinian Territories as an early show of support for democracy promotion, yet also was clear what they wanted the result to be. However, Hamas won a landslide victory, leaving Bush to attempt to put a positive spin on it (Kessler, 2006). Elections in Lebanon since the 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’ led to more seats for Hezbollah in the national assembly (Dakroub, 2005). Democratic elections in Egypt following the Arab Spring allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to initially gain control of Egypt. The same protestors who toppled the dictator Mubarak in 2011 toppled the democratically-elected Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Democracy promotion and elections have not always achieved U.S. goals, created lasting stability nor made the U.S. safer as the Freedom Agenda claimed it would. It has, at times, had arguably the opposite effect.

In summary, the Bush administration pursued a policy course that was just as contradictory to its own Freedom Agenda as it was supportive of it. The relationships with some of the very states—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—that it cites itself (White House, 2007; White House Press Office, 2007) as proof of following the agenda also offer proof it did not. The unequal application of the Freedom Agenda between friends and foes also called the commitment into question and damaged the reputation of U.S. democracy promotion. A policy that was not truly followed cannot be cited as successful in achieving its goals or if it did so, it did so incidentally. Where the U.S. and its allies have established democratic governments—Afghanistan and Iraq—they also did much to weaken them and were only able to do so following military action. These governments did not come to be through indigenous agitation for freedom and democracy brought on by the Freedom Agenda. In the case of Iraq especially, the Bush administration turned to democracy promotion as a major goal only after its initial justification for the war turned out not to exist. The bases offered for promoting the Freedom Agenda—moral imperative, long-term stability, and increased security for the U.S.—have also been shown to be questionable as, when it was followed at all, it has arguably not dependably provided those things or not more so than the alternative policies it criticised and was supposed to offer improvements over.

Too Early to Predict Anything, Let Alone a ‘Democratic Wave’
It is too early to predict or draw any serious conclusions as to the causes, effects and consequences of the Arab Spring. Arguably, it is still going on. Battles in Syria are still raging. The revolution in Egypt continues with the deposition of Mohammed Morsi by the military following demonstrations as large as those against Mubarak (Maqbool, 2013). Protests may flare up again in any number of countries in the region. Any real academic analysis of the Arab Spring cannot take place until all of the facts are known or until it appears to reach some sort of conclusion. Anyone who attempts to do so prematurely risks getting it wrong and being overcome by events, as those who have been asserting since 2011 that the Freedom Agenda contributed to the Arab Spring have been. It is hard to know what next month will bring in the region, let alone claim the events have been a triumph for any policy or any party involved.

It is also too early to say that there has been a ‘democratic wave’ at all in the Arab Spring. Freedom House has called Tunisia the ‘Arab Spring’s pivotal democratic example’ (Walker and Tucker, 2011) and is arguably where the revolt began and where there have been signs of real democratic reform. However, in neighbouring Libya, it took NATO military intervention to topple Muammar Qaddafi. Some armed militias still, two years on, refuse to give up territory. Fighting still grips all of Syria where the regime and rebels are locked into an effective stalemate as foreign Jihadists join in and America and its allies wrangle with Russia, Iran and China over intervention there. Despite protests and minor concessions, there has been no real democratic change in places such as Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. Egyptian protestors overthrew the dictator Mubarak in 2011, but then also overthrew his democratically-elected successor Morsi in 2013. The transition there begins anew with Morsi in the court dock along with Mubarak. In some Arab and North African states, there has been no change at all.

Though many protestors and activists clearly have and will continue to call for increased freedom and democracy and many who have never been politically involved before have taken to the streets to take up the cause, there has not yet been a ‘democratic wave’ if one judges that by the state-by-state results of the Arab Spring thus far. The Middle East and North Africa region is still overwhelmingly not free and democratic (Freedom House, 2013). This being the case, it is hard to argue that the Freedom Agenda contributed to a ‘democratic wave’ resulting from the Arab Spring if there really hasn’t been such a wave as yet. Nonetheless, as above, it is still far too early days to judge what caused or will become of the Arab Spring.

Conclusion
The Bush Freedom Agenda has not contributed to a ‘democratic wave’ resulting from the Arab Spring. The Bush administration deviated from the agenda as much as it adhered to it. Some of the same evidence it puts forward to show its support for the agenda shows equally it did not support it. The administration’s goals in applying the agenda were arguably not met in practice. It is questionable if there has been a ‘democratic wave’ at all thus far following the Arab Spring, though it is still too early to form real conclusions yet as to the causes and consequences of the uprisings. The Arab Spring continues today in many places. However it should be clear that a policy agenda that was only partially or haphazardly followed and has arguably not brought about the goals it sought to achieve in an event that is not yet over cannot be credited with achieving anything.


BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Egypt Coup Was Necessary to Preserve Democracy

This article originally appeared on PolicyMic on 8 July 2013.

Mohamed Morsi has been removed as the elected President of Egypt following a military coup d'etat widely supported by the Egyptian public. Violent clashes continue between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, as Egyptians — and not America or the West — are control their own fate. Independence and stability must come before democracy can take root.

The military takeover has given rise to cries from some among the media intelligentsia. For example, The Independent's Robert Fisk blames President Barack Obama for not denouncing the coup, and claims it shows Egypt is not on the path to democracy (as claimed). Whether called a coup or not, history shows that the road to democracy begins with such violent events, and the military may be the only stable national institution to turn to in times of crisis.

The history of every major democracy in the world starts with a violent war or revolution or even several of them. From Britain's Magna Carta to the American and French revolutions, it has become a rule of history that those asked to give up absolute power won't give it up without a fight. It is wrong to think things are any different in the 21st century. This is a lesson of America and Britain's misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan —democracy doesn't grow on trees.

Though the West claims to believe in democracy above all else, the truth is that democracy doesn't work overnight or on its own. The proper groundwork must be laid. This includes, among others, the trust and confidence of the people, rule of law, freedom of speech and press, a stable economic system and a system safeguarding the physical security and order of the citizenry.

Egypt under President Morsi had none of these things. His refusal to negotiate, failure to commit to improving the economy and assertion that his policy was supreme law brought the people into the streets, eventually leading the military to depose him. In Morsi's defense, he was only in office for a year. But we should expect the people of Egypt, hungry for change after Mubarak, to keep coming back to the streets until someone gets it right. It will be violent and bloody.

The French Revolution would have sent Morsi and his Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to the guillotine — fortunately the Egyptian military has only arrested them, giving several days advanced warning. It may take years of struggles before Egypt stabilizes. America struggled with violent uprisings throughout the first years of its independence. The struggle for sustainable democracy will take longer. Britain's oft-violent struggle for democracy took place over centuries and the UK still has no written constitution. Just because we have 24-hour television and Twitter coverage of the events today doesn't mean that things are any different.

It is a mistake to categorically reject this Egyptian coup as an assertion of military rule and a rejection of democracy. It is a misunderstanding of how revolutions often work. There are many recent historical precedents, particularly in Southwest Asia, which show that the military can act as a national safeguard, providing stability until civilian institutions can get it right in the eyes of the people.

Throughout the modern history of Turkey, the military has acted as a national safeguard. In 1960, 1971 and again in 1980, the Turkish military deposed the civil government. In each case the country had been gripped with economic, social and political turmoil and in each case the military quickly returned the country to civilian rule. Ethnic and political strife has made Pakistan hard for anyone to rule, leading it to be called a "compromise state." The Pakistani military has been the only institution with the strength to rule, supporting coups in 1958, 1977 and 1999, though it has not always been as quick to return to civil rule. The military has also played a vital role in the stability of Thailand, stepping in when the government was deadlocked, most recently in 2006 over the allegedly corrupt rule of millionaire Thaksin Shinawatra.

One only need look at the conduct of the Egyptian military itself during the initial stages of the uprising against the Mubarak government. While the military was brutally suppressing protests in other regional states such as Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen, Egyptian troops generally remained calm observers. Though there were complaints following the fall of Mubarak, rule was quickly returned to civil hands. Now, again following the deposition of President Morsi, the country is nominally in the hands of a civilian interim government, headed by Supreme Court judge Adly Mansour and international diplomat Mohamed ElBaradei.

To denounce this coup as an attack on democracy in Egypt paints a false picture, as does depicting it as a return to military dictatorship. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Egyptians support the action should not be brushed aside. States in turmoil often turn to stable institutions such as the military to safeguard the national interest in times of crisis. The Egyptian military is already taking steps to turn the country back over to civil, democratic rule. Those who are sending up cries of foul had better return to their history books and look at events on the ground. Independence and stability first—then comes democracy.

The Navy SEAL's Bin Laden Raid Bestseller and US National Security

This article originally appeared in The Guardian on 14 September 2012.

Everyone holds an opinion, even those who are obligated by law or profession to remain neutral. It is human nature. It can foreseeably become difficult to sit by and listen as everyone around you who is free to gives their opinion, some misguided and others even profiting from it, while professional obligations require you to stay silent. Such is the burden, however, of being a professional in a position of importance to national security.

This conflict is not new, but the pressures and incentives for breaking the rules are growing. With TV pundit spots, big publishing advances, and organizations such as WikiLeaks providing opportunity and motivation, are western democracies even capable of keeping secrets anymore?

Matt Bissonnette, calling himself "Mark Owen", was a member of Navy Seal Team 6 and took part in the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. He has written a book that extensively details the raid and has unleashed a controversy in doing so. Paired with this debate are the attacks of Opsec, a rightwing political action committee started by other former Navy Seals who are attacking President Obama and his administration for releasing generally similar information on the Bin Laden raid to the press.

Both Bissonnette and Opsec have been rebuked by senior military officials at the Pentagon such as special operations commander Admiral William McRaven and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. The US government has not ruled out taking legal action.

When one swears an oath to serve the country as a member of the military or any national security-related agency, a different set of rules applies immediately. A measure of your personal freedom, freedom of speech, and political participation rights are curtailed. Inductees know this beforehand, are well-briefed upon induction, and periodically afterward. They sign non-disclosure statements to the effect, and laws prevent the disclosure of identified security information. You also know that some, much, or all of what you do will remain anonymous and unaccredited. Matt Bissonnette knew this when he wrote his autobiography.

All this is necessary for many reasons, foremost among them being to preserve the dedication to the nation such jobs require. You may be putting your life, or the lives of many others, at risk for the country, and be privy to sensitive information; you should be doing so because you feel a sense of duty, commitment, and patriotism. To allow public servants working in national security roles or members of the military to profit financially or to have an outsize influence on partisan political debate because of what they've done or what they know is detrimental to national security. Allowing this behavior would mean having soldiers and civil servants motivated by the opportunities of fame and fortune, leaving aside the selfless commitment and dedication to duty and country such roles do and ought to require.

This larger point is one many seem to miss. It is arguable that both the information in Bissonette's book and the information disclosed by the White House following the Bin Laden raid were not classified or going to get anyone killed. The difference is that the president has the obligation and duty to inform the public about such an important event, regardless of one's opinion of him personally: he is the commander-in-chief. But soldiers or civil servants profiting personally, or even for charity as Bissonnette claims he is doing, by giving their own personal accounts of the facts calls into question his selfless dedication to country and duty first. Allowing this to continue would attract the wrong sort of people with false motivations into military or government service.

This has become a problem of late for the United States. Television news channels and bookstore shelves are filled with pundits and commentators who are former CIA agents or soldiers. The gap in time between events and the release of bestsellers about them is getting ever smaller. Many of America's intelligence agencies have lax policies toward private-sector recruiters pulling their employees and some are even allowed to "moonlight" and offer their services privately while still employees of the agency. These policies have become a problem with intelligence agencies losing many of their top people to private firms after years of training and service. Disgruntled civil servants and soldiers have released secured government information in the media.

These events call into question the motivations, independence, and commitment to duty of the individuals who take part in them. Serving in the military or government should be about a life dedicated to protecting and serving the country, not serving one's self by securing a nice paycheck and nice retirement.

Many would push back against this by saying that those who occupy positions in the White House or Congress profit greatly from their service, or even the service of others, so why shouldn't people like Matt Bissonnette, who actually put their own lives on the line, be allowed to profit from it? Yet, presidents and congressmen and women should not profit personally from their jobs either – and their perceived abuse and misuse of their offices to do so is a reason why the majority of Americans have lost respect for these institutions and officials. Overwhelming majorities of Americans still hold a great deal of respect and esteem for the military and intelligence services because they are seen as representing selfless commitment to the country above self. They're not seen as corrupt, as other militaries and intelligence agencies around the world are. Allowing such behavior to continue may put this view in jeopardy.

Such events as the Abbottabad raid don't need to remain a secret forever, especially since the fact that the event occurred is public knowledge. It is important to our democracy, history, and society that the public learns what, how, and why events such as this happen. But there should be a space of several years in between.

Matt Bissonnette should be allowed to tell his story, but not while it is still such a present event. There are many possible consequences. Detailing such a raid may amount to providing "open-source" intelligence for our international opponents. Disclosing details of equipment, tactics, techniques, or procedures that may seem harmless and mundane on their own can be pieced together with other information. For Bissonnette to wait a couple years to tell his story would not have reduced its national historical significance – though it may have reduced his big-name television interviews or book sales.

There is a difference between Bissonnette's book and the disclosure of a crime or "whistleblowing". The reporting or disclosure of a felony or fraud, waste or abuse is quite different from writing a bestselling autobiographical book. Whistleblowers rarely profit from making what they know public: frequently, they lose their jobs, and often endure lawsuits or years of abuse afterwards. Their motivation is usually to correct a wrong. Rewards are offered to encourage them to come forward. Bissonnette was not reporting or disclosing some great crime and he stands to enjoy a great deal of positive attention and profit from his book, even if he donates most of the proceeds to a Navy Seal charity (as he has already attempted to do twice unsuccessfully).

It's hard to be too angry with Matt Bissonnette: he is a genuine hero who put his life on the line more than once and is deserving of the profit and attention he's received. It's pretty hard to keep a secret, especially when that secret is that you had a part in killing Osama bin Laden, one of those rare events which most Americans will recall where they were when it happened. Members of Seal Team 6, already famous before the raid, will probably never have to buy their own beers again.

But what Bissonnette and his defenders miss, and what the majority of his Seal colleagues understand, along with most other members of the military and intelligence community, is that the wider consequences to the national security of the country he risked his life many times to defend outweigh the right to fortune and fame for his bravery, even if it is well-deserved.

In order for the sterling reputation of the United States military and intelligence services to be preserved, and the trust placed in them by average Americans maintained, national security professionals cannot be allowed to profit from their acts, even if they go above and beyond duty or what is normally expected. Seeking fortune and fame, even if merited, cannot be allowed to cloud judgment when it comes to defending America. When it concerns our national security, we need those defending it to continue to put duty and country first. This extraordinary selflessness and dedication is what has kept us safe and strong throughout our history.

Matt Bissonnette has an extraordinary story to tell; he should be allowed to tell it. But he should have waited for it to pass from current affairs and into history first. That a small group of brave and dedicated men finally delivered justice for their country is a story not likely to be forgotten by Americans anytime soon.