Book Review: Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

May, 2014

Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.

In The Clash of Civilisations, Samuel Huntington offers a theory that seems accurate on the surface, but underneath leaves much to be desired. This review will outline some basic criticisms of Huntington’s theory.

Huntington’s central argument is that the world is a collection of competing and conflicting ‘civilisations’, a state of affairs which continues today and can be useful in predicting world trends in future. He poses that there are Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American and (possibly) African (45-48) civilisations. He defines civilisation (42-45) as ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species’ (43). The trouble, which Huntington himself avoids by referencing earlier works to establish them, is trying in any detailed way to define the tenets or boundaries of individual civilisations, which would be vital if it is to offer any value in understanding their motivations or predicting their future actions. He identifies self-identification (43) with a civilisation as a factor and religion as another (42, 47). However, the former is chosen by an individual and the latter can be misleading as to where that individual falls on any issue based upon how strong their faith is. He acknowledges that civilisations change, ‘evolve’, ‘rise and fall’, ‘merge and divide’, and even ‘disappear’ (44). Though it may help explain the world as it is, the evolving nature of civilisations saps his theory of much of its predictive value.

Huntington’s most convincing point in defining civilisations is that civilisations are cultural groupings which outlive or transcend the politics, governments and states which govern them (43-44). Though the British Empire has fallen, there is still British civilisation. The Ottoman Empire is gone, but the civilisation still exists in Turkey. China and Germany have seen multiple forms of state over the last 200 years, but still maintain distinct civilisations very similar in character to those which predate these changes. Civilisations are cultural communities which outlive political, economic and scientific upheavals.

A weakness in the theory, which Huntington alludes to, is that civilisations ‘do not, as such, maintain order, establish justice, collect taxes, fight wars, negotiate treaties, or do any of the other things which governments do’ (44). Civilisations simply exist and their underlying cultures, as discussed above, evolve, merge, divide or disappear. No one controls them. Mao Zedong attempted to alter China’s ‘civilisation’ during the Cultural Revolution, as did Western powers in their colonies, and Hitler and Stalin in their own attempts. Arguably, none of them succeeded in permanently altering cultures or civilisations, despite killing millions. Huntington devotes Chapter 3 (56-78) to the concept of ‘universal civilisation’, dominated by Western ideas which Modernists attempt to portray as the ideal civilisation the world should adopt in order to progress. Huntington actually agrees with his critics, such as Edward Said, that the attempt to impose or promote this Modernist, Western-dominated version of a universal civilisation is a major reason for the ‘clash’ between cultures which reject its imposition upon them. Huntington believes ‘Western universalism is dangerous to the world because it could lead to a major inter-civilizational war’ (311).

However, the specific activities which can be seen as evidence of the’ imposition’ of this idea are conducted by certain identifiable states, not Western civilisation, because no one controls Western civilisation or any civilisation--accepting Huntington’s definition of them. Civilisations exist independent of any control. States within the West, and within other civilisations, often go in opposite directions. The United States and others may claim or be seen as speaking for the West as what Huntington calls a ‘Core State’ (35), but the US cannot control the will of Western civilisation. The division between Western powers over the War on Terror and the Iraq War in particular are examples. GW Bush’s attempt to rally the West with a ‘with-us-or-against-us’ line failed miserably among allies.

When Huntington points out armed conflicts as ‘clashes of civilisations’ they are also still clashes between states. As Huntington himself points out above, civilisations ‘do not, as such, ...fight wars’ (44). ‘Civilisations’ themselves cannot conduct any of the actions which Huntington must cite as evidence of ‘clash’. States can act. Civilisations cannot. Even non-state actors such as terrorist groups and international institutions have only a weak claim to represent civilisation. Different civilisations or cultures may present cultural differences which can lead to conflict, but civilisations themselves have no vehicle for armed conflict, or peace, or governing. Civilisations do not clash; states or non-state actors clash and claim their fight is for the good of their version of ‘civilisation’. Civilisation cannot be controlled by any state, but state behaviour can be controlled.

Civilizations do not clash; states or non-state actors clash and claim their fight is for the good of their version of 'civilization'.

If Huntington is right and civilisations are indeed the vehicle through which clashes are increasingly occurring and civilisations are entities which no state or other institution directly controls, then the ‘clash of civilisations’ would seem to be inevitable and uncontrollable. The only path to peace is for civilisations to retreat into themselves and recognise the spheres of other civilisations. This is exactly the situation Huntington describes and what he prescribes for the West (312). In a section called ‘The Renewal of the West?’ (301-308) he deplores the erosion of moral values, specifically calls for a rejection of multiculturalism, revival of Christianity and a renewed commitment to ‘liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property’ (305), concepts claimed as central to Western civilisation. This can be seen as a return to basic principles akin to fundamentalism. As discussed in a section called ‘The Islamic Resurgence’ (109-119), Huntington holds that Islamic Fundamentalism is the Islamic world doing just that, in line with his advice for the West. His answer to Islamic Fundamentalism is Western Fundamentalism. Arguably, this sort of ‘fight-fire-with-fire’ response could just as well serve to widen any divide and perhaps hasten the very clash Huntington wants to avoid.

Huntington outlines early on (31-35) why other prevailing international relations theories leave room for his argument and makes his weakest argument against Realism (33). He believes Realism explains much about how states exercise power in pursuit of interests, but it doesn’t account for differences in how different states determine what their interests are or determine priorities among interests. He believes civilizational contrasts accounts for these differences. This may or may not be true, but he simply asserts that ‘states increasingly define their interests in civilizational terms’ (34) without much more explanation. He then goes on to argue that international institutions have eroded state authority, that there is a trend toward secessionism and devolution of power to local governments and that globalisation and the internet have reduced states’ ability to control ‘the flows of ideas, technology, goods, and people.’ (35)

Huntington gives international institutions more authority than they actually have. The UN does carry much weight in the world today, but despite this, states continue to do what they consider in their interest and the UN, lacking autonomous enforcement mechanisms, must rely on states to enforce its collective will. Much like civilisations, international institutions only work when states play along. Institutions such as NATO and the World Bank, though international, fall under the sway of their dominant member states, such as the United States. Most devolved governments are still dependent upon national governments for revenue, law and order and security. These institutions don’t have a will of their own; rather they represent the will of their dominant state member(s). Many secessionist movements are in fact proxy conflicts between states. States such as China and North Korea show states are still able to control the flow of goods and ideas within their borders if they decide it is in their interest to do so. Most states have decided open minds and borders are in their interest and haven’t simply lost the ability to control their borders as Huntington argues. State behaviour can be changed and controlled, whereas the character of civilisations cannot be. A ‘clash of civilisations’ is not inevitable.

A major criticism of Huntington’s theory is that it is all about ‘clash’ and says very little about the positive aspects of what happens when civilisations meet. Huntington only explores the negative security dimensions of his theory. The success of Huntington’s Clash may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with those in government who take up the theory seeing only clashes . If the West were to follow Huntington’s prescription, it would retreat into its core, focus on intra-civilisational interaction and pursue isolationist foreign policy. The world has benefitted greatly from the open exchange of people, ideas, culture and technology between civilisations. For example, Huntington goes on in sections entitled ‘Islam and the West’ (207-217) and ‘Incidence: Islam’s Bloody Borders’ (254-258) to discuss at length conflicts between Islam and other civilisations it comes into contact with, but wholly ignores the historically positive benefits of trade, scientific exchange and political cross-pollination between them, for example, between the Ottoman Empire and Western or Orthodox states on the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Huntington’s theory would be much more acceptable if it balanced the ‘clash of civilisations’ with ‘cooperation of civilisations’. There is an argument to be made that even if civilisations clash at times, the benefits of cooperation and interaction outweigh the drawbacks.

In conclusion, Huntington’s theory seems at the surface to explain the perceived intractable differences between the West and the Islamic world and between other civilisations, but, in depth, the picture drawn is an inaccurate representation of how these ‘clashes’ occur. Huntington’s prescriptions for the ‘clash’ are also questionable. He additionally fails to explore any positive aspects of the meeting of civilisations which could bring balance to his theory. However, the theory is not wholly without merit and deserves more in depth articulation and exploration.



NOTES
1. Booth, K. (1997) “Huntington’s Homespun Grandeur.” The Political Quarterly 68 (4): pp. 425–428.

'The Middle East is not so particular': Fred Halliday and his Critique of Orientalism

May, 2014

Introduction
The study of the Middle East, the Arab world and Islam owe much to a group of historians who call themselves ‘Orientalists’ and no study of these subjects would be complete without considering the critique of these historians by another group of Postmodernist thinkers who follow the writings of Edward Said, especially his 1978 book Orientalism. Together their views have formed two academic camps within the study of the Islam, the Middle East and its peoples. In his 2003 book Islam & the Myth of Confrontation, Fred Halliday criticises both camps for their lack of useful analysis and building a ‘particularist’ view of the Middle East in which the region is treated as peculiar from the rest of the world, with conditions there only being explicable through a unique regional prism or by a particular Western program of domination of the region. This essay will explore Halliday’s critique of Orientalism in support of his view that ‘the Middle East is not so particular’ as the Orientalists or Postmodernists would have it.


‘If [Bernard] Lewis is arguing that for Muslims history is about the production and maintenance of a legitimizing set of historical myths, then Muslims are hardly unique. The same could surely be said of the Irish, the Serbs, the Hindus, the Boers, the Americans, the Japanese, and indeed almost anyone. What appears as a specific, defining characteristic turns out to be something shared with many others. The Middle East is not so particular’ (Halliday, 2003:205) [emphasis added].

Here Fred Halliday criticizes an assertion by Bernard Lewis, intellectual and personal arch-enemy of Edward Said, in the New York Review of Books which begins ‘For Muslims, history is important’ (Lewis, 1991). Halliday cites Lewis’ views in the article as an example of Edward Said’s concept of ‘Orientalism’ and explains what Lewis actually means is ‘history in the sense of an accurate assessment of the past does not actually matter for them [Muslims]’ (Halliday, 2003:205). Halliday argues that the ‘production and maintenance of a legitimizing set of historical myths’ (ibid.) is not unique or particular to the Middle East as Lewis would have it and cites other non-Muslim peoples who maintain their own self-regarding historical myths.

Abizadeh (2004:292), writing on nationalism particularly in the context of Western liberal democracies, holds that ‘the national memory must be a wilfully selective memory. This mythical element in its shared memories is what enables the nation’s common history to provide it with a motivating power, so much so that the academic study of history poses a threat to the capacity of the nation to hold together’. The common memory of this manufactured history unites people and ties them together and the unsentimental, objective study of history threatens that narrative. Negative reaction to histories, such as many Americans’ reaction to Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States (1980), which seek to counter such sanitised, nationalised histories by telling the bad along with the good are labelled as revisionist (Greenberg, 2013) by those who do not wish to hear them. Russians, Chinese and Britons for example—all non-Middle Eastern societies—each have just as strong national or origin myths, often historically inaccurate, about their nations and ethnic origins as people of the Middle East. ‘American exceptionalism’ provides a particularly strong example of a non-Middle Eastern society with a selective attitude toward its own history. As Tyrrell (1991:1031) puts it, ‘nowhere has a nation-centred historical tradition been more resilient than in the United States. There, modern historicism, with its emphasis on the uniqueness of all national traditions, was grafted onto an existing tradition of exceptionalism. The pre-historicist idea of the United States as a special case "outside" the normal patterns and laws of history runs deep in American experience.’ Halliday is correct that a selective, oft-inaccurate view of origin and history is not particular to the Middle East as asserted by Bernard Lewis and other Orientalists; it is common throughout humanity.

It is these and similar assertions of the particularity or uniqueness of the Middle East and its people and culture that Halliday’s criticisms are aimed at. He believes ‘In approaching the analysis of the Middle East the element of particularism, uniqueness or impenetrability has been greatly overrated’ and argues that ‘particularism’ by both Orientalists such as Bernard Lewis and Postmodernists such as Edward Said has prevented better academic analysis of Middle Eastern society (Halliday, 2003:215). He holds Orientalists have ‘asserted that the only way to understand the behaviour of Middle Eastern societies is through analysis of “Islam”: that class politics, or revolutions, or even social consciousness do not arise there, or that democracy, in either its literal or socialist sense, is not possible in such countries’ (ibid.:13). Nonetheless, he also points out that Islamists, Arab Nationalists and Arab intellectuals are just as guilty of ‘vaunting the uniqueness and specificity of the “Arabs”, and arguing that forms of oppression found elsewhere—based on class, gender or ethnicity—do not operate in the Arab world’ (ibid.). Al-Azm, among others, calls this approach of extolling the superiority or the contrasting of these specific ‘oriental’, Islamic or Arab values in contrast to Western values, in its most distilled form, ‘Occidentalism’ (Al-Azm, 2011:6). Halliday argues that Postmodernist Saidists are guilty of claiming a ‘special European animosity towards Arabs, let alone towards Palestinians or Muslims, [which] does not bear historical comparison’ (ibid.:210). Though the Islamic world certainly has legitimate grievances against the West, it is not historically accurate to declare, as Said does, the Middle East occupies a special place as a Western target.

Halliday (ibid.:215) explains that there are many issues in the Middle East which can be analysed or explained in either a ‘particularist’ context through concepts such as the prism of the ‘Middle East’, the ‘Arab mind’ or ‘Islam’, but offers that they can also be equally or better analysed or explained using the social sciences in the same way as studying phenomena common and present in other regions and societies elsewhere throughout the world. The issues and problems of the Middle East are also issues and problems in the rest world. They are not particular to the Middle East.

The issue of the structure of Middle Eastern states provides an excellent opportunity to explore Halliday’s criticism of particularism in studying the Middle East. One of the main issues in Middle Eastern society today is that the majority of its constituent states are run by despots who repress political opposition, free expression and political participation, many of which have been or are supported by Western governments, some of which installed these very governments during their rule or as or after the colonial era drew to a close.

The United States, United Kingdom and France, as well as the Soviet Union/Russia and China, have been influential in Middle East politics throughout the Cold War era and after. For example, between 1946 and 2011, the United States provided over $118 billion in aid to the Egyptian government, the majority of which was directed toward military spending, Egypt receiving fully a quarter of all US foreign military aid (Sowa, 2013). The tanks this money bought are on display in Cairo at places like Tahrir Square today. The Soviet Union and then Russia also poured comparable amounts of money into the coffers of Middle Eastern dictators, such as Syria’s al-Assad regime (Hopwood, 1988:72-77), also a continuing relationship. Some Middle Eastern dictators, such as Egypt’s Nasser, were as wily as to receive money from both the US and USSR at times during the Cold War (Goldschmidt, 2008:167). Beyond solely economic or military support, there are also personal relationships between Western and Middle Eastern elites. The special, decades-long business and political relationship between the Bush family and the royal family of Saudi Arabia (Unger, 2007) is an example. That the West ‘props up’ repressive Middle Eastern governments is a valid criticism.

However this state of affairs is not unique to the Middle East. Western states, especially throughout the Cold War era, ‘propped up’ many unsavoury, repressive, non-democratic dictatorships throughout the world. At alternating times, the United States and the Soviet Union provided economic, political and/or military support to oppressive regimes throughout the world. In Southeast Asia, they supported opposing sides: Ngo Dinh Diem or Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam (Immerman, 2011:120-143), Sukarno and then Suharto in Indonesia (Brands, 1989:785-808; Evans, 1989:25-48), and King Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (Kiernan, 1985). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the two superpowers funded competing regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Uganda, among others (Friedman, 2011:247-272; Westad, 1996:21-32). In the Americas, the USSR devoted great attention to the Castro regime in Cuba (Fursenko & Naftali, 1997) while the United States continues to work with friendly dictatorships throughout Latin America (Livingstone, 2014). Moscow devoted its greatest efforts to building and supporting oppressive regimes in Eastern Europe, in places like East Germany (Harrison, 2000:53-74), Hungary and Poland (Kramer, 1998:358-384). No matter which side the people of these particular nations were on, they were abused, oppressed and threatened by their own governments. The Middle East has not been a particular victim in the political power games of Western or European states as Edward Said claimed.

Additionally, if one looks at the grievances that Middle Easterners aired during the recent ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings, it is easy to see that for many their complaints are the same as other peoples throughout the world. As Zubaida (2011:1) explains, ‘the "revolutions" in Tunisia and then Egypt seemed to eschew religion and nationalism in favour of classic political demands of liberty, democracy and economic justice.’ The signs protestors carried and their complaints to media of the corruption and lack of justice and representation in their governments in places like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria were mirrored by those voiced by the ‘Occupy’ movement in Western cities such as New York, Washington, London and Berlin. This solidarity and recognition of common goals between East and West was understood and embraced by the protestors themselves (Shanker & Gabbatt, 2011).

Many Orientalists generally argue, with some variation, that the prevalence of despotic regimes in the Middle East today exists because there is a basic historical and/or social incompatibility or conflict between Islamic society and modern notions of liberal democratic government that has created or aided in creating this state of affairs. For example, William Montgomery Watt (1988:3-8) argues that Muslims see the world and society as ‘unchanging’ and therefore people can live today just as they did in the time of the Prophet and Islam is the ‘final’ religion, living any other way being against God’s will . New, modern concepts such as equality, democracy, and tolerance for different lifestyles do not enter easily into their thinking. Bernard Lewis explains that the history of Islam is different from Christianity or Judaism (and by inference, Buddhism and Confucianism as well), where the central figures of Jesus and Moses were spiritual leaders whose people finally triumphed, but who were never actual heads of a state. Lewis writes that ‘from the days of the Prophet, the Islamic society had a dual character. On the one hand, it was a polity—a chieftaincy that successively became a state and an empire. At the same time, on the other hand, it was a religious community, founded by a Prophet’ (Lewis, 2003:9). He also points out that as the head of a state, Muhammad was also a military leader (ibid.:23). He goes on to explain that Islam conferred the authority on the Prophet and his successors and for Muslims Islam is the only real source of legitimacy, with all forms of secular government incurring ‘reserve, even mistrust’ (ibid.:10). Not all Orientalists see the Islamic world in this way, of course.

Edward Said would argue that these Orientalist views are the result and part and parcel of the process of Orientalism: ‘the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ (Said, 1995:3). Said continues: ‘To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise’ and ‘since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did’ (ibid.: 4).

Nonetheless, oppressive, despotic states restricting civil liberties and avenues of political input from the population they rule are just as common in Africa, Asia and South America and are not particular to the Middle East. North Korea, the Central African Republic, Venezuela or China and Russia can be seen as equally as despotic, repressive and non-representative as any Middle Eastern state. According to the Freedom House report Freedom in the World 2014 (2014), the Middle East and North Africa have the worst civil liberties protections in the world, but there are more people in the world living without freedom outside of the Middle East than in it. While the report shows five of the ten least free countries in the world are Muslim-majority societies, the other half are not. 25% of the world’s states are classified as ‘not free’. The report shows declines in political freedom, stability and civil rights in every region of the world outside of Europe (ibid.).

However, the Postmodernists would reject Freedom House’s criticisms of the Middle East and North Africa as imposing a Western measuring stick onto a non-Western region, with Saidists pointing to Freedom House, a Western-based ‘think tank’, as an example of Foucauldian ‘knowledge as power’ and part of the Western, Orientalist government-corporation-academia nexus which Said discusses at length in Covering Islam (2007:135-161). That the Freedom House report shows declines in freedom throughout the world except Europe could arguably show that the measuring stick is rather Eurocentric.

Orientalists are surely wrong in asserting that the prevalence of despotic regimes is an issue caused by the particular society, history or conditions of the Middle East. Clearly comparable regimes exist in similar circumstances throughout the rest of the world and generally the academics who study these other regions refrain from making sweeping statements about regional incompatibility of freedom, civil rights or democracy there. However, Postmodernist Saidists are also wrong in asserting that Western criticisms of Middle Eastern despotism are particularly aimed against them when, especially in the case of organisations such as Freedom House, they are applied equally or universally to the rest of the world. Postmodernists harm their own case by criticising Western support for oppressive Middle Eastern regimes but then also rejecting Western criticisms and sources which support that argument. Ibn Warraq points out this dilemma between having to utterly reject Orientalist knowledge or selectively accept it as evidence when necessary as a problem in Said’s Orientalism (Warraq, 2007:22-3), where Said alternately rejects Orientalist assertions, but accepts some of them as authentic at other times. As Halliday (2003:211) puts it, ‘Said implies that because ideas are produced in a context of domination, or directly in the service of domination, they are therefore invalid.’ Anything the West asserts about the Middle East is invalid because of its dominant position over it. In that light, anything regarding the Middle East that emanates from the West is unacceptable to Postmodernists.

Postmodernists, if they are true to Said’s thought, cannot even accept Eastern-generated knowledge. For Edward Said, there is really no such thing as the objective ‘truth’, there are simply ‘representations’ which cannot be separated from the interests of the ‘representer’ (Said, 1995:272). By that logic, if Western criticisms of the East are representations of Western interest, then Eastern rejections of these criticisms are also representations of Eastern interest. This creates a circular logic in which nothing anyone says can be considered ‘true’. There is only discourse without truth or talk without substance.

This is another of Fred Halliday’s criticisms. He professes to believe in the ‘now supposedly outmoded and pre-modernist view that there is such a thing as reality, and that it is the task of concepts and theories to analyse it, and that their efficacy and values are above all to be judged in terms of how much they explain it’ (Halliday, 2003:196). Said’s Orientalism and its Postmodernist adherents criticise the theories and discourse of those it calls Orientalists as agents of a cultural process of Western--especially British, French and American--domination of the East (Said, 1995:3). They seek to counteract the Orientalist narrative by questioning the truth and motives behind its representations. Yet Postmodernists do not offer an alternative version of the facts. They pose questions, but give no answers. Edward Said seems to deny that the ‘Orient’ exists at all other than as a concept the West has created (Warraq, 2007:22). This begs the question: If the Middle East is not that way, then how is it?

Said has no answer. In fact, he admits ‘no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam really are’ (Said, 1995:331). Yet, though admittedly lacking the ‘interest’ or ‘capacity’ to say what the Orient and Islam are, he has no trouble saying they are not as the Orientalists would have them. According to Fred Halliday, the value of concepts and theories should be judged on how well they explain the region (Halliday, 2003:196). Edward Said and his Postmodernist adherents fail woefully in this category because they do not—and in fact refuse—to explain the Middle East or Islam at all. One would be ill served in turning to Edward Said or Postmodernists when trying to understand the Middle East.

Halliday also points out that the Middle East is not alone in struggling to deal with or overcome a Western-dominated imperial or colonial past. Regions as diverse as Ireland, Scotland and the Basque region to the former colonial states of Indochina to virtually the whole of Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:71-89) and South America have a history of imperialist and colonial domination by Western states. This treatment was not solely reserved for the Arab world. Though European Christians launched multiple ‘crusader’ armies into the Middle East supposedly to liberate the holy land over a period of centuries (Davies, 1997:358), it also launched similar centuries of ‘crusades’ afterwards into South America and Africa to convert the native populations to Christianity and exploit their labour and resources, wiping out entire nations of indigenous peoples and sending countless thousands back as slaves. Between 1490 and 1890, the native population of North and South America declined 96% as a result of contact with the West (Taylor, 2002:40). Ward Churchill compares Christopher Columbus--formerly considered one of the great European explorers--to Hitler’s executioner Heinrich Himmler due to the deaths of millions of indigenous South and North Americans following his ‘voyages of discovery’ (Churchill, 1993:12).

This does not place the West in a better light, but it does show that the exercise of the West’s expansionist, colonial, imperial drive was not particular to the Middle East alone. Native North and South Americans and Africans by this measure have a stronger claim to being the victims of a particular European animus. Their attempts at resistance were quickly overcome and those peoples who survived the onslaught were unable to regain control of their own lands or cultures until decolonisation in the 20th century. The major indigenous peoples of the Americas and Africa were either enslaved or driven to virtual extinction within a few centuries. Tens of thousands of Africans were transplanted into the Americas, losing all connection with their ancestral land and culture. Their stories are utterly lost to history.

In fact, because of the strength of Middle Eastern kingdoms during the period of the Crusades they were able to resist and finally force out the Christian European invaders, eventually themselves returning the favour by invading and occupying European Christian lands as far north as Tours, France (Lewis, 2003: 47). Peoples of the Middle East were able to preserve their own kingdoms, religion and culture and were able to invade, colonise and dominate Western lands for centuries before being turned back themselves. The Middle East still retains its broad geographic, ethnic, religious and political identity today. Other peoples who were the target of Western expansion are gone. There is no one to speak for them. The Sioux, Comanche and Zulu do not have their own Edward Said.

Both Saidian Postmodernists who attempt to explain the prevalence of despotic government and lack of freedom in politics and society in the Middle East as occurring as the result of particular Orientalist imperial crimes and the Orientalists they criticise for creating the false idea that modern, free, democratic governments are incompatible with Islamic society are leaving out a large part of the story of the rest of the world.

Conclusion
In conclusion, Fred Halliday is correct that the Middle East is not so particular. The Orientalist assertion that Middle Easterners are more susceptible to nationalised, religious or ethnic foundation myths as opposed to objective historical truth is clearly false--the rest of the world suffers from this problem as well. The fact most Middle Eastern states are despotic dictatorships in which its people are not represented is not a particular feature of the Middle East either. The Orientalist assertion that this occurs because there is a basic incompatibility between Islamic society and modern democracy ignores the fact that the West has built and supported these regimes in support of their own interests. They are not indigenous. However, the Middle East is not the only region where Western states have and do support oppressive regimes. The Islamic World was not singled out.

The Postmodernist view of Orientalism criticises and rejects these Western views of the Middle East as part of this domination of the East by the West, but refuses to offer any alternative explanation of the ‘truth’ because, to Postmodernist Saidists, there is no such thing, only subjective representations of it. Halliday believes there is a ‘truth’ and concepts and theories are judged on how well they explain that truth. Said’s Orientalism offers a one-sided critique of the West, but no analysis of the Middle East. It does not explain it at all. The peoples of the Middle East are not the particular victims of Western, imperialist, colonial crimes or hatred and historically fared better in many ways than other peoples who were targets of European expansion. Fred Halliday is correct in his critique that ‘both [Orientalists and Postmodernists] fail us in what I have defined as the central intellectual task, namely the analysis of the societies in question’ (Halliday, 2003:201) [original emphasis]. The Middle East is not so particular.




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Why NATO Intervened in Libya but not Syria

Authored 31 October, 2013.

Despite calls to intervene militarily in Syria, NATO has remained hesitant to do so despite surface parallels with conditions in 2011 Libya which precipitated a NATO intervention that toppled the regime of Muammar Qaddafi. In Syria today, as in 2011 Libya, much of the population is in armed revolt as part of the Arab Spring and being met by a bloody regime campaign to put down the rebellion. Despite similarities, NATO has held back despite the conflict entering its third year and the August 21st nerve agent attack on civilians in Damascus, attributed by the U.S., UK and France to the Assad government (Reuters, 2013), an event identified as a ‘red line’ that would trigger military action (Reuters, 2012).

There are many factors contributing to NATO’s decision against intervening in Syria. Despite using the same Liberal values-based rhetoric and human rights justifications, the situation in Syria has elicited a different response. Domestic politics in individual NATO states runs against it. The Syrian military is better trained and equipped and more committed to Assad than the Libyan military to Qaddafi. The influx into Syria of foreign Islamic extremist fighters on the rebel side has generated second thoughts for NATO and other actors considering the removal of Assad (Martini et al, 2012: 5-7).

The largest contributing factor—and the one I will focus on—is that the resistance to a NATO campaign in Syria would be more significant than with Libya due to the greater strength of international, regional and internal allies of the Assad regime. In the following sections I will compare and contrast the Libyan and Syrian regimes in turn in reference to their relationships with international, regional and internal allies and then show why their respective effects on NATO’s ‘Realist’ calculation has led to the choice not to act in Syria.

Libya under Qaddafi

In an Arab League conference tirade, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi called himself, ‘an international leader, the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of Muslims’ before going on to insult fellow Arab leaders (Otterman and Mackey, quoting Qaddafi, 2009). From the beginning of his rule following a military coup in 1969, Qaddafi rubbed the world the wrong way. As an Arab Nationalist, he never fit into either camp during the Cold War, but also never managed to use this seeming neutrality to Libya’s advantage in attempting to take up Nasser’s mantle (St. John, 1987: 21). The lack of ability to make and maintain powerful friends to shore up his power or to properly balance allies against foes would eventually lead to his downfall.

Early in Qaddafi’s rule, the U.S. hoped to cultivate him as an anti-communist ally and wanted to maintain strategic airbases in Libya, but hopes were dashed when U.S. troops were expelled in 1970 (Zoubir, 2006: 48-9). The nationalisation of Libyan oil in 1971 and his anti-colonial agitation soured relations with Britain (St. John, 1987: 115). The Pan Am 103 bombing and other terrorist acts in the 1980s and the continued use of Libya as a terror haven into the 1990s (Church, 1992) made him a major NATO enemy in the Middle East and led to harsh UN and U.S. sanctions with severe economic consequences.

His relations were also rocky with the USSR as he ‘grouped the United States and the Soviet Union together as imperialist countries intent on expanding spheres of influence in the Middle East’ and, believing Islam was central to Arab identity, condemned the atheism of the USSR. He was not as skilled as Nasser or Assad at walking the line between Moscow and Washington and neither considered him a reliable partner (St. John, 1987: 29).

Libya was also isolated in the Middle East, with regional leaders, especially monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, viewing negatively Qaddafi’s Arab Nationalist views and misuse of Islam to meet political and policy goals (ibid.: 149). Varying relations with regional powers over OPEC and oil issues (ibid.: 107-24) and support for Iran during its war with Iraq (Associated Press, 1985) further deepened its regional problems.

In order to survive an antagonistic position toward the rest of the world, Qaddafi had to build strength at home. He purposely weakened the Libyan military to prevent any challenge while arming loyal militias and the security services (Hendawi, 2011). Though weakening the military prevented challenges, it also eventually left him virtually defenceless against more capable NATO forces. According to Mokhefi (2011), Qaddafi also consolidated internal control by manipulating the tribal system using a ‘carrot and stick’ policy of granting wealth and government positions to tribes that supported him and legally and violently repressing those that did not.

For the first 30 years of his rule, Qaddafi’s rejection of both camps of the Cold War, support for terrorism, espousal of Arab Nationalism, politicisation of Islam and continuing squabbles with neighbours turned Libya into an isolated state with no Great Power patron or strong regional friends. It was not until years after the fall of the Soviet Union that Qaddafi attempted rapprochement with the West. After years of public and behind-the-scenes diplomacy in which Britain played a large role, a deal surrounding handing over the Lockerbie bombers for trial and paying compensation to the victims’ families led to European states re-establishing relations and UN sanctions against Libya being lifted in 2003. Normalisation and lifting of unilateral U.S. sanctions did not occur until 2004 when, against the backdrop of the Afghan and Iraq wars, Qaddafi further agreed not to seek weapons of mass destruction and to cooperate in the War on Terror (Zoubir, 2006).

Libya was in a weakened state of transition from a pariah state to a full member of the international community when the Arab Spring struck in March 2011. Qaddafi responded to protests with violent crackdowns in which hundreds of Libyans were killed by the security forces, leading his newly-found Western friends to denounce him again. Qaddafi underestimated the national and international response to the violence (Buckley, 2012: 84), which undid years of public and secret diplomacy to rehabilitate his image. The Arab League, usually hesitant to endorse outside interference in Arab affairs, gave approval to military intervention (BBC News, 2011). He was denounced by the UN Security Council, which approved a no-fly zone over Libya. Before the vote and further after implementation began, the Arab League and Russia, China, India, Germany and South Africa expressed consternation with NATO’s interpretation of the UN resolution, (Buckley, 2012: 85). These objections in the UNSC and Arab League were too little, too late to save Qaddafi.

Internally, despite years of patronage, Libyan tribal leaders from the influential Warfalla and Zawiya tribes who controlled militias and the security services condemned Qaddafi for his violent crackdowns on protests in Tripoli and elsewhere (Mokhefi, 2011). With a UN resolution and the Arab League against him and support crumbling at home, they sensed the inevitability of his fall. The Libyan military was kept too weak to save him.

Qaddafi’s forces were quickly overcome by the NATO-led campaign, leading to his death in October 2011. In the end, no one but family and his own tribe stood in support of Muammar Qaddafi. He was not the ‘the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of Muslims.’

Syria under the Assads

Hafez al-Assad seized power in Syria after a 1970 coup—shortly after Qaddafi’s in Libya. As a Ba’athist and military officer, Hafez was largely influenced by the same Arab Nationalist and Nasserist sentiments and even agreed a short-lived 1971 proposal for a federation between Egypt, Libya and Syria (Hopwood, 1988: 55). Hafez al-Assad was a shrewd leader with great ability to maintain strong alliances at home and abroad, a trait passed on to his son, Bashar. Hafez was able to build an equal partnership with the USSR without becoming a satellite (ibid.: 76). The ability to balance alliances and power has kept the Assad regime in power for over forty years and is why it is still holding on despite the Arab Spring and strong international pressure.

The Assad’s are members of the minority Alawite sect of Shi’ia Islam and Hafez was the first Syrian president not from the Sunni majority. Though military officers, fellow Alawites and Ba’athists formed Hafez’s base, in power he legitimised and consolidated his rule by including elements of other ethnic and religious minority communities (including Christian Druze and Kurds) in shaping his government and improved the lot of the middle and lower classes. He co-opted and cooperated with other communist and left-leaning political parties. He pursued policy that consolidated all state power in his own hands, but went further than previous governments by legitimising his rule through inclusion of minorities (Ma’oz, 1986: 28-9).

While forming a strong base at home, Hafez al-Assad also forged international and regional alliances. According to Hopwood (1988: 72-7), Syria refused to become a satellite of the U.S. or USSR after throwing off colonial rule. However, the Soviets would sell arms to Syria with no strings attached, unlike NATO. As the USSR sought parity with the West, it curried favour in Syria before Assad took power by offering large public works projects and siding with Syria in the 1967 war as Syrian pilots were shot down flying Russian aircraft.

The relationship grew closer under Assad, with Moscow agreeing multi-million-dollar arms deals and sending thousands of military advisers. The two countries signed multiple diplomatic and trade agreements and Assad dealt with Moscow as an equal, not a subordinate. Syria fielded Soviet military tanks, missiles and other equipment, which were again replaced by Moscow after the disastrous 1973 war. By 1986, Syria had become Moscow’s largest Third World arms purchaser. Regardless of Hafez’s own opinion, America considered Syria a client of the Soviet Union (ibid.: 76).

In 1980, Syria—Arab, pluralist, Ba’athist-led, with a Sunni-majority—formed a counterintuitive alliance with Iran—a newly-formed Persian Islamic republic with a Shi’ite majority—in their war with Iraq. According to Hirschfeld (1986: 115-21), this was an act of shrewd political Realism by Assad. Despite being counter to its economic interest, Syria shut its border and blocked Iraq’s oil pipeline to the sea, costing Syria millions in oil transit fees. Hafez also turned down $2 billion from Saudi Arabia to reopen it (ibid.: 115). However, giving much-needed assistance to Iran in its early days greatly increased Syria’s influence with Khomeini and its control over Lebanon, where Iran was induced into influencing Shi’ites much more persuasively than Syria could alone. In the early years of the alliance, Syria was the dominant partner. Attacks by Iran-controlled Shi’ite terrorists in 1983-4 led to the withdrawal of Western troops from Lebanon, leaving Syria and Iran squarely in control until 2005. It also increased Syria’s independence and influence in the Middle East as a whole, as it was Syria that set its own course and became a fulcrum point deciding where the balance of regional power would lie. With one decision, Hafez had increased Syria’s influence and made it indispensable in the region (ibid.: 115-121).

This was the situation Bashar al-Assad inherited when his father died in 2000. The Soviet Union had collapsed, but Syria’s alliance carried on with Russia. Moscow, along with Tehran, continues to arm and assist Assad to this day. Nonetheless, there was early hope in 2011 that Bashar would ameliorate relations with the West. With the War on Terror following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Bush administration seemed ready to roll up Middle Eastern dictators. In 2005, America approached Bashar with a ‘Libya-style’ deal similar to that offered in 2004 to Qaddafi: stop interfering in Lebanon, supporting terrorism and supporting the Iraq insurgency and receive normalised relations in return (Beeston and Blanford, 2005). They saw Bashar as vulnerable following a damning UN report blaming members of the Assad family for murdering popular former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Despite the blow to its influence when Syrian troops pulled out of Lebanon and a Western-backed government coming to power there, Bashar al-Assad remained in power in Syria.

Internationally, Russia has stood firmly by Assad. Moscow has defended the regime before the UN and threatened to veto military action. Russia acted as Assad’s proxy in negotiations to avert a U.S. strike following the August 21st nerve agent attacks in Damascus and has offered counter-arguments to NATO assertions supporting intervention. It continues to supply Syria with arms and has even displayed a show of force by dispatching additional warships to its Syrian port at Tartus (Investor’s Business Daily, 2012). Stymying NATO efforts in Syria has reminded many of the bipolar era when Moscow was on par with Washington and has increased Russian influence and power in Syria and elsewhere.

Regionally, Iran also remains committed to Syria in the same manner Syria stood by Iran in 1980 (discussed above). There is evidence the elite Iranian Quds Force is assisting Assad in Syria (Reynolds, 2012). Lebanon-based Hezbollah, dependent upon Syria as its conduit of support from Iran (Martini et al, 2012: 3), is fighting alongside Assad’s forces. Tehran is committed to opposing NATO interests anywhere it can in the Middle East and has done so since its 1979 revolution, most recently by proxy in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO troops or a Western-aligned government in Syria, paired with NATO’s presence elsewhere in the region, would leave Iran surrounded and isolated.

Internally, support from minority factions Hafez al-Assad cobbled together to legitimise his rule—military officers, Ba’athists, Alawites—have remained largely loyal to Bashar. There is fear by many that the tolerance cultivated by the Assad regime would disappear and the country would return to Sunni-dominated rule. There is already evidence of repression of minorities in rebel-held areas of the country (Martini et al, 2012: 5). The Syrian military, despite many defections to the rebels, remains largely loyal to Bashar. Many military officers have benefitted materially from supporting Assad over the years and they stand to lose everything and likely be branded as criminals if he falls. Other minority groups split between supporting the regime or the rebels are not enough of a factor to tip the balance to either side (ibid.: 3-5).

Unlike Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, the military and factions within Syria have not abandoned Assad, nor have allies Russia and Iran. These strong alliances have, thus far, kept Assad in power and their existence has checked NATO from taking military action.

NATO Liberalism and Realism in Libya

When considering military action against Qaddafi in Libya, NATO faced almost no opposition to intervention and was encouraged to act by initial Arab League support for a no-fly zone and Qaddafi’s loss of domestic support. The dearth of opposition and Qaddafi’s utter lack of allies meant that virtually nothing stood in the way of a NATO campaign there. Action in Libya was significantly easier to achieve.

There was no opposition to refute the case for a UN resolution. Russia, China, India, Brazil and Germany abstained from voting and they and other states expressed reservations only after military action had begun, holding they had been duped by NATO as to the meaning and interpretation of the UN resolution, a criticism echoed in the Arab League (Buckley, 2012: 85-7). There was little opposition and little to lose in getting rid of a nuisance dictator murdering his own people, though arguably the feeling they had been tricked increased some states’ opposition to authorising UN action in Syria.

Conducting a Realist calculation, Libya presented no real threat to NATO interests or security since normalising relations in 2004, but some argued toppling Qaddafi would get rid of a troublesome dictator with a dirty past and grant access to high-quality Libyan crude oil, decidedly in NATO interests (Jenkins, 2011). However, NATO states predominantly used Liberal, values-based rhetoric regarding democracy, freedom and human rights to legitimise intervention. Both Realist and Liberal justifications were given to support the case for Libyan action.

NATO Liberalism and Realism in Syria

Syria presents a different case for NATO. The same Liberal arguments used in Libya are being used to justify acting in Syria. For Liberals, supporting democracy, freedom and human rights—values NATO states claim to support—for people facing violence to obtain them is right regardless of the power-political circumstances.

However, according to Coetzee (2012: 312), from a structural Realist perspective, supporting Liberal democracy and freedom during the Arab Spring has already been harmful to security interests—specifically NATO’s—as it has led to gains for militant Islamism in the region. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islamist violence against U.S. targets in Libya, and Islamic militants with ties to al Qaeda operating in Syria are examples. It is the Realist calculation of balancing potential gains against potential losses that has held NATO back.

There are some gains to be made. Ending Assad rule would deprive Russia and Iran of an ally and a source of mutual support, reducing their regional influence. Iran would be isolated with the loss of its last large regional ally. Russia would lose a major trade partner, be booted out of the Middle East and may lose Tartus, its only port on the Mediterranean. These outcomes are in NATO’s interest.

Nonetheless, these gains are not worth the potential hazards. According to Martini et al (2012: 3), NATO and its allies have less at stake and Assad remaining in power does not greatly harm NATO interests. In deciding to intervene, it will face strong opposition and vetoes from Russia and likely China in the UNSC. Taking military action without a UN mandate will undermine the legitimacy of any NATO action. Iran already has fighters on the ground in Syria. Russia continues to arm Assad and has shown military support by dispatching more ‘gunboats’ to Tartus (discussed above). It is unclear how far Russia or Iran may go in defending Assad and their interests. Military action may increase violence in Syria and/or lead, at worst, to a larger, longer regional or international war. NATO does not want that and the gains are not worth risking it.

Assad has promised to confront foreign intervention with full military force. Though it recently signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and agreed to decommission its chemical weapons, Syria still has a sizeable stockpile and Assad has threatened to use them against any outside military intervention. If NATO were to intervene, it would still have to deal with post-war stability and reconstruction efforts and could face an Iraq-style insurgency, not to mention undertaking the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons itself.

Though it is a Machiavellian calculation, all that is at hazard for NATO is that the status quo will be maintained in Syria, though thousands of Syrians will continue to die and become refugees. NATO states may be seen as hypocrites for supporting Liberal ideas like democracy and human rights with military intervention in Libya but not in Syria. Russia, Iran and Assad may receive a boost in power and influence for having seen off the NATO challenge. However, none of these outcomes presents a dire, direct threat to NATO security or interests, while possibly enabling Islamists to increase their influence in a new Syria in the absence of Assad may (Martini et al, 2012: 5-7).


Conclusion

From a Realist perspective, for NATO the possible risks of intervention in Syria outweigh possible rewards. A comparison of the strengths of the allies—or lack thereof—of the regimes in Libya and Syria and what they stand to gain or lose in either case explains why NATO has chosen not to intervene in Syria as it did in Libya. The status quo will be maintained in Syria for now, while the jury is still out on Libya’s future.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Coetzee, E. (2013) ‘Democracy, the Arab Spring and the Future (Great Powers) of International Politics: A Structural Realist Perspective’. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 40:2, pp. 299-318 [online]. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpsa20 [Accessed 23 October 2013]

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Jenkins, Simon (2011) The End of Gaddafi Is Welcome. But It Does Not Justify the Means [online]. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/23/gaddafi-downfall-britain-intervention [Accessed 27 October 2013]

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Egypt Unrest Blame Game: August Edition

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 16 August 2013.

Who is to blame for the unrest in Egypt? If you listen to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, Israel and its Zionist ally America are to blame. Iran has also adopted this line. There are some in the United States and Europe who also believe America is to blame as we have given billions of dollars in aid every year to Egypt under Mubarak and are likely to continue to do so under any new government in order to maintain influence. Others, mostly on the political right, have blamed the violence solely on President Obama. The real answer is that Egyptians are to blame for the violent unrest in Egypt. It is an unfortunate human reality that national systems do not experience major changes at rapid pace through peaceful evolution, but rather through violent revolution. Egypt is in the throes of a violent process in which there are no easy or clear answers.

The moment reports the military’s raid against Muslim Brotherhood protesters had turned violent became public the presses were already hot with the next round of the blame game. Who is pulling the secret strings behind the scenes? America is always the first culprit. Even Americans love to blame America. That the US has given an average of a billion dollars annually to the Egyptian military is cited as evidence that America has out-sized influence on Egypt’s military, especially its popular commander, General Abdel el-Sissi. Supporters of the ‘blame America’ school hold we should have used our influence to prevent this latest outbreak of violence and should withdraw our aid and support. America has been blamed for both supporting and opposing Egypt’s coup at the same time.

But hold the phone. US government policy communications regarding Egypt from the beginning of the Arab Spring up until today are filled with calls for the Egyptian military to use restraint. Every major US officeholder and appointee from President Obama on down has called for a peaceful transition from Mubarak and, now, a peaceful transition to democracy following the military coup. And we’re swinging our only big stick. It has been communicated that if restraint is not shown or violent crackdowns continue, the US may withdraw its $1.3 billion aid package. Essentially, America has done what all of its critics are saying it should have done. Yet, here we are.

The problem is that many critics of America share something in common with those diametrically opposed to them who believe emphatically in American greatness—namely, a false belief that America has much more power to shape and influence events in other states than it actually has. America has called for restraint in Egypt. America has threatened to withdraw its billions of aid dollars. It may not have any effect. Here’s why.

America is not the only country in the world writing checks to other governments in exchange for influence. Taking 2010 as an example, the US contributed 19% of all development aid to Egypt. Germany, France, Japan, Kuwait and other Arab states contributed between 10-15% each. If economic aid is supposed to equal a requisite amount of influence, than each of these other states are in the same boat with America. Why aren’t they being blamed equally for failing to act to stop the violence?

Recently Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have agreed to give around $12 billion in financial aid to Egypt, dwarfing the US package of $1.3 billion in comparison. These states, especially those with monarchies still standing, have no wish to see an Islamist government in Egypt and they’re willing to pay lots of money to prevent it—and they care little about the possibly violent consequences. Yet the blame still falls on America’s shoulders.

The US should also tread carefully as it has had to with Pakistan when it comes to the threat to withdraw aid. Continuing to give aid may look like collusion or acquiescence to the actions of the military and interim government, but withdrawing aid may mean the US no longer has any leverage or audience with the powers that be. It is a double-edged sword. If aid continues, the Egyptian military rulers may still continue to do as they please. Withdraw aid and they may do the same thing.

The US and its aid dollars are not to blame for violence in Egypt, nor are the aid dollars of any other outside state. Money did not compel people into the streets again and money could not prevent this recent violence. The Egyptian people overthrew Mubarak by taking to Tahrir Square. The Egyptian military stood down and allowed it to happen. The Egyptian people voted Mohammed Morsi into office as their new president. The Egyptian people took to the streets again to depose him and the Egyptian military allowed it, again. Though the violence is regrettable, many Egyptians are cheering the crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood and General el-Sissi remains the most popular figure in the country.

Though the violent images and hundreds of casualties among Muslim Brotherhood members are absolutely terrible, no one else was there pulling the strings. It was, once again, the Egyptian people and the Egyptian military that set this chain of events in motion. It is only hubris to believe that the US or any other state has enough influence to have stopped these events or to cause them to happen.

Terrible as they are, they are part of a process of rapid political and social revolution. The Russian, French, American, and British revolutions were bloody as well. The difference is that there was not Twitter, 24-hour news or the internet to send the pictures across the world in real time. As much as the violence is regrettable, Egypt is deciding for itself the form its future will take.

Egypt Coup Was Necessary to Preserve Democracy

This article originally appeared on PolicyMic on 8 July 2013.

Mohamed Morsi has been removed as the elected President of Egypt following a military coup d'etat widely supported by the Egyptian public. Violent clashes continue between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, as Egyptians — and not America or the West — are control their own fate. Independence and stability must come before democracy can take root.

The military takeover has given rise to cries from some among the media intelligentsia. For example, The Independent's Robert Fisk blames President Barack Obama for not denouncing the coup, and claims it shows Egypt is not on the path to democracy (as claimed). Whether called a coup or not, history shows that the road to democracy begins with such violent events, and the military may be the only stable national institution to turn to in times of crisis.

The history of every major democracy in the world starts with a violent war or revolution or even several of them. From Britain's Magna Carta to the American and French revolutions, it has become a rule of history that those asked to give up absolute power won't give it up without a fight. It is wrong to think things are any different in the 21st century. This is a lesson of America and Britain's misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan —democracy doesn't grow on trees.

Though the West claims to believe in democracy above all else, the truth is that democracy doesn't work overnight or on its own. The proper groundwork must be laid. This includes, among others, the trust and confidence of the people, rule of law, freedom of speech and press, a stable economic system and a system safeguarding the physical security and order of the citizenry.

Egypt under President Morsi had none of these things. His refusal to negotiate, failure to commit to improving the economy and assertion that his policy was supreme law brought the people into the streets, eventually leading the military to depose him. In Morsi's defense, he was only in office for a year. But we should expect the people of Egypt, hungry for change after Mubarak, to keep coming back to the streets until someone gets it right. It will be violent and bloody.

The French Revolution would have sent Morsi and his Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to the guillotine — fortunately the Egyptian military has only arrested them, giving several days advanced warning. It may take years of struggles before Egypt stabilizes. America struggled with violent uprisings throughout the first years of its independence. The struggle for sustainable democracy will take longer. Britain's oft-violent struggle for democracy took place over centuries and the UK still has no written constitution. Just because we have 24-hour television and Twitter coverage of the events today doesn't mean that things are any different.

It is a mistake to categorically reject this Egyptian coup as an assertion of military rule and a rejection of democracy. It is a misunderstanding of how revolutions often work. There are many recent historical precedents, particularly in Southwest Asia, which show that the military can act as a national safeguard, providing stability until civilian institutions can get it right in the eyes of the people.

Throughout the modern history of Turkey, the military has acted as a national safeguard. In 1960, 1971 and again in 1980, the Turkish military deposed the civil government. In each case the country had been gripped with economic, social and political turmoil and in each case the military quickly returned the country to civilian rule. Ethnic and political strife has made Pakistan hard for anyone to rule, leading it to be called a "compromise state." The Pakistani military has been the only institution with the strength to rule, supporting coups in 1958, 1977 and 1999, though it has not always been as quick to return to civil rule. The military has also played a vital role in the stability of Thailand, stepping in when the government was deadlocked, most recently in 2006 over the allegedly corrupt rule of millionaire Thaksin Shinawatra.

One only need look at the conduct of the Egyptian military itself during the initial stages of the uprising against the Mubarak government. While the military was brutally suppressing protests in other regional states such as Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen, Egyptian troops generally remained calm observers. Though there were complaints following the fall of Mubarak, rule was quickly returned to civil hands. Now, again following the deposition of President Morsi, the country is nominally in the hands of a civilian interim government, headed by Supreme Court judge Adly Mansour and international diplomat Mohamed ElBaradei.

To denounce this coup as an attack on democracy in Egypt paints a false picture, as does depicting it as a return to military dictatorship. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Egyptians support the action should not be brushed aside. States in turmoil often turn to stable institutions such as the military to safeguard the national interest in times of crisis. The Egyptian military is already taking steps to turn the country back over to civil, democratic rule. Those who are sending up cries of foul had better return to their history books and look at events on the ground. Independence and stability first—then comes democracy.

A Quick Primer on Chechnya

This article originally appeared on PolicyMic on 19 April 2013.

Chechnya is a region in the large isthmus between the Black and Caspian Seas north of the Georgia and Armenia in the North Caucuses Mountains. It can be said to stand on the gate between east and west, with Russia to the north and Iran and Turkey only several hundred miles south. Most ethnic Chechens, by far the largest ethnic group, adhere to Sunni Islam. Ethnic Russians, mostly of transplanted Cossack origin, are predominantly Orthodox Christians. The region is also home to other smaller populations of eastern Caucuses peoples. Chechnya was part of the Ottoman Empire and then the Persian Empire until the early 19th century when it was ceded to Russia following their victory in the Russo-Persian War in 1813.

Chechnya has been host to conflict for centuries because of its strategic position between Russia and far eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire and the Middle or Near East. It sits atop the natural barrier of the Caucuses Mountains between two seas. Chechnya has been the site of many instances of brutal ethnic and religious oppression by the Ottomans, Persians, Russian Empire, the USSR, and the Russian Republic, as well as by regional separatist or independence leaders, in an effort to control or keep hold of the region. As a result, inhabitants are quite divided between political, ethnic, and religious allegiances. Roughly speaking, Chechnya has a history similar to regions such as Bosnia and Kosovo, which are subject to much the same tensions.

Chechnya has been fighting on-and-off for independence from Russia for over 200 years. It was briefly independent following the Russian Revolution in 1921. Following the Nazi invasion of Russia in 1940, Chechnya again declared independence until Stalin re-established control in 1944, followed by a brutal purge and mass Siberian deportations. The years following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 were particularly violent as many Chechen groups fought again for independence from the Russian Republic, though the region has been under firm Russian control since 1999. However, this control has led some Chechen separatist groups to turn to terrorism.

Since 1999, Chechnya-linked groups have been involved in at least a dozen terror attacks, the majority of which have taken place in or been aimed at Russia. A Chechen group seized a grade school in Beslan, Russia in 2004, resulting in the deaths of 330 hostages, most of them children. In 2008, Chechen rebels took 130 hostages in a movie theatre in Moscow, all of whom died along with their captors following a botched rescue attempt by Russian security forces. In 2010, two female suicide bombers killed 39 in an attack at a train station near the Moscow headquarters of the FSB, Russia’s main intelligence agency.

There is evidence that some Chechen separatist groups may have links to Al-Qaeda. Many ethnic Chechen fighters fought alongside the mujahedeen, including Osama Bin Laden, in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Chechens also fought alongside the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan against the U.S. and Northern Alliance fighters in 2001. The Taliban government was one of the few in the world to recognize Chechen independence. Russia has claimed it holds direct evidence of links between Chechen rebels and Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Many question this link and cite it as a ploy to ensure the west sees Chechen rebels as terrorists and the west elicits no resistance in return from Russia when it pursues its own terrorists elsewhere.

The U.S. government lists the Islamic Independent Peacekeeping Brigade as a source for funding for Islamist Chechan rebels and has ties to Al-Qaeda. America also lists the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment and Riyadus-Salikhin Brigade of Chechen Martyrs as terror groups.