Book Review: Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

May, 2014

Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.

In The Clash of Civilisations, Samuel Huntington offers a theory that seems accurate on the surface, but underneath leaves much to be desired. This review will outline some basic criticisms of Huntington’s theory.

Huntington’s central argument is that the world is a collection of competing and conflicting ‘civilisations’, a state of affairs which continues today and can be useful in predicting world trends in future. He poses that there are Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American and (possibly) African (45-48) civilisations. He defines civilisation (42-45) as ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species’ (43). The trouble, which Huntington himself avoids by referencing earlier works to establish them, is trying in any detailed way to define the tenets or boundaries of individual civilisations, which would be vital if it is to offer any value in understanding their motivations or predicting their future actions. He identifies self-identification (43) with a civilisation as a factor and religion as another (42, 47). However, the former is chosen by an individual and the latter can be misleading as to where that individual falls on any issue based upon how strong their faith is. He acknowledges that civilisations change, ‘evolve’, ‘rise and fall’, ‘merge and divide’, and even ‘disappear’ (44). Though it may help explain the world as it is, the evolving nature of civilisations saps his theory of much of its predictive value.

Huntington’s most convincing point in defining civilisations is that civilisations are cultural groupings which outlive or transcend the politics, governments and states which govern them (43-44). Though the British Empire has fallen, there is still British civilisation. The Ottoman Empire is gone, but the civilisation still exists in Turkey. China and Germany have seen multiple forms of state over the last 200 years, but still maintain distinct civilisations very similar in character to those which predate these changes. Civilisations are cultural communities which outlive political, economic and scientific upheavals.

A weakness in the theory, which Huntington alludes to, is that civilisations ‘do not, as such, maintain order, establish justice, collect taxes, fight wars, negotiate treaties, or do any of the other things which governments do’ (44). Civilisations simply exist and their underlying cultures, as discussed above, evolve, merge, divide or disappear. No one controls them. Mao Zedong attempted to alter China’s ‘civilisation’ during the Cultural Revolution, as did Western powers in their colonies, and Hitler and Stalin in their own attempts. Arguably, none of them succeeded in permanently altering cultures or civilisations, despite killing millions. Huntington devotes Chapter 3 (56-78) to the concept of ‘universal civilisation’, dominated by Western ideas which Modernists attempt to portray as the ideal civilisation the world should adopt in order to progress. Huntington actually agrees with his critics, such as Edward Said, that the attempt to impose or promote this Modernist, Western-dominated version of a universal civilisation is a major reason for the ‘clash’ between cultures which reject its imposition upon them. Huntington believes ‘Western universalism is dangerous to the world because it could lead to a major inter-civilizational war’ (311).

However, the specific activities which can be seen as evidence of the’ imposition’ of this idea are conducted by certain identifiable states, not Western civilisation, because no one controls Western civilisation or any civilisation--accepting Huntington’s definition of them. Civilisations exist independent of any control. States within the West, and within other civilisations, often go in opposite directions. The United States and others may claim or be seen as speaking for the West as what Huntington calls a ‘Core State’ (35), but the US cannot control the will of Western civilisation. The division between Western powers over the War on Terror and the Iraq War in particular are examples. GW Bush’s attempt to rally the West with a ‘with-us-or-against-us’ line failed miserably among allies.

When Huntington points out armed conflicts as ‘clashes of civilisations’ they are also still clashes between states. As Huntington himself points out above, civilisations ‘do not, as such, ...fight wars’ (44). ‘Civilisations’ themselves cannot conduct any of the actions which Huntington must cite as evidence of ‘clash’. States can act. Civilisations cannot. Even non-state actors such as terrorist groups and international institutions have only a weak claim to represent civilisation. Different civilisations or cultures may present cultural differences which can lead to conflict, but civilisations themselves have no vehicle for armed conflict, or peace, or governing. Civilisations do not clash; states or non-state actors clash and claim their fight is for the good of their version of ‘civilisation’. Civilisation cannot be controlled by any state, but state behaviour can be controlled.

Civilizations do not clash; states or non-state actors clash and claim their fight is for the good of their version of 'civilization'.

If Huntington is right and civilisations are indeed the vehicle through which clashes are increasingly occurring and civilisations are entities which no state or other institution directly controls, then the ‘clash of civilisations’ would seem to be inevitable and uncontrollable. The only path to peace is for civilisations to retreat into themselves and recognise the spheres of other civilisations. This is exactly the situation Huntington describes and what he prescribes for the West (312). In a section called ‘The Renewal of the West?’ (301-308) he deplores the erosion of moral values, specifically calls for a rejection of multiculturalism, revival of Christianity and a renewed commitment to ‘liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property’ (305), concepts claimed as central to Western civilisation. This can be seen as a return to basic principles akin to fundamentalism. As discussed in a section called ‘The Islamic Resurgence’ (109-119), Huntington holds that Islamic Fundamentalism is the Islamic world doing just that, in line with his advice for the West. His answer to Islamic Fundamentalism is Western Fundamentalism. Arguably, this sort of ‘fight-fire-with-fire’ response could just as well serve to widen any divide and perhaps hasten the very clash Huntington wants to avoid.

Huntington outlines early on (31-35) why other prevailing international relations theories leave room for his argument and makes his weakest argument against Realism (33). He believes Realism explains much about how states exercise power in pursuit of interests, but it doesn’t account for differences in how different states determine what their interests are or determine priorities among interests. He believes civilizational contrasts accounts for these differences. This may or may not be true, but he simply asserts that ‘states increasingly define their interests in civilizational terms’ (34) without much more explanation. He then goes on to argue that international institutions have eroded state authority, that there is a trend toward secessionism and devolution of power to local governments and that globalisation and the internet have reduced states’ ability to control ‘the flows of ideas, technology, goods, and people.’ (35)

Huntington gives international institutions more authority than they actually have. The UN does carry much weight in the world today, but despite this, states continue to do what they consider in their interest and the UN, lacking autonomous enforcement mechanisms, must rely on states to enforce its collective will. Much like civilisations, international institutions only work when states play along. Institutions such as NATO and the World Bank, though international, fall under the sway of their dominant member states, such as the United States. Most devolved governments are still dependent upon national governments for revenue, law and order and security. These institutions don’t have a will of their own; rather they represent the will of their dominant state member(s). Many secessionist movements are in fact proxy conflicts between states. States such as China and North Korea show states are still able to control the flow of goods and ideas within their borders if they decide it is in their interest to do so. Most states have decided open minds and borders are in their interest and haven’t simply lost the ability to control their borders as Huntington argues. State behaviour can be changed and controlled, whereas the character of civilisations cannot be. A ‘clash of civilisations’ is not inevitable.

A major criticism of Huntington’s theory is that it is all about ‘clash’ and says very little about the positive aspects of what happens when civilisations meet. Huntington only explores the negative security dimensions of his theory. The success of Huntington’s Clash may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with those in government who take up the theory seeing only clashes . If the West were to follow Huntington’s prescription, it would retreat into its core, focus on intra-civilisational interaction and pursue isolationist foreign policy. The world has benefitted greatly from the open exchange of people, ideas, culture and technology between civilisations. For example, Huntington goes on in sections entitled ‘Islam and the West’ (207-217) and ‘Incidence: Islam’s Bloody Borders’ (254-258) to discuss at length conflicts between Islam and other civilisations it comes into contact with, but wholly ignores the historically positive benefits of trade, scientific exchange and political cross-pollination between them, for example, between the Ottoman Empire and Western or Orthodox states on the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Huntington’s theory would be much more acceptable if it balanced the ‘clash of civilisations’ with ‘cooperation of civilisations’. There is an argument to be made that even if civilisations clash at times, the benefits of cooperation and interaction outweigh the drawbacks.

In conclusion, Huntington’s theory seems at the surface to explain the perceived intractable differences between the West and the Islamic world and between other civilisations, but, in depth, the picture drawn is an inaccurate representation of how these ‘clashes’ occur. Huntington’s prescriptions for the ‘clash’ are also questionable. He additionally fails to explore any positive aspects of the meeting of civilisations which could bring balance to his theory. However, the theory is not wholly without merit and deserves more in depth articulation and exploration.



NOTES
1. Booth, K. (1997) “Huntington’s Homespun Grandeur.” The Political Quarterly 68 (4): pp. 425–428.

Now the Real Work Starts

This article originally appeared in The Truman Doctrine on 12 November 2012.

Everyone breathes a sigh of relief once Election Day is over in hopes
life can finally move on. Though the President has won re-election and
the Democrats retain control of the Senate, don’t expect this to
loosen up the gridlock in Washington. In fact, the political calculus
remains generally the same with the President facing a divided, often
obstructionist Congress. This is the reason we should all breathe a
sigh of relief that Barack Obama was re-elected. In the coming budget
fights, we’ll need a President willing to compromise and work across
the aisle.

Despite the claims of Mitt Romney and Republicans, the U.S. economy
continues to tick slowly upwards with 29 consecutive months of job
growth and the trend looks set to continue. But the next big political
fight will come over massive automatic federal spending
cuts—‘sequestration’—that will occur if Congress and the President do
not agree to a budget deal. The cuts will essentially lock up over $1
trillion and prevent it from being spent, half coming from defense
spending, the other from domestic programs.

Sequestration provided the incentive for the failed budget
‘supercommittee’ to reach agreement. When former Vice-Presidential
contender Paul Ryan accused President Obama of wanting to cut
defense spending, sequestration was what he was referring to—a bit
dishonest considering it was part of a bipartisan deal between
Democrats and Republicans, including Ryan himself as Chairman of the
House Budget Committee.

Efforts to stave off sequestration by passing an agreement acceptable
to both parties have essentially been put on hold pending the results
of the election. Both parties needed to see who would end up in the
White House and Senate before deciding how hard they could push and
what mandate would be impliedly returned from the American people.
They have their answer. The President and Democrats have successfully
made the argument that reducing the federal deficit can only be done
through a reasonable combination of raising revenue and cutting
spending. The revenue would, and should, come from those who can
afford it, namely those making incomes over $250,000 a year. This
would be paired with cuts to spending at a ratio approaching $2.50 in
cuts for every $1 in revenue raised. In returning the President to
office and Democrats to the Senate, the American people have spoken.

To this point, Republicans have argued there should be no increases in
taxes and that the only way to increase revenue is to cut taxes to
promote private-sector growth, in turn returning more revenue. This,
paired with large cuts to domestic programs important to the middle
class, was their solution to the deficit problem. Then again, it’s
always their solution to every problem, whether in good times or bad.
The election result shows Americans have rejected it. Anyone who looks
at their own household finances knows there is only so far you can cut
your spending. Hoping your boss will make a large enough profit to
give you a pay raise won’t feed your family. When you’re short on money, the
better option is to cut what you can and find some way to bring more
money in to pay the bills. The same idea applies to the government
deficit and asking those who can most afford it to pay their fair
share is the right way to do it instead of increasing the burden on
the struggling unemployed and middle class.

But don’t look to Republicans to offer leadership on a compromise even
now. Many are locked into ‘no taxes’ pledges made popular by
conservative commentator Grover Norquist. The belief that taxes should
be cut and never raised is a Republican article of faith. The GOP have
hamstrung themselves from being able to talk about increasing revenue
in any sort of reasonable manner, even when it is essential to
reducing the federal deficit (another Republican whipping boy) and
staving off the effects of sequestration. America’s fragile recovery
requires that a deal be reached. Many have signed away their ability to
compromise even when staring sequestration in the face.

In contrast, President Obama has shown himself to be ready to reach
compromises and reach across the aisle to do so. With congressional
Republicans locked into ridiculous tax pledges, it’s going to take a
President willing to make a deal to get the job done and save the
federal budget from falling off the fiscal cliff that sequestration
represents. Now that the election is over, the real work of governing
can start. It’s a good thing we have a President who can get it done.

It's Congress That Counts

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 10 October 2012.

With both conventions and the first debate over, the presidential campaign season is moving ahead at full speed. At the heart of this election is the state of America’s economy and who presents the best vision of where to go from here. Republicans make the argument that the President should have done better over the last four years and hasn’t earned reelection. Democrats counter this by pointing out the depth of the 2008 crisis inherited from President Bush and the obstructionism of the GOP-controlled House of Representatives. Who is really to blame for this mess?

To go back to eighth grade government class, the U.S. Constitution mandates our government consists of three branches—legislative, executive, and judiciary. All laws involving government revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. The Senate approves international treaties. Congress regulates business and commerce, naturalization, currency, postal service, roads, promoting arts and sciences, patents and trademarks, declaring war, and funding and regulating the military. The President is the Commander in Chief of the military, negotiates international treaties, appoints ambassadors, judges, and agency heads, and must report to Congress in a State of the Union. That’s it. The U.S. Constitution is nowhere near as long a document as the political claims based upon it.

The founders set out the legislative branch first in Article 1 and devoted twice as many sections to comprehensively setting out its duties and powers than those covering the executive branch. Despite what our elected leaders may say, the President is not primarily responsible for drafting or passing domestic legislation. A President may use the prominence of his office as a ‘bully pulpit’ to suggest, influence, and work with partners to cajole Congress into passing items from a legislative agenda. But it is Congress’ job to enact legislation.

Yet many Americans have come to believe that the President is truly the most powerful person in the country and even the world and is to blame for everything that ails the nation. Any disappointing economic or employment data is his fault. The failure to push through Congress a platform or legislative agenda offered before election is equivalent to a lie or betrayal. If business isn’t growing, roads and bridges aren’t being built, or government services are not serving citizens well, the President is blamed. This is actually quite dishonest.

Why have we let the U.S. Congress off the hook? The truth is plain to see from a simple read of Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Congress is responsible for controlling and regulating all of the domestic areas of importance to the daily lives of average Americans. Their powers are specifically enumerated and they are granted the additional power to do all that is ‘necessary and proper’ to pursue these duties. You don’t have to be a constitutional scholar or lawyer to understand that. Every complaint Americans make about our society or economy falls squarely within the purview of powers granted to Congress, a system the President can only influence from the outside.

Closely tied to this misunderstanding is the acceptance by many of the idea that the President should act as the CEO of America and our government should be run like a corporation. Many Americans believe a President should have business experience. That’s certainly the argument being made by Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan. If this were true, this fundamental misunderstanding would be excusable. However, the truth written into the Constitution is that the power and duty to regulate and control the domestic economy, budget, and taxes rests squarely with Congress. This is a fundamental point. The President doesn’t have the power to control these things alone like a business owner. He must go to Congress, which is rather like a huge, partisan, divided board of directors, to affect any change in the domestic situation.

If a company were run by 535 directors who were divided between two camps, each possessing their own constituents and agenda, any CEO would have a very difficult time getting anything done. Real companies have perhaps a dozen directors at most, some of whom may even be related and most having worked closely together for years. The largest difference is that together they are all still striving to achieve the same fundamental goal.

The goal of any business is to create profit for owners and shareholders. The goal of Government is to protect and serve the interests of its citizens. This is inherently unprofitable from a financial perspective. So long as a firm is profiting, a CEO and board can be seen as doing their jobs. It is much more difficult for a President to succeed in the role of serving average Americans when they do not have direct powers to make the laws necessary to fulfill these duties, though they are seen as responsible for them by voters. If America is a corporation in trouble domestically, according to our Constitution it should be our board of directors—Congress– that should be fired and not the President.

The President is not a CEO and America is a country, not a business. Oddly, Americans don’t vote for Presidents based upon the areas they are directly responsible for according to the Constitution, namely national security and foreign policy. When Americans go to the polls to elect a President, their main considerations are almost exclusively domestic issues. A simple read of Article 2 of the Constitution shows that the President’s named duties are in foreign policy, international agreements, and national security. When asked about which issues most concern them when electing a President, voters consistently rank these issues somewhere in the middle or even at the bottom. His largest domestic duties are to appoint the heads of important federal agencies and federal judges. Federal agencies and judges are still beholden to laws passed by Congress.

Congress has a lower approval rating than when there were fears of communism in America; it is no wonder Representatives and Senators want to deflect voter dissatisfaction toward the executive branch. It is also much easier to place blame on one person than it is to take it up with 535 members of Congress. The disenchantment is bipartisan. Despite Congress’ unpopularity as a whole, most Americans seem satisfied enough with their own Senators and Representatives. They continue to reelect them again and again despite deeply disapproving of their performance. One take away from this is that Americans tend to like their own representatives; it’s everyone else’s representatives that are the problem.

While we’ve come to expect more from our presidents, we’ve come to expect less from Congress. They spend less and less time actually in session. More and more of their time is devoted to fundraising for reelection. While Americans’ net worth has gone down since the 2008 crisis began, Congress’ net worth has actually risen. Almost half of our Representatives and Senators are millionaires. They are overwhelmingly older, whiter, and more male than the rest of the population. We also have the most veteran underrepresented Congress since the end of WWII during a time when America has been at war in the Middle East for over a decade, creating a generation of new veterans who are struggling by many measures.

Despite America’s professed love of our Constitution, we don’t seem to pay much attention to it when it comes to who we vote for and why. If we did, we would blame Congress for the dismal state of our domestic economy and not the President. We wouldn’t keep sending the same Congressmen back to Washington over and over again and blame it all on the President. We would pay a good deal more attention to the foreign and national security experience and policy proposals of presidential candidates. We would put more emphasis on these characteristics than on business experience. We would lay blame where blame is due.

All you have to do is read the job descriptions written into the Constitution as we all learned in eighth grade government class. When voters go to the polls this November, they shouldn’t blame this President for our troubles, or any other President for that matter. Congress is responsible for this mess.

New START: Less is More

This post appeared in The Truman Doctrine on 23 July 2012.

When it comes to bombs, the conventional Cold War arms-race wisdom was “The more, the better.”

When it comes to nuclear weapons, this thinking produces diminishing returns. President Obama, along with President Reagan, understood this. There are some, including presidential candidate Mitt Romney, who still argue that reducing America’s nuclear arsenal threatens our national security. Romney still names Russia as America’s greatest foe. In 2011, GOP Senators held out as long as they could against ratifying the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia on this thought-basis. But there is such a thing as enough nukes and the benefits of bilateral nuclear arms reductions to our national security outweigh any cost.

How many nuclear weapons does America need? Let’s do the quick devil’s arithmetic. Nagasaki, Japan had a population of roughly 240,000, (think Madison, Wisconsin) in 1945. It was destroyed by the ‘Fat Man’ device with an estimated yield of 20 kilotons of TNT. It destroyed virtually all buildings, caused 3rd degree burns to tissue, and immediate death from radiation within four kilometers of the epicenter. The deadly effects spread as far as twelve square kilometers.

If America wanted (to borrow a phrase from Iranian President Ahmadinejad) to literally wipe all 1.65 million square kilometers of Iran off the map, we would need over 137,000 ‘Fat Man’ devices. Using today’s nukes, we would need a little over 2,300. New START allows America and Russia to possess 1,550 strategic warheads apiece. That is still more than enough to destroy all population centers in any country in the world; enough to destroy every living thing in 1 million square kilometers.

America still maintains a very significant nuclear arsenal under New START. Other studies have shown that America needs as few as 300 nuclear weapons to maintain deterrence. What the U.S. gets in return from New START is a reduction in nuclear arms outside of its own borders. ‘Loose nukes’ provide many nightmare scenarios involving terrorist attacks in America, its overseas installations, and its allies. The U.S. has spent millions on programs to buy or secure foreign nuclear weapons and materials. The breakup of the USSR and breaches in the nuclear security of western countries by state-directed nuclear espionage programs have led to a doubling of the nuclear club. Iran appears to want to be the newest member.

As Iran’s struggle to get the bomb shows, it is difficult to start a nuclear program from scratch, especially after the cat is out of the bag about its existence. Iraq and Syria’s nascent nuclear programs were allegedly nipped in the bud by Israeli airstrikes. Iran has years of nuclear refinement ahead of it to produce a significant nuclear arsenal and it is facing stiff international diplomatic and economic resistance. It is far easier to piggyback or reverse engineer off of intelligence and materials from another existing nuclear state. Iran is receiving assistance from Russia and China. Once successful, the genie cannot be put back in the bottle, as North Korea and Pakistan show.

The United States and the Obama administration should continue to do all it can to reduce the amount of nuclear warheads, material, and knowledge in the world outside of its borders. New START does this while allowing America to maintain a more than sufficient nuclear deterrent of its own. Sometimes less is more.

Belief in 'American Exceptionalism' is No Basis for National Security Policy

This article originally appeared on The Truman Doctrine on 2 July 2012.

As American power grew over the last century, our strategic goals were often defined by who our opponents were. We’ve defeated competitors over the last hundred years and have emerged at the top of a heap where it is no longer clear how threatening our opponents are.

Neocons continue to seek enemies to confront. The far left argue we only have ‘manufactured’ enemies. Despite America’s ascent over the last century, many argue America is now in decline. In response, many other Americans have rejected this idea and come to accept as an article of faith ‘American exceptionalism’: that we are preordained to succeed because our system or people are superior. GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney has essentially adopted it as part of his platform.

It is false and dangerous to assume American success was and is a foregone conclusion. It ignores the hard work, hazards, and sacrifice successful national security policy requires.

Victory was far from certain in both World Wars and the Cold War, though in retrospect as the subject of intense academic study it becomes easily seen as such. Those who fought and lived through these conflicts, especially on the frontlines, certainly didn’t see it that way. America’s modern conflicts fought thousands of miles away by an all-volunteer military make that easy to forget.

Belief in ‘exceptionalism’ reflects the fact that security today is considered by some to be an issue of political belief rather than realism, pragmatism, or experience. It reflects an attitude that national security is a worldview to be projected upon others, not actions based upon an evaluation and understanding of the situation as it exists.It is the modern-day equivalent of ‘manifest destiny’ of the 19th century in that it smooths over the rough spots in favor of those that put America in a more favorable light and adds a sense of inevitability.

But those who believe too sincerely in their own infallibility plant the seeds of their own downfall. The problem is compounded when politicians, most of whom personally lack national security experience, take political positions on national security issues to a politically divided American electorate, most of whom also lack real security experience.

This lack of experience, the intense politicization of national security, and its inclusion in mainstream media banter has caused much international difficulty and division in America. The national security views espoused by Romney campaign advisors John Bolton, Max Boot, and Eliot Cohen are recent and obvious examples. It used to be a maxim that politics stopped at the water’s edge, but this is arguably not true anymore.

America needs leadership with real, practical, personal national security experience. National security policy should be based upon facts and strategic considerations, not politics or beliefs. ‘American exceptionalism’ is a nice idea, but it is dangerous to allow it to have an outsized influence on our strategic thinking.

Victory is never assured; it requires hard work and sacrifice. The American men and women who fight our wars know this lesson better than anyone.